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Abstract
“The Manliness to Defend Themselves: Race and Civilian/Indigenous Warfare in New
Mexico, 1598-1898,” explores three-hundred years of warfare between the civilian population
and Native peoples in New Mexico. For centuries the regimes of New Spain and Mexico had
utilized New Mexican civilians to battle independent Indians. A culture of warfare had
subsequently emerged among the civilian population. As the United States proclaimed
sovereignty over New Mexico, military officials attempted to put an end to the practice of
warfare by civilians, yet would be hard-pressed to do so. The ideas of Anglo American officials
concerning race and citizenship conflicted with the custom of warfare by civilians against Native
peoples in New Mexico in large part because local militias consisted primarily of ethnic
Mexicans and Pueblo Indians. Attempts by the United States to secure a monopoly of force in
the region by dismantling the centuries-long custom of civilian militarization led to a disconnect
and conflict between the territorial government, the multi-ethnic inhabitants, and the U.S.
military.
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Introduction
During the summer of 1860, citizens of Santa Fe, New Mexico held a convention
concerning a recent assault near the town by certain members of the Navajo nation. During this
meeting, the residents passed a preamble and resolution requesting that Governor Abraham
Rencher organize and call into the field a force of mounted volunteers to wage war with the
Navajo as retribution for the incident. The residents had claimed the mobilization of such a force
was necessary because Colonel Thomas Fauntleroy, the military commander of the Department
of New Mexico, “Refused to call into active service the large body of troops under his command
to protect the Territory and chastise the Navajos.”1 After much reflection, Governor Rencher
declined to comply with the demands of the convention. Rencher based his rejection on the
belief that the department commander was in the immediate process of “Organizing a vigorous
campaign against the Indians.”2 Rencher instead recommended to the convention that the
civilians should: “Organize a regiment of Mounted Volunteers for the protection of their frontier,
and to hold themselves in readiness to be called into the service of the United States, if at any
time, Colonel Fauntleroy should need their services.”3 The citizens recognized that ever since
the U.S. invaded New Mexico, they rarely allowed civilian soldiers to war with Native peoples in
the region. Knowing Colonel Fauntleroy would likely not utilize them to chastise the Navajos,
and fed up with the perceived lack of protection provided by the regular army, the citizens
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rejected Rencher’s proposal to show restraint and wait to be called out by the department
commander.
Dissatisfied with the response from the governor, on August 27, 1860, the people of
Santa Fe again came together and held a meeting concerning the most recent string of Navajo
raids in the area. During this gathering, they defiantly voted to both elect their own officers and
to raise a regiment of mounted volunteers to assault the Navajos in their native homelands to the
west. The Hispano residents also decided, “[We] should receive no orders from the Governor or
Military Commander, nor have any communication with them.”4 These citizens, therefore,
resolved to establish their own military force, outside the purview of either the federal or
territorial governments. Organized for a term of two months, Nuevomexicano fighters, along
with a small contingent of Pueblo Indians, soon penetrated with “some difficulty” into the heart
of the Navajo homeland. During the raid, the attackers killed approximately ten people, took
possession of Navajo cornfields, captured a large amount of stock belonging to the Indians, and
took about a hundred captives, mainly women and children who they “applied to their own use,”
likely utilizing them as slave labor.5 For their part, the Pueblo participants appropriated some
five thousand sheep and horses as their portion of the spoils. After almost two months in the
field, the Nuevomexicanos and Pueblos withdrew to their homes where they awaited “a
favorable opportunity to return.”6
Despite Governor Abraham Rencher’s refusal to comply with the pleas of the citizens to
organize a civilian force, he certainly empathized with their perceived plight. Referring in
racialized language to the Mexican American population of New Mexico as simply “Mexican,”
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the governor stated, “For a year past, the Mexicans have suffered much from the Navajo Indians,
and have good cause to complain.”7 Rencher, like his predecessors, believed that the regular
military routinely failed to protect the settlements against independent Indians, arguing, “The
regular army certainly does not afford the protection which is expected of it.”8 He also indicated
that he would have had no issue calling out civilian volunteers if indeed the situation warranted
such a response. Speaking of the citizens’ pleas to organize a force against the Navajos, the
governor maintained, “If, during the spring previous, I had possessed the means, I would have
taken the responsibility of calling out the military force of the Territory to chastise them [the
Navajos].” In this instance, however, the governor felt compelled to allow the regular military to
act independently of any assistance by civilians, arguing, “After the arrival of large
reinforcements from Utah, and after orders were received from the Secretary of War, directing
Colonel Fauntleroy to make a vigorous campaign against those Indians, I saw no necessity for
volunteers, and no excuse whatever for the lawless manner of calling them out.”9 Despite his
empathetic stance toward the Nuevomexicano citizens, Rencher recognized the potential harm
that would come from an extralegal independent civilian expedition against the Navajos. He
asserted that very few positives could come out of “Mexicans moving in armed bodies upon the
Navajo Indians, without any authority.”10
An additional factor which informed Rencher’s decision not to organize and call out
civilian volunteers was his belief that he did not legally have the authority to do so. The
governor claimed he had “Neither a man, nor a dollar, nor any power to enable him, to raise [a
militia].” He argued that the only law on the books authorizing the governor to call out civilian
7
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volunteers “Was only intended to enable the Governor to call out Volunteers, upon the
requisition of the Military Commander.”11 Only, therefore, if the department commander
requested civilian reinforcements could the civil governors legally organize and call out civilian
volunteers. Military commanders in New Mexico, however, only very rarely made such
requests. Knowing this, Rencher appealed to the Legislature of New Mexico and advised them,
“They should authorize the Governor to call out the volunteers…and provide him with the means
to equip and support them in the field.”12 Like his predecessors, Rencher strongly favored the
use of civilian volunteers in New Mexico, yet, circumstance and ambiguous legality prevented
him from doing so.
Anglo military officials in New Mexico were in complete agreement with Rencher’s
decision to reject the calls of the Hispano citizens by organizing and calling out a volunteer
force. Since the beginning of the U.S. era in New Mexico, the regular military had been deeply
hesitant to utilize civilian volunteers. Military apprehension concerning the use of civilian
soldiers in the region had been a source of constant conflict between civil and military officials,
as well as the citizenry themselves. Both the civil government and civilians constantly appealed
to the military to allow the establishment of a volunteer militia. The military was less than
enthusiastic concerning this approach, which led to multiple petitions by citizens, as well as
heated arguments between civil and military officials. This atmosphere of disagreement and
discord had continued unabated since the introduction of the first civil governor in 1851 and had
seemingly reached a peak directly before the Civil War. The situation between the civil and
military officials in New Mexico had become so poisonous and pervasive that governor Rencher
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actually felt uncomfortable that the military approved of his measure. Rencher, speaking of
denying the citizens a volunteer company, stated, tongue-in-cheek, “[I am] embarrassed in the
performance of this duty, in consequence of the favor shown it by a few federal officers.”13
For their part, civilians around the territory had been strongly in favor of initiatives such
as the extralegal Navajo expedition of 1860. To these residents, they were simply following
precedent, in which previous generations of Nuevomexicanos regularly warred with Native
Peoples. Historically, the practice was common and even encouraged by the governments of
New Spain and Mexico, unlike the United States. Thus, the implementation of an extralegal
defense unit to war with the Navajos drew praise from civilians around the territory. The Santa
Fe Weekly Gazette reported that for too long Nuevomexicanos had seen “Their kindred, friends
and neighbors murdered by the merciless savage; they saw homes desolated and helpless
children carried into captivity.” Therefore, they argued that the creation of a volunteer force,
despite not being under the supervision of either the civil government or the military, “[Was] a
commendable liberality for which our citizens are entitled to great credit.”14 The paper further
chastised the supposed inaction of the federal military in the territory, arguing that the civilians
“Have looked with a confiding eye to those government agents who have the power and means
to afford them relief, for that protection which it is their duty, and should be their pleasure to
give. Vain have been their expectations. The official ear has been deaf to their appeals.”
Ultimately, the publication declared, “Never did any army go forth in a more righteous cause;
never did one go in pursuit of a more devilish enemy,” adding, “In them now rests the hope of
the country.”15 Many New Mexican civilians, as well as some civil officials, shared the opinion
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that civilian defense was the only adequate way to protect the region from Indian hostilities. The
feeling was so commonplace that governor Rencher, speaking of the extralegal Navajo
expedition, claimed that because there were so many who were sympathetic to the Navajo
expedition, “It would, therefore, be difficult, if not impossible, for the Governor successfully to
prosecute these violations of the laws of the United States.”16
By the time of the extralegal Navajo expedition in 1860, the U.S. had claimed
sovereignty over New Mexico for nearly fifteen years, yet a state of warfare between Native and
non-Native peoples in the region had been raging for centuries. 262 years earlier, Juan de Oñate
and a number of settlers trekked from the interior of New Spain to colonize its far north. Spanish
brutality toward Pueblo peoples resulted in the colonizers’ expulsion from the region during the
Pueblo revolt of 1680.17 Upon their return in 1691, the Spanish conceded some autonomy to
Puebloan communities to govern their own settlements. Despite an uneasy détente between the
Spanish and Pueblo peoples, hostilities between New Mexican settlers and tribes such as the
Apaches, Navajos, Utes, Jicarillas, and Comanches had continued almost unabated; each side
ferociously fighting for supremacy over the region. A brutal centuries-long stalemate resulted, in
which the many Native groups and settlers largely failed to dominate one another. The damage
caused by colonialism, however, had been wrought. The area’s traditional food sources such as
the buffalo and other game dwindled as both Native and non-Native colonists had long competed
for the region’s scarce resources. As such, many Native Peoples had to steal or starve, which led
to a marked increase in Indian raiding as time progressed. Many Native American economies in

16
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New Mexico ultimately transformed into those predicated on raiding and poaching.18 The
Nuevomexicano colonists reciprocated this violence by invading Indian country to pilfer both
resources and prisoners. This cycle of violence, captive-taking, plunder, and retaliation endured
for centuries. The governments of New Spain, Mexico, and the United States would all use
varying tactics to deal with this situation.
When the Spanish first arrived on the shores of North America in the early sixteenth
century, they brought with them values, customs, and culture from the Iberian Peninsula that
influenced the trajectory of warfare on the northern frontier. Traditional Spanish ideas
concerning warfare and honor pervaded New Spain. By 1492 the Iberian kingdoms had
overgone a centuries-long struggle to reconquer the Iberian Peninsula from Muslims. The
Spanish endeavor to conquer the western hemisphere from Indian peoples can be thought of as
an extension of this Reconquista due to their desire to spread Spanish culture and Catholicism to
the “pagans” in America.19 Militia service had its roots during the Reconquista since at least the
eleventh century and the militia practice of procuring captives from the enemy and the taking of
booty go back just as far.20 Spanish-style warfare against Native people on the frontier mirrored
their attempts to expel Muslim invaders and municipal militias played a prominent role in both
conflicts. This style of warfare lasted well into the U.S. era after 1848.

18
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Ideas of self-defense that were intertwined with the social constructs of honor and gender
also went back centuries. Honor was the supreme social virtue among the Spanish.21 Patricia
Seed argues that honor in Hispanic society “meant both the esteem a person had for himself and
the esteem that society had for him.”22 For men on New Spain and Mexico’s northern frontier,
the maintenance of honor was intertwined with the idea of masculinity, which implied the
willingness to fight and to defend one’s home. Ana Maria Alonso argues that “to fight and
defeat the Apache became a sign of macho valor and virility, as well as the manly virtue of
affirmed honor.”23 The inability of a man to defend his family and home meant that he lacked
the social standing that honor provided and those who proved that they lacked masculinity held
little esteem among his community. Thus, the motivations for warfare and self-defense went
beyond self-preservation, defense, and economics, but were heavily influenced by social
conditions that went back centuries on the Iberian peninsula.
The governments of New Spain and Mexico utilized a variety of techniques to wage war
with Native Peoples. By the seventeenth century, Spanish officials realized they needed to use
the regular military in conjunction with civilian and Native auxiliaries to be effective in their
conflict with independent Indians. Regular military units stationed in Presidios, alongside
civilian militias, routinely worked in tandem to make campaigns into Indian country. Notably,
Pueblo peoples assisted these units by joining in the fight against their traditional enemies.
Pueblo “auxiliaries” commonly made up the bulk of militia units tasked with combating enemy
Indians during the colonial era. The government of New Spain also created a series of “peace

21
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establishments” to settle nearby Apache peoples and supply them rations in an attempt to keep
the peace. These tactics, alongside a system of treaty-making, resulted in brief, yet sometimes
significant, respites of calm amongst the almost continual warfare during the colonial era.24
As sovereignty in New Mexico shifted from New Spain to Mexico, a new method of
warfare prevailed in the region. During Mexico’s decade-long war for independence in the early
nineteenth century, the colonial government diverted troops from its northern frontier to the
interior to battle the insurrectionists. After independence, due to Mexico’s economic woes,
soldiers did not reappear in the borderlands in the same numbers as had been stationed under the
Spanish regime. Provincial governments, therefore, became much more involved in protecting
their communities. With the diminishment of federal troops on the frontier, local governments
came to heavily rely on the citizenry and their native associates to a much greater extent than did
the government of New Spain. Mexican citizens assumed almost full responsibility for their
military defense, and the central government encouraged them to form civilian militia units.25 At
the same time, treaties between Native People and New Spain fell apart, and very little money
was available to keep the peace establishment system afloat.26 This situation led to a marked
uptick in hostilities with Native peoples during the Mexican era. Thus, the Mexican national
period in New Mexico would be defined by brutal violence and hostility between ethnic groups,

24
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which had a significant impact on the culture of the Nuevomexicano civilians as they became
principally tasked with the protection of their communities.
Violent hostility between Native peoples and Mexican civilians had become the norm in
New Mexico when, in 1846, the United States declared war on Mexico. During the War, the
U.S. military moved into New Mexico intent on conquering the region. Racialized notions of
Mexican inability to subdue the Native tribes of the area in part drove this conquest.27 The U.S.
government arrogantly believed, unlike the Mexicans, the U.S. military could quickly and
decisively subdue the Native peoples in the region. Upon taking possession of New Mexico,
General Stephen Watts Kearny said as much. Kearny underestimated this commitment, boldly
proclaiming to the Nuevomexicanos: “From the Mexican government you have never received
protection. The Apaches and Navajos come down from the mountain and carry off your sheep,
and even your women, whenever they please. My government will correct all this.”28 The
United States certainly did not expect to inherit an almost unwinnable series of wars and
protracted conflict with Native peoples lasting nearly three decades.
The chosen mode of warfare by the United States was quite different than their previous
counterparts in the region. Diverging from the policies of Spain and Mexico, the United States
attempted to establish a monopoly of force in the territory by leaving warfare with Native
peoples almost solely in the hands of the regular army. In particular, the U.S. military sought to
limit the role of Nuevomexicanos in engaging in warfare with Native peoples. In 1847, necessity
drove the U.S. military to utilize Nuevomexicano civilians in conjunction with the regular army,

27
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to quell a violent revolt of both Native and non-Native residents near Taos. Afterward, the
United States would only very rarely consent to utilize citizen soldiers in New Mexico. By and
large, U.S. military officials attempted to end the centuries-old tradition of civilian/Native
warfare due to efforts to secure their own monopoly of force alongside Anglo racial ideologies
concerning ethnic Mexicans and Native people.
There were many reasons why Nuevomexicanos were seemingly so motivated to take
matters into their own hands. Many historians have long noted that vigilantism arose in response
to a typical American problem: the absence of effective law and order in a frontier region.29 In
New Mexico, as in other frontier areas around the United States, vigilante groups argued that
extralegal punishment was a legitimate response to crime because the official institutions of law
enforcement were inadequate to ensure peace and tranquility.30 This certainly was the case in
New Mexico during the U.S. era, as, other than the four years during the Civil War, the presence
of the regular military in New Mexico certainly did not meet the standards of either the citizenry
or the civil government. The number of troops stationed in the territory was perceived as not
adequate to fully protect the settlements from independent Indians. Both the citizenry and the
civil government constantly appealed to the military to increase the number of regular troops.
By 1849, roughly 60 percent of the total regular army, some 7,796 men were garrisoned along
western frontier posts.31 At certain times, Congress agreed to allocate even more troops to the
frontier to be more effective in battling independent Indians. However, as historian Robert Utley
argues, Congress never supplied enough troops “with a liberality permitting anything
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approaching a strength equal to the task.”32 Despite the bulk of the regular army serving in
western outposts, a perceived lack of troops became a common motif throughout the latter part of
the nineteenth century in New Mexico. This undoubtedly accounts for part of the reason why
civilians felt the need to guide the trajectory of warfare in New Mexico.
The long history of civilians warring with Native Peoples was also a prominent motive
for why Nuevomexicanos felt justified attacking Native people, even without the permission of
the civil government or military. Centuries of war between the settlers and Native peoples of the
territory led to a custom of warfare by civilians against Native peoples that lasted well into the
U.S. era after 1848. The governments of New Spain and to a greater extent Mexico allowed and
even encouraged civilians to fight for the defense of their own communities. These regimes
conferred honor, respect, and certain other rewards to those who fought for the security of their
communities.33 This allowed for what anthropologist Ana Maria Alonso calls a “militarization
of the citizenry” along Mexico’s northern frontier. The notion that the newly introduced U.S.
authorities would no longer enable Nuevomexicanos to seek retribution for the raiding of their
settlements didn’t sit well with many residents who felt they had a moral, civic, and historical
right to do so. Frequently, the territorial residents ignored the wishes of the United States
military and enacted warfare on their own accord. As U.S. officials soon found out, this civilian
custom of violence would be challenging to quash.
This begs the question: Why was the U.S. military so against the utilization of civilian
soldiers in New Mexico? Various states and territories around the United States, since the birth
of the country, had frequently used their citizenry for the defense of their communities. Why

32
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should New Mexico be any different? The answer lies in the ethnic makeup of the potential
“volunteers.” As soon as the United States had entered the territory, Nuevomexicanos and
Native peoples of the region held a very uncertain place in a nation constructed upon white
supremacy. In Mexico, the Mexican national identity had included multiple racial groups,
including “Indians,” “whites,” and “mestizos,” but the Mexican federal constitution erased
official recognition of these groups as legally or racially “different.” Embracing the nascent
ideology of mestizaje, the nation imagined one unified race of people from myriad ancestries.
Moreover, the nation granted official citizenship to all people within its boundaries, regardless of
that ethnic background. Mexico even withheld hope that the “Indios Barbaros” also known as
“independent Indians” of the north, could become “civilized” members of the body politic.
Thus, upon the eve of the U.S. War with Mexico, most Indigenous people in Mexico were at
least nominally citizens, and to some extent, “Mexican” in terms of their nationality.
Conceptualizing “Mexicans” primarily in terms of national citizenship, created tension and
confusion after the War as the U.S. annexed the Mexican north and contemplated the status of its
newly conquered population.
Rather than focusing on nationality, the U.S. emphasized purported “racial” categories
and the associated intellectual, social, and political capabilities, or inabilities, “Mexican” status
implied. In the United States, the term “Mexican” denoted only one racial group: “mestizos,” or
those of mixed European and Native American ancestry.34 Under this umbrella term, Anglo
American invaders considered “Mexicans,” who made up the bulk of the population in New
Mexico, to be both culturally deprived and racially inferior. The incorporation of much of

34
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northwestern Mexico in 1848 was accompanied by the spread of scientific racism that raised new
questions about who qualified as American.35 Scientific racism, religion, and the powerful
influence of national economic interests combined to question the “fitness” of “Mexicans” to
enjoy the fruits of U.S. citizenship. The status of Mexico’s former Indigenous people first came
into question, and by the 1860s, U.S. courts had stripped Indigenous people in the U.S. of their
old status as citizens in Mexico, and replaced it with the colonized status of “wards of the state.”
Revoking the citizenship of Native peoples excluded them from political participation in U.S.
institutions, particularly membership in any civilian militias. This division reflected American
obsessions with alleged dichotomies between civilization and savagery that seemed clear enough
when directed towards the Independent Indians such as Apaches and Comanches, and despite
some ambivalence towards Puebloan peoples, they also lost their status. Questions about the
mestizo Mexican population, however, raised more complicated debates about racial status,
particularly whiteness, and status as a citizen in the United States.36
During the U.S.-Mexico War, the U.S. government held debates on how and if they
should incorporate former Mexicans into the larger body politic. Senator John C. Calhoun of
South Carolina implored his colleagues not to annex large portions of Mexican territory. He
claimed that admitting Mexicans into the United States would precipitate a collapse of the racial
order.37 Many government officials, like Calhoun, were against the notion of incorporating a
region so populated with people considered “non-white.” The thirst for a direct route to the
flourishing markets of California prevailed, however, and upon the appropriation of Mexico’s
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north, uncertainty concerning its inhabitants persisted. Although deemed “white” under the law
and given citizenship, in practice mestizos were regarded as second-class citizens. The notion
that people of Mexican descent could never be full citizens was grounded in an Anglo American
belief in ethnic Mexican racial inferiority. Regarding military service, many Anglo Americans
used racialized notions of Nuevomexicanos as justification that they were not masculine enough,
and that they were cowardly, weak, undisciplined, and ultimately unfit for military service.38
Not only did many U.S. officials believe Nuevomexicanos did not qualify for military service,
but they also postulated that if allowed to fight, the settlers’ long hatred toward certain native
groups would be a detriment, and thereby spark more conflict. Centuries of animosity toward
Native peoples would only make Hispanos difficult to restrain during battle, which could lead to
atrocities such as the assault of innocent bands, and the murder of women, and children;
ultimately leading to unnecessary and overblown hostilities. In essence, by taking away the
Hispano right to warfare, Anglo officials stripped them of their customary mode of maintaining
honor among their community.
Anglo Americans also frequently posited that ethnic Mexicans lacked the virtue of
manliness. Despite centuries of warfare partly driven by a Hispano desire to assert his
masculinity, white Americans argued that ethnic Mexicans did not live up to their ideas of
masculinity. As the United States proclaimed sovereignty over New Mexico, changes
concerning gendered ideas took place. Amy S. Greenberg posits, “Dramatic changes in
American society, economy, and culture reconfigured the meanings of both manhood and
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womanhood in the 1830s and 1840s.”39 White men during this time adhered to a wide range of
masculine practices. Men embraced physical expressions of manliness such as boxing and
dueling, while other men practiced the manly virtues of self-restraint and moral self-discipline.40
White men believed that ethnic Mexicans did not live up to either the physical or moral virtues
of what constituted manliness. Belief in the racial superiority of white Anglo-Saxon masculinity
translated to a denigration of Mexican masculinity. Through Anglo American eyes, ethnic
Mexicans could never have the manliness to defend themselves. This translated into an
insistence by some white officials to curtail Nuevomexicano militia service.
At the same time, concerns regarding Nuevomexicano loyalty was also an important
factor explaining why the U.S. military was so reticent in allowing civilians to fight in New
Mexico. Very shortly after the U.S. had entered the region, a Nuevomexicano and Pueblo
uprising took place near Taos in which they murdered many U.S. officials, including the
governor, Charles Bent. To many officials, another rebellion could potentially develop at any
time. Both military and civil officials were constantly concerned that individual sections of the
population were conspiring against the United States. Shortly after the U.S.-Mexico War, the
relationship between the United States and Mexico was also at a low ebb, and U.S. officials
believed Nuevomexicanos were still devoted to their former nation. Thus, if a state of war again
materialized between the two nations, U.S. officials were concerned that the Nuevomexicanos
would ally themselves with Mexico over the United States. Therefore, Anglo American military
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officials assumed that arming and allowing New Mexican civilians to engage in warfare might
not have been in the best interest of the United States.41
The question of ethnic Mexican loyalty to the United States continued to emerge for
decades after conquest and beyond. For example, whites doubting the allegiance of ethnic
Mexicans once again arose as a response to the Mexican Revolution beginning in 1910. Similar
to Irish and eastern European immigrants who used military service to become more “white,”
doubts about loyalty to the United States had historically fueled higher rates of military service
among ethnic Mexicans as military service was one of the most effective ways to prove national
loyalty.42 Hispano military service on behalf of the United States from 1846 to the late
nineteenth century, therefore, certainly could have been motivated by a desire to demonstrate
that they were indeed loyal to the new government in New Mexico and were equally deserving
of the benefits of U.S. citizenship.43
U.S. officials had also terminated the centuries-old system of allowing Pueblo Indians to
fight. New Spain’s casta system placed Pueblo peoples on the lower rung of the social hierarchy,
but they still typically assisted the military with forays against other Indian nations. The practice
was still quite common under the regime of Mexico. In fact, Mexico’s Plan de Iguala abolished
Spain’s casta system and theoretically gave Mexican citizenship to all Native peoples, even in
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the province of New Mexico. 44 Pueblo peoples were, however, better able to claim the benefits
of Mexican citizenship than other indigenous groups in New Mexico, in part because of their
long tradition of militia service and because Mexico perceived their “sedentary lifestyle” as more
civilized than that of the mobile “Independent Indians” such as the Comanche and Apache. Yet,
as the U.S. claimed sovereignty over the region, Anglo American ideology concerning the
savagery of Native Peoples took precedence. U.S. authorities denied American citizenship to
Pueblo peoples, disenfranchised them, and cut back their militia service. At least once during the
early U.S. era, officials allowed the Pueblos to war with the Navajo. However, fairly quickly,
they were barred from engaging in militia service; being only sparsely utilized as guides and
scouts.
The military’s reticence in using civilian soldiers led to considerable strife between the
military, civil government, and the citizenry in New Mexico. Hispano citizens constantly
appealed to the territorial government for permission to launch retributive forays into Indian
country as they had for generations. Upon receiving these many requests, the civil government
was quite sympathetic to their desires. They too perceived that the regular military was mostly
ineffective in New Mexico. The civil government thus attempted to put various militia laws on
the books; the first being in 1851. However, the governors were under the impression that they
were not allowed to call out such a militia without the permission of the department commander.
The department commanders themselves remained almost consistently opposed to the use of
civilian militias except in times of emergencies. Various governors regularly appealed to
Washington for counsel, but with New Mexico so far removed geographically and
psychologically, U.S. officials in Washington offered little if any guidance concerning civilian
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warfare in the territory. This negligence ultimately contributed to a poisonous atmosphere in
New Mexico between the civil government, the military, and the citizenry. Residents became so
frustrated by the situation that they frequently felt compelled to take warfare into their own
hands. Thus, despite their best efforts, the U.S. military was never quite able to establish an
absolute monopoly of force on the frontier of New Mexico.45 The borderlands were an evershifting space in which no single group held real sovereignty over another.
Historic and social factors alongside centuries of violence along the frontier of New
Spain and Mexico, shaped Hispano society into one predicated upon warfare with Native
peoples. U.S. officials had used ideas concerning race, gender, and citizenship to attempt to curb
the practice of both sanctioned and unsanctioned civilian retribution. Cultural change, however,
advanced much more slowly than U.S. officials had hoped. The notion of a historical and moral
right to warfare, along with the continuity of a culture and custom of warfare, motivated Hispano
citizens to continue to wage war against their enemies. Additionally, by continuing the custom
of self-defense into the U.S. era, Hispanos defined themselves as citizens by embodying the state
in its percieved absence. They were doing what the state could not do by performing their own
settler-colonial sovereignty. Ultimately, this dissertation argues that Anglo American ideas
concerning race and citizenship intersected with the custom of civilian warfare in New Mexico
primarily because civilian fighters were ethnic Mexicans and in some cases, Pueblo Indians,
which led to conflict between the territorial government, the multi-ethnic inhabitants, and the
United States military. The narrative of civilian warfare in New Mexico delves into questions
concerning race, citizenship, national allegiance, and the significance of bordered-lands. This
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dissertation endeavors to explore these important themes through a lens that also analyzes the
effects of warfare and violence on the multiple communities of what is now the southwest United
States.
Historicizing civilian warfare in New Mexico during the nineteenth century can reveal a
variety of essential aspects in the history of the southwest borderlands. As such, this study seeks
to do multiple things. First, this dissertation strives to offer a complete examination of civilian
defense in New Mexico from the time of Oñate to the late nineteenth century with the creation of
the New Mexico National Guard. Civilian defense in New Mexico has a long and meaningful
history, yet has been only superficially examined by historians up to this point. Looking deeper
into how Nuevomexicanos and Pueblo Indians conceptualized and enacted the defense of their
own communities can give us a much better understanding of the history of the southwest, both
militarily and socially. This dissertation explores not only how warfare functioned in the
borderlands, but how warfare shaped relations between Hispanos, Indians, and Anglos.
Admittedly, the bulk of this study centers on the era of U.S. sovereignty after 1848. This is, in
part, due to the fact that the introduction of the United States into the region was a period of
profound change in New Mexico and the southwest as a whole. As the United States colonized
the area, Anglo American settlers and administrators brought with them a collection of customs,
habits, and beliefs, attempting to transform the nature of New Mexican society accordingly.
Studying this transitional era can bring to light how U.S. authorities attempted a forced change of
certain fixed institutions in the region, and how the residents, brought under the purview of the
United States, resisted this transformation. Thus, one cannot have a complete picture of the
history of the military, warfare, and society in New Mexico without looking closely into the
institution of civilian defense.
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This study also attempts to offer a better understanding of the causes and effects of
warfare and violence in New Mexico, and the borderlands more broadly, from the colonial era to
the late nineteenth century. Until recently, scholarship has largely overlooked how physical
violence has been a central factor in shaping the history of the United States-Mexico
borderlands. Despite popular culture depictions of the borderlands as a lawless, violent region,
scholarship concerning the actual impact of violence on the many peoples of the area has been
relatively sparse. As Ned Blackhawk argues, “the narrative of American history has failed to
gauge the violence that remade much of the continent before, during, and after U.S.
expansion.”46
The process of settler-colonialism led to the diminishment of Native communities
particularly through violence as well as the marginalization of the Hispano population in New
Mexico after 1848. At its core, settler-colonialism seeks to replace Native populations with
imperial settlers, thus the permanent occupation of indigenous land. Patrick Wolfe argued,
“settler-colonization is at base a winner-take-all project whose dominant feature is not
exploitation but replacement.”47 New Mexico was certainly a site in which both the imperial
core and the settlers themselves attempted to extinguish Native sovereignty through
missionization, confiscation of Native lands, ideas of racial superiority, labor exploitation,
slavery, and extermination through violence. New Mexico was also a space that adhered to
another settler-colonial tenent. Lorenzo Vericini argues, “settlers insist on their autonomous
capacity to control indigenous policy.”48 Frequently, the settlers themselves attempted to
sidestep imperial indigenous policy in New Mexico. They ignored treaties and attacked Native
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bands at peace with imperial authorities. They enacted their own form of settler-colonial
destruction of Native communities.
The basic tenents of this framework: displacement, assimilation, racial classification, and
extermination have all been implemented by the various imperial regimes upon the Native
population in New Mexico. Yet, as the U.S. proclaimed sovereignty over the region, settlercolonial ideas concerning racial superiority motivated the marginalization and displacement of
the Hispano community, most notably with the gradual extermination of Mexican American land
grants. New Mexico is a unique space in which the United States had to reconcile the
elimination of Native communities with the aid of another group who bore the brunt of the
settler-colonial agenda. Thus, officials were hard-pressed to utilize a supposedly racially inferior
population militarily against the original targets of settler-colonialism, the Natives. This paradox
caused much confusion, conflict, and violence in nineteenth century New Mexico.
The effects that centuries of continual warfare had on the many societies and peoples in
New Mexico are front and center in this study. After so long a conflict, and especially on the
heels of an uptick in hostilities throughout the 1830s and 1840s, U.S. officials indeed entered a
region by 1848 that, as historian Brian DeLay argues, “had been transformed into a vast theater
of hatred, terror, and staggering loss for independent Indians and Mexicans alike.”49 After
centuries of mutual combat and destruction, this “War of a Thousand Deserts” had vast
implications for the peoples and the region as a whole. There has, however, been a regional gap
concerning this war. Few studies have illuminated the personal, communal, and regional effects
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of this considerable violence in New Mexico.50 This dissertation endeavors to address this gap
by first showing that, by and large, the Nuevomexicano settlers themselves lived in poverty; the
growth and wealth of the region completely hampered by constant warfare and arguably unjust
economic policies implemented by Mexico. Many were hesitant to settle and do business the
region, and as a result, the Nuevomexicano people struggled to survive on a daily basis.
This dissertation adds to the discussion of brutality by linking violence to evolving
notions of race, shifting definitions of citizenship, and the claims that civilians made to justify
their violence. Hispano civilians in New Mexico claimed a unique right to the utilization of such
violence. Hispanos defended the use of force in relation to the state, territory, race, and rights.
As they perceived that the state offered sub-par protection from Indian attacks, civilians
organized and took it upon themselves to fill the supposed void left by the regular military. At
the same time, a newly implemented border changed the nature of race and citizenship in the
borderlands, as race had become a central factor in obtaining all of the benefits of U.S.
citizenship. Ideas concerning race and citizenship played a primary role in how U.S. officials
envisioned both sanctioned and unsanctioned civilian warfare in the borderlands. This study
explores the fragile line between illegal acts of violence upon persons and/or property, and
violent acts deemed justified by civilians due to perceived failures of the state, a precedent of
racial warfare, and the United States’ reaction to this violence given the region’s ethnic makeup.
Ultimately, through a lens of race and citizenship, this study analyzes the idea of control over the
use of force. Brutality was perceived as justifiable by the citizenry while being regarded as
illegal by the state, leading to a state of turmoil in the territory.
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Native Peoples were in an even more dire situation. Years of colonialism and warfare
culminated in the near-starvation of many Indian groups. Raiding for survival, therefore, became
an absolute necessity. The reorientation towards a raiding economy ensured the continuation of
hostilities in the foreseeable future because Anglos, Mexicans, and competing Native groups
would inevitably seek revenge. Hundreds of years of violent captive-taking on both sides also
wholly remade New Mexican societies. As historian James F. Brooks argues, “Most such slaves
became members of the capturing society, often in marginal categories but in ways that allowed
them to bring useful cultural repertoires and mediation to their new kinspeople.”51 Thus,
centuries of warfare had very real, if often overlooked, consequences among the peoples
examined in this study.
By analyzing the nature of warfare in New Mexico, this study also stresses that raiding
and violence between settlers and Native Peoples in the southwest were not just a one-sided
occurrence. The historical record is filled with Euro-American references to Indian raiding and
its savagery, yet any mention that New Mexicans were also engaging in the raiding of Indian
communities is missing. Yet they were; heavily. Thus, traditional scholarship has generally
been one-sided regarding Indian hostilities and raiding, with Native Peoples bearing the brunt of
the blame for raiding, taking prisoners, and nurturing an atmosphere of violence. This
dissertation looks to overturn this idea and offer a different interpretation. Raiding and plunder
were indeed mutual on both sides. Certain Indian groups surely attacked and robbed New
Mexican settlements, however, Nuevomexicano raiding of Indian country was equally as
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widespread. Nuevomexicanos were as enthusiastic as their Native counterparts to steal stock and
prisoners and enact retributive violence upon their enemies.
In a similar vein, this dissertation attempts to offer a better analysis of the idea of “cycles
of violence” that have dominated borderlands historiography. The impression that cycles of
warfare and raiding influenced the nature of borderlands communities is generally correct. Yet,
historians have somewhat blindly accepted that these “cycles” of violence and retribution were
somehow inevitable. This dissertation hopes to remedy this notion by offering a better
explanation of these cycles than previous historical scholarship. These cycles were anything but
unavoidable, as a culture of retributive civilian violence can be linked to many factors which
include encouragement by the state and its desire to secure a monopoly of force. These cycles
continued into the U.S. era due to both historical notions of “defense,” perceived military
weakness, and a desire to attain equal claims of citizenship. Thus, these “cycles” continued
throughout many years not because of “culture” or simply the economics of raiding, but rather
philosophical notions of “defense,” the claims of law and rights, and notions of citizenship.
This dissertation also emphasizes the effects of nineteenth-century racial thought on
communities in the U.S. Southwest. With the induction of a large number of people of color into
the United States after the U.S.-Mexico War, U.S. officials pondered if and how they would
introduce these people into the larger body politic of a nation founded upon the institution of
white supremacy. Racial beliefs concerning warfare and the institution of civilian defense are
significant in the history of the U.S. Southwest. Notions concerning New Mexican inferiority
and uncertainty concerning citizenship played prominently in Nuevomexicano and Pueblo Indian
service (or lack thereof) in civilian militias. Consequently, through the institution of warfare,
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these notions have helped shaped the history of the region. A more thorough examination of the
topic is indeed warranted.
Lastly, this dissertation seeks to provide a tri-ethnic or tri-racial perspective on events in
New Mexico. Many borderlands narratives have commonly limited relations and interactions as
being strictly bi-racial. Interaction between two ethnic groups in the borderlands did not,
however, happen in a vacuum, to the exclusion of all others. Commonly, relations between one
racial group continued down a particular trajectory because of their interaction with another.
Intercultural contact, communications, and connections, therefore, can indeed be more
multilayered and complex than traditionally credited. All too often, scholars tend to bifurcate
interactions between people; such as black/white, Mexican/white, white/Indian. By looking into
the interconnectedness of multiple races at once, we can better see how their interactions were
influenced by relations with others. In this respect, this dissertation hopes to give a better
understanding of interethnic relationships and how they functioned.
This dissertation is inspired by and draws from various facets of historical literature.
First, this study adds to the plethora of existing literature concerning citizen soldiers in the
United States during the nineteenth century. There have been many notable works that have
analyzed militia service in the United States in very general terms. In 1957, William H. Riker
surveyed the creation, degeneration, and ultimate revival of the militia in the United States in his
work, Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy.
Similarly, in 1964, Jim Dan Hill wrote a sprawling, single-volume work on the Volunteer
Organized Militia and the National Guard with The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of
the National Guard. One year later saw the publication of an edited collection: Bayonets in the
Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances, in which several historians pieced together the
26

history of not just the militia and national guard in the United States, but the military utilization
of civilians such as federal marshals and police to quell popular uprisings around the United
States. More recently, works such as Michael D. Doubler’s Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War:
The Army National Guard, 1636-2000, offer a more modern examination of civilian warriors in
the United States to the year 2000.52
In addition to these broad surveys of civilian warfare in the United States, some authors
have taken a more focused approach to the subject. Certain historians have analyzed civilian
warfare on a more regional scale. Most of these scholars have predominately focused on the
institution of the militia and national guard in the eastern United States, yet few have analyzed
the subject in regions that many have deemed “the western frontier.” There has emerged,
however few, notable scholarship that focuses on these areas. In 1935, John H. Nankivill looked
into the history of civilian soldiers in Colorado with History of the Military Organizations of the
State of Colorado, 1860-1935, and Richard Campbell Roberts wrote a critical dissertation of the
Utah National Guard in 1973 with “History of the Utah National Guard, 1894-1954.” More
recent works include Jerry Cooper and Glenn Smith’s Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the
North Dakota National Guard, published in 1986. These works have offered broad analyses
concerning militia use in specific locations. Unsurprisingly, the scarce literature concerning
civilian soldiers in frontier areas has led to only one piece of historical scholarship specifically
devoted to civilian warfare in New Mexico. In 1980, the New Mexico Historical Review
published Larry D. Ball’s “Militia Posses: The Territorial Militia in Civil Law Enforcement in
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New Mexico Territory, 1877-1883.” This article, however, barely scratches the surface of the
history of civilian warfare in New Mexico, limiting its scope to just six years. Other than Ball’s
article, there has not been one substantive study concerning the citizen-soldier in New Mexico.
This study hopes to add a much-needed perspective on the topic.53
This study also intersects with literature concerning the causes, effects, and impacts of
borderlands violence. Many works have begun to address this critical topic. The borderlands of
northern Mexico has received particular attention. Published in 1988, William B. Griffen
explores the nature of Spanish-Mexican and Apache relations in his book Apaches at War and
Peace: The Janos Presidio, 1750-1858. Griffen shows how Spanish and later Mexican civilian
violence, and military expeditions both increased interethnic hostilities and drove many Apaches
toward the peace establishments. Once there, Apaches adapted by taking advantage of the
establishments while, at the same time, retaining their tribal autonomy. Three years after
Griffen’s book, Max Moorehead, in The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands offers a
complete examination of the role of the Spanish and Mexican presidio in borderlands warfare.
Ana María Alonso’s 1997 book, Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on
Mexico’s Northern Frontier, argues that due to constant warfare with the Apaches and the lack
of centralized Mexican control in the area, the northern Chihuahuan community of Namiquipa
“became a society organized for warfare, with specialists in violence.”54 Alonso illustrates that
an enduring culture of violence pervaded northern Mexican society, which had a significant
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impact on the Mexican Revolution, as northern peasants rose up in response to the injustices of
the Porfiriato. More recently, Lance Blyth has followed in the footsteps of these scholars with
Chiricahua and Janos: Communities of Violence in the Southwestern Borderlands, 1580-1880,
published in 2012. This work posits that precisely because there was little-centralized authority
in the northern Mexican frontier, violence between troops stationed at the Janos Presidio and
nearby Apaches served explicit purposes of creating diplomatic relations, as well as conferring
status on Apaches and Janos men as warriors.55
Other essential works concerning violence have shifted their attention onto the southwest
United States. Ned Blackhawk’s Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early
American West, published in 2006, shows the nature and effects of brutality against Native
groups such as the Paiutes and Shoshones in the Great Basin throughout the centuries.
Blackhawk uses violence as a method to understand the understudied world of the Great Basin
Indian peoples. Karl Jacoby’s Shadows at Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the Violence of
History, published two years later, demonstrates the ways in which violence structured
relationships between the various ethnic groups in Arizona during the nineteenth century. A
culture of violence in the borderlands culminated in the Camp Grant Massacre in 1871, in which
a force of Anglo Americans, Mexican Americans, and Tohono O’odham Indians attacked a
peaceful Apache encampment in southern Arizona, and massacred a large number of women and
children. This violence, he argues, has the potential to rupture history, as the narrative of the
Camp Grant Massacre, over time, came to symbolize the celebrated tale American manifest
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destiny and the conquering of the savage, rather than a story of overt violence perpetrated upon
innocent Native peoples.56
Also published in 2008, Brian DeLay’s War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and
the U.S.-Mexican War shows how violence in the borderlands was one of the defining factors
responsible for the U.S. – Mexico War in 1846. Anglo American conceptions of the Mexican
inability to properly conquer their northern frontier led many Americans to assume that Mexico
had forfeited any claim over the region. Nicole M. Guidotti-Hernández’s Unspeakable Violence:
Remapping U.S. and Mexican National Imaginaries, published in 2011, analyzes four diverse,
violent events: the lynching of a Mexican-American woman, the Camp Grant Massacre,
racialized and sexualized violence in south Texas, and the Yaqui Indian Wars. GuidottiHernández argues that violence “is an ongoing social process of differentiation for racialized,
sexualized, gendered subjects in the U.S. borderlands in the nineteenth century and early
twentieth.” Brendan C. Lindsay’s Murder State: California’s Native American Genocide, 18461873, published in 2012, argues that due to a conscious attempt by whites to exterminate
indigenous populations in California, Indians in the state suffered a violent campaign of
genocide. To carry out this method of extermination, state and non-state violence hid behind
notions of democracy. Benjamin Madley’s An American Genocide: The United States and the
California Indian Catastrophe, 1846-1873 also uncovers the roots of American Indian genocide
in California. This dissertation looks to add a significant yet overlooked viewpoint to these
studies: how violence affected communities in New Mexico during the nineteenth century.57
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This study also hopes to add to a growing body of historical scholarship, which
emphasizes how ideas concerning the interweaving of race and citizenship played a central role
in the lives of the varied borderlands peoples. There has been a rich and insightful
historiography concerning this topic. In 1983, Arnoldo DeLeon offered a ground-breaking
examination of white stereotypes of Tejanos in nineteenth-century Texas in his study They
Called Them Greasers: Anglo American Attitudes Toward Mexicans in Texas, 1821-1900. Four
years later, in Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1936, David Montejano pieced
together Anglo/Mexican relations in Texas over time, attempting to contradict the ever-present
triumphalist narratives in which Anglo Americans subdued Indians and Mexicans, and the west
was completely won. Both of these works delve into the ways in which racialized Anglo
perceptions led to a status of second-class citizenship for most ethnic Mexicans living in Texas.
In 1999, Deena J. González in Refusing the Favor: The Spanish-Mexican Women of Santa Fe,
1820-1880, delved into notions of race and gender in New Mexico, showing the injurious effects
on ethnic Mexican women due to the acquisition of New Mexico by the United States. González
argues that although U.S. colonialism led to the impoverishment and disempowerment of ethnic
Mexican women, they were ultimately able to stave off complete colonization by retaining their
culture. Martha Menchaca’s Recovering History, Constructing Race: The Indian, Black, and
White Roots of Mexican Americans, published in 2001 chronicles the aspects of the Southwest
from Spanish contact up to the present day that have assisted in shaping notions and definitions
of race, and its consequences. Menchaca analyzes the legacy of racial discrimination against
Mexican Americans that began during the era of the Spanish and was reinforced by the
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conquering of northern Mexico by the United States. Following this historiographical trajectory,
with The Language of Blood: The Making of Spanish-American Identity in New Mexico, 1880s1930s, John M. Nieto-Phillips shows how New Mexicans shaped their identity as one of a
Spanish background in order to distance themselves from their indigenous roots.58
In his work, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico
1800-1850, published in 2004, Andrés Reséndez traces ideas of racial identity in the borderlands,
explicitly noting their fluidity and uncertainty. Many residents were able to use the malleability
of identity in the borderlands to secure an advantage regarding both state and market forces.
Similarly, in 2007, Eric Meeks’s Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos
in Arizona charges that Indian, Mexican, and Anglo identity in Arizona has changed over time
due to various, but principally, economic reasons. Meeks posits that complete political and
economic incorporation of Arizona into the United States was tied, from the state’s inception to
racial and economic inequality. In 2009, Katherine Benton-Cohen, in her work Borderline
Americans: Racial Division and Labor War in the Arizona Borderlands, argues that an idea of
“whiteness” eventually emerged in the industrial sector of the Arizona borderlands, which
ultimately culminated in the Bisbee deportation and other aspects of racial and economic
discrimination against non-whites. Benton-Cohen’s study illuminates the evolution of racial
categories imposed upon certain peoples from outside their own communities, showing how
certain U.S. residents became “white” and some did not. Anthony Mora’s Border Dilemmas:
Racial and National Uncertainties in New Mexico, 1848-1912, published in 2011, details that
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ideas concerning race and space are intertwined. Mora describes how Las Cruces came to be
identified as a primarily Anglo American town, while nearby La Mesilla attempted to keep its
Mexican heritage. Mora attempts to discover how and why there were many notions concerning
national identity in such a small region. Omar Valerio-Jiménez, in River of Hope: Forging
Identity and Nation in the Rio Grande Borderlands, published in 2013, explores ideas
concerning race and state-formation, showing how these notions shifted and contributed toward
the historical experience of the residents of the Rio Grande Valley. The lower Rio Grande
Valley saw three nations compete for control over the region, and each helped shape the social
and political identities of its inhabitants due to shifting ideas concerning race and citizenship.
My dissertation looks to add to these works which have emphasized how race and citizenship
functioned in the multi-ethnic and fluid southwest borderlands.59
In six chapters, this study analyzes the meaning of race, citizenship, and belonging in
New Mexico and its connection to the role of civilian soldiers as they claimed the right to
employ violence, with or without the sanction of the state. Chapter 1 offers broad context
concerning the history of civilian/Native warfare in New Mexico from the time of Spanish
colonization in the late sixteenth century to the end of the U.S.-Mexico War in 1848. This was
an era in which both civilians and Native peoples such as the Pueblo Indians significantly
contributed toward the “defense” of their own communities. Hispanos and Pueblo peoples
provided the bulk of the manpower needed to engage in warfare with Native peoples. The
Spanish central government played a prominent role in both using the regular military and
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civilian militias to achieve their goals. The Mexican nation, on the other hand, principally relied
on their citizenry, including Pueblo peoples to patrol New Mexican communities and war with
independent Indians. This reliance on the New Mexican residents for their own defense led to a
culture of militarization which became entrenched in the communities of the region. As the
United States entered the area in 1846, Anglo American officials found that a custom of civilian
warfare was extremely difficult to extricate.
The second chapter narrows its focus to the years 1848-1853. During this short period,
despite U.S. promises to bring Indian hostilities to an end, fighting between Nuevomexicanos
and Native peoples accelerated. Acting on a perceived notion that the regular military was
failing in their duty to protect the settlements, civilian officials such as governor James S.
Calhoun saw the advantage of attempting to utilize civilians for warfare against independent
Indians. Due to derogatory Anglo American ideas regarding the racial identity, citizenship, and
loyalty of the multi-ethnic New Mexican residents, the military, however, tried to curb the
practice of civilian defense of their own communities. With an emphasis on the effects of Anglo
American thought concerning the racial inferiority of the New Mexican people, this chapter
analyzes the conflict that emerged between the regular military, civil government, and residents
of New Mexico due to the army’s restriction of utilizing civilian soldiers for warfare. In
particular, governor Calhoun and military department commander Edwin Sumner bickered back
and forth concerning the topic, resulting in a toxic atmosphere between the civil government,
military, and citizenry in New Mexico.
Chapter 3 expands upon the narrative of the previous chapter, showcasing the tenuous
atmosphere between the civil government, military, and citizenry, primarily concerning civilian
warfare, that continued in New Mexico until the coming of the Civil War. This chapter’s subject
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matter builds upon the racial attitudes of U.S. military officials, focusing on the racialized doubts
they held concerning the national allegiance and loyalty of Nuevomexicanos, which put into
question the advantages of arming the ethnic-Mexican population in New Mexico. Despite such
notions, however, the civil government remained highly sympathetic to the desires of the
residents to war with Native peoples as they had for centuries previous, and interim governor,
William S. Messervy, for example, made great strides in attempting to establish an organized
territorial civilian militia. This was due, in part, to the employment of General John Garland as
military department commander in New Mexico. Garland was much more lenient in allowing
for the use of civilian soldiers than both his predecessors and successors. Garland’s replacement,
however, Colonel Thomas Fauntleroy, in contrast, tried to curb the use of civilian militia units.
This back and forth tug-of-war between the civil government and the military in New Mexico
continued until the firing on Fort Sumter in 1861.
Chapter 4 showcases Nuevomexicano resistance to U.S. military efforts to stop them
from engaging in warfare with independent Indians. This chapter focuses on the brutal behaviors
of certain residents of La Mesilla during the 1850s. During this time, an unsanctioned militia
unit, the Mesilla Guard, emerged in that community. Utilizing a repertoire of guerilla tactics,
massacres, murder, and theft, the Mesilla Guard violently terrorized nearby Apache peoples for
nearly a decade. The violent and unauthorized actions of the residents of Mesilla caused U.S.
officials much frustration, as they were seemingly unable to put a stop to their exploits. This
shows that despite their best efforts, the U.S. government never truly held a monopoly of force
on the frontier of New Mexico during this era. The actions of the Mesilla Guard were both a
response to a seemingly unsympathetic U.S. military, as well as a continuation of a custom of
civilian warfare and violence that went back centuries.
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Chapter 5 analyzes the vast effects that the Civil War had on the institution of civilian
soldiers in the territory. The Civil War was a substantial turning point in regards to civilian
warfare in New Mexico. During the brief four-year period during the war, military officials had,
for the first time in any substantial way, begun to utilize territorial residents for warfare heavily.
Civil officials noted the military’s newfound clemency concerning the institution and went to
work organizing civilian militias all over the territory. This was the initial time in the history of
the United States that ethnic Mexicans were in the employ of the U.S. military in any significant
way. Many “Hispanic” residents throughout the country volunteered for Union and Confederate
duty. The Territory of New Mexico, however, had the largest number of Civil War volunteers of
Mexican descent. This chapter emphasizes how the volunteer army and militia in New Mexico
suffered a process of racialization in which they were privy to a multitude of discriminatory
practices by Anglo American troops and officers stationed in the territory. Despite this,
Nuevomexicano volunteers and militia were integral in expelling invading Confederates in New
Mexico, as well as violently subduing powerful tribes such as the Mescalero and Navajo peoples.
Despite all they had done during the Civil War, these New Mexican units generally
disappeared after its conclusion. New Mexican civil governors, however, still strove to enact a
sustained territorial militia. Chapter 6 analyzes how specific territorial emergencies, such as the
Lincoln County War, and hostilities with the Apache leaders, Victorio and Geronimo, would
finally lead to that result. The development of the territorial militia is also associated with the
growth of the Anglo American community in New Mexico. This, more than any other reason,
contributed to an organized territorial militia beginning in the late 1870s. Military officials were
much more tolerant of militias which consisted of those they deemed “white,” and they also
began to ensure that Anglo American officers headed the many ethnic Mexican militias around
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the territory. As a response to this demographic shift, multiple militia units began to spring up
all around the territory, culminating in the creation of the New Mexico National Guard during
the late nineteenth century.
This dissertation looks to be the only substantive piece of scholarship concerning civilian
warfare in New Mexico from the era of the Spanish to the creation of the New Mexico National
Guard during the late nineteenth century. This study also seeks to be much more than a standard
history of particular military undertakings. This project began as just that, with an emphasis on
the effects of violence and warfare on New Mexican communities. However, as research on this
project commenced, it became clear that there was much more to this topic than military exploits
and warfare. Central to various other borderlands topics, ideas of race and citizenship alongside
notions of a historical right to violence, played a notable role in the story of civilian soldiers in
New Mexico. Thus, this study seeks to intersect with both the overall historiography of civilian
warriors and that of race relations in the southwest United States during the nineteenth century.
Ultimately, this dissertation hopes to uncover a story and voices long overlooked in the historical
archive.
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Chapter 1: Spain and Mexico Set the Stage, 1598-1846

The arrival of the Spanish in the region they had branded Nuevo Mexico created the
overall blueprint for civilian warfare in the region for years to come. The entrance of Spain,
which brought the introduction of the Catholic religion, presidios, and large-scale mining and
ranching operations, precipitated tensions that antagonized the Native people of the north.
Colonial violence stemming from these institutions caused many of these peoples to retaliate
against Spanish colonists. This violence, in turn, triggered the establishment of both sanctioned
and unsanctioned civilian militias to reinforce the relatively weak formal military presence in the
frontier. With hostilities brewing between the colonists and Native peoples since the
colonization of the area after 1598, warfare on the frontier developed a specific form which
greatly emphasized the role of the colonist as citizen-soldier as had been common during the
Reconquista centuries before. Through the significant use of civilians, the Spanish and Mexican
governments implemented various mechanisms based on warfare with Native peoples that
transformed settler society. Militia service and independent civilian expeditions against New
Mexican Natives defined much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and generations of
inter-ethnic warfare shaped New Mexican society into one predicated and centered on violence.
During the early Spanish era in New Mexico, directly after initial colonization, warfare
with independent Indians was primarily the responsibility of the civilians. After the Pueblo
Revolt of 1680, colonial officials placed more of the burden of warfare against the Natives on the
regular military, constructing a system of presidios along New Spain’s far north. The presidios,
however, proved largely ineffective in combating Native peoples. Issues concerning the
construction and location of these forts, as well as low morale among the scant regular military
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personnel stationed within the province, dictated that civilians continued to play a significant role
in warfare in New Mexico. Although the physical expressions of colonialism, such as the
presidios, would eventually crumble, a social custom of warfare among the New Mexican
populace continued for much longer. In fact, warfare between independent Indians and the
settlers would last long into the era of the United States, much to the chagrin of U.S. officials.
Thus, during the colonial era, a cultural transformation emerged as sections of the civilian
populace were fast becoming militarized, and the function of warfare became linked with
gendered ideas of masculinity, social honor, and even economic advancement and political
status. This culture of warfare became even more entrenched in New Mexican society as Mexico
struggled to achieve independence from Spain beginning in 1810. The new nation’s many woes,
which included an empty federal treasury, weakened foreign relations capacity, and a crippled
political system assured the decline of the ability of the regular military to carry out their duties.
Civilians, therefore, became even more inclined to enact warfare on their own terms and for their
own ends than during the colonial era. Not coincidentally, the growing utilization of civilian
fighters during the Mexican era overlapped with a marked increase in hostilities with Native
peoples, especially in the 1830s. The large scale structural changes following in the wake of
Independence exacerbated local conditions on the northern frontier to cause the future
entrenchment of a tradition of civilian warfare in New Mexico.60
Civilian warfare during the era of the United States in New Mexico after 1848, the
principle time period analyzed by this dissertation, cannot be fully understood without a
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knowledge of the institution during both the colonial and Mexican periods. Many of the
mechanisms of warfare put in place by both the Spanish and Mexican regimes, specifically their
reliance on the civilian population, had a direct effect on the struggle by the United States to
subdue independent Indians. The Spanish colonial and Mexican eras set a precedent for how
civilians interpreted the role of the state, their claims to citizenship, their gendered masculinity,
their sense of obligation to their communities, and their understanding of violence as a means to
survive a hostile northern frontier. The economy, social structure, and even the spatial layout of
towns in New Mexico reflected violent relations with Indigenous groups. Considering these
deep roots and structural realities, civilian warfare after the U.S. declared war against Mexico
and claimed the Southwest would not easily disappear. This chapter will discuss the
implementation of warfare in New Mexico, specifically emphasizing the tremendous reliance on
non-military personnel, from the beginning of the Spanish era to the U.S.-Mexico War. I
ultimately argue that the structures of warfare fostered by the Spanish and Mexican regimes
would have a vast and longstanding influence among many of the residents of the region, thus
contributing toward cycles of warfare and violence between the civilian and Native populations.
Ultimately, the trajectory of civilian warfare implemented by these regimes in New Mexico
would long endure even after these governments had disappeared from the region.

Violent clashes between Native peoples and Spanish colonists in northern New Spain had
become a common occurrence since the mid-sixteenth century. The extension of the Spanish
Reconquista reached northern New Spain as the Spanish attempted to conquer and control Indian
“infidels” whom they compared to the Muslim invaders of the Iberian peninsula. Motivated by
Spanish beliefs of cultural and religious superiority, they saw Indian people as little better than
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beasts.61 Settlers residing in Zacatecas and Durango soon sent small parties north in search of
Indian peoples whom they raided for slaves.62 By 1598, as the Spanish presence grew further
northward to New Mexico, colonial violence enveloped Indigenous groups such as the Apaches,
Navajos, and Utes. Both the colonists and Indigenous people frequently raided each other for
captives and livestock, and to extract revenge for previous outrages. Interethnic brutality rapidly
accelerated during the seventeenth century, and the Spanish frequently sent out search and
destroy expeditions against enemy Indians, going as far as offering rewards for pairs of Apache
ears, and sending Apache prisoners into permanent exile.63 The Spanish ultimately sent over
two-thousand Apache prisoners into regions of the empire from which they could never return.64
Indigenous peoples were compelled to retaliate; leading to a cycle of murder, revenge, and
mutual animosity that would carry on for well over two centuries. By 1664, violence with the
Apache and Navajo became so fierce that the governor of New Mexico forbade the entrance into
the colony of any of whom the Spanish termed Indios Barbaros.65 At the same time, the Spanish
had also mistreated many of the region’s numerous Pueblo peoples, whom the Spanish perceived
as more “civilized” than the mobile Indios Barbaros. Clergy attempted to stamp out Pueblo
religious customs and beliefs, the system of encomienda exploited Pueblo labor, and rape and
murder by colonial soldiers were commonplace. As a response to this violence, as well as other
aspects of Spanish colonialism, brutality would long define the relationship between certain
Indigenous groups and the Spanish colonists. Thus, brutality became routine in the Spanish
borderlands, and both sides enacted a war of terror upon the other. The killing of men, women,
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children, and the elderly alongside the mutilation of the dead and the taking of heads and ears to
show a “body count” were common.66 This level of brutality bestowed certain benefits among
both societies such as the capture of prisoners and plunder as well as the ability to enact revenge
for previous outrages.
The introduction of the Spanish in New Mexico led to the transformation of the lives of
many Native groups which further fostered an atmosphere of hostility in the region. Due in part
to Spanish intrusion, increased calls for military pressure against Native peoples, and the arrival
of the powerful Comanche, groups such as the Apaches faced a narrowing set of options to
maintain a livelihood that required vast tracts of land. The mutual theft of horses, livestock, and
the taking of captives had been commonplace since the Spanish had entered the region; however,
settler colonialists’ demand for land and resources, military pressure, and warfare between the
tribes placed a tremendous strain on Indigenous livelihood and subsistence, and many had few
options beyond raiding for survival. Pressures such as these against Native peoples coincided
with an impressive expansion of Spanish ranching in New Mexico. This buildup of Spanish
livestock overlapped with a sharp decline in buffalo populations, a principal source of
nourishment and provisions for Native societies.67 Spanish ranching directly threatened the
southern plains buffalo herds, but it compromised the ability of eastern Apaches and western
Comanches to procure the buffalo and trade the hides and meat to Puebloan communities in New
Mexico. As a result, many Native groups increasingly turned to Spanish livestock for
subsistence. Many of these peoples quickly shifted from buffalo hunters and partial
agriculturalists to people who lived almost exclusively by raiding and poaching Spanish animal
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herds and livestock.68 The expansion of the theft of horses and other livestock contributed
toward a realignment of Indigenous economies, which in turn resulted in an upward spike of
violence across the region. At the heart of indigenous raiding was survival; however raids were
“deeply embedded in a larger network of exchange stretching far beyond the Spanish settlements
out onto the Great Plains.”69 Thus, raiding increasingly became a vital part of indigenous trade
and wealth, which contributed to the intensification and frequency of the undertaking.
Spanish officials and settlers in the region usually tended to identify Indian raiding as
acts of war, but indigenous groups such as the Apaches may have thought differently. The
Apaches were unaccustomed to treating animals as private property, and they might have seen
Spanish livestock as a form of wild game. As a result, certain Indigenous groups could have
seen the taking of these animals more as hunting than raiding.70 When engaged in raiding the
opportunity to avenge past wrongs was frequent and such expeditions were also a valuable
chance to enhance one’s reputation as a fighter and someone who could provide for their family
and kin relations.71 Engaging in such raids usually required that those involved in the operation
form small groups in order to capture the cattle and horse herds of the Spanish, and later
Mexican and American ranches. Frequently these small assemblages were not sanctioned by the
leaders of the group but were initiated by rebellious members of the band. Particular Apache
bands such as the Mescalero also possessed minimal political or military organization beyond
that of the local group.72 Therefore misunderstandings were common because whatever peace
agreements reached by the Spanish, Mexicans, or Americans were with individual Apache
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bands, rather than a larger unified group. This often led to confusion on the part of the colonists,
as they frequently sought vengeance against innocent groups of Native peoples because they
were unable or unwilling to differentiate between offending and innocent bands.
To address this threat as the Spanish perceived it, local communities frequently had to
defend themselves when the Crown was unable to provide them with presidio soldiers. Since the
beginning of the seventeenth century colonial military duties in the province were principally
assigned to a small handful of encomenderos who assumed command of citizens and who were
entrusted to commence war with Indian groups. Encomenderos were especially known for their
control over sedentary Native communities and for the obligation to Christianize and protect
them. In exchange for assembling and funding civilian militia units, the encomenderos held the
right to extract labor and tribute from Indian heads of households.73 The governor of New
Mexico himself exercised direct control over these encomenderos. The exploitation and
mistreatment of the Pueblo peoples, however, would end this system by 1680, but the use of
citizens such as encomenderos laid the groundwork for non-military use of force and violence
against Native people.74
Juan de Oñate’s colonization of New Mexico had led to warfare against many Pueblo
peoples that had resulted in widespread violence and death. Afterward, the colonizers and the
Pueblo peoples adhered to a tenuous peace built upon a widespread fear infused by coercive
tactics employed by the Spanish.75 Pueblo labor was exploited by the encomienda system and the
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Franciscans had imposed upon the Natives the mission system in which priests attempted to
diminish the influence of Pueblo religions and stamp out cultural practices deemed unacceptable
in a Christian society. Forced labor, conversion to Christianity, and obligatory transformation of
their culture only led to much Puebloan resentment. Physical and emotional abuse by Spanish
priests and soldiers further emboldened many, but not all, Pueblos to resist Spanish control.
Many Pueblos opposed Spanish power by continuing to practice their own religions and adhere
to their traditional customs in secret. Certain Pueblos also attempted to oust the Spanish by
initiating a series of violent revolts such as rebellions at Taos and Jemez in 1613 and 1614. By
the second half of the seventeenth century, drought, famine, and disease plagued New Mexico
and led to a marked decline in the indigenous population.76 These dreadful conditions led many
Pueblo communities to pool their resources and organize an extensive campaign against the
Spanish. Under the leadership of the Tewa Pueblo Indian, Popé, various Pueblo communities
initiated a violent revolt that resulted in the wholesale expulsion of the Spanish from New
Mexico in 1680.77
After the Pueblo peoples and their allies expelled the Spanish from New Mexico in the
Pueblo Revolt of 1680, the system of encomienda was ended in the province along with its ties to
militia duty. The Spanish returned a decade later and reclaimed the region for Spain. After the
reconquest of New Mexico, Spanish authorities sought to center warfare in the region around a
system of presidios. These garrisons were constructed to not only protect the colonists situated
within this hostile environment but to guard their perceived imperial possessions from foreign
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invasion. Construction of presidios had begun in the interior provinces starting in 1570, and by
the 1690s, the colonial government had finally begun to devise a line of garrisons in the far
north. Eventually, traders, settlers, and military families congregated around these presidios,
which in time grew into towns of varying size and importance. The province of New Mexico;
New Spain's most remote and regarded by many as its most desolate outpost, boasted two of
these strongholds; one in Santa Fe, the other some three-hundred miles south in El Paso del
Norte. Not only were these presidios too spread out to offer any real protection, but as in other
areas of New Spain, they were often poorly constructed and dilapidated.78 These costly presidios
had also come under criticism because they were not suited for the style of warfare initiated by
mounted Native peoples, as independent Indians could easily avoid the expensive, stationary
forts.79
The introduction of regular soldiers stationed at the presidios further contributed toward
an environment of violence in New Mexico. Regular soldiers in the field, as well as the settlers
themselves, repeatedly committed atrocities upon Native peoples. Soldiers called out to war
with independent Indians were frequently known to indiscriminately slay innocent women and
children. They were also responsible for enacting violence against innocent indigenous groups.
For their part, the settlers commonly raided Indian rancherías in search of plunder and prisoners,
often slaughtering non-combatants during their expeditions.

In 1741, New Mexican governor

Gaspar Domingo noted certain brutalities undertaken by both soldiers and settlers, stating, “It has
come to my attention that during pursuits of the infidel Indians, or while returning from raids
against them, small groups of women, young boys and girls, and other persons who are unable to
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defend themselves are encountered, and [the men] who go on these raids have attempted to
mistreat them and take their lives.”80 After more than a century of violent interactions, Spanish
officials knew that a change in Indian and military policy would be necessary to halt the
simmering animosity brewing between the colonists and Native peoples.
By 1765, the poor state of the presidios, as well as the growing violence between the
Spanish and Native peoples, led the reform-minded King Carlos III of Spain to reexamine the
seemingly feeble northern frontier defense system. The crown subsequently implemented a
restructuring of administration, policy, and defense in America, known as the Bourbon Reforms.
Spain’s defeat two years earlier in the Seven Years’ War also motivated a shoring up of
defenses. During the War, England had seized the heavily fortified city of Havana, and if
another war should occur Spain believed they would need stronger defensive fortifications.81
The crown was also interested in strengthening frontier presidios because they had surpassed the
mission as the dominant institution in the far north.82 The king tasked the Marqués de Rubí to
tour the interior provinces - or northern frontier. He was to report on the condition of the
presidios and make recommendations for their improvement. The ensuing report, Rubí's
Regalamento of 1772, guided military policy in New Mexico far beyond the era of the Spanish.
Among Rubí's suggestions was a reorganization of the military garrisons in New Mexico as well
as the implementation of a revamped Indian policy which ultimately stressed trade over war and
deception over confrontation.83 Although the Regalamento didn’t directly affect the Santa Fe
presidio, it called for the complete elimination of the stronghold at El Paso. Rubí’s report
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generally emphasized peaceful rather than hostile interactions with most Native Peoples, yet he,
like many other officials, considered Apaches in particular to be the most severe threat to the
province; therefore, he recommended their extermination as well as peace and alliance with all
Apache enemies.84 Although not endorsed by the King in its entirety, Rubi's policies, especially
those regarding Apache extermination continued to fan the flames of hatred between the
Apaches and the colonizers.
As Rubí was touring the presidios preparing his Regalamento, the king also assigned
Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez to devise an effective frontier system of governing, which included
a workable Indian policy. Gálvez's report, the Instrución para el Buen Gobierno de las
Provincias Internas de la Nueva España of 1786, which superseded yet complemented in many
ways Rubi's Regalamento, suggested that dealings with Indians through gifts, diplomacy, and
trade were preferable to war. He did, however, stress that Indians not willing to negotiate would
indeed feel the wrath of the Spanish military.85 Therefore, Gálvez's Instrución was an ambitious
combination of war as well as peace. It was designed to impress the Native peoples through warmaking while at the same time keeping open a path to peace if actively sought by Indigenous
groups.86 Significantly, the Instrución suggested the creation of "establamiento de paz" around
which Apaches who wished to remain at peace with the Spanish could settle and receive muchneeded provisions. These establishments are the earliest and most extensive system of military-
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run reservations in the Americas.87 Many of the proposals of both Rubí and Gálvez remained
fundamental policy throughout the remainder of the Spanish period and beyond.88
As part of Gálvez’s Instrución, and to deal with the situation threatening the northern
frontier, the viceroy established the commandancia general, or frontier military district, under a
commandant general to direct military affairs. The duties of the general were broad, which
enabled him to exercise direct and forceful supervision in all military matters.89 The king
appointed Teodoro de Croix as the first commandant general of the Provinces Internas, and he
reported directly to the king. The military forces under the commandancy general consisted of
the presidial garrisons, mobile companies (of which New Mexico had none), citizens’ militia,
and Indian auxiliaries. Directly below the commandant general were the provincial governors
who acted as military commanders in their respective districts.90 The governor of New Mexico
was both the chief military and civil officer of his jurisdiction. He communicated directly with
the commandant but also went through the newly created adjutant inspector located in
Chihuahua, who served as an intermediary.91 As a military ruler, the governor was responsible
for the maintenance of the peace, yet he was subject always to the approval of his immediate
superiors. He was, however, accorded a vast amount of leeway in his dealings as military
commander; being directly in charge of supplying, training, and commanding the regular troops
and militia. His title was “commander of the armed forces of New Mexico,” and he often
personally led war operations himself or left it to a trusted subordinate.
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Despite their apparent benefits, the enactment of the Bourbon Reforms in New Mexico
came with specific challenges. A Spanish New Mexican Indian policy centered around a
presidio system came with particular difficulties, principally, that many observers believed the
presidios were never adequately staffed. For example, as part of Rubi’s recommendations, the
presidio at El Paso was eliminated entirely, a new one being constructed to the south at Carrizal
in Nueva Vizcaya in 1772. Rubi’s rationale stemmed from his belief that the residents of El Paso
were fully capable of defending themselves.92 The Spanish, therefore, placed a militia in charge
of the protection of El Paso, which consisted of two companies; the first consisting of forty-six
Spaniards and thirty Indians; the second comprising forty-seven Spaniards and thirty Indians
respectively.93 The one remaining northern presidio located at Santa Fe was generally
insufficiently staffed. By 1777, the number of soldiers stationed at the Santa Fe presidio, at 110,
represented a force more substantial than that stationed at any other presidio in Northern New
Spain.94 However, being New Mexico’s only presidio, that number was actually wholly
inadequate to patrol the entire province.
Military officials frequently appealed to the colonial government to supply the northern
provinces with more troops and supplies. In particular, the governors repeatedly asked for
reinforcements, increases in arms, and the establishment of additional presidios. The colonial
government, however, was hesitant to provide the resources necessary to adequately secure the
region due to the province's low population and negligible economic promise outside of a few
silver mines spread throughout the north that produced the bulk of the region’s wealth.95 A
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general policy of neglect by the ruling government remained a prominent feature of New Mexico
long into the future, and it emboldened settlers to take matters into their own hands. In a letter to
viceroy Gálvez, commandant general Croix begged for more troops for the most northern
frontier of New Spain. Croix stated, “I have spoken of the impossibility of keeping up the
defense of that frontier, so extensive, with the small number of troops that are stationed
there…with reference to the panic and terror that the hostility of the Indian enemy has caused
these inhabitants, I beg your excellency the help of two thousand men.”96 These reinforcements
were not forthcoming, and the Santa Fe presidio never exceeded more than 120 soldiers
throughout its lifespan.
Not only did these garrisons rarely boast a strength equal to the task, but the regular
military soldiers who staffed the presidios were generally inadequately trained and suffered from
low morale. Many soldiers were forced to serve at the presidios; a good number being convicted
criminals who had been given duty on the frontier as their punishment.97 Pay was also low at
between 420 and 450 pesos per year, and salaries arrived only sporadically.98 In New Mexico,
presidial soldiers were thus oftentimes poorer than the local settlers and frequently subject to
debt servitude, which had the effect of worsening the already low morale among the troops.99
During an inspection of the Santa Fe presidio in 1726, Brigadier Pedro de Rivera Villalón noted,
“The necessary provisions were supplied to the soldiers at inflated prices and were deducted
from their salaries.”100 These poorly compensated and debt-ridden soldiers were tasked with
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both the defense of the nearby settlements as well as carrying out retributive forays into Indian
country. The effects of these punitive invasions usually consisted of little more than instilling
grudges, thereby increasing the hatred between Indian groups and the colonizers. Historian Max
L. Moorhead posited that the frontier soldier provided "heroic but ineffective service. The best
they could do was make the enemy pay dearly for his victories."101 Thus, during the eighteenth
century, violence between the Spanish and Indians in New Mexico flourished. Of the 1,775
settler deaths that occurred in New Mexico from 1700 to 1820, sixty percent of those happened
during the twenty years from the 1770s and 1780s.102
The seeming ineffectiveness of the regular troops and the marked increase in inter-ethnic
violence on New Spain’s northern frontier ensured the necessity of militia and civilian protection
units. As stated above, civilians had played a large part in New Mexican warfare since before
the Pueblo Revolt. Although civilian military ties to encomienda ended after the Pueblos
expelled the Spanish, the utilization of civilian warriors in New Mexico continued long into the
future. As New Mexican refugees fled south to El Paso after their expulsion from the province,
the first presidio on the far northern frontier was erected there in 1683. Upon Spanish reconquest
of New Mexico during the 1690s, the colonial government commissioned the second presidio
located in Santa Fe in 1693. However, even after the implementation of these presidios, settlers
continued to organize to defend the province and plunder certain Native peoples. Settler militias
both worked independently and in tandem with presidial troops in warring with independent
Indians.

101
102

Moorhead, The Apache Frontier, 114.
Frank, From Settler to Citizen, 35.

52

Although civilian soldiers had been utilized since the reconquest of New Mexico, the
aforementioned Pedro de Rivera composed a Reglamento in 1729 which officially made militia
duty mandatory upon the call of the presidial captains. Rivera’s order specified, “The political
administration of Spaniards, mulattos, and mestizos who may take up residence in the presidios
and their surrounding jurisdictions belongs to the presidial captains. For this reason, these
people may be called upon for military service whenever the occasion of war necessitates the use
of the troops in the place where they reside, or to solve any disputes over jurisdiction that may
arise.”103 By the mid-eighteenth century in New Mexico, in theory, all able men were to be
enlisted in hometown units led by their own officers who received their appointments from the
governor. The soldiers of the presidial company were designated as tropas veteranas to
distinguish them from the militia. The officer class of the militia usually consisted of men of
high social standing as some militia captains were the alcalde mayor of their town.104 By 1808,
there were at least three companies of volunteer cavalry totaling sixty-nine men in the principal
towns of Santa Fe, Santa Cruz de la Canada, and Albuquerque. It is, however, unclear how
strictly many smaller communities adhered to maintaining a standing, organized militia.
Scholars have had difficulty obtaining detailed information about civilian militias across
the northern frontier, but evidence suggests that they were an important component of Spanish
warfare in certain communities during the eighteenth century. For example, Nicholas Lafora,
who accompanied the Marqes de Rubí on his inspection tour from 1766 to 1768, maintained that
Albuquerque had at the ready eighty militiamen organized with officers.105 After the elimination
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of the El Paso presidio, the settlement initially supported four militia companies of fifty-three
men each, whose salaries were paid by the local citizens.106 In a report in 1781, Commandant
General, Teodoro de Croix noted the importance of civilian volunteers for the defense of New
Mexico while emphasizing the strategic importance that he placed on the province. He stated,
“From the Pueblo of El Paso there intervenes to the north a desert of more than 100 leagues to
the first establishment of New Mexico….it depends for its defenses upon the presidial company
at Santa Fe of 110 units, and upon the strength of its settlers, Indians, and Spaniards…Its
conservation is so important that if we should lose New Mexico a second time, we would have
upon Vizcaya, Sonora, and Coahuila all the enemies who now invade that province.”107 Even
with the rise of the presidio system, militia service was no less important than it had been before
the Pueblo Revolt.
Usually noted for their effects on the presidio system, the Bourbon reforms also had a
palpable impact on civilian warfare across the northern frontier of New Spain. An expansion of
the Spanish military presence accelerated the militarization of northern colonist’s social
structures. The creation of a line of presidios, as well as increased emphasis on placing military
pressure on hostile Apaches, brought with it an increase in the number of active soldiers in the
north as a whole.108 Many of these fighters who served on the frontier were recruited from
frontier provinces, and when these battle-hardened men returned to their communities, they
brought home with them a culture of militarism based on violence against Indian groups.109 In
1777, Croix persuaded the crown to loosen regulations against officers marrying into frontier
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families without royal permission.110 Therefore, even soldiers from the interior of New Spain
added to the process of militarization by marrying into peasant families and becoming frontier
settlers upon retirement. These circumstances assisted in blurring the line between settler and
soldier in the Spanish north. Militia units on the northern frontier also enjoyed certain privileges
given them by the government of New Spain. In Nueva Vizcaya, for example, militiamen were
exempted from the labor draft, involuntary guardianship of their personal funds, impressment
into the regular army, having to pay federal dues, and having to quarter troops in their homes.111
These benefits assisted in entrenching a culture of violence, cloaked in notions of “defense,” on
the northern frontier.
Recognizing the necessity of civilian protection of the province, the Bourbon reforms had
also attempted to congregate colonists into populated settlements for the defense of the region.
Croix, in particular, tried to bolster the presidio with a defensive line of military settlements.112
The colonial government believed that New Mexican colonists would be more effective in
halting enemy attacks if they settled in close proximity to each other. To the great frustration of
Spanish officials, civilians, however, had the inclination to spread out, typically due to the need
for large sections of land to sustain their ranching and farming pursuits. In 1772 governor Pedro
Fermin de Mendinueta stated, “[Among] the Spaniards there is no united settlement, so that the
dispersion of their houses the name of ranches or houses of the field is properly given and not
that of villas or villages.”113 Four years later, Adjutant Inspector Antonio de Bonilla similarly
noted, “The force of settlers is divided, and they can neither protect themselves nor contribute to
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the general defense of the country.” He, however, praised the settlements of the Pueblo peoples,
stating that they “are defensible because of their excellent and unified formation.”114 Therefore,
commandant general Croix sought to reorganize the colonial settlements to have families who
resided in the countryside gathered together to thwart Apache and Comanche attacks. There is
evidence that such progress was made at Encinal, Albuquerque, Canada, Taos, and possibly Ojo
Caliente, but these settlements were the exception rather than the rule across the region.115
Many settlers despised mandatory militia duty because serving was detrimental in
various ways. Militiamen in New Mexico were usually unpaid (excepting the standing militia at
El Paso), and had to supply their own arms, mounts, and pack animals. They were called out by
the sound of a drum in times of emergency and could serve campaigns of up to forty-five days.116
In 1812, Don Pedro Bautista Pino reported that militiamen sometimes had to sell their children
into peonage in order to purchase the weapons and animals necessary for militia service, stating,
“it is enough to say that many of these unfortunate souls are ruined in one single campaign, they
are forced to sell their clothes and their families’ clothes to supply themselves with ammunition
and food. This horror gets to the point where they even have to sacrifice the freedom of their
children to carry out their civic obligations.”117 During extended forays into Indian country, the
men were also compelled to leave their families and property unprotected.118
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Thus, the advantages of militia service were few but there were factors that encouraged
militiamen to fight. One of the benefits was an ability to collect and retain spoils of war. This
would be a motif that continued far into the U.S. period in New Mexico, and created a powerful
cycle of violence and retribution, as civilian soldiers saw militia service as an opportunity to
compensate themselves for the perceived wrongdoings of groups like the Apache. The violence
of the militias in seeking retribution for Apache aggression, and to obtain wealth in
compensation for the debts associated with service itself, spawned greater retaliatory strikes from
Apaches. Thus the militia members were in a somewhat unenviable position as they were
exploited by the provincial government, chronically poor and in debt, and subjects of Native
campaigns against their farms and ranching operations.
However, the idea of social honor was also a significant motivating factor for militiamen
to fight. The social construct of honor developed during the Reconquest of the Iberian peninsula
from the Moors. The idea of honor only grew in the Americas due to the more heterogeneous
environment.119 In colonial Mexico honor was worth fighting and dying for because Spaniards
saw a man without honor as worse than dead.120 A man’s honor was, therefore, the single most
important social characteristic in his life. The prestige and reputation a man held among his
community was tied to his ambition and ability to fight for the defense of his family and home.
To stray from his military duty and thus forsake the protection of both his family and community
was deemed dishonorable. Honor also became linked with ideas of masculinity and manliness.
It was a man’s duty to defend his home and if he failed in this task, he lacked manliness which
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directly affected his standing among his community. Although militia service was an unpleasant
affair, civilians certainly had many motivations to continue fighting, the ideas of honor and
masculinity being chief among them.
Many colonial officials noted the impoverished condition of the militia in New Mexico.
However strong in numbers, militia units during the colonial period most notably suffered due to
a chronic lack of serviceable weapons.121 Teodoro de Croix noted the threadbare condition New
Mexico’s civilian militia. Croix observed that civilian defense of the province consisted of “a
militia of Indians and Spaniards, ill-equipped with arms and horses and without instruction and
discipline.”122 The provincial government, therefore, took responsibility of arming these settler
soldiers when they could. As far back as 1719, Governor Antonio de Valverde articulated,
“forty-five settlers and volunteers…offered voluntarily to serve his majesty on his campaign…to
these, on account of the impoverished condition of some, it was necessary to supply powder and
balls and distribute among them ten leather jackets, which his lordship had bought and had
made.”123 By the early 1770s, there were still only 250 people in the province of New Mexico
who possessed firearms, and most of these were outdated escopetas or flintlock muskets.124 In
1779, Governor Juan Bautista de Anza similarly observed the poor condition of the militia. He
announced: “I found the troops provided with three horses to each soldier with arms, munitions
of war, and food supplies more than enough for forty days. This was not the case with the
settlers and Indians. Because of their well-known poverty and wretchedness, the best equipped
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presented themselves with two riding beasts, the most of them almost useless; their guns were
the same, very few of them having three charges of powder; in everything else the proportion
was similar.”125 Adjutant Inspector Bonilla similarly remarked that the militia was “a
congregation of dissident, discordant, scattered people without subordination, without horses,
arms, knowledge of their handling, and were governed by their [own] caprice.”126 Thus, the
military frequently loaned supplies to the militia such as when governor Anza ordered “two
hundred firearms with corresponding munitions for the equipment of the militia, settlers and
Navajo who attend the campaigns with the troop.”127
It is not therefore surprising that desertion by militiamen serving on expeditions during
the colonial period was not uncommon. In a letter to Teodoro de Croix in 1780 concerning
hostilities with the Comanches and Apaches, military officer Pedro Galindo Navarro noted,
“Eighty settlers of the jurisdiction of Albuquerque and La Canada voluntarily offered themselves
for the undertaking, but because of the flight of some of them…there were now no more than
sixty.”128 Flights such as these were commonplace, and to further reward militiamen and prevent
desertion, the government occasionally supplied funds to pay militiamen who were called upon
to perform service outside their own districts.129 Concerning payment of the militia, Navarro
stated, “The settlers of New Mexico who volunteer to make the expeditions are entitled to some
recompense as a reward for their zeal and labor. Besides that which they will be able to secure
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from the distributions and divisions which, by equal parts, pro-rated with the troops, will have to
be made of the booty captured from the enemy, it appears to me that your lordship will be able
also to concede with the existent money destined for the support of those settlers.”130 Payment
of the militia in the form of anything other than spoils of war was, however, extremely rare, and
this key reality of civilian poverty remained one of the driving factors behind the cycles of
violence between militias and Natives on the Spanish frontier.
Although the presidial soldiers and settler militias played a significant role in enacting
warfare against Native peoples in New Mexico, by far the most commonly utilized people who
aided the Spanish militarily were known as Indian “auxiliaries.” The bulk of these troops in
New Mexico consisted of the various Pueblo peoples. In 1704, Governor Diego de Vargas led a
multi-ethnic expedition against the Apaches, which marked the beginning of a new era of
Spanish and Pueblo Indians being united in combat against a mutual enemy.131 Approximately
one decade after the Reconquista of northern New Mexico in the wake of the 1680 Revolt,
Pueblo auxiliaries became crucial to the military defense of Spanish towns on the frontier.
Pueblo combat service was made up of tribal warriors serving as allies to the Spanish who
worked in concert with the regular troops and militia. These men were usually drawn on a quota
basis for temporary duty, and there were a few special garrisons of Indians regularly organized as
military companies.132 Pedro de Rivera made note in his 1729 Regalamento: “The Indians of the
pueblos of this province assist the regular troops of the presidios in their campaigns against
hostile Indian tribes. Each pueblo provides the number assigned it by the governor at no cost to
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the royal treasury. They provide their own supplies, horses, and weapons. Their deeds have
proven their loyalty.”133
The many benefits of utilizing the considerable population of Pueblo peoples for warfare
was not lost on Spanish officials. During the eighteenth century, their population had far
exceeded that of non-indigenous inhabitants in New Mexico, as the 1752 census revealed that
there were 6,453 Pueblos to 4,458 Spaniards, with approximately 1,046 residing in El Paso.134
Government officials considered these Indian troops, provided mainly by Pueblo villages, to be
part of the New Mexican citizenry and made their villages subject to the same defense
requirements as Spanish villages. These Pueblo militia units even went as far as forming
separate military units for protection of their own villages under an appointed Capitan de
Guerra, supplying their own horses and arms for the task.135 There were many reasons Pueblos
chose to fight alongside the Spanish. Expeditions provided them with the opportunity to war
with their enemies, and the Pueblos could share in the spoils of battle. The Spanish even
regularly distributed annual presents to loyal allies.136
The use of Pueblo “auxiliaries” was so widespread in New Mexico that they usually
made up the majority of troops tasked with enacting warfare against enemy Indians. Numerous
battle accounts mention the large numbers of Pueblo peoples that took part in war expeditions
during the colonial era. General Juan Ulibarri stated in his diary in 1706, “I received at the same
time the enlistment roll of the soldiers and settlers, and found that it comprised forty men of war:
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the twenty-eight military men and the twelve settlers of the militia. These were joined by some
groups of friendly Indians of different tribes who came from the pueblos and missions of this
kingdom. They amounted to one hundred Indians.”137 In 1715, military commander Juan Páez
Hurtado mentioned, “I set out from the pueblo of Picuries at about nine o’clock in the morning
with thirty-seven soldiers, eighteen settlers, and one hundred and forty-six Indians.”138 It was
not, therefore, uncommon for Native peoples, mainly Pueblos, to make up the majority of the
companies assigned with battling independent Indians.
Nevertheless, many colonial officials were extremely wary about utilizing Pueblo peoples
to enact warfare. The 1680 Pueblo Revolt cast a long shadow over Spanish communities in the
eighteenth century, and numerous officials repeatedly questioned the wisdom of arming the
Pueblo populations. In 1714 a junta de guerra regarding Pueblo practices was held in Santa Fe.
The governor, Flores Mogollon examined, among other things, the right of the Pueblo people to
bear arms. Many colonists feared that the Pueblos would use the firearms given the Indians to
defend the province against them.139 The governor, for example, claimed that he believed the
Pueblos were raiding horse herds and cattle under the guise of peace. As the Franciscan strategy
of Christianization called for the open elimination of native Pueblo ceremonies, Pueblo war
customs such as wearing war paint and feathers were also put into question.140 In the end, the
Spanish need for Pueblo militias outweighed these concerns. Pueblo peoples were allowed to
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dress as they pleased and keep their arms, yet on military campaigns they remained segregated
from Spaniards, both regular and militia.141
Other Indigenous groups also regularly assisted the Spanish in war expeditions, though
not nearly to the extent of the Pueblos. Certain Apaches, Utes, Navajos, and Comanches were
frequently enthusiastic about joining the Spanish to battle their Indian enemies. As reward for
their service, the Spanish would present these Indians horses, weapons, and other gifts.142 These
tribes saw increased use as the eighteenth century advanced. In a diary entry of Governor Juan
Bautista de Anza in 1779 concerning an expedition against the Comanches, he recorded, “two
hundred men of the Ute and Apache nation also joined me with one of their principal captains.
Of the first were those who ever since my assumption of this government have asked me, and
have reiterated incessantly with prayers that they be admitted into my company in confirmation
of our friendship, provided I should go on a campaign against the Comanches. I agreed to grant
this to them, as much to take advantage of this increase of people as to try in this way to civilize
them so that they may be at least be more useful to us against the enemy itself than they have
been formerly.”143 The Spanish, however, trusted these warriors much less than they did even
the Pueblos. Commander General Jacob Ugarte y Loyola in 1786 mentioned, “The cited order of
January 18 last included the most appropriate method for making campaigns without
interruption, composing the detachments of troop, settlers, Pueblo Indians and a competent
number of Navajos. Although it would be good for the latter to act by themselves provided that
positive tokens of their fidelity are had, it is necessary that, to prove themselves to us, they carry
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out before-hand a series of four or six campaigns with our people, each ranchería furnishing a
proportionate part of its own people.”144 Ugarte’s words illustrate that he did not have
confidence that the Navajo could effectively carry out warfare against Indian enemies without
Spanish supervision. The same is true for other independent Indian groups, as Spanish
authorities utilized these peoples very intermittently and kept them under constant observation.
Another designation of people, the genízaros, also assisted with militia duty during the
colonial era. Not fitting the binary of either “Spanish” or “Indian,” these enigmatic and varied
people were former Indians who had been captured or ransomed by the Spaniards and educated
as Christians. Although the Spanish government had outlawed the practice of slavery throughout
Spanish America, a doctrine of “just war” and the Catholic doctrine of rescate resulted in the
growth of a slave trade economy in New Mexico.145 Genízaros were initially slaves in the
houses of Spanish citizens but eventually congregated in towns along the frontier. In an effort to
populate land grants deserted by Indian raids, the New Mexican government ordered that
genízaro communities be given deeds to lands such as at Ojo Caliente.146 Other prominent
genízaro communities were established at the Pueblo of Abiquiú, and in the Taos valley.147
Their standing ranged, therefore, from “near-slave status initially to autonomous conditions
within their own communities by midcentury.”148
The Spanish required genízaros to form their own company of militia and assist with
forays against independent Indians. Many genízaro men were enrolled in a military unit created
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for genízaros called “la tropa de genízaros.”149 This military organization was drawn from all
genízaro settlements in New Mexico and maintained in Santa Fe.150 Throughout the colonial
period, they proved crucial in colonial defense and ultimately acted as slave raiders
themselves.151 In 1744, Fray Miguel del Menchero noted that he admired the genízaros for the
“great bravery and zeal” with which they traversed the “country in pursuit of the enemy.”152
Genízaros assisted the Spanish with excursions against the Gila Apaches in 1747, Comanches in
1751 and 1774, Sierra Blanca Apaches in 1777, in the defeat of Cuerno Verde in 1779, and
possibly many more engagements.153 By the late eighteenth century, their reputation as fighters
caused genízaros to be seen as a distinct and dangerous ethnic group and were thus assembled
into their own villages.154 Unfortunately, the documentary evidence concerning militia service
of these people is both sparse and conflicting.155
Amidst an atmosphere of violence during the late eighteenth century, two events took
place which finally pushed New Mexico into a relative era of peace between the colonists and
certain Indigenous groups: the governor of New Mexico entered into peaceful negotiations with
the Comanche, and the usage of Apache peace establishments began to increase. In 1779,
Governor Juan Bautista de Anza, with a force of almost six hundred presidial soldiers, militia,
Indian auxiliaries, and genízaros formed a military expedition against the Comanches. The party
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initially killed eighteen Comanche men and thirty women and children, taking thirty-four women
and children captive. Anza then attacked a Comanche group near Taos under the famed
headman Cuerno Verde, during which the chief, his eldest son, and a number of influential
warriors perished. Soon after, there was an almost immediate halt in Comanche raiding in New
Mexico, and some Comanche leaders sought to negotiate with the governor. This cessation in
hostilities was only due in part to Anza’s military expedition, as war with other plains tribes, an
erosion of Comanche economic and commercial fortunes, and an outbreak of smallpox
contributed toward the gestures of peace.156 Although a peace treaty was not signed until 1786,
Anza’s campaign had helped lead the province toward peace with New Mexico’s most
dangerous enemy and had also opened up a tentative Comanche-Spanish alliance against the
Apache.157 After 1786, the Spanish also secured a tenuous peace with the Utes, Jicarilla
Apaches, and the Navajos. However, a large number of Apaches, primarily Mescalero,
Chiricahua, and Lipan remained independent all along the northern frontier.
Spaniards, along with their new allies, the Comanches, almost immediately sought to
bring their mutual enemy, the Apaches, to subjugation. They began working in tandem to attack
Apache settlements in Southern New Mexico, Texas Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and
Tamaulipas. In 1786, a campaign consisting of 127 Spaniards and 108 Indians, twenty of whom
were Comanches, surveyed the lands south of Santa Fe, engaging in small scale skirmishes. In
that instance, thirteen Apache prisoners were taken and one woman killed.158 These continuous
small-scale attacks on the Apaches strained the physical resources of many Apache groups and
reduced their ability to obtain food and supplies necessary to sustain their livelihood.159 The
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prospect of receiving necessary provisions from the Spanish eventually compelled many Apache
rancherías to begin requesting peace. By 1790, hostilities along the northern frontier had
diminished as Apaches had begun to settle near presidios such as Janos in Chihuahua, Paso del
Norte, Presidio del Norte (near present day Ojinaga, Chihuahua) and some near Sabinal, New
Mexico. A central motivating factor for these Apaches to remain near the presidios were
Spanish promises to supply them with rations and gifts. At the system’s height, Apaches at
peace comprised at least 50 percent of all Mescaleros and Southern Apaches.160 That is not to
say, however, that there was a complete halt in hostilities. A surge in violence between the
Mescaleros and the Spaniards took place during the 1790s that can only be categorized as war.161
Between 1790 and the beginning of Mexican Independence in the early 1820s, hundreds
of Apaches moved in and out of the establishments on the northern frontier. As Mathew
Babcock notes in Apache Adaptation to Spanish Rule, Apaches incorporated the “reservations”
into their larger cultural landscape and “settled” in them when they suffered from Comanche
attacks, drought, or other disruptions to their survival. Peace establishments revealed an
ambivalent set of realities for Apaches in that the Spanish offered them rations, farming
equipment and protection from Comanches, but the Spanish also extracted promises that
Apaches would stop “raiding” towns and villages throughout the region. Although some
Apaches remained for several years, most groups seemed to perceive living in the establishments
as a temporary if not pragmatic option to help them survive a rapidly changing world. The
inconsistencies of the peace establishments in the context of violence perpetuated by vecinos and
Comanches made Apaches cautious about their utility, but they nonetheless frequented them well
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into the nineteenth century. By 1817, between four hundred and five hundred Apaches were
living at Peace near Janos in Chihuahua.162 Many of these Apaches at peace served alongside
Spanish forces as auxiliaries and scouts, and were promised booty taken in battle. The
Mescaleros, for example, when they weren’t the target of Spanish attacks, contributed
substantially to fighting other Apaches alongside the Spanish.163 Although, many of these
Apaches at peace continued to raid other settlements to the south, the events of the late
eighteenth century brought New Mexico into an era of relative peace.164 This led to a period of
economic development in New Mexico that continued until Mexican independence.165
The struggle for Mexican independence beginning in 1810 would change the nature of
warfare throughout the northern frontier. During Mexico’s decade-long struggle for
independence, New Spain found it necessary to divert troops from the far northern presidios to
the interior to battle the insurgency. These changes ensured that the newly independent Mexican
nation-state would inherit little more than a feeble version of Spain’s northern defenses.166
Mexico’s economic woes after the war for independence ensured that troops were unable to
reappear in the borderlands in such numbers as during the Spanish colonial era. Mexico was
financially unable to support presidial protection, and as a result, the Spanish system of presidios
began to decay. Although the presidio at Santa Fe continued to house about one hundred troops,
these soldiers were more neglected than ever before. Morale at the presidios declined, and many
soldiers turned to illegal trade with the Indians to earn a living due to reductions in pay.167 The
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Mexican era produced a precipitous drop in both political authority and economic activity.
Accordingly, the power of the Commandancy General weakened and its power shrank. In 1826,
the Mexican government attempted to revive the decaying presidios and even suggested creating
several new ones. The plan never took off and individual states were left with the majority of the
burden for frontier defense.168 Thus, provincial governments, also extremely lacking in financial
resources were principally charged with the task of protecting their colonies. One of New
Mexico’s leading citizens, Donaciano Vigil, observed New Mexico’s military woes during the
Mexican era, verbalizing that “the central government of the nation, continually distracted and
occupied with more general concerns, has not been able to provide us with the protection we
need and that we have wanted for our security. The few troops that are in this Department are
employed in this capital…due to their number and due to the deterioration of most of their
equipment…they would not be able to defend more than the place where they live.”169 Arguing
that more of the burden of defense would inevitably fall on the civilian population, Vigil added
that “I believe we should not count on any protection or resources other than those the New
Mexicans themselves can provide.”170
This inability of the Mexican government to effectively manage warfare with Native
peoples came at a time when many settlers believed they needed it most. Numerous factors
during the early Mexican period contributed to an era of unprecedented violence between
Mexicans and Indigenous peoples. First, trade between the United States and New Mexico
opened up via the Santa Fe Trail, starting in the early 1820s. Spanish authorities had tried to
keep trade within the empire itself by denying foreign traders’ access to New Mexico. The
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Mexican government, however, in an effort to bolster the economy of the new nation,
encouraged such trade. Santa Fe subsequently became an important link to an economic chain
connecting the United States and central Mexico.171 Because of this trade, unlike the interior of
Mexico, the new nation’s northern frontier experienced significant economic growth.172 Two
and a half decades after Mexican independence, New Mexico was economically far more
integrated into the economy of the United States than Mexico and helped to prime New Mexico
for American conquest.173
As Missouri came to replace Mexico as the principal source of trade for New Mexican
inhabitants, Indigenous people also began to turn toward American traders. Firearms were one
of the more significant commodities that Anglo Americans traded with Native Peoples. New
Mexican Natives were, for the first time, able to obtain a significant number of firearms which
increased their proficiency at warfare and bolstered their confidence to attack settlements across
the frontier. As Native peoples now had a pathway other than New Mexico for obtaining
manufactured goods through trade, the necessity to form a conciliatory relationship with New
Mexicans diminished. The introduction of new trading partners proved ruinous for the province.
The introduction of a deluge of firearms, as well as the unraveling of Native-Hispano alliances,
led to a destabilization of civilian-Native relations and frequently erupted in more violence.
In 1831 an economically impoverished Mexico also abandoned the ration and gift-giving
system that had kept many Apaches contained within the peace establishments. In 1818
Governor Melagres articulated that funds for Indian gifts had run out leaving him “little or
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nothing of that used as Indian presents.”174 Most Apaches thus evacuated the peace
establishments en masse and Apache raiding parties began laying waste to the northern Mexican
frontier. These factors returned the Mexican north as a whole back to a state of war with
indigenous peoples.175 Historian Joseph F. Park articulates, “The twenty year respite of peace
ended in a flame of revolt that burned brightly for many years thereafter.”176
By the decade of the 1830s, the Apaches effectively seized the area between Socorro,
New Mexico and Paso del Norte, the Navajos had joined forces with Utes to attack outlying
settlements, and the Pawnees were reaching as far south as San Juan Pueblo. Although the New
Mexican/Comanche alliance endured long after their peace with the rest of Mexico collapsed,
certain Comanche bands also began to threaten northern and eastern New Mexico.177 Many
individual settlements in the Mexican north were relegated to signing unauthorized peace
treaties, known as “calico treaties,” with certain Native bands. However, the Apaches remained
the principal threat to the region. One American mercenary, George Evans noted, “The whole
country seems to be governed by the Apache nation, and those pretending to rule dare not say
that they are masters.”178 Instability caused by all of the aforementioned factors, including the
growth of scalp hunting epitomized by James T. Kirker, as well as the spike in Apache
retaliatory violence, caused many Mexican families to abandon certain frontier areas in the
1830s.179
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During the Mexican era from 1821-1848, amidst this unprecedented atmosphere of
mutual brutality, the institution of civilian warfare gained importance to fill the vacuum created
by the weak Mexican state. The lion’s share of both offensive and defensive warfare in
Mexico’s north indeed fell to both mandatory and volunteer civilian militias sanctioned by the
state. In a bankrupt nation, strong local militias seemed an economically sound alternative to
maintaining an expensive standing army. As in the colonial era, regional Mexican governments
maintained local militias, which included all able-bodied men, except those with position or
wealth who could afford to pay a fee to avoid service.180 However, in 1835, to weaken the
power of the states, centralist President Antonio López de Santa Anna reduced the size of local
militias to only one out of every five hundred inhabitants.181 As a result, non-sanctioned
volunteer units arose to defend their homes motivated by the necessity to defend themselves and
their communities or to avenge an outrage.182 Sonora and Chihuahua even went as far as
adopting extermination policies, paying 100 pesos or more to volunteer militiamen for an adult
male Apache’s scalp.183 The most notorious of these scalp hunters was James Kirker, contracted
by the governor of Chihuahua to fight Apaches. Kirker was given a force of two hundred
militiamen at his disposal.184 Unlike the other northern provinces, New Mexico didn’t find it
necessary to adopt Indian extermination policies and continued utilizing civilian warriors for
defense. As in the colonial era, the poor tended to bear the brunt of regional defense, and by
1834, civilian militias in New Mexico totaled nine hundred men “badly armed, poorly equipped,
and without instructions in handling arms.” 185 These men weren’t only tasked with warring with
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Independent Indians; they took an active part under the direction of the governor in both
suppressing the Chimayo Rebellion and repelling invaders during the Texas-Santa Fe
Expedition.
Certain observers commented on the change in the nature of warfare in New Mexico
from the Spanish regime to the Mexican, explicitly noting the destitute condition of the
overburdened civilian militias. Donaciano Vigil stated that during the colonial era, only “one
company of presidial soldiers, properly under a superior system of discipline, well armed,
mounted, and supported in everything, along with the customary aid of the citizenry, protected
this area.” Noting the importance of civilian warfare during the colonial era, he stated that
expeditions were successful due to “the cooperation of as many citizenry as were named who
blindly obeyed the established authorities.” However, articulating the marked increased reliance
on civilian warfare during the Mexican era, as well as their destitute condition, Vigil
begrudgingly said, “Most of the inhabitants of New Mexico, and especially those who are most
exposed to attacks by the barbarians, are armed only with bows and arrows and these are scarce
because they do not have the means to buy more – not to mention guns and ammunition.” He
added, “I do not doubt, gentlemen, that if the people of New Mexico could acquire arms and
ammunition at reasonable prices, the same barbarians who now insult our defenseless situation
will very quickly learn to respect us.”186 Governor Francisco Sarracino himself blamed the ricos
for putting all the responsibility of defense on the poor population and stated that the lower class
fought out of necessity, but did so “without enthusiasm or zeal.”187
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The experiences and organization of these civilian frontier militias differed from
professionalized career soldiers in several ways which contributed towards a sustained and
unique military culture in the north. First, these men were able to use military valor and honor to
improve their social positions. On the frontier, the legitimization of authority became linked
with warfare. As Ana María Alonso argues in her analysis of violence in Namiquipa,
Chihuahua, men who possessed extraordinary fighting skills and bravery gained a local
following within their pueblos.188 Second, frontier forces largely ignored legal regulations and
strategies. Instead of following standard military protocol, civilians as frontier warriors followed
their own unendorsed, unsanctioned paths of violence. These men learned to fight like their
enemies, attacking “without regularity or concert, shouting, halloing, and firing their
carbines.”189 Military violence on the frontier, therefore, lacked the more restrictive regulations,
including a system of military justice and punishment for egregious behavior, observed by a
professional army. Finally, whereas the soldiers stationed at a presidio typically lacked personal
or familial ties to the region they protected, civilian militia lived in the communities they
protected. Living in the towns sometimes for generations provided them with an additional
incentive to violence and retribution not generally possessed by the professional soldiers during
their temporary appointment a presidio because they were in charge of the protection of their
land and families. Thus, civilian militia perceived their retributive violence as an individual and
communal right associated with protecting their families, property and homeland, the core
tenants of maintaining honor among one’s community. This unique military culture on the
northern reaches of Mexico ensured that an interweaving of violence and honor, freedom from
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traditional military protocol, and protection of kin and hearth, helped to shape the ideals, values,
and actions of its citizens well into the U.S. era in the Southwest borderlands.
In addition, and tied to the issues discussed above, masculine honor necessitated that
these militiamen respond with a certain kind of gendered violence which both feminized Apache
men and obliterated Apache womanhood. Even before engaging in warfare with Indians,
Mexican colonists already held that Indian men did not adhere to masculine standards partly
because they believed the men did not properly engage in work. According to one observer:
“The men never occupy themselves in any other work but hunting, fighting, and stealing, for
everything else is done by the women.”190 These gendered ideals assisted in further drawing a
boundary between the civilized male colonist who adhered to his manly duties and the native
savage who did not. According to Ana María Alonso, “the colonists deployed a multiplicity of
practices that feminized the ethnic other and stripped him of his masculinity and power.”191
Defeating Indian men in warfare and capturing women were some of the ways in which Mexican
men could further dishonor and emasculate Indian men.192 In particular, the murder of Apache
women had much to do with this gendered ideal. By slaying Apache women, militiamen took
women out of the category of non-combatants. By doing so, Juliana Barr argues in her analysis
of the eighteenth-century frontier; colonists deprived these women of the consideration and
protection that European-based codes of war dictated, which was “in effect- a denial of their
identity as women eligible for the privileges of respectful…womanhood.”193
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Acts of brutality by militia groups and citizenry were thus extremely common throughout
the Mexican north on the eve of the U.S.-Mexico War. In 1834, for example, at the northern
Chihuahuan town of El Cobre, a group of Apaches consisting of five women and two men
approached the town in an effort to trade fifteen head of cattle. Even by this time, Mexican
hatred for Apaches ran deep, as the Mexicans in the town allowed the Apaches to enter, where
they immediately fell upon them, killing two of the men and one woman. The Mexican
commander at El Cobre was able to seize two Mexicans for the murders, however popular
sentiment was against him, and he had to let them go when the townspeople turned on him “with
their weapons in their hands.”194 In another example of this trend of violence in the Mexican
north, colonists from the Chihuahua town of Galeana invited over a hundred Apaches to a feast.
Much of the day was festively spent dancing and drinking. By midnight “nearly everyone was
lying in a drunken stupor.” The Mexicans of Galeana took advantage of this circumstance and
violently attacked the sleeping Apaches. The Mexicans proceeded to “stab, hack, and club the
recumbent Apaches.” One pregnant Apache women was killed in the town church, where the
Mexicans proceeded to tear her unborn child from her body.195 These are but some examples of
the violent acts against Indians that were prevalent in the Mexican north during the nineteenth
century.
Violent interactions between such militia groups and Native peoples in the borderlands
were indeed based upon a long history of mutual violence and hatred due in part to Apache
raiding and retaliation, but by the nineteenth century, justification of the brutality employed
towards Indians became much more heavily influenced by Mexican racial ideologies concerning

194
195

Blyth, Chiricahua and Janos, 130.
Ibid., 142.

76

Native peoples. The idea of race, despite being officially expelled as an identification system by
the Mexican federal government, still held a large amount of importance in the lives of the
various peoples situated in the Mexican north during the nineteenth century. Indian peoples such
as the Pueblos, who served in militias, paid their taxes and maintained their own municipal
governments were not considered to be on equal footing with the Mexican colonists, but they
were still more easily incorporated into an idea of Mexicanidad, or Mexican identity, than groups
such as the Apaches.196 Many considered these groups which refused to follow these precepts
outside the boundaries of modern civilization. Mexican colonists considered seminomadic
Native peoples such as the Apache who based much of their economies on raiding livestock as
“barbarians” who lived in a state of nature. Within an ideological framework that equated
independent Indians with animals, Apaches could be hunted and slain in a similar fashion, with
little cause for remorse.
Many northern Mexicans, however, found it more difficult than their neighbors in Texas
and the United States to think in binary racial categories as most Mexicans had native ancestry
themselves. The Spanish casta system separated the races into hierarchies yet the blurring of
racial boundaries in New Mexico led to confusion over what criteria constituted indigenous and
non-indigenous. Genízaros, for example, never fit into either category and their existence
bordered in between these two worlds. During the Mexican era, a more conscious separation of
the identities of the mestizo and the Indian occurred in the Mexican north. In order to claim all
the benefits of “whiteness,” northern colonist’s redefined their heritage based on “whiteness”
rather than “Indianness.” According to invented tradition, conquest and settlement of the frontier
had been carried out by Spaniards, whom colonists considered white, and intermixture with
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Indians had been negligible.197 Accordingly, colonists in the Mexican north began to distance
themselves from anything considered traditionally Indian. As evidence of the intensity of this
conceptual separation of ethnicity, by the end of the eighteenth century, northern Mexicans
consumed more than one-third of the entire wheat harvest, even though they comprised only onefourth of the total population because cornmeal was associated with Indianness.198 Such
conscious racial separation served to harden the line between groups such as the Apaches and
Mexicans in places such as New Mexico.
Although unable to supply significant numbers of troops to defend the frontier, the
Mexican federal government was still able to regulate the use of force in the north, thereby using
these militarized citizens as tools of the state. The Mexican state successfully acted as a fount
and arbiter of honor for civilians engaged in community defense. For instance, to secure
political office, military skill and valor were a necessity.199 Also, with peasants often being too
poor to purchase their own weapons, the state tried to provide civilian warriors with arms and
munitions.200 As Donaciano Vigil noted, [it is not] “the rich who usually go in pursuit of the
barbarians when they have carried out a raid.”201 Therefore, the Mexican government managed
violence and fueled the search for personal honor by furnishing civilian fighters with rights to
land, tax exemptions, rights to booty captured from defeated Indians, and as was the case of
James Kirker, cash payments for Apache scalps and prisoners.202 In these ways, the government
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was able to assert its control over frontier warfare, shape the nature of borderlands combat, and
influence the culture of its residents for decades.
By the 1840s, the Mexican government, at last, began to address the extreme violence
taking place on its northern frontier. It was not, however, solely Indian hostilities which
compelled the government to act. The possibility of a foreign invasion by Texas made the
Mexican federal government extremely anxious. Mexican authorities had long blamed the U.S.
and Texas governments which they believed were helping the Apache in their war with the
Mexicans in order to ultimately annex the provinces.203 During the 1840s, the Mexican
government had reason to think that neighboring Texas had been encouraging and assisting
Indians in their war with New Mexico. Under the threat that Texas would endeavor to overtake
New Mexico as they had attempted in 1841, the Mexican government gave more weapons,
supplies, and troops to Santa Fe. In 1846, the President had ordered the national treasury to
provide New Mexico with “all the resources available to the Supreme Government.”204
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Illustration 1.1: A depiction of Santa Fe in 1846-47. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Encouraging cooperation between the departments, the number of potentially available troops at
the Santa Fe presidio increased to more than 200. These actions proved to be too little too late,
however, as war with the United States was at hand.
United States observers pointed to the state of warfare with Independent Indians in the
Mexican north as a reason to question Mexico’s claim over the region. As part of their quest for
a continental empire, many U.S. officials saw merit in acquiring the Mexican north, specifically
the budding markets of California. After a questionable boundary dispute in Texas, U.S.
officials saw an opportunity to act, declaring war on Mexico in 1846. Soon after, the U.S.
military under General Stephen Watts Kearny swept through New Mexico. Upon hearing of the
coming of the Americans, 4,000 civilian volunteers under the guidance of Governor Manuel
Armijo gathered in Santa Fe and declared their intentions to fight. As the American army drew
near the defensive stronghold of Apache Canyon, General Armijo and his troops were waiting on
the other side. As it became clear that there would be no hostilities that day, the governor
unceremoniously sent all the militia home. He then mustered the small company at the Santa Fe
presidio and hastily fled to Chihuahua. Although primed for a fight, the civilian population was
consigned to bow to the wishes of the governor. Armijo justified his decision not to battle the
Americans, arguing, “We would defend our country, we desire to defend it, but we cannot do so,
our general government being hundreds of leagues distant, it is impossible for me to receive the
necessary aid to make such a defense.”205 Kearny and his men thus marched into Santa Fe. The
acting governor turned the province over to American general, not a shot fired.
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Immediately after occupying New Mexico, U.S. military officials frequently claimed that
they had come to liberate the region, specifically arguing that, unlike Mexico, they would
actually be able to subjugate the independent Indians. They thus attempted to play off of the
people’s frustration toward the Mexican government, specifically their seeming neglect
concerning warfare with independent Indians. In a proclamation in Santa Fe, general Kearny
stated, “From the Mexican government you have never received protection…The Apaches and
Navajoes come down from the mountains and carry off your sheep, and even your women,
whenever they please. My government will correct all this.”206 The Polk administration also
gave general Zachary Taylor a proclamation to read which said that the Mexican people were left
“defenseless, and easy prey to savage Cumanches [sic], who not only destroy your lives and
property, but drive into captivity more horrible than death itself your wives and children.”207
Taylor had also claimed that many Mexican communities “were disgusted with the lack of
protection from these [Indian] raids by their government far away in Mexico City.”208 Thus, the
United States presented themselves as liberators, but as time progressed, it became clear to the
Hispano residents that they would be anything but.

Centuries of near constant warfare between the settlers and Native Peoples shaped New
Mexican society. Mandatory militia service alongside a system of retaliatory violence and
plunder became so commonplace that Hispano settlers came to believe that it was their moral
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right and duty to battle independent Indians either with or without the consent of the government.
Violence and brutality begot violence and brutality in New Mexico. A hostile environment such
as this certainly influenced the behavior of the residents for years to come.
The modes of warfare enacted during the Spanish and Mexican periods in New Mexico
set a precedent that would continue long into the U.S. era. Their consistent reliance (especially
during the Mexican era) on civilian warriors bled into the culture of the diverse residents,
priming them to fight Indians, particularly Apaches, regardless of the policies articulated by the
U.S. military or the American governors of New Mexico. As the United States attempted to
assert their own style of governance and warfare in the territory of New Mexico, they would be
surprised to find just how deeply the desire for civilians to carry out their own form of warfare
was. Partly due to Anglo American racialization of the various peoples of New Mexico,
however, the United States military would try to place warfare solely into the hands of the
regular army. Yet, civilians repeatedly called for their own form of retribution against their
traditional Native enemies, and in the process, called into question the authority of the U.S.
military and the territorial government to control the actions of Nuevomexicanos. When the US
government refused to track down Native perpetrators of thefts or violence, many residents took
matters into their own hands. Thus, during the first decades of U.S. rule in New Mexico, the
Anglo government, Nuevo Hispano civilians, and Native groups such as the Apache, waged not
only a physical war based on retributive violence, but they also engaged in a more conceptual
battle over cultural authority, manhood, the right to protect the homeland, and larger questions of
belonging in the Southwest borderlands.
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Chapter 2: Bordered-lands and the Dismantling of an Institution, 1846-1852

In 1848, less than two years after its commencement, the U.S.-Mexico War came to a
close as the United States secured victory over Mexico. In May of that year, the two nations
ratified the landmark Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which ceded a sizeable portion of Mexico’s
northern regions, almost half of its entire domain, to the United States for a paltry sum of 15
million dollars.209 Through the stroke of a pen, the region transformed from a borderland to a
bordered-land, at least on paper. Almost immediately an approximate boundary between the two
nations roughly the length of the Rio Grande westward to the Pacific emerged on the maps of
cartographers and in the minds of politicians. An international line of demarcation between the
two nations etched like a scar through New Mexico.210 As abstract and arbitrary as this
boundary was, it had very real consequences for the residents of what was now the U.S.
Southwest. Above all the new border delineated a concept of citizenship which became
interwoven with Anglo American notions concerning race. Relative racial and social fluidity
observed during the Spanish and Mexican eras in New Mexico would quickly be replaced by
hardened conceptions of belonging, inclusion, and exclusion.
A large segment of the newly acquired territory, New Mexico was generally seen by
many Anglo Americans as a hopeless and inaccessible desert which was basically worthless and
unable to sustain what they considered civilized life.211 This idea was contrary to the ways that
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Americans had envisioned the fertile lands and trading ports of California. Many Americans
were therefore extremely anxious concerning the incorporation of this domain. Most concerning
to these critics was the racial and ethnic makeup of the region’s population. By 1850, less than 1
percent of New Mexico’s 62,000 inhabitants (a number that excludes the region’s numerous
nomadic Indian groups) were Anglos.212 Many Anglo Americans, due to widespread racial
beliefs, couldn’t fathom incorporating such an unwelcome mix of Hispano and Indian peoples
into the broader U.S. body politic. To these observers, New Mexicans had no place in a nation
that continued to operate within the ideological confines of presumed white Anglo Saxon
supremacy.213 This can be ultimately exemplified in prolonged disagreements concerning the
prospect of New Mexican statehood. Although New Mexico by law could apply for statehood if
they reached a population of 60,000, it had exceeded that number by 1850. The territory,
however, would not achieve statehood until 1912.214 Thus the initial prospect of granting New
Mexico’s Hispano population full equality and citizenship struck many Anglo American officials
as objectionable.
Anxiety concerning conflict with the region’s various Indian peoples also plagued many
Anglo-American officials who questioned the wisdom of acquiring Mexico’s northern frontier.
Centuries of warfare with Native Peoples in New Mexico had preceded the Americans, and
despite General Stephen Watts Kearny’s insistence that the U.S. military would quickly remedy
the situation, the difficulty of adhering to this promise soon became apparent. Through Article
11 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States arrogantly agreed to forcibly restrain
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“incursions within the territory of Mexico” by “savage tribes.” In one of the only provisions of
the treaty that favored Mexico, Article 11 stipulated that the U.S. had the responsibility of
preventing Indian raiding parties who ventured below the border. The task of militarily
subjugating New Mexico’s Native inhabitants would, however, prove nearly impossible. New
Mexico itself was vast. It included modern-day Arizona and bordered Sonora, Chihuahua, and
far West Texas. It’s porous borders ensured that Native people could easily escape U.S. military
engagements. The region was located in the heart of both Dinetah and Apacheria, and the total
Indian population of New Mexico was between 40,000 and 58,000; only a small minority of
those were on peaceful terms with the non-indigenous inhabitants.215 New Mexico itself was
vast. It included modern-day Arizona and bordered Sonora, Chihuahua, and far West Texas. Its
porous borders ensured that Native people could easily escape U.S. military engagements. In
addition, the lion’s share of the Hispano and Pueblo communities resided only in the very
contained upper Rio Grande region and the Mesilla Valley; there being no permanent Hispano
settlements to speak of in far eastern or western New Mexico. It’s safe to say that independent
Indians held sovereignty over the bulk of what was known as New Mexico during the early U.S.
period. Adherence to article 11, therefore, would be an arduous if not impossible undertaking
which would lead to its eventual extraction from the treaty by 1854.216 Yet during the early
years of U.S. rule, the military would endeavor unsuccessfully to fulfill the article’s stipulations.
In their effort to forcibly overpower New Mexico’s independent Indians, the United
States military would seek to transform the nature of civilian warfare throughout the territory. In
contrast to New Spain and Mexico’s abundant reliance on civilian militias in the region, the
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United States military sought to restrain civilian warriors and place a greater dependency on the
regular troops to engage in warfare with Native Peoples. It quickly became apparent, however,
to the settlers, the Pueblo peoples, and the territorial government established in 1851, that the
military strength offered by the army was woefully inadequate and would not nearly be enough
to effectively war with the independent Indians of New Mexico. To afford the necessary
manpower to battle these Native peoples, many non-military personnel in New Mexico,
including Indian agent turned first civilian Governor James Calhoun, saw the benefit in
continuing the utilization of civilian soldiers, both Native and non-Native, either with or without
the cooperation of the regular army. The military, however, especially under Department
Commander Edwin Sumner saw things differently. During the U.S. War with Mexico and
shortly after, the military welcomed aid from certain sections of the New Mexican population to
help battle independent Indians. Upon his arrival in 1852, Sumner, due in part to prevalent
racialized ideas concerning Nuevomexicanos, tried to limit the organization and power of such
civilian militias because, at the onset of U.S. conquest, there were very few Anglos in the
territory. Thus, the creation of a civilian militia would undoubtedly have been primarily
comprised of Nuevomexicanos and Pueblo Indians. The civilian population, however, continued
to advocate for self-defense, thereby implementing their own notions of citizenship. They, in
essence, became the state in its absence and continued to hold sovereignty over their own
conceptions of what defines citizenship, which included the right to warfare. This ushered in an
era of conflict with the territorial government, citizens, and Pueblo Indians on one side, and the
U.S. military on the other.
The civil government and territorial inhabitants had their own sets of concerns and
perspectives which commonly ran counter to the interests of the military. The territorial
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government along with the New Mexican settlers and Pueblo peoples, for example, frequently
sought to continue the mode of civilian warfare that they and their forbears had performed for
centuries. Yet, U.S. military officials, with the exception of a few more open-minded officers
initially, were generally reticent to utilize civilian fighters whom they considered racially
incapable of being effective warriors and ultimately a liability. Necessity drove the military to
use Hispano volunteers during and shortly after the occupational period. Yet, many Anglo
American officials held to the racialized beliefs that Nuevomexicanos were ignorant, lazy, and
apathetic; at the same time noting their failure to subdue independent Indians during the Mexican
era effectively. These observers also claimed that Hispanos lacked the masculine qualities
necessary for self-defense. Therefore, officials such as Edwin Sumner assumed that the
Nuevomexicano population would be anything but effective warriors. They also supposed that
these men, if allowed to fight, could not, by virtue of their supposed disobedient nature, exist as
disciplined units which the military could easily supervise. Primarily due to the simmering
centuries-long hatred between these inhabitants and independent Indians, U.S. officials assumed
that during military expeditions, Nuevomexicanos would be difficult to restrain and manage.
These factors, many military officials believed, would ultimately have the undesired effect of
inciting further chaos and violence in the territory. With these viewpoints in mind, Department
Commander Colonel Edwin Sumner upon his appointment in 1852, would attempt to put a stop
to the long-adhered-to custom of civilian warfare.
Additionally, several Anglo American officials, as chapter 3 will outline in greater detail,
adhered to a belief that the dubious citizenship status of the Hispano population was a factor that
disqualified them from engaging in warfare on behalf of the United States. Anglo observers
surmised that although Nuevomexicanos were given U.S. citizenship in 1848, this status was
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questionable at best. Being defined as “white” under the law Hispanos were theoretically
granted all of the rights and privileges that the status entailed. Yet the political power of
whiteness was generally denied these people by the emerging Anglo elite. Historian Pablo
Mitchell posits that the physical characteristics of being “white” can be equated with voting
rights, civic leadership, and legal protections.217 To many Anglo Americans, Hispanos certainly
did not possess the perceived physical and mental traits that supposedly qualified them for these
privileges. Furthermore, many U.S. officials reasoned that Nuevomexicano citizens held no real
loyalty to the United States and actually retained allegiance to their former government of
Mexico. In general, the military viewed Hispanos as conquered people. Just a few short years
earlier, the U.S. deemed Hispanos as effectively enemies of the U.S as they were at war. During
the occupational period, in 1847, an alliance of Hispanos and Pueblos near Taos revolted against
the United States, resulting in many deaths, including then governor, Charles Bent. This worried
many Anglo officials who questioned the wisdom of arming such a population. Hispanos in
New Mexico, due to their relatively large population, were initially able to secure political rights
longer and fend off prejudicial legislation and court decisions more effectively than other ethnic
Mexicans in California or Texas. Yet, during this early period, the U.S. military nonetheless
attempted to curtail Hispanos’ right to engage militarily on behalf of the United States due to
racialized notions concerning citizenship.
The citizenship status of Pueblo Indians, as this current chapter will discuss, also affected
Anglo American willingness to utilize them militarily. Anglo Americans generally imagined the
various Native Peoples of the United States in monolithic terms. The Pueblos of New Mexico fit
in with this conception. As just one of the many Native American communities located within
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U.S. boundaries, Pueblo peoples were accorded the same status given other Indian nations.
Native peoples located within the limits of the United States were not allowed U.S. citizenship,
and even though the Pueblo people attained citizenship under Mexico, they were denied this
status by the U.S. government. A series of court cases in the late 19th century further confirmed
this status as “wards of the state.” Although many Anglo American observers perceived Pueblo
peoples as more exceptional and industrious than Hispanos, Pueblo Indians generally fell under
the racialized rhetoric of being too “savage” and “uncivilized” to continue to assist with military
duty, at least on the scale previously seen during the Spanish and Mexican eras.218 Through the
eyes of many Anglo military officials, these intertwined notions of race and citizenship and the
supposed “savagery” of Native peoples disqualified both Hispanos and Pueblo Indians to engage
militarily on behalf of the United States.
The events which took place in New Mexico during the short four-year period of 18481852 laid the overall framework for the nature of warfare in the territory, both civilian and
military, that would, excepting the five years during the Civil War, last another fifty years.219
Primarily, this period became one of initial racialization of the New Mexican people by a
growing Anglo elite. Pablo Mitchell defines racialization as an “externally imposed set of
categories that differentiate and hierarchically organize social groups according to scientific and
quasi-scientific physical embodied features.”220 This process had a tangible impact on not only
its people but warfare in general in New Mexico. This brief era saw the U.S. military curb the
utilization of Pueblo Peoples as active participants in warfare against independent Indians; the
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territorial government attempt to implement New Mexico’s first U.S. era militia law; and a
concerted effort by certain military officials to halt the traditional practice of Hispano warfare
with Native Peoples. These circumstances led to the formation of a specific pattern of extremely
limited civilian defense in New Mexico that would last many years. As a result, the era saw the
birth of what would be a long precedent of conflict between the civil government along with the
inhabitants, and the U.S. military. This chapter will explore these various themes through a lens
that emphasizes the impact that Anglo American racialization of the New Mexican inhabitants
had on warfare in the region. This chapter ultimately argues that Anglo American ideas
concerning race and citizenship in New Mexico during the nineteenth century bled into white
military officials’ views of civilian militias consisting mainly of Pueblo Indians and Hispanos,
effectively putting a halt to the centuries-old model of civilian warfare, ultimately leading to a
colossal disconnect and conflict between the territorial government, the multi-ethnic inhabitants,
and the military.

The tumultuous nature of U.S./Indian relations in New Mexico as well as general
dissatisfaction with the U.S. military’s actions in the region led many of its inhabitants and
initially even some military officials to continue to support the institution of civilian warfare. A
turbulent Indian policy, a perceived lack of sufficient military manpower, and the overall
deleterious condition of the few regular troops stationed in New Mexico all contributed toward
an apparent need for civilian warriors. Similar to the Spanish and Mexican regimes, Native
peoples and Nuevomexicanos during the U.S. era continued to take part in the centuries-old
ritualistic dance of violent revenge and mutual plunder for livestock and captives. The
government of the United States placed the blame of this shared violence solely on the overly
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simplistic explanation of “Indian raiding.” Thus, in order to carry out the stipulations of Article
11, the central objective of the military in New Mexico quickly became the endeavor of halting
Indian raids both within the territory and directly below the new border.221 Military policy in
New Mexico, therefore, became entangled with the overall Indian policy of the United States
which, at that time had long been ambiguous and inconsistent.
Since the nation’s founding, the United States had been largely unable to implement a
uniform, definitive Indian policy. Instead, policymakers carried out relations with Indian peoples
through “a series of experimentations on successive frontiers.”222 As such, varying methods of
handling relations with Native Peoples located within the supposed boundaries of the United
States had been carried out over many years. These techniques included war, treaties, the
cession of Indian land, annuities and presents, and complete removal of some tribes to so-called
Indian country in the west. At best, these practices resulted in only temporary cessations in
hostilities, and as American settlers increasingly flooded into the West, the notion of an
independent Indian country as a permanent solution was swept away by the colonial tide. At
worst, U.S.-Indian relations had devolved into open hostility culminating in violence, warfare,
and death. These various modes of Indian-U.S. relations had been implemented at different
times and under unique circumstances, leading to many different outcomes. In general, the
United States had therefore pursued anything but a uniform, coherent, and effective Indian policy
leading up to the U.S.-Mexico War.
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The acquisition of Mexico’s far north after the U.S.-Mexico War further imperiled this
already disordered policy. With such a sizeable territorial acquisition thousands of Native
Peoples were placed under the perceived dominion of the United States. This led many
observers to believe that any former Indian policy, as ineffective as it already was, would prove
wholly inadequate. In 1849, for example, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando Brown
concluded that if there were to be any practical solution to the “Indian problem,” the policy of
the federal government toward Indian tribes would need to be completely transformed, and they
would need to implement a more concrete and effective strategy concerning their interactions
with Native peoples.223 Accordingly, that same year, in an effort to achieve a fresh approach to
Indian relations, the Indian office was transferred from the Department of War to the Department
of the Interior. Government officials reasoned that civil administration would be more effective
in “civilizing” and educating the Indians than the military.224 In theory, through this transfer, the
federal government subordinated the military to civilian authority in matters relevant to Indian
relations. In practice, however, the policy frustrated many military field commanders, which led
to considerable controversy over whether military or civilian officials were more adequately
competent to manage Indian affairs.225 Frequently, bickering between military and civil officials
concerning the correct course of action caused more complicated relations with not only Native
nations but Congress, on which both departments depended for appropriations.226 Confusion and
ensuing struggles concerning whether military or civil authority should oversee Indian relations
would indeed play out in the newly acquired territory of New Mexico.
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One of the defining characteristics of Indian policy in the United States was the
government’s heavy reliance on Indian agents, and the acquisition of Mexico’s north would
place tremendous strain on this institution. It had been the policy for many years that a regional
superintendent, usually the governor, be in charge of that particular region’s Indian affairs.
Immediately under these superintendents were Indian agents, who lived with or nearby a specific
tribe and were crucial points of interethnic contact. Despite directly incorporating approximately
124,000 Native peoples into the United States after acquiring Mexico’s northern region in 1848,
Congress did little to increase the number of Indian agents needed on new frontier outposts.
New Mexican officials, however, thought it necessary to employ many more Indian agents to
communicate and negotiate with the many Native nations residing there. Yet, no change in the
number of Indian agents was forthcoming in New Mexico until 1851. This left James Calhoun a 47-year-old ex-army officer and soon-to-be first civilian governor of the territory- as the lone
Indian agent in New Mexico for more than two years.227 This was a monumental if not
impossible task given the number of indigenous people disseminated around the territory, which
at the time included present-day Arizona. Even when Congress finally consented to have four
Indian agents in New Mexico, territorial officials still found this number insufficient to
communicate with the numerous Indian nations in the region effectively. Thus, directly after the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, due to a chaotic, shifting, and mostly ineffective Indian policy,
Indian agents and the military were hard-pressed to do their duties effectively. These factors
almost immediately led to the continuation of an environment of violent hostility between
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indigenous and non-indigenous people in New Mexico as the region switched hands from
Mexico to the United States.
As the United States saw massive territorial growth after the U.S. War with Mexico, the
need for more troops to police these newly acquired areas was considerable. Yet Congress,
similar to their hesitancy in expanding the number of Indian agents, was likewise reluctant to
increase the size of the army. In 1848, President James K. Polk stated that the number of troops,
as it existed before the War with Mexico, would be enough to serve peacetime necessities. He
mistakenly believed that the current number of Indian agents would be able to secure peace with
the tribes; therefore, no additional troop numbers would be needed. Congress concurred with the
President, and the regular army maintained just over ten thousand men to police the entire United
States.228 In 1850 and 1855, Congress allocated additional troops to help subdue the frontier,
however, as historian Robert Utley argues, they never supplied enough troops "with a liberality
permitting anything approaching a strength equal to the task."229 This seeming lack of military
manpower hit New Mexico particularly hard. Major George Archibald McCall said as much
during his 1850 inspection tour of New Mexico. He pointed out that “it must appear that the
military force at present in New Mexico is idle and inefficient, or that the extent of frontier
entrusted to its protection is out of proportion to its strength and the character of its
organization.”230 Despite such observations by military officials, troop numbers long remained
lower than the settlers and the military themselves stationed in New Mexico had hoped for.
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Straightaway, aggressions arose between Native peoples and U.S. soldiers and settlers in
New Mexico during the occupational period during which a general feeling of the inadequacy of
the military began to spread among the populace. In the fall of 1846, the army was able to
induce the Navajo to a peace treaty using the strength of the occupying forces available at that
time.231 However, after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, the volunteer army was
mustered out of service leaving the territory with a relatively limited number of regular military
soldiers. After the U.S. military mustered the volunteer troops out of New Mexico in 1848, they
left the territory with a scant force of fewer than five-hundred soldiers from a peak of nearly
three-thousand during the occupational period.232 Many inhabitants began to question the
effectiveness of these few remaining regular troops perceiving that their limited numbers would
hinder them from effectively subduing independent Indians. Few as they were, regular troops in
New Mexico were disbursed over six towns; two companies in Santa Fe, one in Taos, and the
other two distributed between Albuquerque, Socorro, Tome, and Doña Ana. Although the
military population in New Mexico increased to 895 by 1850, settlers believed that there were
too few troops scattered over too many areas to be at all effective against powerful Native groups
such as the Navajo, Apache, and Ute nations.233 This perceived lack of military manpower
would come to be a significant point of contention between the territorial and federal
governments as well as the citizenry for decades to come.
The perceptibly insufficient number of soldiers stationed in New Mexico after 1848 had
very tangible consequences as there were typically not enough soldiers to complete the most
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essential tasks. Without a sufficient number of men, officers and soldiers were expected to
undertake an often-overwhelming array of assignments which commonly led to overwork, stress,
and exhaustion. On top of their central mission of battling Native peoples, soldiers in the
territory carried out laborious duties such as building their own outposts and farming their own
subsistence. Concerning an obvious lack of military manpower, in 1853, Colonel Joseph King
Fenno Mansfield, upon his military inspection of New Mexico noted, “Here it is proper to
remark that there has been too few officers at their companies to secure instruction to the rank
and file and to perform the duty. There were eleven companies with only one officer at a
company for duty and in four cases out of the eleven, that officer commanded the post and did
quartermaster and commissary duty at the same time…It is therefore apparent that these officers
were over worked and nothing but their extraordinary merit, combined with the high character of
the other officers, has kept up the character of the army to the high standard it should always
maintain of honor and sobriety.”234 Recreation time for soldiers was therefore almost
nonexistent, and it’s hard to imagine that the life of a soldier in New Mexico was anything but a
grueling, drab, tedious, and uncomfortable affair. These factors all but guaranteed that troop
morale on western outposts such as New Mexico would be dismal.
Congress’s reluctance to supply additional troops to New Mexico, in particular, stemmed
from the fact that the cost of maintaining forces in the ninth military department, which oversaw
New Mexico and initially west Texas, was proportionally higher than any other department in
the United States. Due to New Mexico's relatively isolated position and its distance from any
navigable river, expenses such as transportation, the purchasing of supplies and the renting of
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facilities skyrocketed military costs.235 Particularly expensive was military transport to western
outposts. Soldiers and goods had to travel hundreds of miles, much of that through an arid
expanse of desert to reach the military stations in New Mexico. Twelve years after the U.S. War
with Mexico, U.S. transportation costs averaged about $2,000,000 a year, which was an increase
of about 1,500% from before the war.236 These massive expenditures, mostly due to the
formation of the U.S. Southwest, persuaded Congress to enact cost-cutting measures that,
because of their detrimental effects on frontier defense, infuriated the territorial government and
the citizenry. Yet those hit hardest by such cost-cutting measures were the troops themselves.
Regular troops felt the harmful effects of these financial measures first-hand. Living
quarters and supplies for the soldiers, particularly those stationed in remote frontier areas such as
New Mexico, left much to be desired. Most of these soldiers received inadequate clothing and
insufficient provisions from the War Department. The soldiers’ pay was meager if they received
it at all and when the troops in New Mexico moved out of the settlements and into frontier forts
in 1851, these posts were rough-shod, usually an assemblage of adobe or log huts which offered
inadequate shelter against the desert sun, whipping wind, and rain. 237 During winter, the troops
shivered from the intense cold, and during summer, nothing could combat the oppressive New
Mexican heat. Weapons supplied to the soldiers were merely operational at best; most of whom
were armed with muzzle-loading guns which at the time were antiquated and obsolete.238 In
1850, the captain of the post of San Elizario in west Texas, south of present-day El Paso, then
still part of the ninth military department which encompassed New Mexico, complained of this
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apparent lack of necessities for his company during a retributive expedition stating, “No blame
can be attached to the company commanders for their deficiency in clothing and other necessities
for their companies…they were literally shoved off on their march with all their deficiencies
known to General Harvey, then in command of the department.”239 Soldiers and their officers
likewise continually expressed their concerns with the lack of basic materials needed to achieve
their objectives in New Mexico.
Additionally, the style of warfare initiated by the U.S. military against Native peoples in
New Mexico was generally ineffective at achieving their desired goals. Even though the U.S.
military frequently peddled the idea of Indian “savagery” and boasted of American technological
and cultural superiority, the military in New Mexico had an extremely difficult time securing
many decisive military victories over independent Indians during this early period. Many Native
groups still had firearms due to trading on the Santa Fe Trail and raids into northern Mexico.
They were, therefore, armed fairly well, which made the Army’s task of subjugation all the more
difficult. The odds were stacked against the regular troops in New Mexico from the outset. Not
only did the Army in New Mexico lack sufficient funds, but no set of rules guided Indian
military policy in the West, and the military offered regular troops no systematic training for
Indian warfare.240 Infantry, a vital component of the army during the U.S. War with Mexico,
proved to be almost completely useless in the fight against mounted Indians in New Mexico.
The frontier guerilla tactics frequently carried out by Native peoples required fast-paced pursuit,
all but impossible for infantry soldiers on foot. Expeditions to pursue the enemy were often
many miles in length, exemplified by a retributive journey near Doña Ana in 1849 in which a
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company traveled over fifty miles to exact revenge against a group of Apaches for the murder of
a citizen.241 Such long-distance expeditions were commonplace, and troops could move up to
2,000 to 3,000 miles per year in some cases.242 Thus, frontier forces in the west constantly
appealed to the federal government for additional companies of dragoons and mounted riflemen.
This style of long-distance pursuit, however, still placed a massive strain on even mounted
dragoons and their horses.
Combined, these unsatisfactory conditions made it difficult for the army to respond to
citizen petitions for military assistance effectively. Alcaldes from various towns in New Mexico
regularly appealed to military officials for the military to undertake retributive campaigns against
independent Indians accused of stealing from or murdering the residents.243 However, due to the
many factors previously discussed, these officials frequently denied such requests. In February
of 1849, for example, the Alcalde of Canales, then a small town about ten miles north of
Albuquerque, appealed to a lieutenant to make a campaign against the Navajos due to their
supposed theft of livestock. The lieutenant was compelled to decline the request. He justified
his refusal by stating, “Having but few troops to spare, I refused to comply with the request…to
this decision, I was led partly from the fruitless result of the last expedition, and again from the
fact that the robberies complained of had been committed more than a week previous.” He then
stated that such a campaign would require “one or two months with at least a hundred men and
the utmost I could do would be to send twelve or fifteen men for about two or three weeks at the
farthest.”244 To the Nuevomexicanos, these rejections became all too commonplace, leading
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these inhabitants to question the effectiveness of the regular military further. The inability of the
army to respond to requests for military assistance had the detrimental effect of ultimately
harboring more ill will towards the regular military in New Mexico.
Another point of contention that developed between settlers and the military was that
many Nuevomexicanos believed that companies stationed in New Mexico were too far removed
from the villages. Initially, following the U.S.-Mexico War, the military housed U.S. troops
within the settlements themselves. The military quickly began to transfer these troops away
from the towns to what officials deemed more strategic locations. When the military planned to
relocate away from a town, often residents expressed extreme dissatisfaction. In 1849, upon
learning that officials were proposing to relocate the post at Franklin, the site of present-day El
Paso to San Elizario, twenty-five miles to the south, a petition by residents of the town, whose
signatories included noted businessman James Magoffin stated, “We have recently learned that
an order has been issued to vacate the post at present occupied by troops opposite to El Paso
which would leave this part of the country totally unprotected. That such a measure is not only
highly detrimental to our interests but injuring to the interests of the whole neighboring
county.”245 A letter to Major Jefferson Van Horne from a resident of El Paso concerning the
same proposed removal stated, “The situation of this place deserves indeed some considerationit is one of the most exposed points on the frontier, where Indians always almost lay…near
enough to fall on the travelers.”246 U.S. military officials surmised that these transfers away
from the settlements brought with it a greater chance of military success, yet the civilians did not
see it that way. Instead, they perceived these relocations as a wholesale military abandonment of
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the civilians. Actions such as these began confirming settlers’ beliefs that they were alone in
their struggles with Indians, and that their resumption of war was justified.
Due to these various factors, many inhabitants and even some military officials
themselves quickly perceived that the military stationed in the territory was predominately
ineffective at preventing Indian raiding. Hence, some pragmatic military officials saw the
wisdom in utilizing the military assistance of the civilians themselves. These officials reasoned,
with a certain amount of hesitancy, that additional military aid by the residents would be
necessary if they were to be at all effective in subduing the independent Indians of New Mexico.
Although there was a relatively sufficient amount of troops stationed in New Mexico during its
occupation, the military welcomed the help of the residents during this period. After the
withdrawal of the occupational force, military officials saw the benefit of further utilizing
civilian volunteers. There was, therefore, a short window directly before and after the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in which the military actively sought to recruit New Mexican volunteers for
temporary military service. This practice, however, was short-lived.
Between 1846 and 1851, the U.S. military occasionally worked in tandem with a limited
number of friendly Hispanos and Pueblo Indians to war with independent tribes. Although the
New Mexican inhabitants were initially an occupied people, both sides welcomed the other’s
help in warring with a mutual enemy. General Kearny himself advocated the use of civilian
auxiliaries to help subdue independent tribes. In an announcement to New Mexico’s inhabitants
in 1846, Kearny stated, “[I] hereby authorize all the Inhabitants (Mexican & Pueblos) living in
the said District of Country, viz the Rio Abajo, to form War Parties, to march into the Country of
their enemies, the Navajoes, to recover their Property, to make reprisals and obtain redress for
the many insults received from them.” Kearny, therefore, welcomed the unsupervised assistance
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of both Hispanos and Pueblos in the area of Rio Abajo, south of Albuquerque, in his war against
the Navajos. There is evidence that the residents responded to Kearny’s announcement by
independently campaigning within the Navajo homeland.
After the withdrawal of the occupying force, in 1849 Colonel John M. Washington,
military commander and interim governor of the territory sought to overawe the Navajos with an
expedition into their country with what few troops were at his disposal. Washington foresaw all
too well the necessity of having civilian volunteers assist regular troops in their efforts. In
March of that year, Colonel Washington called for the organization of four companies of
volunteers for a six-month enlistment period for the expedition. These volunteer companies
consisted almost entirely of Hispanos recruited from nearby villages. At first, Washington
planned to discharge the volunteer service after the arrival of additional regular troops from Fort
Leavenworth in Kansas. He thought the better of it, however, and kept these volunteers in
cooperation with army regulars in service against the Navajos.247 Volunteer Nuevomexicanos
and the regular army fought side by side against the Navajos and had the desired effect of
inducing them to terms of peace via a treaty.
To their surprise, certain military officials were generally impressed with the combat
prowess of the volunteer Hispanos. In a letter to a territorial official in Santa Fe, Captain Henry
B. Judd praised the actions of the New Mexico volunteer companies in their fight with the
Navajos. He even went as far as recommending the employment of additional volunteer units in
the territory. Judd particularly noted that the volunteer’s familiarity with the region made them
useful soldiers. He stated, “The necessity for their service seems the more important and their
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capabilities for the protection of this frontier more fully developed from their knowledge of the
country and an increased degree of confidence in their own valor and military merits under strict
discipline.” He desired the continuation of at least one of the volunteer companies after their
term of service had expired, asserting, “I would therefore respectfully recommend [that] to
secure their services as soon as possible, that authority be granted me to organize and muster in
at least fifty of these men.”248 Due to their perceived respectable efforts, a minimal number of
the Nuevomexicano Volunteers would remain in service, albeit under very loose terms to be
mustered upon the call of the federal military when needed. These men were very informally
assembled and utilized by the military on an as-needed basis, and no actual legislation
concerning a standing militia was forthcoming at this point.
Serving in capacities where the regular army couldn’t, almost every state and territory of
the United States had long utilized civilian militias. In addition to participating in traditional
wars, militias were commonly utilized as a solution to a weak standing army, being organized
and deployed to deal with issues on state, territorial, or local levels. Employed with a more
regional focus, local militias had been used to stem popular uprisings, engage in warfare with
Native peoples, and recapture fugitive slaves among multiple other purposes. Usually recruited
from the localities that saw such issues, antebellum militia volunteers had been almost
universally Anglo-American men.249 The concept of the citizen soldier was so strong in the
United States that Congress passed the Militia Act of 1792 in which all able-bodied white male
citizens, aged 18-45 were to be enrolled in a state or territorial militia to be used whenever local
legislatures deemed necessary. However, the law’s greatest weakness was that it contained no
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penalties for non-compliance.250 Therefore, indifference and the bureaucratic inability to adhere
to the Act led to the disintegration of militia units in individual states and territories by the midnineteenth century. For example, by 1844, the militia of Indiana had not been mustered for
twelve years.251 Although the militia system was in decline throughout the United States, New
Mexican civil authorities would soon endeavor to create an organized militia in the territory.
Rather than relying on a territorial militia to aid them, early military officials in New
Mexico turned to an informal network of volunteers. Unlike standing militia companies, the
military called up civilian volunteers very sporadically on an as-needed basis, offering no
payment but the prospect of revenge and plunder. From 1849-1852, the military deployed New
Mexican volunteer companies on several different occasions. One month after Washington’s
Navajo campaign, for example, a party of New Mexican volunteers, under U.S. Army Captain
A.L. Papin, responded to the robbery of livestock by a group of Jicarilla Apaches. Military
officials praised the subsequent expedition, particularly noting the ferocity of the volunteers.
The militiamen, about forty in number, pursued the Apaches some twenty miles, confronted the
Indians and killed at least five of them, including their chief, Petrillo. In a letter admiring the
tenacity of the volunteers, Captain Henry B. Judd said that “the Mexicans composing Captain
Papin’s company exhibited much determination and gallantry, the great difficulty was the ability
to restrain them.” Their aggressiveness suggests that hatred between the settlers and Native
people in New Mexico still ran deep. It also exemplifies that, as historian Durwood Ball claims,
“Local militia had concrete stakes – homes, families, farms, and businesses – in their conflict’s
outcome, vengeance would come easily to them.”252 These civilian warriors thus took full
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advantage of the military’s initial enthusiasm for allowing them to battle Native peoples as had
been the custom before the U.S. claimed sovereignty over the region. Overall, Captain Judd was
so pleased by the success of his company that he ordered the alcaldes in the vicinity of San
Miguel, just to the east of Santa Fe, to enroll all the men of the settlements above the age of
sixteen who were capable of bearing arms into a system of night police and patrols. There is no
evidence that the residents strictly adhered to these orders, yet Judd’s order shows that at least
some military officials were indeed initially pleased with the service of Nuevomexicano
volunteers.253
These New Mexican volunteer companies during the early U.S. era continued to be
motivated by the honor of protecting one’s community, vengeance, a desire to do physical harm
to their traditional enemies, but they were also inspired by the prospect of payment in the form of
stolen property. It had long been the policy, as far back as the Spanish period, for volunteer
militia to be paid in booty and prisoners captured from Indians. The U.S. period was no
different. The vast majority of Hispanos were generally poor, owning little land and engaging in
small-scale agriculture and ranching.254 They had, for hundreds of years, attempted to further
their economic fortunes by obtaining prisoners, animals and other property from enemy Indians.
The volunteer companies during the early U.S. era desired similar rewards for their service.
They, therefore, received no pay other than what they took from the expeditions, and this
payment system worked perfectly for a cash strapped War Department. Under this arrangement,
there was little then that separated the actions of the volunteers from what many deemed Indian
“raiding.” Indian raids were usually organized for the purposes of enacting revenge and
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obtaining property and prisoners. So too were these Hispano volunteer expeditions against
independent Indians. The volunteers, for example, returned from the aforementioned Jicarilla
expedition with one hundred and fifty head of cattle and other plunder. In a letter concerning the
event, army Captain Henry B. Judd wrote: “As a trifling reward for their gallantry I have directed
Captain Papin to retain for their use such articles of captured property as are not needed for the
public service or claimed by those from whom they may have been stolen.” The pilfering of
Indian property was indeed a significant motivating factor for these volunteers to engage in
military service, and although Anglo military officials generally shunned the practice of taking
prisoners during this early period, the method would live on and be encouraged, especially
during the Civil War.
With the relative success of these initial volunteer expeditions, certain officials
considered the thought of further adding to the fighting force of New Mexico by employing the
territory’s Pueblo Indians. Since the return of the Spanish after being expelled due to the Pueblo
Revolt of 1680, Pueblo communities possessed a certain level of autonomy seldom allowed
Native peoples by a colonizing force. Pueblo communities generally governed themselves which
included the independence of organizing their own militias. These Pueblo militias coordinated
their own military expeditions against their enemies as well as assisted the Spanish and Mexican
governments to battle independent Indians for almost 150 years. Yet, despite their relative
autonomy and militia service, Pueblo Indians during the Spanish period were still considered
socially inferior to non-indigenous inhabitants in New Mexico due to Spain’s casta system.
With Mexican independence in 1821, however, the new government implemented the Plan de
Iguala, which abolished race as an official defining category. In theory, The Plan de Iguala
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ensured that “race could no longer be legally used to prevent Indians, mestizos, and free
afromestizos from exercising the citizenship rights enjoyed by whites.”255
In theory, Mexico granted all Native peoples in the nation the privileges of Mexican
citizenship, but it was easier for non-Indigenous Mexicans to accept Pueblo citizenship over
other Indians in New Mexico due to several factors which indicated to non-Native observers a
degree of “civilization” among the Pueblo peoples. Many of these Pueblo communities, unlike
various other indigenous groups in New Mexico, lived in what the Spanish and Mexicans
perceived as towns. They had also maintained their own municipal governments, paid taxes,
practiced agriculture, and held to at least a superficial adherence of Christianity.256 Of particular
importance to Mexican officials was that Pueblos had long organized their own militias and
acted as auxiliaries to the armies of the Spanish and Mexican periods. As the United States
claimed sovereignty over the region, they had similarly noted the supposed “civilization” of the
Pueblo peoples. Many U.S. observers claimed that the Pueblo peoples possessed a civilization
and industriousness even superior to the Hispano inhabitants of the region. Therefore, many
Anglo-American officials saw the benefit in reviving the idea of Pueblo Indians serving
alongside the regular military to combat enemy Indian nations.
In 1849, James Calhoun, the sole Indian agent for New Mexico, sought to persuade the
federal government to allow Pueblo Indians to fight the Navajos, Apaches, and Utes, as they had
done for hundreds of years under the Spanish and Mexican regimes. Since his appointment,
Calhoun had spent a significant amount of time settling disputes concerning Hispano
encroachment on Pueblo lands.257 He was therefore very familiar with the Pueblo peoples and
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encouraged their participation in military endeavors. Like most residents of the territory,
Calhoun was a firm believer that more troops would solve the territory’s woes, and he saw in the
abundant population of Pueblo peoples much needed military strength. Calhoun had frequently
penned letters to the federal government in hopes that they would increase the troop strength in
New Mexico. In a letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando Brown, Calhoun claimed
that the number of regular military soldiers in New Mexico was inadequate to subdue the
independent Indians. He asserted, “It will not be a difficult matter for [the Indians] to elude the
most piercing military eye in this territory. Look upon the maps and see the extent of country
over which they roam and say, whether six hundred troops, of all arms, about one half infantry,
are sufficient to check for a moment, these Indians in their irregular mode of warfare.”258 As it
became clear that an increase in troop strength was not forthcoming, Calhoun saw the wisdom in
augmenting regular troops with Pueblo Indians. In a letter to the subsequent Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, William Medill, Calhoun pleaded for the use of Pueblo Indians to supplement the
regular troops. He appealed to Medill: “Give me four companies of Dragoons and allow me to
organize a force from the Pueblo Indians, with the means to subsist them, and to pay them, and
my life for it, in less than six months I will so tame the Navajoes and Utahs that you will scarcely
hear of them again.”259 Calhoun was therefore extremely enthusiastic about allowing Pueblo
peoples the responsibility of battling independent Indians.
Many Pueblo peoples themselves, steeped in a long tradition of independently warring
with their enemies, were also heavily in favor of being allowed to fight. On multiple occasions,
the Pueblos petitioned the U.S. military for permission to make war upon enemy Indians. In
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October of 1849, the Zuñi Pueblo community applied to Colonel Washington to allow them to go
to war against the Navajos. Initially, the Colonel did not comply with their request. In August
of 1850, after two assaults by the Navajos upon Zuñi, during which they killed three residents
and procured several animals, the Gobernador, the Captain de Guerra, and other Principal
leaders from the Pueblo of Zuñi once again petitioned the military to allow them to organize and
make war upon the Navajos. Like the Nuevomexicano population, the Governor of Zuñi
articulated the need for their community to take matters into their own hands, as he was quite
distraught by what he perceived as a lack of U.S. military protection of their pueblo. He stated
that it wasn’t sensible that as the Navajos were commencing war against Zuñi, the military was
in the process of withdrawing troops from nearby Cibolletta and relocating them to Albuquerque.
Unlike Washington, his successor, Colonel John Munroe heeded their petition and consented to
the wishes of the people of Zuni, allowing them to go to war with the Navajos.260
James Calhoun, although a firm believer in the use of Pueblo auxiliaries, was
apprehensive about this particular expedition due primarily to a lack of military oversight by
Munroe. Colonel Munroe failed to issue the Zuñi people any orders other than a very general
permission to make war upon the Navajo. This left the Zuñi people in charge of guiding New
Mexican warfare without the input or management of either the military or territorial
government. Even Calhoun, an early advocate for allowing Pueblos to engage in military
service, wasn’t willing to fully trust Native peoples to guide the trajectory of warfare in the
territory independently. Pueblos should fight, he reasoned, but only if they were employed in
cooperation and under the direction of an Anglo authority; either the military or civil
government. Calhoun articulated his fears that “a general war between the Pueblo Indians and
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the Navajos, would beget results that every lover of humanity would deeply deplore – and the
policy of permitting such a war, is a question for others to determine.” By not directly
overseeing the Zuñi expedition, Calhoun believed that the military was failing in their duty to
have a U.S. authority guide and supervise the course of warfare in New Mexico. In his view,
allowing the Zuñi and Navajo to make war on each other without U.S. guidance and intervention
would lead to disastrous consequences.
James Calhoun’s reluctance also stemmed from the fact that the Pueblo peoples as a
whole were massively underequipped for the task of even temporary military service. In 1849
there were five hundred and ninety-seven men in the Pueblo of Zuñi, and only forty-two muskets
and rifles. This left five hundred and fifty-five potential fighters without firearms. A chronic
shortage of useful arms had long plagued the Pueblo people of New Mexico. In most cases, they
had been relegated to using crude, antiquated, and largely ineffective weapons. American trader
Josiah Gregg observed that during the Mexican era in New Mexico, “The weapons most in use
among the Pueblos are the bow and arrow, with a long-handled lance and occasionally a
fusil.”261 The lack of Pueblo firearms endured long into the U.S. era. This fact concerned
Calhoun greatly, and he stated that with so few firearms, the Zuñi expedition against the Navajo
might “prove disastrous unless other Pueblos fly to the rescue.” He had therefore hoped that the
Zuñi would ask for assistance with their expedition by applying to Colonel Munroe for a joint
operation against the Navajos in cooperation with other Pueblo villages.262 Without proper
munitions, Calhoun reasoned that Zuñi defeat was all but inevitable. It’s not known if the Zuñi
expedition against the Navajo ultimately failed or succeeded in its purpose.
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Colonel John Munroe initially gave his blessing to the Zuni people to make war upon
the Navajo, yet afterward, the U.S. military would only very seldom allow Pueblo peoples other
opportunities to engage in militia service. Anglo-American racialized notions concerning Native
peoples played a prominent role in this decision. Since acquiring the territory, Anglo American
officials in New Mexico had lumped the Pueblo peoples into the overall community of Indians
living within the United States. Their situation, however, was quite different from most other
Native peoples as, under the Mexican Plan de Iguala, Pueblo peoples had obtained full
citizenship which included the right to vote. Although other indigenous groups in New Mexico
during the Mexican era theoretically held this status, the Pueblos were the only Native group in
the region that actively exercised their rights as citizens. Although the U.S. Organic Act of 1850
conferred full rights of citizenship upon ex-citizens of Mexico who fell under the purview of the
United States with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, confusion arose over whether the Pueblo
Indians, as indigenous peoples, were able to attain U.S. citizenship at all. Anglo policymakers
ultimately felt that the Pueblo people, as Native Americans, were too “uncivilized” to merit U.S.
citizenship. U.S. colonial administrators would eventually use boarding schools as a tool to
attempt to acculturate and transform Pueblo Indian youth into individuals they felt worthy of
citizenship consideration.263 But for the time being the U.S. Congress ultimately decided that
they would regard Pueblo peoples as all other indigenous people in the United States, rescinding
their right to vote and denying them U.S. citizenship.264 During the U.S. era, the Pueblo peoples
saw their rights eroded which also included their right to engage in military service as they had
done for centuries before the United States claimed sovereignty over the region.
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Although allowing them to fight initially, Colonel John Munroe fairly quickly afterward
suggested that the Pueblo Indians, as Indigenous peoples, should not be trusted in aiding the
army militarily. Two years after he allowed the Zuñi’s to make war upon the Navajos, Munroe’s
suspicion and distrust of the Pueblos surfaced. Munroe admitted that allowing the Pueblos to
battle the Navajos in 1849 had been out of absolute necessity, yet he felt that it was too risky to
continue to enable Pueblos to fight if not essential to the overall defense of the territory. It was
tough for Anglo officials such as Colonel Munroe to differentiate Pueblo Indians as friend or foe,
and many military officers imagined that Pueblo peoples were generally hostile toward the
United States and allied with the independent Indians of New Mexico. Accordingly, Munroe,
ignoring hundreds of years of historical precedent, wrote to Governor Calhoun that the Pueblos
and Navajos were conspiring with one another to the detriment of the United States. Upon a
request in 1851 by the Governor of Jemez that the military lend his community powder and lead
to make war upon the Navajo, Munroe declined. The colonel stated, “At that time I am led to
believe the intercourse between the Pueblos of Jemez and the Navajoes was not beyond
suspicion and I would not now, feel myself at liberty to supply them with public ammunitions,
without a very evident necessity.”265 Munroe and other military officials continued to remain
extremely hesitant to use Pueblo peoples for military service. Joseph King Fenno Mansfield, in
his report on the condition of New Mexico in 1853, curtly stated that the Pueblo people should
play no role in assisting the United States militarily. Concerning the Pueblos, Mansfield made a
claim, “No reliance whatever can be placed on this class of the population for national defense as
militia, or even against the wild Indians.”266 By virtue of these racialized attitudes by the
military, Pueblo peoples were rarely ever used again for the defense of the territory during the

265
266

Munroe to Calhoun, 31 March 1851, in Abel, The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun, 312.
Frazer, Mansfield on the Condition of the Western Forts, 8.

112

early U.S. period. Yet, the civil government would still endeavor to make Pueblo militia service
a reality.
In March of 1851, the federal government promoted James Calhoun as the first civilian
Governor of New Mexico, and he wasted little time in attempting to utilize both Hispanos and
the Pueblo Indians for military service against independent Indians.267 On March 18, 1851, the
new governor had issued an announcement that attempted to establish the territory’s first civilian
fighting force during the U.S. era. Calhoun issued the first proclamation of the U.S. period in
New Mexico that called for the wholesale organization of non-indigenous civilian warriors all
across the territory. In his announcement, Calhoun ordered the formation of citizen volunteer
companies in every corner of the territory for “service against hostile Indians.” Calhoun ordered:
“All able-bodied male citizens of the Territory, capable of bearing arms, [form] Volunteer Corps
to protect their families, property and homes.” The governor himself was to commission the
officers of all companies, and they were to report to him their strength and numbers.
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Afterward, these companies would be authorized to pursue and attack any hostile Indian groups
who may have entered the settlements for the purpose of plunder.
Calhoun attempted to place limits on the order. He made clear that the volunteer
companies were only to be used for self-defense against enemy Indians. They were not to go out
into Indian country without the permission of either the military or territorial government. He
also threatened that the full force of the law would be brought upon any of these organized
bodies who committed unlawful acts. He stated, “I also remind those who may volunteer in any
such company, that the law will be strictly enforced against any persons who shall use this
manner of protection to the inhabitants of the Territory, as a pretext for any depredations upon or
invasions of property by the peaceable citizens of New Mexico; the intention being to put in
force the means which are in the power of the people for their benefit, and not that a license for
injury to them shall be the result.” Therefore, the proclamation was not a blank check given to
the civilians to inflict violence upon just anyone. Rather, the proclamation was a means of selfdefense against Indian groups only to be used in accordance with the permission of the governor
or military commander.268
One day after issuing the proclamation, in an order which apparently flew in the face of
the inclinations of Colonel Munroe, Calhoun also gave the Pueblo Indians permission to organize
and make war expeditions against independent Indians if they so desired. In an order to the
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Caciques, Governors, and Principals of the Pueblos, Calhoun stated that for the purposes of
either “chastisement” or “the extermination of hostile Indians…you are directed to abstain from
all friendly intercourse with the Navajo Indians and should they dare to come into your
neighborhood, you are authorized to make war upon them, and to take their animals and such
other property as they may have with them, and to make divisions of the same according to your
laws and customs.” Indeed this was a broad-ranging order, but Calhoun tried to curb the power
of such unsupervised expeditions by stating that warfare be limited to “hostile Indians” only if
they entered their communities. He also required that the Pueblos must remain in constant
contact with the military commanders should they decide to make war, adding that they should
“be exceedingly careful to prevent and prohibit that the least trouble shall be given to the persons
and property of all Americans, Mexicans, and Pueblos.”269 The new governor had tried to
maintain a middle ground, allowing Pueblos to defend their communities while attempting to
keep the military on board as a supervisory force. Despite the military powers that these
proclamations theoretically gave the Pueblos and Hispanos, the New Mexico legislature would
then endeavor to enact a more potent law calling for the creation of an official territorial militia.
Although standing militias were, by and large, declining throughout the United States, the
civil officials of New Mexico saw the benefit in attempting to organize such a force within the
territory. Following Calhoun’s proclamations, the House of Representatives and Council
Chamber of the Territory of New Mexico, which consisted primarily of wealthy Hispanos with
backgrounds in clergy and land ownership, knew that they needed a legitimate law on the books
to commission a functioning territorial militia. To do so, the legislature felt they required the
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permission of the federal government. In 1851, they petitioned President Millard Fillmore to
give the federal authority to enact a militia law in the territory. The petition was highly critical
of the U.S. military and spelled out the need for a federally mandated territorial militia. The
petition stated that
“Some few days since a party of Navajoes made a descent
upon the Pueblo of Isletta one of the numerous villages upon the
Rio Grande and drove off a large number of animals, successfully
completing the robbery and escaping a rescue, while the officers
and soldiers of the regular army were quietly reposing in quarters
at Albuquerque and Socorro. The undersigned would respectfully
suggest to your Excellency, that the masterly inactivity of the
Government troops does not afford that protection from foray and
rapine which the present unhappy and distracted state of this
Territory imperatively demands; and in view of these facts and of
the unguarded situation of the lives and property of our citizens the
undersigned respectfully request of your Excellency first that
sufficient arms and munitions of war be supplied to the Territory to
equip and furnish a militia and volunteer force to be raised in the
Territory – Second, that ample power be delegated to the
Executive officer of the Territory to call forth the Militia and to
offer sufficient inducement to volunteer corps as shall command
ready and effectual men at arms…Your excellency will permit
your memorialists to urge the great necessity of the above
suggestions and petition upon your consideration inasmuch as the
experience of the last two years has with frightful and appalling
events of murder and robbery convinced the minds of your
memorialists and their constituency of the utter inefficacy of the
regular troops to save and protect the Territory from lawless
savages upon our frontiers and roaming bandits in our midst. The
best interests of our constituents and the Territory would be more
effectually shielded by men who will fight for their altars and their
firesides, than by disciplined troops however powerful and intrepid
who seem disposed to recline upon the glory of past triumphs and
are reluctant to tarnish by petty skirmishes with hordes of halfnaked savages.”270
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The territorial government’s call for a militia was heavily motivated by a perceived lack
of military manpower in New Mexico. The harsh wording of the petition made known the
legislature’s unenthusiastic perception of the military. Not only did the territorial legislature
voice their concerns that the military was ineffective, but they also painted a picture of the
military as too grandiose to be bothered with battling Indians whom they described as fragile and
feeble. The depiction of an ostentatious army was juxtaposed with a representation of “half
naked savages.” These images were offset by the legislature’s interpretation of civilian warriors
as resolutely fighting to protect their homes. They had ultimately hoped that the federal
government would note this disorderly atmosphere in New Mexico and ultimately emphasize
with the alleged noble deeds of the civilians, allowing for the creation of a standing territorial
militia.
The military in New Mexico was well aware of the ill feelings toward them by the
territorial government and inhabitants. Military officials argued that money-hungry charlatans
mainly instigated such negative portrayals. Colonel John Munroe took issue with the allegations
against the military in New Mexico. He responded to these inflammatory claims by stating that
the people of New Mexico who were criticizing the army was led by
“…a disregard for facts from motives of self-interest.
Various statements emanating from persons in this Territory and
circulated in the United States through the public prints…having in
view to disparage the military force in this Department and more
immediately commanding officers, teem with direct violation of
truth or with gross misrepresentations intentionally made. The
objects mainly to be attained being to prepare the public mind and
the congress of the United States to consider favorably the claims
proposed to be set up for the payment of all the stock which has
been or which they will represent to have been driven off by the
various bands of surrounding Indians- through the supposed
neglect of the government to give that protection which has been
guaranteed by the people of the territory, and by deprecating the
117

services of the regular army, expect that Congress will authorize
the creation of a local force as a substitute or partial substitute for
it.”271
In Munroe’s view, the citizens of New Mexico were intentionally disparaging the regular army
so that they could receive compensation for lost property and so that Congress would be more
sympathetic to authorizing an official militia system in the territory.
Despite Munroe’s claims, all available evidence points to the assertion that civilians and
the territorial government did indeed believe that the military was too idle and ineffective.
Indeed, there were residents who may have exaggerated the number of Indian “depredations” to
receive compensation from the government. Yet, inhabitants in the territory were increasingly
desperate to expand the overall number of troops available to patrol the region. The inhabitants
and the territorial government had pleaded with the federal government to increase the number of
troops in New Mexico numerous times. In 1850, citizens of Santa Fe sent a petition to President
Zachary Taylor which stated, "Indian troubles at this moment are of a more terrible, and
alarming character, than we have ever known them before. We feel confident Sir you are ready
and willing to give us all proper aid and protection, and that the Congress of the United States
will promptly place at your disposal the means necessary to affect that object… We beg for an
adequate mounted force to accomplish these ends, and we further pray there may be no delay in
sending them to our rescue."272 In February of 1852, Governor James Calhoun wrote to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Luke Lea. In similar language to the Santa Fe petition, Calhoun
claimed, “the troops of the United States are at present totally useless, on account of the inability
of the mounted men to perform their duty, the feeble and half-starved condition of their horses
will not allow them to travel, and infantry is of no use whatever.” He ominously added: “If such
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outrages continue much longer, our Territory…will be left a howling wilderness, with no other
inhabitants than the wolf, and the birds of prey hovering over the mangled remains of our
murdered countrymen.”273 Similarly, in less dramatic language, Colonel Munroe himself even
concurred that an increase in regular troops would better serve the department. On March 15,
1850, Munroe wrote a letter to the Assistant Adjutant General detailing the insufficiency of the
cavalry force in the department. He stated that if military officials withdrew any cavalry without
being replaced, "I apprehend the most serious consequences."274 The call for additional troop
numbers had become a recurring theme in the territory that would continue for decades. The
perceived necessity of increasing the number of troops in order to transform the military into a
more formidable force was indeed at the forefront of the minds of many of the territory’s
inhabitants. The military’s detractors in the territory certainly weren’t only opportunistic
individuals attempting to increase their own wealth, as Munroe had claimed.
There is no evidence that the President responded to the legislative assembly’s petition to
establish a territorial militia. Nevertheless, soon after in July of 1851 the territorial assembly
drafted the first militia law of the U.S. era in New Mexico.275 The Legislative Act to Organize
the Militia of New Mexico made law that any male inhabitant of the territory over eighteen and
under forty-five years of age, barring any disability and not being clergy, were required to
constitute the militia of the territory. This territorially mandated militia was to consist of three
divisions. The first division encompassed the far northern counties of Taos and Rio Arriba
which was to be called the Northern Division. The second division consisted of the counties of
Santa Fe and San Miguel and was labeled the Central Division. The final division included the
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counties of Santa Ana, Bernalillo, Socorro, Valencia, and any villages lying south of the Jornada
del Muerto, which was to be the Southern Division. Each of these divisions were to be divided
into brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies. 276 The territorial legislature, therefore, took
it upon themselves to enact the territory’s first militia law which would quickly become the basis
of much confusion and conflict between the territorial government and military in New Mexico.
It’s also unclear if this law applied to the numerous Pueblo communities throughout the territory.
This long and comprehensive piece of legislation itemized all of the particulars relating to
militia duty, with more regulations than could be realistically adhered to with such a sparse
government presence in New Mexico during this time. The militia law established the office of
the Adjutant General of the Territory, called for the democratic election of militia officers, and
allowed for the governor or department commander to call out the militia in times of need. The
law also outlined the various officer designations to be adhered to, as well as necessitating yearly
muster and inspection orders. Militia officers could appeal to the governor to make a campaign
against an enemy provided that they conducted themselves according to the rules and customs of
the laws of the United States. Most significantly, the law laid out that the only payment that the
officers and men were to receive was to be captured property taken during campaigns to be split
evenly between the militia company. Punishment for poor conduct during expeditions was the
withholding of such spoils of war from the offender.277
Evidence shows that the residents of New Mexico only superficially adhered to the Act to
Organize the Militia of New Mexico due to there being almost no bureaucratic way to ensure
they were adequately following the new law, as well as the fact that Nuevomexicanos, like their
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Pueblo counterparts, were sorely lacking in firearms. A large portion of New Mexican citizen
soldiers during the Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. periods had been relegated to utilizing bows and
arrows or fighting hand to hand. During the 1830s, American trader Josiah Gregg noted the New
Mexican militia’s lack of effective weaponry, stating, “A great portion of the militia are obliged
to use the clumsy, old-fashioned escopeta, or firelock of the sixteenth century; while others have
nothing but the bow and arrow, and sometimes the lance, which is in fact a weapon very much in
use throughout the country.”278 Things were no different during the early U.S. era in New
Mexico. In 1851, one concerned resident wrote to James Calhoun that the citizens of Taos and
Rio Arriba, “Labour under much difficultly for the want of arms as most of them have but their
bows and quivers of arrows and in this respect possess no advantage over the Indians. I am well
satisfied that could arsenals and arms be distributed through this country, so that these people
could be furnished with arms and ammunition whenever they wish to carry on an expedition of
this kind.”279 The necessity of supplying civilian soldiers with proper firearms would soon
become yet another point of contention between the settlers/territorial government, and the U.S.
military.
Most settlers, therefore, didn’t have the arms available to create active militia companies
under the new law. Civilians could only properly follow the act if the military or civil
government supplied useful weapons to the civilian population. This would prove to be more
complicated than the legislature had imagined. On many separate occasions, Governor James
Calhoun begged the federal government to supply the territory with firearms. On March 31,
1851, Calhoun petitioned the federal government for more weapons, claiming, "We need
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munitions of war of every kind. These we have not, and our treasury is empty. Has Congress
provided the means to aid us?"280 One month later, he again asked the federal government for a
supply of weapons. Calhoun claimed, "There are but few...difficulties or annoyances that I could
not remedy, at an early moment, if I had the means - - that is to say munitions of war."281
Despite these pleas, the federal government seldom agreed to supply firearms for the purposes of
arming the militia. Lack of serviceable weapons would be only one of the many reasons that the
militia law of 1851 would rapidly fall into obscurity.
The militia law would also suffer because of the actions of one Colonel Edwin
Sumner.282 Nine days after the New Mexican legislature drafted the Act to Organize the Militia
of New Mexico, new Department commander Edwin Sumner replaced John Munroe and arrived
for duty in New Mexico. Sumner’s arrival kick-started an era of conflict between the territorial
government and federal military officials, mainly concerning civilian warfare, that guided the
course of the institution for decades.
Upon his arrival, Sumner was directed by his superiors to carry out changes in the
department which were intended to provide more efficient protection at less cost.283 In his letter
notifying Sumner that he was to command the Ninth Military Department, Secretary of War
Charles Magill Conrad articulated, “It is believed that material changes ought to be made in that
department, both with a view to a more efficient protection of the country and to a diminution of
expense.”284 The letter outlined ways in which Sumner was to cut costs in the territory while
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trying to maintain an adequate measure of defense; two seemingly contradictory goals.
Sumner’s first assignment was to relocate the remaining troops from the settlements and station
them in strategically placed forts. These new posts were generally situated several miles distant
from the settlements and towns. Sumner felt the need to break up the military establishments
among the settlements because he believed they were “expensive and useless.”285 For these new
forts to be as cost-effective as possible, the military tasked soldiers with building these fortresses
as well as farming their own subsistence.
Already suffering due to the perceived lack of troops in the territory, Sumner’s wholesale
removal of the soldiers from the towns further alienated the military from the civilian population.
The residents of Doña Ana in southern New Mexico, for example, petitioned James Calhoun for
the soldiers not to abandon their settlement. Using language that hearkened to their past
masculine obligation to protect their families, the residents argued, “The execution of such a
movement would bring imminent peril to us, to the extent that our lives and wives and families
might be sacrificed and lose the little we have to live upon and will be exposed to the fury of the
bloody hands of the Apaches, just as we have in the past years.”286 The citizens of El Paso
County, located in far west Texas but still under the purview of the Ninth Military Department,
also petitioned against the removal of the troops from both the fort located within the town and
one at nearby San Elizario. These inhabitants believed that the removal of the troops from their
community to some seventy miles away “has paralyzed all and everything.” They had claimed
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that many of the citizens had, as a consequence, abandoned their farms and homes and retreated
to El Paso (present-day Ciudad Juárez) on the Mexican side of the border.287
Edwin Sumner quickly dismissed these criticisms and similar to his predecessor argued
that fault finders of his decision to abandon the settlements were motivated more by money than
the need for protection. In response to several petitions by the citizens against the removal of the
troops from Santa Fe, Colonel Sumner callously stated: “I understand that many applications
have been made to the government, by the people of Santa Fe, to have the troops ordered back
there. I have no hesitation in saying, that I believe most of these applications proceed directly or
indirectly from those who have hitherto managed to live, in some way, from the extravagant
expenditures of the Government, I trust their petitions will not be heeded.”288 It is indeed true
that the soldiers stationed within the towns injected comparatively large sums of money into
these communities.289 Yet, Sumner never wanted to admit that the settlements were indeed left
in great peril upon the desertion of the troops.
It didn’t take long for Department Commander Edwin Sumner and territorial governor
James Calhoun to come into conflict concerning various matters including civilian warfare in
New Mexico. Almost immediately the two men diverged concerning the appropriate way to
deliberate with the territory’s vast number of Native peoples. Calhoun believed that Sumner was
blocking his attempts to confer with Indians properly. According to historian Howard R. Lamar,
“Sumner felt that he himself was the logical director of Indian relations and the savior of that
worthless country.”290 In August of 1851, Sumner had planned to carry out a punitive expedition
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against the Navajo. As a matter of policy, Calhoun requested that Indian agents accompany the
military on their expedition in order to negotiate and communicate with the Navajos if need be.
Sumner refused to allow any Indian agents to accompany his expedition citing curtly, “With
regard to the transportation and subsistence of Indian Agents, I would remark, that no
allowances, whatever, can be made to any person from army supplies, not provided for, by
express law.”291 Sumner’s actions were contrary to federal policy, as regular troops were not to
pursue alleged Indian depredators until the local federal Indian agent investigated and confirmed
the report of violence and requested military intervention.292 However, as historian William
G.B. Carson argues, Sumner was resentful of the presence of a civil government in New Mexico
and thought that all authority should have been vested in him.293 Sumner’s unwillingness to
bring along federal Indian agents on his military excursion against the Navajos seem to reinforce
that statement.
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Illustration 2.2: Colonel Edwin Sumner,
Commander of the Department of New
Mexico from 1851-1853. Photograph no.
111-B-4444; “Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, 18601865; Mathew Brady Photographs of Civil
War-Era Personalities and Scenes, 19211940 Records of the Office of the Chief
Signal Officer, 1860-1985, Record Group
111; National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD.

James Calhoun believed that the accompaniment of Indian agents on expeditions such as
these were absolutely necessary not only because it was the policy of the United States but
because non-violent negotiation would be preferable to an aggressive encounter. Sumner’s
decision to not take Indian agents on military expeditions set a dangerous standard in which
relations with Indians were left solely in the hands of the military. Sumner also refused to
provide military escorts to civil officials attempting to visit nearby Native nations. This angered
Calhoun and in a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs concerning a proposed journey to
conferr with the Gila Apaches, he stated, “I shall not be able to visit the Gila Apaches, as I
intended, and deemed absolutely necessary, because Col. Sumner declines affording this
Superintendency escorts for my purpose – If this course is in pursuance of instructions from
Washington, our Indian Affairs must be conducted by the officers of the army, or they must be
neglected.”294 With no way for Indian agents or other civil officials to reach the Indian nations
in New Mexico, these men would not be able to negotiate with this diverse array of peoples
effectively.
The New Mexican Indian Agents themselves began to lament that by not providing escort
to Indian country, Edwin Sumner was not allowing them the essential means to do their jobs. In
a joint letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the New Mexico Indian agents said, “In this
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state of things, we feel that it is impossible for us to render that efficient aid to the public service,
that our duties require…How is it possible for us as Indian Agents to discharge the important
duties devolving upon us when all the facilities of performing the same are withheld by the
military officers in command?”295 These agents believed that they had no choice but to stand
idly by as the military, an entity designated for warfare rather than negotiation, dictated the
course of relations with Native peoples. It appeared that the relationship between the civil and
military authorities in the territory was growing incredibly sour.
In light of these events, James Calhoun appealed to Washington to give him instructions
on how he was to conduct Indian affairs when Sumner appeared to be blocking his every
attempt. Replies were not forthcoming. William G.B. Carson argued that “so far as Washington
was concerned, New Mexico might just as well have been on another planet, and no one there
took the slightest interest in its vote-less inhabitants.”296 The lack of federal response to
Calhoun’s pleas reaffirms this statement. Time and time again, Calhoun grumbled that he had
received no word from Washington on any matter whatsoever. This was a severe source of
frustration for him, as he sought advice and authorization concerning a host of territorial matters.
Without proper guidance from Washington, Calhoun was unsure if he was indeed following
proper protocol. In one communication he claimed, “[I am] without means or instructions, and
without a satisfactory guarantee that my actings and doings will be approved."297 In August,
Calhoun complained to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs: "The mail from the states arrived on
the 29th without bringing me a word of instructions from Washington, and you must feel that I
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am sorely troubled at the embarrassments which surround me."298 In April of 1852, a highly
frustrated Calhoun again complained to the Commissioner, "If the government of the United
States intends on doing anything for our protection for Heaven's sake let us know and allow us
an opportunity for each one to look out for himself and allow us an opportunity to leave as soon
as possible."299 Even Colonel Munroe, during his tenure as Department Commander, had been
aggravated with the lack of communication from Washington. In March of 1850, Munroe wrote
to the Assistant Adjutant General, "I have not received an acknowledgment of a single official
communication written since my arrival on the 23rd October last."300 It seemed as though both
civil and military officials in New Mexico were to try to administer New Mexico with minimal
direction from federal authorities in Washington.
Due to the almost complete absence of communication from Washington, James Calhoun
was left entirely in the dark regarding whether federal law allowed him the permission to call out
the newly established militia. Since the drafting of the Militia Act of 1851, Calhoun was not
convinced that he held the independent authority to call out the militia without having to rely on
the approval of the military department. Although territorial law gave the governor authority to
independently assemble the militia, it was unclear under federal law as to whether or not he
could actually wield that power. On at least seven different occasions from 1851-1852, Calhoun
wrote to the federal government pleading that they grant him the authority to call out the militia.
In one instance, Calhoun wrote, “At the moment the necessity of an organization of the militia is
oppressively felt…until we can procure munitions of war, and the Executive is clothed with
authority to call out the militia, there will be no quiet in this territory.”301 In another letter, he
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appealed to the federal government, declaring, “We need munitions of war, and the authority to
call out the militia to preserve internal quiet and to repel aggressions at points which cannot be
supported by the troops of the United States.”302 Again in 1851, Calhoun wrote to Washington
maintaining, “The people are uneasy, and with arms and munitions of war, and the bare authority
to call out the militia, confidence would prevail, and the means of properly conducting our
Indian relations in this territory would secure quietude.”303 Despite these anxious pleas, Calhoun
would never receive the answer he had so desperately sought.
Unlike James Calhoun, Edwin Sumner held no enthusiasm for using a civilian militia in
the fight against the independent Indians of New Mexico. This could have been, in part, due to
Sumner’s disparaging views of the Nuevomexicano population. After the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, a process of racialization occurred in New Mexico. New Anglo Americans in the
territory, small in number as they were, tended to seize elite positions: governors, judges,
military commanders, etc. These elite Anglos brought with them racialized and gendered
notions concerning Nuevomexicanos that had a marked impact on New Mexican communities.
These newcomers generally considered Hispanos and Native peoples in New Mexico as racially
and culturally inferior to themselves as they believed that Hispanos in New Mexico to be a
product of racial mixing, which to the racialized scientific rhetoric of the time led to negative
physical and mental traits. Anglo Americans also tended to use the label “Mexican” as a distinct
monolithic racial rather than a national marker of identity and they used this term on one racial
group: mestizos, or individuals of mixed European and Native American ancestry.304 Therefore,
to Anglo Americans, Hispanos in New Mexico were simply “Mexican,” with all the negative
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racial connotations that the label carried with it. How Anglo Americans perceived these people
also influenced their perceptions of themselves. According to historian Anthony Mora,
“Distinguishing Mexican as a racial group afforded Euro-Americans an inverted mirror in which
they could assert their own sense of national and racial identity as superior. If Euro-Americans
were “pure whites,” then Mexicans must be “mongrels”; if Euro-Americans were industrious,
then Mexicans must be lazy.”305
Anglo Americans also continuously denigrated Mexican masculinity. Anthony Mora
argues that to Anglo men saw “Mexicans’ gender and sexual behavior as the most obvious
evidence of racial difference.”306 White American men frequently contrasted their supposed
superior gendered ideas of themselves against that of Mexican men. Concerning ethnic Mexican
males, the Southern Quarterly Review in 1847 stated, “the mass of the male sex is selfish, false,
reckless, and idle.”307 To be morally virtuous and industrious were core tenants of Anglo
American masculinity, traits that they did not accord ethnic Mexican men. White Americans
also frequently stripped away Mexican masculinity by feminizing the men. Former U.S. minister
to Mexico Waddy Thompson, for example, claimed that “I do not think that the Mexican men
have much more physical strength than our women.”308 Gendered notions such as these caused
many Anglo Americans to question ethnic Mexican citizenship, fitness to hold positions of
power, and effectiveness in military combat.
From the beginning of the U.S. era in New Mexico, military officials were known to
make derogatory remarks concerning Nuevomexicanos which ultimately conveyed their opinion
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that these people were generally unfit to serve as citizen-soldiers. Military officials often held
Hispanos with disdain, labeling them as indolent, degenerate, undependable, dishonest,
impoverished, and addicted to gambling and other vices.309 Edwin Sumner himself had made
many disparaging remarks concerning Nuevomexicanos in 1852. Not only had he described
them as “stupidly ignorant,”310 but in a letter to Secretary of War Conrad in 1852, Sumner used
gendered language to emasculate the residents of El Paso due to their recent objection to having
troops removed from their town. Sumner proclaimed, “If these Mexicans when banded together
in large numbers, have not the manliness to defend themselves from small parties of roving
Indians, they deserve to suffer.”311 In a similarly scathing report to Washington, Sumner
declared that “The New Mexicans are thoroughly debased and totally incapable of selfgovernment, and there is no latent quality about them that can ever make them respectable. They
have more Indian blood than Spanish, and in some respects are below the Pueblo Indians, for
they are not as honest or industrious.”312 In 1853, Colonel Joseph King Fenno Mansfield made
similar observations in his report on the condition of the military in New Mexico. He
proclaimed, “[These people] as a body are ignorant, and as a community jealous.” He added: “I
think I can safely say, that no reliance whatever can be placed on them as militia to defend the
Territory…they are not warlike and are incapable of defending their property against the Indians
as a general thing.”313 With his statement, Mansfield had ignored the fact that these residents
had been obligated to defend their communities long before the United States entered the region.
Yet, it’s clear that racial attitudes among Anglo American officials concerning Nuevomexicanos
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made the inhabitants ineligible in the eyes of some officials in aiding in the fight against
independent Indians.
The ramifications of this racialized rhetoric upon the people of the new U.S Southwest
were great. Although considered “white” under the law and technically given all the rights of
U.S. citizenship, most ethnic Mexicans were generally accorded inferior legal rights.314 Anglo
Americans fairly quickly occupied positions of power and multiple land grants respected since
the Spanish era were considered void. Court decisions concerning a variety of issues generally
favored Anglo newcomers, and Mexican Americans of the Southwest quickly became a
marginalized people. New Mexico was, however, able to halt prejudicial legislation longer than
many other areas in the U.S. southwest due to its relatively high percentage of inhabitants of
Mexican descent. Unlike California and Texas, which attracted large numbers of Anglo
Americans, 90.9 percent of the population of New Mexico in 1850 were Hispanos.315 Even by
1900, Hispanos would still constitute two-thirds of the New Mexican population.316 Therefore,
despite a substantial increase in the Anglo American population, Hispanos in New Mexico
continued to hold considerable political power, wealth, and status, and Hispano culture
persisted.317 Yet, during the U.S. era, Nuevomexicanos saw their status as citizens continue to
erode, and their calls for self-defense was one way in which they attempted to preserve their
rights, traditions, and notions of citizenship. Anglo American officials still however brought
with them these racialized views which reinforced their own supposed racial superiority while
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causing harm to the New Mexican population. It would only be a matter of time until Hispanos
were marginalized like other peoples throughout the southwest.
As Anglo Americans began to arrive in New Mexico after the U.S.-Mexico War,
Nuevomexicanos had to come to terms with this new racialized rhetoric quickly. Hispanos in
New Mexico eventually sought to free themselves of the term “Mexican” along with its negative
racial connotations by emphasizing their more perceptibly white Spanish roots. Anglo American
men were generally charitable in their views of Hispanas, whom they frequently labeled
“Spanish,” but typically held contempt for the men who they almost universally designated as
“Mexican.”318 As a result, to seem more “white” to the newly-emerging Anglo elite,
Nuevomexicanos eventually began to refer to themselves as “Spanish-American” or simply
“Spanish” to avoid being labeled as “Mexican.” Hispano elites, in particular, sought to maintain
some measure of power by asserting and defending their claim to whiteness by referring to
themselves as “Spanish.”319 The “Spanish/Mexican” dichotomy, as trifling as it may seem, had
real ramifications in New Mexico. Hispano identity began to separate from a historical and
racial attachment to Mexico. After the U.S.-Mexico War, racial ideologies in New Mexico thus
had the impact of not only shaping Anglo American identity but the identity of Hispanos
themselves.
Even before the slow influx of an emerging Anglo elite in New Mexico, Anglo American
racial ideology concerning “Mexicans” had already had a sustained and significant impact on the
people of the region. Perceived negative racial traits of ethnic Mexicans had played a crucial
role in the United States’ decision to annex the southwest from Mexico. According to historian
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Brian DeLay, “Americans formed a mental picture of the Mexican north as a place of enormous
potential that the Mexicans had patently failed to redeem from Independent Indians.”320
Americans often blamed this failure on Mexican cowardice, weakness, and stupidity. Due to
such racial and gendered ideologies concerning its inhabitants, American officials felt justified in
annexing Mexico’s northernmost regions. To the residents of Mexico’s north, U.S. colonialism
involuntarily washed over them. Racialization thus had already had a marked impact on the
people of the now U.S. southwest, and Anglo Americans such as Edwin Sumner also held these
prejudices which would shape how they perceived New Mexican citizen-soldiers.
Despite these racial attitudes, Sumner met Governor Calhoun halfway by reluctantly
conceding that a territorial militia should be maintained but ultimately disagreed with Calhoun
about the nature of the militia’s duties. Sumner believed that the militia ought to be organized
for the defense of their communities only. To the department commander, the militia should
only be called up in the event of Indian infiltration into civilian neighborhoods. He shunned the
idea of any offensive military expeditions by the militia. However, if there just so happened to
be any occasion upon which the militia should be offensively called into the field, Sumner
insisted that they be controlled solely by himself. Sumner didn’t trust the territorial government
with military (or many other) matters and wanted full and complete control over the territorial
militia. He did not want the civil government to intervene in military affairs by commanding
what he saw as a tattered Hispano militia that would ultimately damage whatever military gains
the U.S. had made. He, however, never actually intended to employ the territorial militia in any
offensive way and would do everything in his power to prevent its utilization.
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James Calhoun and Edwin Sumner frequently bickered about the overall obligations of
the militia. In defense of his aversion to an offensive rather than strictly defensive militia,
Sumner stated to Calhoun, “This is not the kind of warfare that our government has hitherto
condescended to engage in…it will give me the highest satisfaction to cooperate with you in all
measures for the protection of the people of this territory that are not in direct violation of the
law and the express orders of the War Department.”321 Calhoun, however, wanted the authority
to offensively call out the militia himself without having to rely on the permission of the
department. He felt that the department was too ineffectual and would not act swiftly and
decisively enough in times of military need. Calhoun reasoned that the territorial militia could
be mustered and deployed quicker and more efficiently than the regular army. The ability of the
governor to call up the territorial militia would become a significant point of contention between
the two men for as long as they both remained in office.
In one particularly heated exchange, Calhoun told Sumner that he might unilaterally call
out the militia if he believed it was necessary. Calhoun blatantly made known that he would not
wait for the permission of the Department Commander to muster the militia in an offensive
manner. In a letter to Sumner, Calhoun argued, “As the Governor of the territory, the solemn
duty is imposed upon me, to assist them [the settlers] in every proper measure of defense – and
that duty I am called upon to discharge…it may be absolutely necessary to allow the people to
defend themselves against the Navajo assaults.” Sumner responded by threatening that if the
governor was to prompt an expedition by the militia into Indian country without his consent, he
would deploy the regular troops to prevent the militia from carrying out its objectives. Calhoun
was extremely distraught at this attempt at intimidation, stating, “Is it possible, that the
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murderers of our people are to go unpunished, our women and children to be carried off, and our
property taken away, and the people are not to be permitted to go in pursuit of those demons who
have possession of their wives and children and property beyond a purely imaginary line,
without incurring the risk of having pointed at them, by the troops of the U.S. the very arms
placed in their hands for our defense and protection – What!”322 The department commander’s
threat to use military force against the civilian warriors illustrates how far Sumner was willing to
go to prevent the deployment and use of a territorial militia. Threatening to use violence against
citizens of the United States also speaks to Sumner’s views concerning Nuevomexicanos. He
didn’t believe these people worthy of the same considerations as white American citizens;
specifically that of not using the military to subdue a state-mandated militia.
After some time, cooler heads prevailed, and Sumner reluctantly conceded that he would
not actually deploy regular troops against the militia if Calhoun called them into the field.
Sumner penned a letter to Calhoun stating, “After mature reflections, I have determined that I
shall not use the regular troops, to expel from Indian Country the marauding parties that your
Excellency may think proper to commission, as it will not be their fault. I hereby protest against
any such action on your part, as an interference with my duties, and contrary to the express
orders of the War Department.”323 Notably, the language Sumner used to describe the civilian
soldiers of the militia was very similar to that commonly used to portray Native raiders. By
using the term “marauding parties,” Sumner equated the service of Nuevomexicano militiamen to
the actions of Indian depredators. In his mind, little difference separated the Nuevomexicano
militiamen and Indian raiders in terms of their supposed uncivilized nature and illegality of their
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deeds. Calhoun was satisfied with Sumner’s promise not to use troops against the militia,
although he was not happy with the term “marauding parties.” Calhoun grumbled to Sumner, “I
think you are discreet in your determination; but not wise in your application of the term
“marauding parties” – which you point to me, as an epithet of opprobrium – be it so, such
measures will not deter me from the discharge of my duties, and I thank you for withdrawing the
epithet from the citizens of the territory, and applying it to me, their Governor.”324 It appeared as
though the relationship between the civil government and military had reached its highest level
of toxicity.
On at least two occasions, Calhoun successfully persuaded Sumner to meet him halfway
by supplying portions of the militia with arms and ammunition. In accordance with Sumner’s
desire that the militia was to be used for defense only, Calhoun appealed to the department to
have them supply the organized citizens of Santa Fe with arms due to a string of Indian raids into
the town in November of 1851. Sumner agreed, providing seventy-five flintlock muskets, with
the same number of cartridge boxes, and bayonet scabbards to the governor to distribute to some
companies of the territorial militia.325 Sumner, however, agreed to supply the weapons on “two
conditions alone.” Sumner stipulated that the men could have their weapons recalled by the
department at any time and that the company would be restricted to obey only the orders of the
department commander. In a surprising move, because of these conditions, the citizens of Santa
Fe actually declined the firearms last minute. They refused to accept the weapons because, as
they claimed to governor Calhoun: “[We are] liable to have our arms taken away at a moment’s
notice,” and “because we do not wish to be restricted in our incursions by the Commander of the
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9th Department, but held subject only to Your Excellency’s orders as commander in chief of the
Militia of this territory.”326 Thus, due to the poor perception of the regular army, it seemed that
the citizen’s loyalties lay with the governor over the military. In spite of this rejection, In March
of 1852, Sumner again agreed to issue one-hundred stands of arms with ammunition to the
people in the vicinity of Socorro due to recent Indian depredations there. Unlike the residents of
Santa Fe, the people of Socorro gladly made use of these weapons.
Despite these rare occasions of accommodation, Calhoun constantly complained about
the lack of coordination and harmony between the civil government and the military. Calhoun
had foremost emphasized that without cooperation between the two organizations, violence with
Native peoples would endure. He stated, “Unless Colonel Sumner and myself can adopt a plan,
by which we can harmonize, but a very inconsiderable amount of treaty drafts will be used.”327
He also frequently suggested that partly due to the discord between the civil government and the
military, the government experiment in New Mexico had in large part failed. He expressed his
dismay through appeals that the government and military should abandon the territory entirely.
He stated to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in October of 1851: “I must say – the military
officers and the executive cannot harmonize, and I am not certain that the public interests would
not be promoted by relieving us all from duty in this territory.”328 Sumner held a similar view
that the territory was beyond repair, and U.S. officials would be wise to vacate. Sumner once
stated that he proposed to “withdraw the troops and civil officers, and let the people elect their
own civil officers, and conduct the government in their own way, under the general supervision
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of the government.”329 Of course, neither men were entirely serious about abandoning New
Mexico, but both believed that saving the territory from its current state of discord and violence
was an almost impossible task.
Conflict and disagreement between Calhoun and Sumner lasted many more months. All
the while, jaundice, scurvy, and the many stresses of governing the territory took its toll on the
Governor. In May of 1852, James Calhoun fell gravely ill. He, with his coffin in tow, made the
trek east to seek medical assistance. He died in route and was buried somewhere near Kansas
City. Upon learning of the governor’s death, Department Commander Edwin Sumner took it
upon himself to assume the governorship of the territory while the federal government
contemplated a permanent replacement. Arriving in New Mexico in September of 1852, new
Governor William Carr Lane would pick up exactly where Calhoun had left off, bickering with
Department Commander concerning many matters; chief among them the utilization of civilian
warriors.
The years 1848-1852 set up the primary conditions for the continuation of strife between
the territorial government/residents, and the military in New Mexico. The creation of a racial
and ideological dividing line that sliced through New Mexico had significant repercussions on
the many peoples of the area. The process of racialization would long plague the many peoples
of the territory and had a marked impact on the lengthy tradition of civilian warfare. Anglo
American military officials generally held negative viewpoints toward the New Mexican people,
and their questionable status as citizens in a society dominated by ideas concerning Anglo Saxon
dominance and supremacy led to their eventual marginalization. This process also led to the
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erosion of Pueblo political rights. Hispanos, due to their status as citizens and legal designation
as “white,” as well as their relatively large population numbers, were able to resist such
prejudicial practices longer than their Pueblo counterparts. However, both groups saw the
immediate curtailment of their participation in the engagement of warfare on behalf of the United
States. This didn’t sit well with certain section of the New Mexican population who wished to
continue their mode of warfare with Native peoples. Edwin Sumner’s hesitancy in utilizing
civilian warriors lived on in the actions and viewpoints of subsequent military commanders
stationed in New Mexico. Yet others, such as General John Garland would be more forgiving
toward the institution. This, however, did not stop individual sections of the populace from
warring with Native peoples without the permission of the military or territorial government as
the decade continued.
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Chapter 3: Loyalty Questioned, 1853-1860

From 1846 onward, U.S. colonialism had changed the nature of civilian warfare and to a
more significant extent the overall condition of the multi-ethnic inhabitants of New Mexico.
U.S. ideas of Anglo-Saxon supremacy, alongside the implementation of a border which ran
through the territory, had a marked impact on ideas concerning the race and citizenship of the
peoples of the region. For a variety of reasons that spoke to the wholesale Anglo American
disparagement of Hispanos and Pueblo peoples, military officials such as Colonel Edwin Sumner
tried to ensure that these civilians would be hard pressed to continue fighting independent
Indians, even alongside the military. Conversely, governor James Calhoun together with the
New Mexico territorial legislature were champions of keeping the mode of civilian warfare that
had existed since time immemorial. They had implemented a law in 1851 mandating a standing
civilian force throughout the territory. Logistic and practical considerations, however, prevented
complete adherence to the law, and it quickly became defunct. Nevertheless, the governor’s
death in 1852 was a seemingly tremendous blow to the institution as well a significant victory for
Colonel Sumner. As territorial governor, the Colonel would continue to attempt to dismantle the
already brittle civilian defense system that had been implemented by Calhoun and the territorial
legislature.
After Calhoun’s death, relations between New Mexico’s various inhabitants continued
down a very tumultuous path. As the 1850s progressed, violent hostilities between Native and
non-Native Peoples in the region accelerated. The United States and several Native groups
signed many treaties in efforts to keep the peace, but Congress never ratified the vast bulk of
these, which ultimately led to further confusion, distrust, and violence. Following in the
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footsteps of James Calhoun and Edwin Sumner’s rivalry, civil and military administrators
continued to disagree concerning how they should engage with this threat. They relentlessly
bickered about multiple topics ranging from Indian policy to military expenditures, very rarely
finding any middle ground upon which they could harmonize. Continued cost-cutting measures
by the army further alienated the military from the civil government and citizenry of the territory.
For their part, civilians continued to decry the perceived lack of military protection that these
seemingly tight-fisted economic measures generated. Both civil officials and settlers, therefore,
continued to call for the utilization of civilian warriors for the defense of the territory. Certain
New Mexican inhabitants would even go as far as enacting their own unauthorized violent
military expeditions against Indian groups; such as the unsanctioned militia, the Mesilla Guard,
as will be discussed in the next chapter. The military, however, was still generally hesitant to use
civilian soldiers and civilian defense continued to be a hugely divisive issue during the rest of the
1850s.
Throughout the 1850s, the use of civilian warriors was very much contingent upon
individual Department Commanders’ attitudes toward both the institution and the New Mexican
people. As Colonel Edwin Sumner temporarily assumed the governorship after Calhoun’s death,
the militia law of 1851 fell into obscurity relatively quickly. For as long as Sumner was in
command of the department and the government, he would do everything in his power to prevent
the persistence of sanctioned or unsanctioned civilian militia units in New Mexico. Sumner’s
reluctance to utilize civilian warriors partially stemmed from prevalent racial biases concerning
Hispanos and Native Peoples, yet a perceived uncertain national allegiance of the
Nuevomexicano population had also haunted the Colonel as well as many of his military
contemporaries. Sumner’s successor, General John Garland, however, was much more receptive
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to allowing civilians to take up arms. Being much more pragmatic than his precursor, Garland
saw the wisdom in putting aside his prejudices and concerns with the Hispano population,
allowing them to aid him in the war with independent Indians. As Sumner successfully
invalidated the Militia Law of 1851 by neglecting to enforce it, Garland restored the system of
utilizing temporary volunteers alongside the military that was prevalent before Sumner took
command of the department. Consequently, the organization or dissolution of civilian warriors
was mainly contingent upon the department commander’s personal views towards the institution.
During this time, the civil governors, territorial legislature, and residents themselves
repeatedly sought to resurrect the idea of a standing territorial militia. Subsequent governors of
New Mexico after Calhoun continued to support the custom of civilian warfare, and during the
five-year tenure of Department Commander John Garland, they took advantage of the new
Commander’s relative tolerance of civilian warriors by attempting to utilize, strengthen, and
sustain a territorial militia. Most noteworthy, in 1854 interim governor, William S. Messervy
who took charge during governor David Meriwether’s absence did more to attempt to enact
strengthen local militia units than any individual up to that point. Ethnic Mexicans took
advantage of this brief window of opportunity to prove their loyalty and readiness for full
citizenship. Colonel Thomas Fauntleroy, however, would again try to curb the new-found power
of these militia units. Colonel Fauntleroy and governor Abraham Rencher, Meriwether’s
replacement, would constantly squabble concerning the utilization of civilian warriors. This
back and forth tug-of-war concerning civilian defense defined the institution throughout the
1850s.
The militia act of 1851, as well as the actions of certain civil officials such as William
Messervy, were significant steps forward in attempting to utilize Nuevomexicanos to war with
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independent Indians during the U.S. era. However, some Anglo American officials could not
stomach the idea of military power being consolidated in the hands of a people whom they had
deemed, in racial and national language, untrustworthy. Alongside the racialization of the New
Mexican people by a growing Anglo elite discussed previously, many Anglo American observers
supposed that Hispano cultural and historical ties to Mexico carried with it an uninterrupted
fidelity to that nation. In particular, the fact that a collaboration of certain Hispanos and Pueblo
Indians rose up against the United States in rebellion only a few short years earlier in 1847
caused many military officials to reason that another uprising could potentially materialize at any
time. Due to these factors, ideas concerning Hispano loyalty and citizenship weighed heavily on
the minds of many Anglo American observers.
Broader issues were taking place between the United States and Mexico, which further
promoted uncertainties concerning Hispano loyalty to the United States. During the 1850s
relations between the two nations remained tense, as the legacy of the U.S. invasion left a deep
and lasting scar upon the region and its people. Disputes concerning the exact location of the
new border as well as interracial strife and internal conflict in Mexico alarmed U.S. officials.
Discord between the two nations had transformed into a racial suspicion toward ethnic Mexicans
as a whole. Anglo Americans generally envisioned Mexico as a nation of mestizos. As such,
through Anglo eyes, any mestizo in the United States could potentially be aligned with the
interests of the Mexican nation. Nation and race were indeed intertwined in the minds of many
Anglo Americans which ultimately affected the ways in which many Anglo American officials
envisioned a standing army of Hispanos.
Some Anglo American officials in New Mexico were able to look past their fears of a
potential Nuevomexicano rebellion; others were not. In large part, the civil governors, daily
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inundated with civilian requests to organize companies to make military campaigns against
independent Indians, were better able to concede the necessity of arming the Nuevomexicano
population than their military counterparts. This is not to say, however, that civil officials such
as James Calhoun did not hold their own suspicions of the New Mexican population. Calhoun
and other Anglo American public officials frequently voiced their concerns that the Hispano and
Pueblo population held an overall contempt for the government of the United States. Yet, they
felt that the situation with independent Indians was so dire that it necessitated looking past these
fears and utilizing civilian warriors. To the military, however, anxieties concerning
Nuevomexicano loyalty were too much to swallow. Thus, they were much more cautious
concerning the arming of the civilian population. Conceptions such as these led to a back and
forth debate concerning the enactment of civilian militias in New Mexico. The bulk of the 1850s
saw racial bias indeed pervading the thoughts of military officials such as Colonels Sumner and
Fauntleroy, but in a broader sense, doubts concerning national allegiance and loyalty put into
question the merits of arming an ethnic Mexican population so recently placed under the
dominion of the United States. This chapter will analyze the turbulent nature of civilian warfare
in New Mexico during the 1850s while also examining the relations between Native Peoples,
Hispanos, and Anglo Americans in the territory as a whole. This chapter ultimately argues that
Anglo American intertwined ideas concerning race, nation, and loyalty dictated not only the
course of civilian warfare but overall relations between Indians, Nuevomexicanos, and Anglo
Americans in New Mexico.

After the death of governor James Calhoun in 1852, Colonel Edwin Sumner declared
himself governor of New Mexico while the federal government contemplated Calhoun’s
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successor. Being in charge of the military department as well as the civil government, Sumner
asserted near complete control over almost all aspects of New Mexican affairs. Due to the
previous clashes between the civil government and the military, he likely reveled in the freedom
and power that this new role offered. Sumner’s actions as both governor and department
commander dictated the course of warfare, both civilian and military, as well as influence the
trajectory of relations with Native peoples in the territory.
The new governor/department commander immediately went to work carrying out his
controversial objective of reducing military costs in the territory while attempting to maintain an
adequate measure of military strength. These two objectives frequently contradicted one
another. For example, in 1852 Sumner relocated the U.S. troops from the settlements,
establishing six permanent military posts in various locations. These forts were generally located
closer to independent Indian nations than the settlements. These included Fort Conrad, twentyfive miles below Socorro; Fort Fillmore, six miles below Mesilla; Fort Defiance, deep into
Navajo territory; and Fort Webster near the Santa Rita Copper Mines. Sumner, in part, chose the
location for these new posts based on their agriculture potential. Under Sumner’s cost-saving
strategies, rather than purchasing foodstuffs through a vendor, the troops themselves were
expected to cultivate their own crops. Observers of this unusual practice were of the opinion that
Sumner’s conception of the farmer-soldier hampered the military’s overall effectiveness. They
generally believed that because of the necessity of agricultural production, the new posts were
not constructed in locations best suited for warfare with the Indians. Strategies such as this
which seemingly emphasized economics over protection irritated both civilians and territorial
officials.
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Even though there was no longer a civil governor to criticize Sumner’s cost-cutting
measures, his approaches nonetheless drew criticism from all sides, including his military
contemporaries. Due to his efforts, Sumner had temporarily reduced expenditures in some
categories, but as historian Robert Frazer argues, “It was a questionable economy that hampered
efficiency, led to shoddy results, and, in the long run, increased costs.”330 Sumner’s farming
initiative was a particularly significant point of contention between the Department Commander
and other officials in the territory. Major Enoch Steen, commander at Fort Webster, informed
Sumner that “as you are well aware, soldiers are bad farmers at best, even in countries better

330

Frazer, Forts and Supplies, 62.

147

adapted to cultivation than New Mexico.”331 As officials such as Major Steen predicted, the
farming project ultimately proved to be a failure. Overworked soldiers made lackluster farmers
at best, and the crops cultivated were rarely enough to feed entire companies. Colonel Joseph
King Fenno Mansfield observed in 1853 that the business of farming is “so entirely different
from the pursuits of an officer and soldier, that it is not at all astonishing it did not succeed.”332
Unenthusiastic observations such as these concerning his efforts induced Sumner into believing
that the settlers, civil officials, and even his military counterparts were opposed to his strategies.
Sumner resentfully declared that the orders of the war department concerning frugality had been
carried out, “in spite of the most determined opposition from all classes.”333 Sumner’s muchmaligned policies further ostracized the regular military in the territory, inducing civilians to
persist in their calls to aid in the defense of their own communities.
Sumner’s cost-cutting measures coincided with a marked increase in hostility between
Native and non-Native peoples in New Mexico. Previously signed treaties commonly fell apart,
and independent Indians and certain sections of the civilian population continued to attack each
other; waring with, murdering, and stealing from one another at an ever-increasing pace. Noted
frontiersman and Indian Agent for the Ute tribe, Kit Carson, articulated the uptick in hostilities
with Indians during the first half of the 1850s. Noting the ineffectiveness of the regular military,
as well as the supremacy that independent Indians held over New Mexico, Carson stated, “As it
is at present, the Indians are masters of the country. They commit depredations as they
please.”334 In the late 1850s, then governor, Abraham Rencher, also highlighted the constant and
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growing state of hostility which had taken place between Native peoples and settlers throughout
the decade. Placing the blame for the aggressions solely at the feet of the Natives, the governor
claimed, “The wrongs which they [the civilians] have suffered at the hands of the Indians, ever
since it was a territory, have been enough to exhaust both the energies and patience of any people
on earth.” He also faulted the military and federal government for these aggressions because
they had not allowed civilians to take up arms in their own defense without the caveat of being
under the control of the military. Rencher asserted that the people of the territory “have confided
in the parental assurances of the Federal Government, that as they were forbidden by law to
vindicate their own wrongs, the United States would provide for their indemnification. But up to
this time the promise has been kept ‘only to the ear.’”335 Thus, in his view, the resident
population had suffered because they were neither given the opportunity to war with the Natives
independently nor were they adequately recompensed for stolen property.
For their part, by the 1850s generations of violence, disease, and hunger due to
colonialism had decimated many independent Indian groups. Yet, these people continued to
persist, striking fear into the hearts of the civilian residents through warfare and raiding. More
enlightened non-Native observers noted the desperate situation of certain Indian groups in the
territory, discerning that in most cases Indian raiding was a mechanism necessary for the survival
of their communities. Remarking that certain Indian groups in New Mexico were quite literally
starving, Apache Indian agent Michael Steck, for example, wrote in 1853, “I found [the Indians]
poor – and from the scarcity of game – likely to suffer from want of provisions.” He added:
“some Utahs…were in a starving condition…and found as had been represented, about forty

Governor’s Message to the House of Representatives of New Mexico, Undated, SDTP, NM, RG59, NA, T17,
Roll 1.
335

149

families mostly women and children suffering for want of provisions.” He went on to state that
these people had no other recourse but to “consume their mules and horses and the bark of
trees…. I have been in their camps when their only visible means of subsistence was the bark of
the pine and asher trees…. the squaws with hatchets removing the bark and their children seated
around…collecting and eating the pulp and soft parts.” In empathetic language, Steck noted the
necessity for certain Indian bands to steal from the settlements, stating, “Notwithstanding, their
disposition to steal and often murder to appease hunger must elicit sympathy…they are reduced
to the absolute necessity of choosing between stealing or starvation.”336 As frequent as these
observations were, the majority of the non-Native population, however, continued to adhere to
the belief that Indian raiding was less about necessity but rather the ultimate result of Native
American “savagery” and hostility.
Historical Hispano hostility toward independent Indian groups had also contributed
toward the dire situation of many Native bands. Deviating from the views of the majority of
non-Native inhabitants in New Mexico, Michael Steck contended that civilians had historically
engaged in the violent raiding of Indian communities, which had been a significant reason for the
despondent situation of Native peoples. Steck stated that the settlers had been involved in an
unending and reciprocal pattern of violence and theft with the Native peoples throughout many
generations. This extended cycle of revenge and retaliation had the effect of devastating certain
Native groups in New Mexico which by the 1850s had become all too apparent.337 He claimed
that there was “a custom for the Indians to steal from the N. Mexicans and then the Mexicans to
steal from them…this system of thieving and retaliation has been kept up, and under the Mexican
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rule organized parties were permitted to make campaigns for the avowed purpose of stealing
Indian stock and prisoners.” Thus, raiding wasn’t only a one-sided occurrence instigated solely
by independent Indians. With such views in mind, Steck advocated for a more sympathetic
strategy concerning Native Peoples in New Mexico. Steck compassionately enquired: “Does not
justice demand that something be done for the Indian, that some return he made for his lands
taken possession of by us [and] for his game killed and driven aside?”338 Accordingly, Michael
Steck and other Indian agents attempted to halt Indian depredations in New Mexico by
implementing a more humanitarian philosophy.
Acknowledging that Indian “depredations” were necessary to prevent starvation, the
New Mexican Indian agents pursued a course of action that reflected this reality. By 1853 they
sought to carry out a new policy which, in their words, would commence “the work of
civilization” towards Native peoples. This was approximately twenty years before the
implementation of Ulysses S. Grant’s “Peace Policy,” which, under the guise of “civilizing” the
Natives ultimately sought to destroy Native languages and customs. This early strategy by the
agents was much more moderate. Michael Steck recommended the establishment of agencies in
the vicinity of each tribe where the agents could teach them “the advantages of civilization.”
Noting the famished condition of many Native groups, Steck’s main focus would be teaching the
independent Indians how to farm their own subsistence. Under this proposal, Indians would be
supplied with provisions until they were “taught to provide for themselves.”
During the 1850s, U.S. officials had begun to contemplate the idea of permanent
locations upon which they could confine Native peoples. An embryonic idea of “reservations”
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had been practiced for many years, as the Spanish had implemented a technique of assembling
“Apaches de Paz” around military outposts.339 Whites located within the bounds of the United
States had also attempted to, with varying degrees of success, relocate Native Peoples to
specifically chosen tracks of land upon which they could assert a more considerable amount of
control over them. Indians caught in the wake of Anglo American westward expansion were
continually forced to relocate, and as more and more whites pushed west, they continued to force
Indians westward to areas that were generally deemed undesirable.340 By the mid-nineteenth
century, wholesale continental conquest had resulted in there no longer being a “west” with
which to relocate Native peoples. The U.S. government thus began to formulate the idea of a
formal reservation system; permanent locations upon which whites could better regulate Indian
life while endeavoring to “civilize” and assimilate them. This system would become more fully
developed after the Civil War, but by the 1850s, the idea was generally vague and untested.
Michael Steck was a firm believer that a reservation system in New Mexico could potentially be
a panacea for the plight of Indian peoples in the region. He argued that reservations should be
established “in order to protect them in their rights, from the encroachments of settlers and from
the neighboring tribes of Indians.”341 Thus, Steck began to implement a plan in which territorial
officials would assign certain Native groups a specific tract of land upon which white agents
would teach them how to farm, thereby theoretically eliminating their need to raid the
settlements. Steck went to work choosing sites upon which Indians at peace would be able to
learn to cultivate the land.
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Attempting to change the culture and lifeways of the Independent Indians was admittedly
no easy task for the colonizers. These Native peoples had been fighting against the tide of
colonialism for centuries, and they certainly were not going to be receptive to transforming their
way of life under the direction of U.S. officials. Historically, peoples such as the Apache had
successfully subverted Spanish attempts at assimilation. They had been able to adapt to the
Spanish reservation system by taking advantage of the rations, gifts, and military protection to
preserve their families.342 They also maintained a measure of autonomy, avoiding state
incorporation by moving in and out of Spanish zones of control, relying on movement, economic
exchange, and small-scale livestock raiding.343 U.S. authorities would attempt to succeed where
the Spanish had failed. Michael Steck endeavored to induce various bands of Native peoples to
settle on reservations. In return, they had to agree to give up their independence and become
dependent upon the U.S. government. Unsurprisingly, Steck found few participants willing to
undergo such a lifestyle alteration. The Indian agent noted, “I enquired into their willingness to
settle in towns - and instead of their roving life – to become permanent settlers and cultivators of
the soil. There is still a strong disposition among them all to adhere to their ancient customs.”344
Steck was, however, able to convince certain, more receptive Native bands to try the farming
experiment. Under the prospect of receiving rations, these groups saw no other way of
prolonging the survival of their communities. The long-term result of this policy is difficult to
determine. Some Native bands made great strides practicing agriculture while others preferred to
continue the age-old custom of procuring sustenance through hunting and raiding. However, the

342

Babcock, Apache Adaptation to Hispanic Rule, 2.
Ibid.
344
Steck to Lane, January 1853, Michael Steck Papers, University of New Mexico Center for Southwest Research,
MSS134BC, Box 1, Folder 2.
343

153

importance that U.S. officials placed on a system of reservations would only increase as the
nineteenth century progressed.
During the time that Michael Steck was endeavoring to implement a more humanitarian
Indian policy, both the U.S. and Mexican armies had been pursuing independent Native peoples
along the border. Reliance on violent negotiation led to several fleeting overtures of peace with
a few Native groups. The most significant was the Treaty of Acoma in 1852. Early in the year,
certain Chiricahua Apache leaders met Colonel Sumner and acting Superintendent of Indian
Affairs John Greiner at the Pueblo of Acoma to hammer out a peace treaty. Sumner chose the
Pueblo of Acoma as a meeting ground due to its proximity to his headquarters in Santa Fe.345
These Apaches had been at war with Sonora and used the new border to their advantage. They
would remain at war with Mexico while using the United States as a peaceful base of operations.
Chiricahua leaders led by noted chief Mangus Coloradas signed the Treaty of Acoma, which
became the only officially ratified treaty between the United States and the Apache people.346
The treaty contained eleven articles which stipulated that the Apaches would recognize the
jurisdiction of the United States, establish friendly relations between the two peoples, and allow
the government to create military posts and agencies in their country. Attempting to keep to the
terms of article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the treaty also stipulated that Indians
return any Mexican captives and prohibit raiding in that country. In return, the Americans
agreed to issue presents and other gifts.347 Although ratified by Congress, U.S. officials were
skeptical that the Indians would adhere to the treaty. Captain John Pope, present at the signing
of the Treaty stated, “The state of comparative peace to which they [the Apaches] had been
345
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brought by the treaty of Acoma in 1852, is well understood to be a very uncertain and precarious
arrangement and one liable at any and every moment to be abruptly terminated.”348 The
Americans ultimately issued fewer presents than the Chiricahuas would have liked, and the treaty
was soon defied. The Treaty of Acoma, however, illustrates how the new border benefitted
Native bands which crossed at will between both nations. Native peoples found that they could
escape pursuit by one country by taking refuge in the other. This emboldened certain Native
groups which frequently led to further hostilities in both nations.
Throughout the 1850s, pauses in violence brought about due to treaties such as Acoma
and others signed by the New Mexican governors collapsed rather quickly. Federal officials
were extremely hesitant to appropriate scarce government funds for Indian treaties in a territory
so physically and psychologically removed from what they considered the civilized world. The
Treaty of Acoma, for example, was the only treaty with an Apache group that Congress ever
ratified. However, various other treaties with the Apaches and other groups were negotiated and
signed by territorial officials without the approval of federal authorities. These treaties generally
promised to provide the Native peoples with rations and other provisions, but without continued
congressional funding, territorial officials could not deliver the commodities promised. On
multiple occasions, New Mexico, and by extension, the United States had violated its treaty
agreements by not providing the supplies pledged to Indian groups. At the same time, New
Mexican officials believed that various Indian groups had also breached their treaty stipulations.
Various Native groups that New Mexican authorities thought to have embraced treaties
continued to raid the settlements. However, through a fundamental misunderstanding of Native
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American societal structures, U.S. officials failed to realize that although they had made an
agreement with several bands, it was not necessarily binding upon all the members of the
tribe.349 Some Native leaders who did sign such treaties also had a difficult time hindering
rebellious young men intent on proving themselves through raiding. These issues, as well as
sheer necessity to “steal or starve,” continually led to the breakdown of treaty obligations on both
sides. After signing a treaty in 1852 for example, a group of Mescaleros in 1853 violated their
treaty stipulations by killing two residents of Dona Ana who left to collect salt near the town.
The Mescaleros later killed ten out of fifteen emigrants driving away one hundred and fifty head
of stock.350 Hispano residents also continually harassed Native groups despite having signed
treaties. Such is the case with the unsanctioned militia group, the Mesilla Guard, who engaged
in multiple massacres and thefts of Native peoples at peace throughout the 1850s. Thus, both
settlers and independent Indians accused each other of violating treaty stipulations, which further
led to increased aggressions.
Due to an apparent rise in hostilities with Native peoples, many New Mexican residents
deemed Edwin Sumner’s military exploits and cost-cutting strategies as failures. Realizing that
his tenure as both department commander and governor failed to yield any significant results,
Sumner wrote a scathing letter to Secretary of War Charles Magill Conrad summarizing the
bleak condition of New Mexico. In his letter, Sumner argued that the tumultuous state of Indian
affairs in New Mexico could not be resolved. To the proud and obstinate department
commander, if he could not restore peace in New Mexico, then the territory was simply beyond
repair. Therefore, he concluded that it would serve New Mexico best if the civil and military
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officials completely abandoned the territory. After such supposed withdrawal, Sumner asserted
that the U.S. should supply arms to the civilians allowing them to conduct warfare with
independent Indians as they saw fit. In this context, Sumner considered the merits of civilian
defense, arguing that if no civil or military official remained in the territory “with regard to the
protection of these people from the Indians, they would have the same that was extended to them
by the Mexican government – that is to say, permission to defend themselves. Besides, they
would be much better armed than they have ever been before, and the Indians would have more
respect and fear for them.”351 The federal government did not take his recommendations
seriously. Moreover, despite these aforementioned views, as long as the U.S. military remained
in New Mexico, Sumner continued to remain opposed to allowing settlers to fight. The use of
civilian warriors would again become a significant point of contention upon the arrival of a new
civil governor.
In September of 1852, former six-term mayor of St. Louis and surgeon William Carr
Lane entered New Mexico to assume the governorship from Sumner. Lane was immediately
thrust into the conflict between the civil government, military, and settlers; the foundation of
which was built upon James Calhoun and Sumner’s toxic relationship. Sumner was perfectly
contented with the authority he had held since Calhoun’s death and was not pleased that he had
had to cede the governorship back to a civilian who was again bound to get in the way of his
objectives. Sumner was resentful of civilian authority from the outset, and his troubles with
Calhoun left a bad taste in his mouth. Having to transfer his governmental authority to Lane
greatly distressed him. As he conceded the office to Lane, Sumner lamented, “When the
President appointed you as successor to Governor Calhoun, I felt bound to understand, that it
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was his wish to try again the appointment of a civil government in this territory.”352 Sumner
would, however, do everything in his power to limit the influence of the new civil governor.
Sumner immediately attempted to assert his authority over Lane. The department
commander made it clear that similar to his dealings with Calhoun, the military was not going to
supply the governor or his agents with any military support toward their objectives. He strictly
prohibited any military supplies for being used for the purpose of aiding the governor, going as
far as reprimanding one of his officers, Colonel Horace Brooks, for wasting ammunition by
firing a salute in the plaza at Governor Lane’s inauguration.353 Sumner even ordered the
American flag, which had flown over the plaza since Kearny’s conquest, to be taken down with
the justification that he was not allowed to furnish the governor with government stores.354 With
these actions, Sumner made it known at the outset that there would be very little cooperation
between the military and the civil authorities. This non-cooperation bled over into the institution
of civilian defense, and strife concerning this issue continued just as it had under the Calhoun
administration, for a time.
During his tenure as governor, Sumner had disregarded the Militia Law of 1851 allowing
the idea of a standing militia in New Mexico to crumble. The fact that there was virtually no
maintained militia in the territory was baffling to the new governor. Lane quickly became aware
of New Mexico’s Indian troubles and firmly believed that a standing militia would solve many of
the territory’s woes. Lane penned an angry letter to Colonel Sumner criticizing that the
department commander had not sanctioned or maintained a territorial militia in any form. Lane
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furiously observed that there was not “a single company of militia organized in the whole
territory, nor a single musket within reach of the volunteer, should there be an offer of service by
anyone; and you, Colonel Sumner, must have been, from your official position, duly informed of
these things.”355 Like Calhoun, Lane was a proponent of using civilian warriors to battle
independent Indians and was extremely troubled as to why there were seemingly no militia
companies available when, in his view, the territory could so clearly benefit from their
organization.
In the vein of his predecessor, the federal government provided William Carr Lane with
insufficient direction regarding the organization of the militia or any other matters concerning
New Mexico. Congress and other federal officials in Washington, D.C. accorded very little
significance to New Mexico, rendering much more importance to the growing sectional disputes
and other matters to the east. They gave very little heed to concerns emanating from a territory
thought to be so inconsequential to the overall value of the United States. Struck by the United
States’ perceived indifference to the territory, Lane stated, “I find a deplorable state of ignorance
to exist, among the officials [in Washington], on the subject of New Mexican affairs.356 Federal
apathy was a severe source of frustration for Lane, as it would be for many officials stationed in
the territory. After his tenure as governor had ended, Lane claimed, “Never was an executive
officer in a more pitiable plight than I was at this time. I was an utter stranger to my official
duties, without having any competent legal advisor, and with scarcely an official document on
file to direct or assist my official actions…not a cent of money on hand or known to be subject to
the draft of the governor…not a cent in the city, county or territorial treasuries and no credit for
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the country.”357 Lane, however, had a defiant character that his predecessor lacked, and would
be much more comfortable making decisions without the input of Washington or the New
Mexican military authorities.
Lane’s rebellious nature first emerged in his interactions with Native peoples. In terms of
Indian relations, the governor was of the same mindset as Indian Agent Michael Steck. Lane
believed that, for the peace of the territory and the survival of its many inhabitants, independent
Indians needed to learn to cultivate the land and raise stock. Lane, like other more humanitarian
observers, correctly noted that Indians had to "steal or starve.” He, therefore, advocated treatymaking and ration-giving over the utilization of violence. Without the approval of the Senate,
the governor negotiated numerous treaties with Native groups throughout his tenure. He
ultimately spent between $20,000 and $40,000 on treaties with Apache groups alone. He also
agreed to supply rations to over 1,000 Native peoples.358 As these treaties were unauthorized,
they lacked sustained federal funding. Without the financial backing of the federal government,
the bankrupt territory of New Mexico could not continue to adhere to the treaty stipulations of
supplying provisions to Native peoples. As a result, New Mexico had subsequently violated
many treaties they had made with various Indian groups. This understandably infuriated Indians
with whom Lane had made the treaties, leading to an increasing distrust of the New Mexicans.
Cynicism concerning violated treaties drove a wedge between native groups, such as the Apache,
and non-Native peoples in New Mexico, which only led to more violence. Lack of
communication between the territory and Washington thus had genuine consequences.
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However, when federal officials learned about Lane’s unauthorized expenditures on
Indian treaties, they were incensed. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, George H. Manypenny was
particularly distraught. He argued that authority was not “given by this office to any officers of
the United States in New Mexico to incur the heavy expenditures that have been made there
during the latter part of the year 1852, and the first six months of 1853.” Manypenny revealed
that Lane had spent a total of $19,174.51 on Indian affairs, which was “nearly double the amount
of the appropriation for the current year.”359 Receiving the ire of certain federal officials would
not, however, deter the governor from following a path that deviated from the wishes of the
federal government and military department in New Mexico.
Lane’s role in a boundary dispute between the United States and Mexico regarding the
town of La Mesilla further showed his daring disregard for federal authority. After the U.S. War
with Mexico, many residents of New Mexico who did not wish to become citizens of the United
States migrated south of the newly established border. Doing so, according to historian Anthony
Mora, “became one of the most important expressions of Mexican patriotism in the first decade
after the war.”360 During the 1840s, several small communities existed across the river from
modern-day Las Cruces. After the War, repatriates poured into these communities birthing the
Mexican town of La Mesilla, incorporated in 1850. That same year, the United States and
Mexico participated in a joint boundary survey to shore up the vague borders of the two nations.
There was, however, a dispute as to whether the town of Mesilla fell under the jurisdiction of the
U.S. or Mexico. The Mesilla Valley no doubt was a vital strip of land to the United States
primarily because they wanted to secure the southernmost section of New Mexico for purposes
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of building a railroad.361 Mexican citizens of La Mesilla who founded the town to escape being
under the sovereignty of the United States, however, certainly did not want to be once again
placed under the purview of the United States.
There were, however, a minority of Mesilla residents who advocated for U.S. rule over
the town. In 1851, certain U.S.-friendly residents of La Mesilla signed a petition. They pleaded
to Governor Calhoun to clear up the boundary dispute and place Mesilla under the authority of
the United States. The petitioners falsely claimed, "The town of La Mesilla was settled
sometime in the early part of 1850, by Americans and New Mexican Territory Citizens, under
the conviction that it was New Mexican Territory and was subject to its laws."362 Their
grievances against the Mexican authorities included the establishment of a Mexican custom
house which collected duties from the residents, as well as their claim that the Mexican
government was “taking away lands from Americans and others who are favorable to American
rights and privileges, and giving them to those who profess to be Citizens of Mexico.”363 These
residents argued that Mexico held no jurisdiction over the town and they advocated the
detachment of the area from the Mexican Republic.
Shortly after assuming office, Lane responded to the wishes of these residents by
traveling to the Mesilla Valley with the intent of issuing a proclamation claiming the area for the
United States. Federal authorities did not authorize Lane’s actions, and his rash decision led the
U.S. and Mexico exceptionally close to war. Lane reasoned that he would need military aid with
this daring scheme. He appealed to Colonel Sumner for assistance in supplying troops to aid in
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occupying the town. Sumner was appalled that Lane even considered such a course of action.
He, like most other military and federal officials, perceived Lane’s actions as a reckless abuse of
power and refused to offer the governor any military aid whatsoever. Despite not having any
official military or federal support, in March of 1853, Lane proceeded with his plan and arrived
in the U.S. town of Doña Ana, some 20 miles north of La Mesilla. Upon his arrival, the
governor issued a proclamation in which he claimed the Mesilla Valley as part of the United
States. In his announcement, Lane justified his taking possession of the area due in part to his
opinion that Mexico had failed to protect the area against Indian incursions.364 Lane’s words
echoed racialized rhetoric used by federal officials to go to acquire Mexico’s north in 1848.365
Lane’s brash actions sent ripples throughout the United States. In New Mexico, a
meeting of the citizens led by prominent Anglo men took place in Santa Fe. During this
gathering, the people in attendance agreed with Lane’s course of action and promised him their
support. Racialized rhetoric certainly influenced these people’s decision to back the efforts of
the governor. They had used the term “American” to denote Anglo American inhabitants of
Mesilla while denoting “Mexican” as the mestizo residents. The citizens of Santa Fe claimed,
“American citizens located there [Mesilla] were despoiled of their property, and many Mexicans
who had commenced the settlement of Mesilla, in 1847, with the understanding that they were
placing themselves under the protection of the Government of the United States, found
themselves, against their will, again under the Mexican government.”366 Particular residents of
New Mexico went further by agreeing to volunteer to recapture the area by force. Volunteers
from Texas also offered their military assistance. In California, the General Assembly agreed to
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organize ten companies of men and assist Lane in his endeavor if war with Mexico should
occur.367 Lane’s actions led many throughout the United States to perceive that another war with
Mexico was on the horizon.
The governments of both Mexico and the United States were infuriated with Lane's
actions. Despite being the exploits of one man, Mexico saw Lane’s proclamation as an act of
hostility by the United States. Mexican President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna subsequently
ordered troops into La Mesilla to resist any military attempt to gain possession of the area. Up to
four hundred Mexican soldiers immediately amassed in the town with the prospect of a thousand
more arriving from nearby Chihuahua City. The possibility of military hostility with Mexico
was obviously of grave concern to U.S. officials. In a letter to the Assistant Adjutant General,
the commander at Fort Thorn near Doña Ana, Lieutenant Colonel Dixon Miles, stated that Lane
chose to "issue the proclamation, without authority from Congress or the chief executive of the
United States.” He added, “As the question now stands, it will be involved in difficulty to settle,
if not ultimately result on the part of Mexico in a declaration of war."368 Alfred Conkling,
United States Minister to Mexico similarly disavowed Lane's actions and severely criticized him
for what he saw as an illegal act.369 U.S. authorities decided to end the boundary dispute quickly
before hostilities broke out with Mexico.
For his part, William Carr Lane felt he was completely justified in his actions. He
claimed that he held the independent authority to make such brazen decisions because, as
governor of New Mexico, he was not beholden to military authority. In a letter to Colonel Dixon
Miles, Lane tried to vindicate himself arguing, "As the army is subordinate and auxiliary to the
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civil authorities of the U.S. - in all states and territories...the Governor of New Mexico is
certainly not accountable to the army for his acts as civil magistrate. I therefore do not hold
myself accountable to Colonel Sumner, or yourself, for what I have done, in relation to this
disputed territory." In the same letter, Lane voiced his opinion that the inept nature of the
military currently stationed in New Mexico compelled him to act. He argued that it was
ultimately the military’s duty to end the boundary dispute by force, yet, as he asserted: "Some
350 U.S. troops, who are unemployed and are within 5 miles of the scene of action, fold their
arms in frigid tranquility and thereby sustain the enemies of their country!"370 Receiving
minimal direction from Washington additionally emboldened Lane into believing that he could
make weighty decisions without the permission of the federal government. It also revealed and
reflected larger debates unfolding across the U.S. regarding the division of powers between the
territorial government and the military, the role and power of civilian governments, the influence
of the military, and other weighty questions in antebellum America.
Lane’s independent action brought the U.S. and Mexico very close to another war which
forced the federal government to act. The administration decided to make a new treaty with
Mexico. The two nations negotiated the Gadsden Treaty in 1854 in which Santa Anna agreed to
sell the southern portion of New Mexico to the United States for 10 million dollars. The U.S.
favored this treaty because they desired the southern portion of New Mexico to construct a
southern route to the transcontinental rail line. Thus, the government was able to step in before
any blood was shed. The Gadsden Treaty, however, did not bring an end to turmoil between the
two nations. Santa Anna, not pleased with the aggressive actions of the United States, responded
with orders against free speech, the surrender of arms, and a system of passports for travel for all
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foreigners in Mexico. Mexican authorities mainly directed these mandates toward American
citizens living in Mexico.371 The treaty also contributed toward a feeling of resentment toward
the United States by the vast majority of residents of La Mesilla, being once again placed under
the authority of the United States against their will. Most residents of Mesilla in southern New
Mexico considered themselves more attached geographically to Mexico than Santa Fe. Mesilla
was located but 45 miles from Paso del Norte, yet was almost 300 miles from New Mexico’s
capital and center of government. These residents rarely felt that the far off New Mexican
government shared their particular local concerns. This disconnect would become most apparent
during the Civil War, as Mesilla rejected the United States and cast their lot with the
Confederacy.
The boundary dispute demonstrated that Lane felt he was not subordinate to military or
federal authority which also fueled greater tension between himself and Colonel Sumner
concerning civilian defense of New Mexico. Similar to the relationship between Lane’s
predecessor and Sumner, the new governor’s views on civilian militias created tumult between
the civil government and the military. In May of 1853, for example, territorial officials blamed
the murder of a man and the taking two captive children in Rio Arriba County on a group of
Navajos. In a rare scenario, Lane and Sumner both agreed on how to proceed. They decided
that a retributive expedition into Navajo country was in order. Lane, however, believed that a
much larger fighting force than what the regular military could provide would more effectively
compel the Navajos into submission. He assumed that a campaign undertaken by regular troops
alone could only lead to a protracted and costly war. The Governor thereby requested
supplementing Sumner’s regular troops with New Mexican volunteers. Predictably, Sumner yet
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again refused to allow citizens to campaign against their enemies.372 So adamant was Lane about
the use of civilian warriors that he threatened to order out volunteers without approval from the
military. Sumner’s rejection of Lane’s proposal so infuriated the governor that he challenged
Sumner to a duel, who subsequently declined the offer.373 The use of civilian volunteers was
indeed still a very heated topic among the officials of the territory.
Alongside the general vilification of the New Mexican people by Anglo American
officials examined in the previous chapter, concern over uncertain national loyalties of the
Hispano population defined the 1850s which also certainly played into Sumner and other
official’s hesitance in utilizing the civilian population militarily. Many U.S. officials perceived
that the Hispano population still held more allegiance toward their former government than they
did the United States. In particular, military officials in New Mexico supposed that Hispano
cultural and historical ties to Mexico translated into a sustained loyalty to that nation as well as
an instinctive hatred for the United States. Anglo officials believed they had many reasons to
fear a potential uprising among the Hispano population. The U.S.-Mexico War was but a recent
memory, and the Gadsden Treaty had placed many displeased residents back under the purview
of the United States. Most concerning was the fact that in 1847 many Nuevomexicanos and
Pueblo Indians united and rose up in rebellion killing several U.S. government officials including
then governor Charles Bent.374 U.S. officials were particularly anxious about the allegiance of
the poorer classes. Elite Hispanos generally, sometimes reluctantly, embraced the United States,
yet U.S. officilas thought that poorer residents might have harbored anti-American sentiments.
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To Anglo officials, shadows of another revolution potentially lurked around every corner. This
distrust and suspicion toward the New Mexican population translated into racial mistrust on a
larger scale.
Another rebellion by the ethnic Mexican population and Pueblo Peoples was a genuine
threat in the minds of many Anglo-American residents of New Mexico during the 1850s. In
April of 1852, then governor James Calhoun wrote to Edwin Sumner that he believed there was a
“rebellious feeling among the people and that they now only await a favorable opportunity to
attempt carrying out their treasonable purposes into effect.” Believing that some certain
Nuevomexicanos and independent Indians were conspiring with each other to overthrow the U.S.
government, Calhoun claimed, “The savages surrounding them were being excited against us by
emissaries and traitorous persons.”375 Calhoun argued that the lower class were the ones
responsible for the proposed revolution, stating, “The more intelligent and better-informed
portion of the natives of this Territory have taken no part in the projected revolution.” He
claimed that in order to carry out their plans, leading insurrectionists had played off of the strong
Mexican national sentiment of the people. He asserted that the agitators had “doubtless worked
upon the naturally strong national and religious preferences of the lower classes…their object, as
far as we can learn is to overthrow the present administration and do all the injury possible to the
public officers.”376 Calhoun, therefore, called for an additional military force at Santa Fe to
prevent an insurrection of the populace. Sumner agreed that revolution was looming and
acceded to Calhoun’s demands, consolidating troops at Santa Fe. When the Department
Commander felt that the rebellious spirit had subsided, he withdrew the troops. Despite
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Calhoun’s fears concerning rebellion, he was still much more inclined than Sumner in allowing
civilians to serve in a territorial militia.
Anglo fears concerning the questionable loyalty of the Hispano population was further
exacerbated by ongoing tensions between the United States and Mexico as well as within Mexico
itself during the 1850s. Since the U.S.-Mexico War, the relationship between the United States
and Mexico was understandably hostile and fraught with suspicion and mistrust. Many U.S.
officials reasoned that ethnic Mexicans along the border would potentially support any hostilities
prompted by the Mexican nation toward of the United States. Events taking place within Mexico
intensified Anglo American suspicions of potential rebellion. In Mexico during 1853, certain
officials sought to bring Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna back as chief executive and revive the
federal constitution of 1824 through the Plan de Hispocio. To U.S. officials, this political
rebellion in Mexico could potentially inspire revolt within the United States. Upon learning of
this undertaking, Colonel Dixon Miles at Fort Fillmore, concerned that the population of
Hispanos residing in the area would turn their back on the United States, issued a proclamation
to all of the inhabitants below the Jornada del Muerto. In his announcement, Miles stated:
“it has come to my knowledge that a revolution is in progress by
our neighbors to the south, the Mexicans, to change their form of
government. The various laws enacted by our National
Legislature, the Congress of the United States, positively prohibits
under severe penalties, any of our citizens from engaging in the
revolution of neighboring governments. To maintain the strictest
neutrality with all whom we are at peace, to prevent our citizens
from participating in any of their internal difficulties, under severe
penalties of fine and imprisonment, be it therefore known to all
concerned, I shall, as superior commander of the United States
troops within this district use all lawful means within my power to
prevent any of you from participating in the present revolution now
carrying on in the State of Chihuahua, and I call upon all civil
officers, judges and magistrates to lend me their assistance in
restraining the inhabitants from any act, or acts, compromising the
169

neutrality of the United States Government – and I further declare I
shall, without hesitation, perform the duty placed upon me by law,
to bring to the United States Courts, for punishment, all who may
be aiding and assisting in this present revolution. My advice to
you my fellow citizens, is to remain quietly at your homes, and let
our neighbors settle their own difficulties in their own way…Like
good citizens, obey the law, if you do not I will, and however
painful to my feelings, shall be bound to prosecute you.”377
In response, justices of the peace and other government officials from San Elizario,
Socorro, and “other towns on this side of the river” signed an agreement pledging neutrality
“among the Mexican population” in Mexican affairs.378 The fact that these leaders felt the need
to assuage U.S. officials by insisting that the ethnic Mexicans in their jurisdictions held no
hostile intentions toward the United States displays the apprehension many Anglos felt toward
the ethnic Mexican population. To many government officials, potential Hispano insurrection
was, therefore, a very real danger.
Racial strife on both sides of the border further influenced Anglo American perceptions
concerning ethnic Mexican loyalty to the United States. A noteworthy example of Anglo and
Mexican discord occurred in and around El Paso in July of 1853. That year, Mexican officials
had jailed an American citizen by the name of James Magee in El Paso del Norte (modern-day
Ciudad Juárez) on his way to California for allegedly stealing some oxen from Mexican citizens.
Upon being summoned by the Prefect of the city, Magee brought the cattle back to the Mexican
side of the river and delivered them to the authorities. He maintained his innocence, claiming
that he did not knowingly steal from the Mexicans but instead found the oxen among his own
herd. Despite his proclamation of innocence, Mexican officials arrested and imprisoned Magee.
The Mexican government agreed to free the prisoner if he paid a fine of one hundred dollars. As
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the Prefect called Magee into court; however, he changed his mind and refused to release him.
Several hundred California emigrants encamped along the Texas side of the river soon learned of
the actions of the Mexican government. These Anglos maintained Magee’s innocence, arguing
that his return of the oxen to Mexico proved no wrongdoing. These Americans and others
located on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande (present-day El Paso) were incensed that the
Mexicans did not free Magee as they had promised, and “the excitement rose to a fearful height.”
They subsequently took it upon themselves to cross into Mexico, attack the jail, and free Magee.
On July 18th, several Americans had fired upon the prison and were repulsed by Mexican
defenders. One American was immediately killed, and one was left wounded, expiring a day
later.379
Because of this event, relations between the people of the two nations further
deteriorated. On the American side of the river directly adjacent to El Paso del Norte, Anglos
and Mexicans regularly insulted and drew pistols at each other. The situation became so dire
that Consul to Mexico, Davis Diffendorfer, “for the sake of safety,” ordered, “every American to
shut up his store at dusk, and upon no account leave his house after dark.” In favor of the actions
of the small group of Anglo American invaders, Diffendorfer claimed that “the whole proceeding
is a plan [by Mexico] to extort money from [Magee].”380 Eventually, the racial tensions caused
by this occurrence cooled, yet a sense of racial suspicion never fully abated. Officials opposed to
the use of civilian volunteers were influenced by the precarious national, and ethnic relations
such as these examples suggest.
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Not all military officials in New Mexico would be wholly against the use of civilian
volunteers, however. In 1853, General John Garland, a sixty-one-year-old veteran of the War of
1812, the Seminole Wars, and the U.S.-Mexico War, replaced Edwin Sumner as Department
Commander in New Mexico. This shift in military leadership would change the course of
civilian warfare in New Mexico for the next five years. Although Garland held Sumner in high
regard, he criticized the actions that he took in New Mexico. The new department commander
claimed, “My predecessor is an old friend and acknowledged throughout the army to be one of
our most efficient and gallant officers in the field…but his energies have been misapplied, and he
has left the department in an impoverished and crippled condition…. [H]is sole aim appears to
have been to win reputation from an economical administration of his Department; in this, he
will be found to have signally failed, if all his acts are closely looked into.”381 Garland,
therefore, attempted to cultivate more amicable relations with New Mexico civil authorities and
strengthen the military so impaired by Sumner’s strategies.382 Above all, Garland was much
more receptive to using civilian volunteers than his predecessor.
Upon assuming command, Garland sought immediate and significant changes to the
military department. He abandoned many of the cost-cutting measures of his predecessor.
Under Garland’s management, there would be no more skimping.383 The military under Garland
pushed even further into New Mexican Indian territory establishing additional forts such as Fort
Massachusetts and Fort Stanton while abandoning some thought useless such as Fort Webster.
Under Garland, the troops no longer had to cultivate the land, nor were they required to construct
these additional forts. A big proponent of extra troop strength, upon taking command of New
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Mexico Garland brought with him 300 recruits to reinforce additional military posts made
necessary by the acquired land of the Gadsden Purchase. A proponent of utilizing force to
attempt to overwhelm the Indians, Garland launched numerous campaigns against Native groups
in New Mexico and west Texas. He had embraced a policy of aggression against Native peoples,
and as such he recognized the necessity of supplementing the regular troops with civilian
volunteers if the territory was to be successful in subduing the independent tribes. He, therefore,
encouraged the practice of allowing New Mexican volunteers to fight alongside regular troops.
Garland was more pragmatic than his predecessor and didn’t let disparaging views of Hispanos
influence the course of civilian warfare.
While advocating for the use of civilian warriors fighting alongside the military, Garland
also generally tolerated small independent civilian expeditions against Native peoples accused of
stealing from or murdering the residents. Under Garland, civilians were usually free to seek
redress against independent Indians as long as these expeditions did not result in wholesale
slaughter or the assault of innocent tribes under treaty. The long-adhered to custom of civilian
warfare had endured and survived the Sumner era as a limited number of independent volunteer
companies had still been active around the territory. Civilians had been more than dissatisfied
with the regular military and as a response, small local volunteer units frequently acted
autonomously without the supervision of either the territorial government or the military. They
believed they had the right to pursue Indian depredators as a matter of precedent as well as
governor Calhoun’s previous proclamations encouraging them to do so. Men of high social
standing such as local government officials, led these independent volunteer companies and
frequently initiated forays into Indian country under the guise of self-defense.
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By and large, Garland accepted these small expeditions, allowing these men to deliver
their prisoners to military posts. In 1854, for example, the Justice of the Peace of El Rito, fiftyfive miles north of Santa Fe, Felipe Martinez, headed a local volunteer company which surprised
and captured a party of eight Apaches who were accused of stealing sheep in the area. Two of
the Apaches attempted to make their escape and were killed; the rest were captured and delivered
to the military. In another instance, Juan Martinez y Peña led an expedition of men who
captured ten Apaches near La Servilleta, approximately thirty miles north of El Rito. The men
killed one Apache, while one escaped, and they sent the remainder to Taos as prisoners. These
particular prisoners threatened that they would “war with the United States as long as any of
them are left alive or until the white population are driven from the territory.”384 Independent
local militia organizations such as these certainly took advantage of Garland’s general tolerance
of their actions. Garland and other military officials, however, would shun certain overly violent
civilian forays that resulted in a breakdown in relations with friendly Natives, such is the case
with the Mesilla Guard discussed in the next chapter.
The arrival of a new governor in New Mexico further paved the way for a more lenient
attitude toward civilian defense. In 1853, William Carr Lane resigned the governorship, and
President Franklin Pierce appointed David Meriwether to head the civil government in New
Mexico. Governor Meriwether was not at all pleased with many of the previous governor’s
actions, particularly regarding Lane’s numerous unratified treaties with Native peoples.
Meriwether voiced his frustration declaring: “I entered upon the discharge of the duties of this
office…and soon found that my predecessor had made a compact with several bands of the
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Apache tribe…which has caused much embarrassment and difficulty.”385 Due to the U.S.
Senate’s decision to ratify only one Apache treaty, the rations Lane had promised the Apache
tribes had never materialized. These Apache groups were perplexed as to why the New Mexican
government had failed to live up to their end of the treaties. Upon his visit with an Apache band,
Meriwether claimed, “They [the Apaches] ask how it was that the former Father could satisfy
them with food…whilst their present Father could not. When I say to them that I have no money
to purchase presents and provisions with, their reply is, how did their former Father get money
for this purpose.”386 The refusal of the New Mexican government to abide by the terms of the
treaties emboldened Native groups to become more hostile. From the Albuquerque Agency,
Apache agent Edmund Graves made this observation. He said that a certain chief of a
“dangerous” and “warlike” Apache band “complained much that presents had not been liberally
given…and unless given to them, they should consider it evidence of an unfriendly feeling.”387
Increasing hostilities with Native Peoples led Meriwether to take a more hardline militaristic
approach to Indian relations.
The tenures of David Meriwether and John Garland had shifted Indian relations with the
civil government in the territory from a semi-humanitarian approach to the utilization of violence
to induce peace. After only five weeks in office, Meriwether reported thirteen citizens murdered,
ten to fifteen wounded, and a property loss by theft of $10,000 to $15,000.388 Thus, he believed
the benevolent strategy advocated by William Carr Lane had primarily been a failure.
Meriwether stated that federal Indian policy in New Mexico took two forms: either “feed or
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whip them…the former had been the policy of my predecessors; the latter has not been
effectively tried.”389 Apache agent Edmund Graves similarly promoted a more aggressive
approach to Indian relations. In a letter to the new governor, Graves placed the blame of the
current state of the territory on the historical disconnect between the civil and military
authorities. He claimed, “There are two equal and independent authorities in this territory, who
often have to act upon the same matter. If they differ in opinion, as is frequently the case, the
Indian escapes, and the citizen remains without redress.” Graves encouraged a stronger military
approach to Indian affairs, claiming: “Indians should be made aware of…the power of the
government, and this can only be done, by bringing to bear upon them, in full force, the power of
the military…After the Indian has been made to feel and appreciate the power of the government
to punish and enforce a compliance with its institutions, then presents can be given and treaties
made with safety.”390 Graves also supported the right for civilians to war with Native peoples.
He argued, “either complete and adequate protection should be afforded to the settlers, or they
should be permitted fully to redress their wrongs…. It is hard, that the privileges of retaliation
should belong only to the Indians and that the settlers should have to await the slow and
uncertain remuneration of this government.”391 The views of these two men would prevail, and
with General Garland’s blessing, the U.S. military along with civilian volunteers placed
increasing military pressure on independent Indians during the second half of the decade.
Despite an approach to Indian relations based on military power, the results were similar
to those under Calhoun and Sumner. After the military overpowered Native bands, Meriwether
utilized the treaty system for those who requested peace. In July of 1854, Congress appropriated
389
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$30,000 to make treaties with the Indians of New Mexico.392 In 1855 alone, Meriwether had
negotiated six treaties with Indians. However, like Lane’s treaties, Meriwether’s were never
approved by Congress, which added to the frustration felt by Indian groups leading only to
further hostility. Despite not being ratified, New Mexican civilians themselves were displeased
with Meriwether’s treaties with Native peoples. Some New Mexican residents thought that the
treaties bestowed too much to the Indians. Utah Indian Agent Diego Archuleta, for example,
complained that certain treaties promised Native peoples lands that belonged to the Hispano
community. Archuleta, one of a handful of Hispano Indian agents in New Mexico, the majority
being Anglos, argued, “The treaties negotiated by Gov. and Supt. Meriwether were in direct
violation of the rights of individuals, because the selections of the reservations were not only
upon private grants, but also so proximate to the settlements.”393 New Mexican civilians were in
fact so upset by the liberal offerings of the treaties that they had hung an effigy of Meriwether to
a flagstaff in the central plaza of Santa Fe.394 Meriwether’s approach to Indian relations
generally failed to produce any real change and aggravated both Native and non-Native peoples.
Yet, an Indian policy based on militarism alongside a lenient approach to civilian warfare by
general Garland soon led to a revival of the idea of a standing territorial militia.
One civil official, in particular, put a great deal of effort into coordinating the
implementation of a standing civilian fighting force in New Mexico. In early 1854, David
Meriwether had been granted a four-month leave of absence by the State Department, leaving
Lieutenant Governor William S. Messervy in charge. By means of a territorial emergency, the
interim governor did more to strengthen and organize militia units in New Mexico than any
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governor preceeding him. During his brief tenure, Messervy would not shy away from utilizing
his temporary powers to attempt to solidify and maintain a functioning New Mexican militia.
Upon stepping into his new position, civilian requests to enact warfare against Native
peoples immediately inundated the interim governor. In 1854, the Probate Judge of Rio Arriba
County, Jose Maria Chavez, petitioned William Messervy to make an expedition against the
Jicarilla Apaches. These Apaches had initiated a series of raids against the residents of the
region. Messervy was initially compelled to refuse, citing, “the Executive Department cannot
render any assistance to that frontier until information is received from the General
Commanding, that he is not able to chastise and check the invasions of the Indians.” He also
claimed, “There would be great difficulty in giving protection to that frontier, in consequence of
the want of organization of, and arms and ammunition, for the militia.”395 One month later, a
combined force of 100 Jicarilla Apaches and Utes engaged a company of regular soldiers twentyfive miles south of Taos. After a three-hour battle, twenty-two dragoons were killed and thirtysix wounded.396 After this incident, with general Garland hundreds of miles away in West
Texas, Messervy decided to act. He issued an executive proclamation stating: “The tribe of
Indians, known as the Jicarilla Apaches, have made war upon, and commenced hostilities against
the government of the United States.” In his proclamation, he made it a criminal act for any
“Americans, Mexicans, Pueblo or other Indians, now at peace with the United States, to hold any
communication whatever with said tribe of Indians.”397 Thus, the new governor considered the
actions of the Jicarillas as an act of war and would respond accordingly. At the same time, bands
of Mescalero Apaches had been attacking travelers in Southern New Mexico. Messervy knew
395
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that he would need to entrust military power to New Mexican civilians to effectively chastise
these offending Indians.
The interim governor used war with the Jicarillas and Mescaleros as justification for the
revival of standing militia units in the central and northern portions of the territory. Messervy,
who styled himself “Commanding Chief of the Militia,” saw the threat as particularly imminent
which necessitated militia organization quickly. During his brief tenure, Messervy immediately
set about organizing the militia under laws set forth by the territorial government. On May 19,
1854, Messervy brought the Militia Law of 1851 back from the dead. He issued a military order
to Probate Judge Jose Maria Chavez of Rio Arriba County, who he named Brigadier General of
the second brigade of the first division of the Militia of New Mexico. In this order, he
commanded Chavez to organize two-hundred fighting men in the “shortest practicable time.” He
ordered Chavez to “hold yourself and them in readiness at such place or places as you may deem
expedient to repel any invasion or invasions threatened or made by said [Jicarilla] Indians, and if
practicable you will pursue them into whatever parts of said territory they may flee.”398 This was
the first time that a New Mexican governor had used his power to organize a militia unit during
the U.S. period.
After calling for the organization of a militia company in Rio Arriba County, Messervy
advised other settlements to be ready for militia service if need be. In a letter to Francisco
Lopez, Probate Judge of nearby San Miguel County, Messervy stated that he had already called
many men into service and he expected that Lopez would communicate to the people [of San
Miguel] the importance of volunteering for service when called upon. He stated, “I expect that
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you, as Probate Judge will represent to the people, the necessity of action for the defense of their
lives and property,” he added that if civilians were called upon and refused to serve, they could
expect punishment. He told the Probate Judge: “I expect that you will use all the powers
conferred upon you by law, in case any person should refuse to render said service.” Messervy
expected that “each town, village, and settlement [within San Miguel County] should organize
themselves and be ready to repulse any invasion of the savages, for the better preservation and
security of their families.”399 Thus, militia service under Messervy was compulsory, under
penalty of retribution.
Soon after, Messervy turned his attention to the Mescalero threat. He ordered Manuel
Herrera of San Miguel County, Brigadier General of the second brigade of the second division of
the Militia, to also organize two hundred men to deal with this danger. Admitting that many men
in the county were not well armed, Messervy communicated to Herrera, “You are therefore
commanded to detail from the militia of your said district two hundred efficient men armed and
equipped as well as circumstances will admit.” He then ordered Herrera to organize a corps of
officers, noting, “In the organization of the detachment you will select such men as are best
qualified and place them in the subordinate positions and commands, and when there organized
you will report the names of the occupying said subordinate positions to me.” Local officials
were supposed to report these positions and officers monthly according to the Militia Law of
1851, which shows that much of the law had not been adhered to. Messervy added the
restriction: “You will confine your operations to your particular districts of the territory.”400
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The want of arms for volunteer forces remained a significant problem well into the
1850s. These newly organized militia personnel continually pleaded with the territorial
government for firearms. In a letter to Governor Messervy, a militia captain begged the
governor to send “as soon as possible, a supply of arms in order that we may be able to defend
our lives and property; the critical state of affairs in this county compel us to make this request of
Your Excellency, which we hope that Your Excellency will not fail to grant.”401 In reply,
Messervy stated, “I have no arms at my disposal, at this time to supply the militia of this
territory. I have represented to the general government, this condition, and am now awaiting the
arrival of Gov. Meriwether, (who is daily expected) who I entertain no doubt, will come from
Washington with ample power to relieve the many embarrassments.”402 Militia units organized
under Messervy certainly did not have the number of arms necessary to carry out their duties
most effectively should they be called upon, and civilian leaders would soon attempt to remedy
this issue through legislation.
In the meantime, generally following the guidelines of the Militia Law of 1851, Messervy
commissioned militia captains, lieutenants, and other officers; almost entirely men of Mexican
descent. Under his work, he organized entire companies of militia for the northern and central
militia divisions. Messervy also laid out certain militia guidelines not present in the Militia Law
of 1851. He noted that substitutes were to be procured for certain militiamen who had
“sufficient reasons for being excused.” He also outlined that the men of the militia should not
remain in service for longer than three months, noting however, “In order that the militia in your
district may be well organized at all times, at the expiration of one month service, you should
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discharge a certain number, and replace them with an equal number of men, who should be
organized previously and be ready for detail – but in this you should use great prudence in order
that the service shall bear equally upon all.” Thus, not only was Messervy trying to organize
civilian volunteers, he was attempting to create a sustained functioning territorial militia.403
The acting governor felt that the organization of standing militia units was entirely
necessary primarily because, as many in New Mexico had argued before him, there was a lack of
effective regular military troops stationed in the territory. During the troubles with the Jicarilla
and Mescaleros, general Garland had been lingering near El Paso on business (no longer part of
the military department of New Mexico).404 Messervy appealed to him to return to New Mexico
as quickly as possible, arguing a deficiency in regular troops available to combat the Natives. He
stated, “Our Indian relations are becoming every day more and more embarrassing and our
frontier settlements are daily visited by the Apaches in small parties who rob and murder the
inhabitants.” He admitted that the primary reason for calling out the militia was that the troops
already stationed at Fort Union were withdrawing in the direction of the Raton Mountains
“leaving the Indians referred to, in [their] rear.” He therefore noted that the utilization of these
militia units was only a temporary measure until General Garland arrived with more troops.405 In
1861, then governor Abraham Rencher also claimed that Messervy had been obliged called out
the militia because during the turmoil, the “military force in the Territory was comparatively
small and the military commander absent and could not be heard from.”406 Upon learning of
Messervy’s actions, General Garland was apprehensive about the organization and use of these
units to enact war with Native peoples. He stated, “The acting governor of the Territory has
403
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deemed it necessary, in my temporary absence, to call out several companies of volunteers. This
step is to be much regretted. Of its necessity I cannot well judge until my arrival at Santa Fe.”407
The department commander, however, allowed Messervy to employ volunteers and even
supported their war with the Natives.
Four hundred men of these newly organized militia units saw combat against the
Jicarilla and Mescalero Apaches in 1854. These men saw an opportunity to battle their
traditional enemies while proving their loyalty to the United States which displayed their desire
for all of the benefits of full citizenship. General Garland, however apprehensive he was
concerning this particular expedition, aided the volunteers with a company of regular troops from
Fort Union. Several clashes between the Jicarillas/Mescaleros and soldiers and citizens resulted
in deaths, principally among the Indians. In one battle of the Jicarilla campaign, militiamen had
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taken forty-nine Jicarillas prisoner, and “several” were shot.408 Overall, both civil and military
officials deemed these expeditions successful. General Garland reported that “the Jicarilla
Apaches have been most thoroughly humbled, and beg for peace.”409 Messervy himself was
particularly delighted with these results because, as he claimed, the militia had been “so poorly
provided with the necessary arms and munitions, to defend themselves against the incursions of
the hostile Indians.” To Messervy, the fact that the New Mexican people were able to defeat
these tribes despite a lack of firepower proved their resolve, determination, and masculinity.
Deviating from the previous payment system consisting of the booty captured from
enemy Indians, Messervy promised these volunteers monetary compensation. The Jicarilla and
Mescalero campaigns had been the largest conflict between civilians and Native peoples during
the U.S. era up to that point. The four hundred men who volunteered for the fight fully expected
someone to compensate them. Issues inevitably arose concerning this payment system.
Messervy’s militia served a term of six months, and these men were promised payment upon
being released from service. A bankrupt territorial government, however, had no funds with
which to pay them. This understandably angered many who were promised recompense for their
service. During the campaign, many volunteers used their own weapons, animals, and supplied
their own food. They particularly anticipated reimbursement for their losses. Militia Captains
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such as Jose Maria Chavez pleaded with the territorial government to pay him and his men as
promised by the governor. However, the civil government in New Mexico would fail to live up
to their end of the bargain. These officials turned to the largely apathetic federal government to
supply funds for militia payment.
Upon his return, governor Meriwether applied to the federal government for funds to pay
the militia for their service. Meriwether informed Congress, “These militiamen furnished their
own arms and ammunition, horses, forage, and subsistence, during the time they were in service.
He added: “I estimate twenty-five thousand dollars to be a sum sufficient for their
compensation.”410 The federal government had heavily criticized Messervy’s decision to call out
the militia, and they were less than enthusiastic about supplying the requested funds. Secretary
of War, Jefferson Davis, argued that the expedition was unlawful to begin with, as “the men
were called out without the usual requirements, or the competent authority.”411 Congress
concurred and ultimately determined that “no satisfactory evidence has been adduced to enable
the committee to judge of the necessity of calling out of the said militia, the actual time it was in
service, or the amount of money necessary to defray the expenses thereof.”412 The federal
government denied Meriwether’s appeals and the militia remained unpaid for their service in the
1854 Jicarilla and Mescalero campaigns. These men received no payment nor did Anglo
Americans change their views regarding ethnic Mexican national allegiance. Despite showing
their desire and readiness for citizenship through warfare, Anglo Americans still refused to see
ethnic Mexicans as equal members of the nation-state.
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The unenthusiastic response of the federal government toward the mustering of New
Mexican volunteers had been in stark contrast to Washington’s reaction to their equivalents to
the east, the Texas Rangers. During the 1840s and 1850s, Texas had organized volunteer
“ranger” companies at will. Unlike the New Mexican volunteers, these ranger units were almost
entirely men of Anglo descent. These companies had militantly and violently warred with the
various Native peoples of the region, so much so that historian Gary Clayton Anderson claims,
“Killing Indians apparently had become ‘sport’ in Texas.”413 Some of these volunteers had also
been known to assault sections of the Tejano population in Texas. The Texas volunteers’ tactics
were so appalling in some instances that in 1846, General Zachary Taylor endeavored to “get the
‘rangers’ so called, out of service.”414 The federal government, however, chose to continue to
pay and equip ranger units to carry out their bloody tasks for years into the future. The federal
government’s endorsement of the Texas Rangers while shunning the actions of New Mexican
volunteers is telling. They continued to pay and supply ranger companies accused of overly
violent forays against both Indians and Tejanos while touting the illegality of the mustering of
New Mexican volunteers.
Despite fairly significant issues regarding compensation, the civil government and
military in New Mexico finally seemed to be on the same page with regard to militia use.
General Garland did not hesitate to again call up territorial militia units to war with Native
peoples. On Christmas day of 1854, a band of Muache Utes and Jicarilla Apaches under Chief
Blanco attacked a small trading post located in present-day Colorado. Fifteen occupants of the
post were killed and two young boys were taken captive. In January 1855, Garland himself
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called up five companies of territorial volunteers under the veteran trapper Ceran St. Vrain,
supplying these men with weapons, in order to punish those responsible.415 A retributive
expedition ensued which consisted of two companies of Dragoons, one company of artillery, and
500 New Mexican volunteers. The campaign, which lasted six months, comprised several battles
which eventually resulted in the surrender of the Muache Utes and Jicarilla Apaches and the
signing of a peace treaty; never ratified by Congress.
The volunteers of this particular expedition were exceptionally proud of their designation
as citizen soldiers. Each company of volunteers purchased their own shirts and hats of the same
color, which “gave them quite a military appearance.”416 Their enrollment as temporary soldiers
also produced an air of superiority over their fellow citizens. Dewitt C. Peters, who took part in
the expedition as an army surgeon, observed, “Never were men prouder of the position they now
held than the volunteers under consideration…So pleased were they at being recognized as
soldiers, that they could not, when afterwards marching through their own towns, resist the
temptation of jocosely taunting their countrymen whom they chanced to meet, for being obliged
to till the ground.”417 The privilege of serving alongside the military indeed gave these men a
masculine sentiment of self-importance and special-standing among their community.
During this brief window of military and civil government accommodation, the New
Mexican legislature saw an opportunity to draft new legislation concerning civilian militias. The
idea of a territorial militia seemingly had the acceptance of the department commander, and
through the actions of William Messervy, organized militia units had been formed and saw
service. However, the Militia Act of 1851 had been mainly a failure, and civil officials reasoned
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that the time had come for new legislation. In 1857, the new governor, Abraham Rencher, and
the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of New Mexico drew up an act that amended the first
militia law of 1851. The amendment permitted much more liberal use of civilian volunteers than
the original 1851 code. It stated: “any man of experience and good character who shall raise and
organize a force of not less than two hundred men nor more than two hundred and twenty-five
men is hereby authorized to apply to the governor of this territory to make a volunteer campaign
against any tribe or tribes of Indians at war with this Territory.” The amendment added, “as soon
as their respective commanders shall have received their commissions and instructions from the
Governor in the manner in which they shall conceive and conduct the campaign against what
tribe or nation of Indians they shall commence operations independent of all other military
authority.”418 The original law of 1851 provided that there would be an enduring standing militia
in New Mexico. Knowing that this stipulation had been almost impossible to enforce, the 1857
amendment to the original law specified that militia companies would only be created and
deployed as needed. This act also gave the civilians the authority to wage war without the
requirement of military oversight or cooperation. After the payment debacle in 1854,
compensation for service, however, remained spoils taken from the battlefield.
This new legislation gave incredible leeway to civilians wishing to war with Indians.
Many residents seemed to be more than satisfied with the power the new law gave them, and the
press was quick to capitalize. The Santa Fe Gazette on August 22, 1860, ran an article
encouraging citizens to form volunteer companies for warfare with Indians due to Rencher’s
liberal law. The article stated that
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“the occasion presents itself to you to redeem yourselves,
your families and your country from the accursed condition of
subjection to the savages who so long have preyed upon your
vitals….the regular troops at the disposal of the Commandant have
arrived with exhausted teams and are without the fresh and
efficient equipment essential to the accomplishment….Under these
circumstances, to you the people of New Mexico, the appeal is
made for that co-operation with the regular army which will
subdue for ever the savage foes who have cost you so much blood
and property. Respond promptly, raise a volunteer force of a
thousand men, and we have the promise of the Governor of the
Territory that he will call them into the field and supply them with
arms. We have the assurance of the Military commandant that he
will supply them with ammunition and accept cordially their
cooperation….Though it would be better if the volunteers
proposed to be raised could be mustered into the regular service,
and thus be entitled to subsistence and pay; yet, this being
unattainable, let us not underrate the advantages which are offered
for our acceptance.”419

Alongside the Act amending the Militia Law, Governor Rencher also issued several
orders to civilian military leaders that bequeathed a vast amount of military authority to
volunteer companies. In one letter to several militia captains, Rencher stated, “You have the
right to defend yourselves and your property against the Navajoes, or other marauding Indians,
or if they have committed any murders, or stolen and carried off any stock, or other property
from your settlements, you have a right to follow the Indians, who have committed these
offences where you can find them, even into the Indian Country, for the purpose of punishing the
murderers, or of recapturing the property stolen. If in such pursuit, it becomes necessary to kill
the Indians who have committed such offenses, you have a right to do so.”420 Rencher’s
instructions gave civilian warriors unprecedented power to chart the course of warfare with
Native peoples in New Mexico. The prospect of allowing civilians to pursue Indians into their
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territory and enact violent revenge, including the right to take life, was, however, too much for
certain military officials to stomach. In their minds, the form of warfare advocated by Rencher
could potentially set a dangerous precedent which could undo whatever efforts toward peace the
military had achieved.
Assuming command of the Department in 1860, Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy, a
veteran of numerous Indian battles, was one such dissenter. Stubborn and proud, the new
department commander was less amiable toward civilian officials than Colonel Garland.421 After
Faunleroy’s appointment, whatever goodwill and harmony established between civil and military
officials during Garland’s tenure would soon be undone. As soon as Fauntleroy assumed
command, conflict between him and Governor Abraham Rencher immediately erupted. In
October of 1860, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury tasked Rencher with repairing the crumbling
Palace of the Governors located in Santa Fe. Rencher found it necessary to tear down a vacant
and crumbling part of the building formerly used as a post office. For reasons unknown,
Fauntleroy threatened Governor Rencher with martial law if he continued with his plan to
demolish the old post office.422 In response to Fauntleroy’s threat, Rencher grumbled that
Fauntleroy had a “continued disposition to subordinate the civil to the military authority of the
government.”423 Thus, after a period of relative cooperation, conflict once again emerged
between the civil government and the military.
Disagreement and tensions between the two men soon spilled over into territorial militia
affairs. During the period of brief cooperation which allowed civilian warfare to flourish, the
territorial legislature passed an Act Authorizing the Loan of Public Arms in 1857. This act had
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meant to make it easier for the territorial government to supply arms to militia companies called
into service. The Act was an agreement between territorial officials and the military that the
latter would provide the militia with weapons in times of need. In November of 1860, The
Navajos had instigated a series of raids near Santa Fe, and Governor Rencher found it necessary
to supply a portion of the militia with weapons to protect themselves. Although the military was
expected to supply the arms requested of the governor, Fauntleroy, whose stance on civilian
volunteers tended to echo that of Edwin Sumner, chose not to provide the requested arms to the
militia.424 The loyalty of the ethnic Mexican population was, once again, in question.
Fauntleroy’s hesitance to arm the Hispano population stemmed from his perceived notion
that the loyalty of the New Mexican population was suspect. A year previous, a revolt by the
ethnic Mexican population on both sides of the border in nearby south Texas added to Anglo
anxieties concerning the allegiance of these people. Near Brownsville, Texas, Juan Cortina led a
party of men who attacked and occupied the town. Cortina, son of wealthy Mexican landowners,
had been disaffected with the way Anglo Americans had treated the Mexican population along
the Texas border. This led to a series of battles between the Cortinistas and the Texas Rangers.
Cortina’s actions had attracted the support of hundreds of distressed Mexicans on either side of
the border, and for five months Cortina and his followers controlled south Texas, burning the
ranches of whites and their Tejano allies.425 In 1860 Colonel Fauntleroy had worried that a
similar rebellion was brewing nearer to home. Fauntleroy articulated that, similar to the Cortina
Rebellion, in nearby El Paso (Juárez), the Mexican population was contemplating invading the
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United States, encouraging Mexican American citizens to rise up against their government. The
Colonel fearfully stated, “Mexicans are likely to enact on that border scenes similar to those at
Brownsville.”426 Thus, due to the percieved questionable allegiance of ethinc Mexicans,
Fauntleroy reasoned that they could not be trusted with government issued firearms at this
particular time. He, therefore, neglected to enforce the Act Authorizing the Loan of Public
Arms.
Perturbed, Rencher appealed to U.S. Secretary of State Lewis Cass to help him gain
possession of the arms, which, he stated, were “so much needed by the people for their
protection against Indian murders and depredations.”427 In reply, the Secretary of State
concurred with Colonel Fauntleroy on the matter stating, “There is reason to apprehend injurious
consequences from the employment of volunteer troops in New Mexico against the Navajo
Indians, which seems to be one of the subjects of difference, without the plan of Colonel
Fauntleroy.”428 Thus, the federal government acquiesced that Hispanos should not have the
independent power to battle independent Indians.
The people of the territory, of course, felt differently. The Santa Fe Gazette heavily
criticized Colonel Fauntleroy for his actions. The paper claimed that Fauntleroy’s decision not
to supply the requested arms was a “usurpation of authority on the part of the ‘distinguished
Colonel’ that justly excited dissatisfaction in our people, for the Colonel had no more rightful
control over the disposition of those arms than had the Editor of the News who probably had no
knowledge of their existence. The Governor thought they were necessary for the preservation of
the peace of the citizens and the protection of the Territory and the ‘distinguished Colonel’ had
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no right to any opinion on the subject whatever.”429 After the harmonious tenure of John
Garland, conflict between the civil government, military, and inhabitants concerning civilian
warfare once again gripped the territory.

Throughout the 1850s, the use of civilian warriors primarily hinged upon the views of the
particular military department commander. As such, the institution of civilian warfare saw both
upsurges and declines throughout the decade. During the very early 1850s, the civil government
had attempted to implement a policy which generally emphasized a humane approach to Indian
affairs. At the same time, an effort at frugality had rendered the army almost useless in the eyes
of many and civilians who were by and large banned from engaging in warfare with Indians. By
the mid-1850s, a more aggressive Indian policy emerged under the direction of both General
John Garland and Governor David Meriwether. As a result, General Garland saw the benefit in a
stronger military force and he abandoned his predecessors cost-cutting measures. He also
employed civilian volunteers to aid the military in their battles with Indians on many occasions.
New Mexican governors were subsequently empowered to develop territorial militia units.
Under governors Meriwether and William Messervy, sanctioned militia units in several counties
were birthed. This relative harmony in regards to civilian warfare wouldn’t last, however. Upon
taking command of the department, Thomas Fauntleroy tried to curb the power of civilian
volunteers, much to the chagrin of civil officials. Overall, however, the decade saw great strides
in organizing and utilizing sustained militia units in the central and northern portions of the
territory.
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Racialized ideas regarding Nuevomexicano national loyalty and allegiance had
influenced the thoughts and actions of military officials such as Sumner and Fauntleroy
concerning civilian defense. Bitter relations between the United States and Mexico, Anglo and
Hispano racial discord, as well as internal struggles in Mexico, led certain Anglo officials in
New Mexico to question the rationale of arming the ethnic Mexican population. Anglo
racialized notions led to the conclusion that the New Mexican population had not entirely
severed their allegiance to the Mexican state, and that they were indeed plotting a revolution
against the United States. Certain governors, however, felt that the Indian threat was a greater
danger than a potential Hispano revolt. Therefore, these civil authorities worked tirelessly with
more enlightened military officials such as General Garland to enact policies favoring civilian
warriors. Ultimately, fears of rebellion by the Mexican population had come to not, yet because
of Anglo anxiety, the majority of Hispanos, specifically the lower classes, had become suspect.
These ideas had led to Colonel Fauntleroy’s refusal to arm Hispanos in 1860.
Despite attempts by certain military officials to curtail the use of civilian warriors, small
independent groups pursued Indians accused of plundering the settlements. Many civilians took
it upon themselves to continue to war with the Natives as they had done for centuries under the
Spanish and Mexican regimes in New Mexico. Even Edwin Sumner had been powerless to end
the tradition of civilian warfare completely. Specific communities had thus formed their own
units that that acted without the permission or supervision of the civil government or military.
By and large, General Garland had tolerated the exploits of these unsanctioned militia units. Yet
a militia group organized in the town of Mesilla would take the “defense” of their communities
farther than officials such as Garland had consented to. A long precedent of self-defense and
hatred for Native Peoples endured through the Mesilla Guard, and throughout the 1850s, this
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militia group terrorized Apache peoples, and civil and military officials were almost powerless to
stop them.
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Chapter 4: The Mesilla Guard, 1853-1860

For nearly two centuries in New Mexico, a custom of violence fostered by settler
colonialism had developed among the region’s various inhabitants. Long before the United
States proclaimed sovereignty over New Mexico, the governments of New Spain and to a greater
extent, Mexico, advocated utilizing civilian warfare to attempt to assert their dominance over the
region. Neither the Spanish nor Mexican state ever held a genuine monopoly of force on the
frontier and attempts by these governments to regulate the use of force unexpectedly resulted in
expanding and strengthening the practice of civilian warfare.430 A tradition of civilians engaging
in warfare with Native Peoples either in cooperation with the military or independent of
government oversight evolved over the centuries. As the United States proclaimed sovereignty
over the region, U.S. military officials diverged from the policies of the previous regimes by
concentrating warfare with Native peoples almost solely in the hands of the military; only rarely
allowing civilians to fight. Colonel Edwin Sumner, in particular, attempted to establish a
monopoly of force in the region by going to great lengths to prevent New Mexican civilians from
engaging in warfare with Native Peoples either independently or alongside the military. On the
rare occasions that more practical U.S. military leaders relied on settler warfare, they enrolled
citizens in temporary, heavily-supervised sanctioned militia groups. Yet, despite the efforts of
these administrators, constant unsanctioned warfare between New Mexican civilians and Native
peoples continued for years. During the 1850s, U.S. officials were hard pressed to end the
institution of unsanctioned civilian warfare in New Mexico, as the previous regimes had
implemented processes which sustained the behavior for decades after their departure.
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As certain military officials attempted to reign in the practice of civilian defense, some
New Mexican communities were heavily resistant to the efforts of the U.S. government to stop
them from engaging in unsanctioned warfare. The residents of the southern New Mexican
community of Mesilla were of particular aggravation to U.S. officials. Soon after the U.S. War
with Mexico, residents of southern New Mexico, displeased with being thrust under the purview
of the United States, moved back into Mexican territory south of the newly conceived border.
These repatriates established the Mexican community of La Mesilla some twenty miles south of
the town of Doña Ana. Almost immediately, the townspeople organized a community militia to
protect the village from nearby Apaches, with whom the settlers had been at war for generations.
Brendan Morgan argues that the creation of a geopolitical border “did not create ordered,
bounded space, and it certainly did not bring an end to violent interactions along the border.”431
In practice, the “protection” offered by this militia group was almost entirely offensive in nature,
consisting of guerrilla tactics, massacres, the murder of individual Apaches, and theft. These
Mesilleros frequently crossed over the newly delineated border into U.S. territory to enact their
bloody style of retributive justice against Native groups. Even after the U.S. took possession of
the Mesilla Valley in 1854, the residents of Mesilla, now residing in the United States, continued
to attack Apaches, to the aggravation of U.S. officials.
Mesilla’s unauthorized militia organization, the Guardia Movíl, styled the “Mesilla
Guard” by Anglo residents on the U.S. side of the border, would rain terror down upon their
time-honored Apache enemies throughout the 1850s. The militia had generally directed the
brunt of their malice toward the nearby Mescaleros, on whom the Mesilleros blamed most of
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their woes. The unsolicited and brutal actions of the Mesilla Guard over the course of ten years
caused U.S. officials in New Mexico much irritation, and in effect, undermined the goal of a
military monopoly of force on the frontier. Further, many of the Apaches who suffered at the
hands of the Guard were under treaty stipulations with New Mexico. The violent actions of the
people of Mesilla were, therefore, undoing whatever tentative peace New Mexican authorities
and the Apaches had arranged.
The Mesilla Guard followed processes and precedents that had been established under the
regimes of Spain and Mexico. U.S. officials were quick to blame the exploits of the Mesilla
Guard on the relatively lenient policy of civilian warfare implemented by the Mexican regime.
They claimed that such a policy of individual reprisal had entrenched itself in the culture of the
residents. Civilian warfare against independent Indians had its initial roots in the era of the
Spanish. Spanish officials frequently sought civilian assistance to battle New Mexico’s Native
population. After Mexican independence, the new nation had relied even more heavily on
civilian warriors to protect their communities from Native peoples. At the same time, Mexican
residents in the region frequently invaded Indian communities to procure livestock and prisoners,
as well as to enact violence upon their enemies. Mexican authorities in New Mexico seldom
disciplined Hispanos for such unauthorized forays. This style of warfare had ingrained itself into
the culture of specific Mexican communities in southern New Mexico, and they would be highly
resistant to change under the government of the United States. Well into the U.S. era in New
Mexico, the Mesilla Guard had continued the mode of both retributive and unwarranted violence
against Native peoples that had been prevalent under the Mexican state.
The newly delineated border in New Mexico also undoubtedly played a significant role in
events concerning the actions of the Mesilla Guard. Before 1854, the Guardsmen, being
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residents of Mesilla, were initially located within the bounds of Mexico. During this time, they
had crossed the border into the United States multiple times to commit atrocities against Apaches
at peace with the United States. As the frontier shifted to a borderland, the nations of the United
States and Mexico attempted to “establish clear territorial sovereignty over their respective sides
of a territorially delineated border.”432 As such, the practice of crossing the border to execute
violence against Native Peoples added to an atmosphere of turmoil between the United States
and Mexico. The actions of the Guard specifically hurt the U.S.’s prospects of adhering to
article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and they were able to escape justice as the United
States had no authority to prosecute Mexican citizens for crimes committed in New Mexican
territory.
After 1854, the Guard was brought under the sovereignty of the United States, yet they
continued to harass the Mescalero people. New Mexican authorities, however, failed to bring
justice to the Mescaleros because of a failure to convict the Guard primarily due to centuries of
Hispano-Apache animosity. Juries were highly unlikely to convict residents who had committed
atrocities against Native Peoples, especially if the juries benefitted and supported such violence.
Ultimately, the narrative of the Mesilla Guard shows that the custom of civilian violence against
Native people encouraged by the regimes of Spain and Mexico continued well into the U.S. era
which conflicted with U.S. efforts to secure a monopoly of force over New Mexico. This
chapter also endeavors to show how the newly conceived border contributed toward furthering
both interpersonal and systemic violence in the borderlands during the nineteenth century.
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Central to this chapter specifically, and the dissertation more broadly are the oftenintertwined themes of colonialism and violence. As the colonial reach and influence of Spain,
Mexico, and the United States stretched further into the territory of New Mexico, diseases
decimated native populations, raiding for Indian slaves became common, and competition for
precious resources increased. Under these conditions, Native peoples such as the Apaches were
compelled to base their economies and livelihoods on raiding livestock and taking captives from
nearby communities. The residents of these colonies responded mainly with violence toward
Native peoples, as they interpreted raiding purely as a racialized act of violence rather than a
complicated response to Mexican aggression as well as dwindling economic opportunities. In
this vein, analyzing the nature of the Mesilla Guard further displays the characteristics and
effects of the violence that aided in defining what is now the U.S. Southwest during the
nineteenth century. Furthermore, this chapter explores the violence inherent in the failure of the
United States to protect Native peoples whom they had agreed to safeguard. The Apaches
assailed by the Mesilla Guard had signed treaties of peace and had agreed to place themselves
under the “protection” of the United States. These groups were residing near military
establishments when these attacks occurred. Furthermore, the failure of the courts; a space in
which justice should have been served the Apaches, had also contributed toward the violence
against Native peoples. Ultimately, but not surprisingly, the justice system had failed the
Apaches, encouraging further violence against Native peoples without fear of legal retribution.
This chapter also endeavors to show the complex nature of change over time. An
examination of the Mesilla Guard illuminates the idea of multiple, rather than a single, onedirectional time. The narrative of the Mesilla Guard, and this dissertation more broadly displays
that cultural change advanced at a much slower pace than political change. The Mesilla Valley
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switched hands from Mexico to the United States seemingly overnight. Despite their best efforts
U.S. officials struggled to end the long-standing cultural practice of civilian warfare against
Native peoples in New Mexico. This social tradition, however, endured well into the 1860s and
continued to cause much vexation among U.S. authorities in New Mexico. The Mesilleros acted
from the view that the U.S. military had not sufficiently “protected” their settlement, and due to
cultural and historical custom, New Mexican residents felt that they had a historical right to
warfare, and continued to carry out their long-standing mode of bloody conflict. Rapid political
change clashed with slow-moving cultural continuity, which caused much turmoil in the territory
of New Mexico during the mid-nineteenth century.

Small communities had existed for many years on the site that would become known as
Mesilla. Yet, after the U.S.-Mexico War, Mexico embarked on a resettlement program in
northern Mexico designed to create a buffer zone against any future U.S. invasion. The Mexican
government commissioned Father Ramón Ortiz to establish communities throughout northern
Chihuahua. Ortiz issued several Mexican land grants in and around Mesilla in order to
encourage repatriation.433 Encouraged by the Mexican government, residents of the new U.S.
territory of New Mexico, who were unhappy about being under the sovereignty of the United
States, moved across the Rio Grande into Mexican Chihuahua. These Mexican repatriates, under
the guidance of Rafael Ruelas, future alcalde of the newly established La Mesilla in 1850.
Afterwards, Mesilla became a blossoming community attracting immigrants from throughout
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northern Mexico. Historian Anthony Mora argues, “Founding Mesilla was an explicit act of
Mexican nationalism because it was an escape from Euro-American imperialism.”434

Illustration 4.1: La Mesilla in 1854. New Mexico State University Library, Archives and Special
Collections. MS 0339.

Three years after the founding of the town of La Mesilla, the Mesilla Guard ferociously
entered the archival record for the first time. In February of 1853, a band of Apaches had been
peacefully residing near the U.S. controlled town of Doña Ana for some time. These particular
Apaches were under treaty stipulations of peace with New Mexico. It is unclear, however, if
they were signatories to the 1852 Treaty of Acoma, or if they were protected by a temporary,
unratified treaty with New Mexico. Governors James Calhoun and William Carr Lane had
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signed various treaties with Apache peoples during the early 1850s. These treaties were never
ratified by Congress. Nevertheless, the Apaches certainly expected New Mexico to adhere to the
negotiated treaty provisions. Occupying an area near San Nicholas Spring, the Apaches had, by
all accounts, obeyed their treaty stipulations and had not committed a single depredation upon
any resident on either side of the border. News of an Indian settlement so close to Mexican La
Mesilla had soon reached the residents of that community. Despite the Apaches not engaging in
any theft or violence, the Mesilleros were controlled by a desire to do physical harm to their
traditional enemies. Some twenty men from the community militia crossed the porous border,
arriving in Doña Ana on the fifth of February. Taking the unsuspecting Apaches by surprise, the
aggressors drew their arms and murdered in cold blood fourteen or fifteen innocent men, women,
and children. After completing this atrocious deed, the group then robbed their victims, taking
several horses, mules, saddles, bridles, guns, and bows and arrows.
News of the slaughter soon reached U.S. administrators in New Mexico. The Apache
victims had been at peace with the United States, and they had, therefore, reasoned that the
murders had been unwarranted. Enraged, both civil and military officials quickly condemned the
Mesilleros for the atrocity. The Commander at nearby Fort Fillmore, Colonel Dixon Miles
immediately attributed the murders to the “outrageous conduct of the bad people of Mesilla.”435
The New Mexican government and U.S. military were incensed that these men had committed
such a heinous act upon Apaches at peace, which threatened to undo the tenuous truce that they
had established with the tribe. They were also angry that citizens of Mexico had crossed into the
United States to commit this deed.
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An arbitrary national boundary had been conceived after the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo which among other things delineated notions of citizenship and belonging. However,
the newly implemented border was also extremely permeable, which allowed unhindered crossborder movement. The border was primarily an imaginary line which, although having
significant ramifications on the people of the region, did not exist in a physical sense. The
contemporary idea of an imposing, impermeable, policed border certainly did not exist during
the mid-nineteenth century. Before 1900, the U.S. government could not and did not prevent
Mexican immigrants from crossing the border, nor did they record any entries.436 At that time,
Mexican citizens could enter the United States at will, as there was no port of entry and no
customs office. Mexican citizens crossing the international boundary for a variety of reasons had
been a frequent and accepted occurrence. However, Mexicans entering the United States to
commit murder angered U.S. officials, even if that border had been established only five years
previous after a war that many observers believed the U.S. started without real provocation.
Nonetheless, Colonel Dixon Miles described the event as a “gross trespass on the soil of the
United States,” which “cannot be for a moment overlooked or permitted.”437 Thus, the idea of
“trespassing” on U.S. soil certainly existed during this time, yet, the idea was mostly contingent
upon the actions of the intruders. Mexicans who entered the United States to commit crimes
were intruders, while Mexicans who entered the United States peacefully were generally
unnoticed.
What caused U.S. officials particular aggravation, however, was that the massacre
interfered with the military’s efforts to enforce Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
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As noted by Brian DeLay, in War of a Thousand Deserts, Article XI was the only provision of
the Treaty that favored the nation of Mexico and stipulated that the United States would forcibly
restrain “incursions” by “savage tribes” into Mexico as well as rescue any Mexican captives that
these Indians held. Officials had heavily debated Article XI upon its inception. Many U.S.
senators who were more enlightened concerning the situation in the borderlands opposed the
provision, understanding that it would be nearly impossible to enforce. In over two centuries, the
governments of New Spain and Mexico had failed to subdue the independent Indians of New
Mexico, and some believed that U.S. efforts to do so would be more demanding than the area’s
overall worth. These dissenters claimed that adherence to such a stipulation would leave the
United States “encumbered by conditions relative to the Indians which would be worth more, in
a pecuniary point of view, than all the vacant land acquired.”438 However, these dissenters were
clearly the minority, and the majority of senators, “versed more in the rhetoric than the reality of
Mexico’s Indian war, voted to assume the responsibility for preventing Indian raids into
Mexico.”439 U.S. overconfidence and views of racial and cultural superiority led many to believe
that once Anglo-Americans possessed former Mexican territory, they would quickly subdue the
raiders and inaugurate a new era in the new U.S. southwest.440 The task of enforcing the article,
however, turned out to be more difficult than most Anglo officials had imagined.
By the 1850s, the military had had to endure insurmountable difficulties in attempting to
enforce the article. Almost all treaties negotiated between the United States and Native Peoples
in New Mexico had been broken. The inability of the United States to continue to provide
rations and other goods to the Natives, as the treaties stipulated, led to further hostilities and
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Native raiding of the settlements. Moreover, the relatively sparse military presence in the
territory had not been enough to subdue Indian peoples determined to both raid the New
Mexican settlements and venture below the border to assault Mexican communities. Native
peoples also held an advantage due to the creation of the international boundary. They were able
to use the newly conceived border as “protection” from the military. Although citizens could
cross the border at will, it was illegal for the militaries of either Mexico or the United States to
cross into the territory of the other. Native bands would, therefore, frequently attack Mexican
settlements and subsequently retreat across the border out of reach of the Mexican authorities.
They would repeat this process on the other side of the border. This tactic and the determination
of Native Peoples to defend their homelands against continued European intrusion contributed
toward the inability of the U.S. military to curb raids either at home or into Mexico as they had
promised.
The independent actions of the people of Mesilla, and their willingness to cross the
border at will to attack Native Peoples, further added to the difficulty in enforcing Article XI.
The Mesilleros had assaulted Apaches that had negotiated a peace treaty with New Mexico and
civilian attacks upon Indians at peace could potentially lead these people to reject their treaty and
seek vengeance against their assailants. Retributive violence would only lead the Apaches into
conflict with the military, thus nullifying any peace the two sides had maintained. Colonel
Dixon Miles argued, “the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo stipulates that the Indians within the
United States shall be controlled by that Government from committing depredations on the
property, or inhabitants of Mexico, but this cannot be effected, if the citizens of the latter
Government will not adhere to the Treaties of peace made by the United States with the Indians
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bordering on the boundary.”441 The actions of the Mesilla Guard in February of 1853 were a big
blow to article XI, causing New Mexican officials to question further the wisdom of having to
adhere to it. By crossing into the United States from Mexico, the actions of the Mesilleros
revealed how both the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in general, and Article XI specifically failed
to recognize the fluidity of communities along this very porous border.
U.S. officials were quick to blame the Mexican citizens of Mesilla for the massacre, but
they also placed responsibility at the feet of the Mexican government itself, while conveniently
ignoring how the U.S. war with Mexico caused the traumatic and dramatic redrawing of
borderlands geography. They had claimed that the Republic of Mexico was responsible for the
violent behavior of its citizens toward Native Peoples because of their past and current tolerance
and acceptance of individual reprisals by its citizens against Indian groups. Civilian warfare
against Native Peoples had existed since the era of the Spanish, as settlers and Native allies had
worked in cooperation with the regular military in countless expeditions against enemy Indians.
After Mexican Independence from Spain, due to economic woes, the Mexican government had
to prioritize where they were to station their troops. The northern frontier of New Mexico had
not been their priority. Historian Daniel Tyler argued, “the Mexican central government denied
New Mexico the support it needed to woo the Indians successfully until it was too late.”442 A
policy of benign neglect by the central Mexican government, therefore, prevailed in New Mexico
and local New Mexican officials were compelled to shift more of the responsibility for
community protection onto the citizens themselves. The governors of New Mexico during the
Mexican era frequently called upon civilians to engage in warfare against independent Indians.
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Local New Mexican governments had given these civilians liberal powers in conducting warfare
against Indians as they saw fit by permitting settlers to enter into hostilities with Indians to enact
violent revenge and take property or captives as they desired. In some instances, the Mexican
central government, unable to provide a large amount of military assistance, offered various
rewards to civilian Indian fighters. In their communities, civilian warriors had also been
accorded heightened social status, honor, and respect. This contributes to Ana María Alonso’s
claim that the frontier of Mexico had become a society organized for warfare, laden with
specialists in violence.443 Through their actions, the Mesilla Guard had been following decades
of precedent in which the civilians themselves and all levels of government venerated civilian
violence against Apaches.
Since the United States absorbed New Mexico in 1846, various U.S. officials had
grumbled that the Republic of Mexico had haphazardly militarized much of the citizenry by
liberally allowing such violent reprisals during its tenure over the area. During his governorship,
James Calhoun had made the observation: “The eternal state of war, and reciprocal robbery,
under a former government, gave to many, a pleasurable excitement, and afforded to all an
opportunity of satisfying their own demands, whether founded in justice, or, in a mere desire to
possess other people’s property.”444 Calhoun later made a similar conclusion, noting, “In former
years, such authority [to make independent campaigns against Indians] was easily obtained, and
robbery and murder, with their usual terrible accompaniments, were cured by robbery and
murder, and in all such instances, the most innocent became the victims – for the guilty were
soon beyond the reach of pursuit.”445 Thus, Calhoun noted that individual civilian campaigns
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against the Indians had been frequent and had deep-seated roots emboldened by the leniency of
the Mexican regime.
Like Calhoun, New Mexican Indian Agent Michael Steck and Colonel Dixon Miles also
voiced their disapproval of the Mexican government allowing its citizens to redress their wrongs
against independent Indians. Steck noted, “It has been the custom for the Indians to steal from
the New Mexicans and then the Mexicans to steal from them, this system of thieving and
retaliation has been kept up, and under the Mexican rule organized parties were permitted to
make campaigns for the avowed purpose of stealing Indian stock and prisoners and dividing it
among the captors. This having been the custom it is not easily broken up.”446 Colonel Miles
argued that the Mexican government’s continued approval of retributive forays was harmful to
the United States. He claimed, “If the Mexican authorities do not instantly repress the
disposition of their people to individual redress, for wrongs done them by the Indians and if such
a feeling and disposition prevails among [the] inhabitants, the efforts of the officers of the United
States Government to keep the Indians at peace, will ever be attended with vast expense and
vexation.”447 Ultimately, Calhoun, Steck, and Miles argued that unsanctioned reprisals were
engrained deep in the culture of the residents of the border, and it would not be easy to prevent
them from making such retributive attacks in the future. They also admitted, contrary to many of
their contemporaries, that the Hispano population was just as responsible for the violent
atmosphere of New Mexico as were their Native counterparts.
The centuries-long precedent of retributive violence allowed—even encouraged-- under
the Mexican regime, shaped race relations and relationships between Mexicans and the U.S.
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Military, for much of the nineteenth century. The international border had washed over the
people of New Mexico without their consent, and with it came unwelcome attempts to change
their traditional lifeways. As such, retributive or other military expeditions into Indian country
by civilians had generally been shunned by the U.S. military in New Mexico. Residents of the
U.S. borderlands, who had been Mexican citizens only a few years prior, however, claimed that
they had a historical right to engage in warfare with Native peoples independently. Many
Hispanos had themselves engaged in warfare against Indians, and had long lineages of Indian
fighters going back to the Spanish era. Attempts to curtail Hispanos’ perceived historical right to
warfare was, in their eyes, an effort to restrict what they thought of as one the only modes of
justice and fairness allowed them by former governments. By taking away their right to redress
themselves, many Hispanos felt that the U.S. government was further placing them in a position
of helplessness as fairly quickly after being placed under the sovereignty of the United States,
Hispanos saw the erosion of their historical rights. The dissolution of their legal rights would
soon follow.
Residents continually pleaded with the U.S. government in New Mexico to allow them to
enact retributive expeditions into Indian country, usually to no avail. These residents had
constantly compared the policy of the United States that emphasized military over civilian
engagements to the more civilian-friendly policy of retribution under Mexico. In one instance in
1849, Governor James Calhoun was approached by a New Mexican resident who claimed that
Indians had driven off a large number of his stock. The man had asked Calhoun for permission
to engage in an independent expedition to retrieve his property. The governor did not comply
with his wishes, upon which, according to Calhoun, the man “in quite an agitated
manner…contrasted the present with the former government of this territory. The preceding
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government permitted reprisals, which is not tolerated now.”448 The resident was certainly
dismayed that his right to retribution, a core tenant of citizenship and honor under Mexico, was
being curtailed by U.S. authorities. Another occurrence in 1854 saw the citizens of Bernalillo
county petition the governor of New Mexico to assemble an expedition against Indians that they
accused of robbing them of several horses and other livestock. These citizens argued that long
into the past, the Mexican government had allowed them to organize and retake stolen property
through warfare. In their petition, the citizens pleaded with the governor, stating, “[We hope]
your Excellency will grant us the right of following said Indians and taking from them
such…property as will indemnify us for the heavy losses we have sustained. Such was the
custom under the government of the Republic of Mexico.”449 Despite such a rationale, the U.S.
government reasoned that such expeditions would only result in further disorder and violence.
Thus, the U.S. government, unlike Mexico, was never willing to accede to the peoples’ demands
for individual retribution.
Following the massacre of Apaches by the people of Mesilla, a sense of anxiety gripped
the inhabitants and authorities in U.S. controlled New Mexico. They feared that the aggrieved
Apaches would attempt to seek revenge for the massacre and they believed that an Apache
reprisal would not discriminate between citizens of the United States and the Mexican citizens
responsible for the murders. This frightening possibility was at the forefront of the mind of
Colonel Miles. He stated, “This act of the Mesilla people, reopens the war with this Tribe and
they surely will take their revenge- on probably innocent people, who had no participation in the
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murder of their companions.”450 The Colonel also argued, “It will involve innocent people of
our country in much trouble, as the Indians cannot, or will not here after, draw the distinction
between the people of Mexico who are guilty, - and our inhabitants, in the vengeance they will
surely endeavor to take.”451 New Mexican officials reasoned that any retributive action by the
Apaches would further embroil the region into chaos and violence.
Fears of Apache retribution within the United States triggered Colonel Miles into taking
immediate and forceful action. He first issued an order to the Alcalde of Doña Ana, Pablo
Melendez, directing him to capture any members of the Mesilla Guard found in U.S. territory.
Miles commanded to Melendez: “confine any of the Mesilla people you can catch for the
infraction of our law and territory; for the outrage they have committed; and this I advise you to
do, if you know them.”452 The Colonel also issued a strongly worded warning to the Mexican
Alcalde of Mesilla notifying him that “hereafter, I will apprehend and turn over to the civil
authorities for prosecution, every resident Mexican armed body, found within the limits of the
United States territory, seeking, killing, or pillaging Indians; as being contrary to the laws
enacted by the Congress of the United States.”453 The actions of the people of Mesilla further
contributed toward the turbulent relationship between the United States and Mexico that had
been prevalent since the U.S.-Mexico War in 1846.
Attempting to avoid diplomatic conflict, the Republic of Mexico sought to satisfy the
Americans by reprimanding the people of Mesilla for their actions. In late February, the
Republic of Mexico sent three commissioners to Mesilla in an attempt to settle and regulate
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affairs. These ambassadors visited Colonel Miles at Fort Fillmore, who assured the Colonel of
their desire to cultivate an amicable feeling with U.S. authorities. The Mexican commissioners
then took disciplinary action towards the people of Mesilla. Colonel Miles noted that the
Mexican government “censured the people of Mesilla for their conduct and ordered them to
make full reparation to the Indians.” Not only did the Mexican government force the Mesilleros
to return the Apaches’ stolen property, but they also compelled the residents to provide the
affected Indians with presents. Mexico’s response to the crisis pleased Colonel Miles, largely
due to the fact that Mexico’s ambassadors had tried to appease the Apache victims, thus
decreasing the chances for violent reprisal.
As for the Apaches themselves, the Mesilleros had murdered fifteen members of their
band had in cold blood, they had robbed them, and the Apaches demanded justice. The Apaches
had arrived at Doña Ana three days after the massacre to converse with Alcalde Pablo Melendez
concerning the murder of their people. As the killings happened on U.S. soil, the Apaches had
looked to U.S. authorities for action. Melendez spoke with the afflicted Apaches and returned
much of their stolen property while promising to obtain from Mesilla their stolen horses and
mules. Eight days after this encounter, the Apaches met with Colonel Miles at Fort Fillmore.
The Colonel tried to make it clear that the murderers were Mexican citizens from Mesilla, and he
assured them of the desire of the United States to be at peace with the band. The Apaches were
seemingly appeased, at least temporarily, by the actions of the U.S. and Mexican governments,
and they ultimately took no retributive action against citizens of either nation. Colonel Miles
claimed that the conciliatory measures of the people of Mesilla under the direction of the
Mexican commissioners, and the efforts of the U.S. government left the Apaches “perfectly
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satisfied” and they were ultimately able to “bury the hatchet.”454 A short time later, however, the
people of Mesilla would again violently provoke innocent Apache peoples.
Nine months after the February 1853 massacre, the people of Mesilla again violently
assaulted a group of nearby Apaches. In November, a Mescalero Apache band led by Cuentas
Azules visited Fort Fillmore to reiterate their desire to be on peaceful terms with the Americans.
The Commander of the post, Major Electus Backus, commanding Fort Fillmore in Colonel
Miles’ absence spoke with them, fed them, echoed a desire to remain at peace, and sent them on
their way. After their official visit with U.S. authorities, the Mescaleros certainly didn’t expect
that any physical harm would come to them so soon. Little did Cuentas Azules suspect, he and
his band had been followed for at least a day by several residents of La Mesilla. In the dark of
night, as the Apaches neared Doña Ana, the men surprised the Mescaleros. They kidnapped
Cuentas Azules from his camp and proceeded to “beat the chief’s brains out” with a club.
Stealing his horse, the men left the chief for dead. The remaining Indians escaped unharmed,
and Cuentas Azules took his last breath the next morning.455 This unprovoked assault on an
innocent Mescalero headman again contributed toward diplomatic turmoil between the United
States and Mexico. The new international boundary certainly played a significant role in the
events which took place shortly after the murder.
U.S. officials in New Mexico were enraged by this second unprovoked act of violence by
the people of Mexican Mesilla. A major point of vexation was once again that the Mesilleros’
tactic of crossing the border to assail Native Peoples would make enforcement of Article XI of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo extremely difficult. Major Backus made his opinion known
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that actions such as those taken by the Mexican citizens of Mesilla should have effectively
rendered article XI null and void once and for all. He argued that the provision should have been
“annulled and abrogated by the act of the Mexicans themselves,” adding that “Mexico alone is
responsible for the consequences which may flow from the conduct of her armed citizens, under
the protection of her own civil magistrates.”456 Backus, of course, had no authority to cancel a
significant provision of a U.S. treaty. However, the murder of Cuentas Azules by the citizens of
Mexico was another significant blow to the already weakened article. Officials felt that the
actions of the citizens of Mexico had made the article difficult to enforce because of their
insistence on crossing into the U.S. to attack peaceful Indians and Indians under treaty within the
United States. Any retributive action by the aggrieved Apaches could potentially undo such
treaties and add to an already violent atmosphere in the borderlands. Due to the ultimate
inability of the U.S. to adhere to the stipulations of article XI, (the actions of the people of
Mesilla being a contributing factor), officials would rescind the stipulation less than a year later.
The inability of the U.S. to check Indian incursions along the border demonstrated that article XI
amounted to an arrogant and empty claim of U.S. superiority. Despite repeated assertions of
military, technological, and racial supremacy, U.S. authorities had been unable to conquer the
independent Indians of New Mexico, and these people continued to hold sovereignty over a large
portion of the borderlands.
Fears of Mescalero retaliation were well founded. The death of a prominent and
respected leader enraged the Mescalero people, who immediately declared their intention to
avenge him, ultimately triggering anxiety throughout the borderlands. Nearby residents noted
that Cuentas Azules’s people had “fled to the mountains threatening vengeance against all
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Mexicans and especially against those of Mesilla.”457 This made both New Mexican officials
and its citizenry extremely uneasy. Major Backus noted, “The evils which are likely to flow
from this vile act, can scarcely be estimated at this time.”458 In a letter to Governor David
Meriwether, Backus claimed, “This foul act has probably rendered this friendly band of Apaches
the most hostile of any in this frontier, and I have much reason to fear that our highways will
again be infested with marauding parties and the business of the county interrupted.”459
Meriwether echoed the fears of Major Backus concerning the murder of the Mescalero chief,
articulating, “such an occurrence would be deemed unfortunate at any time but singularly so at
this particular juncture as our relations with these Indians has not been of a satisfactory character
for some time past and I had but very recently succeeded in opening with them a friendly
intercourse. I am really apprehensive that serious consequences will grow out of this affair and
that some of our innocent citizens may suffer for this wanton act.”460 The murder of Cuentes
Azules clearly exacerbated an already tense situation along the U.S.-Mexico border, and it
promised to unleash violent remuneration by the Apache.
With the February massacre was still a fresh memory, and this most recent atrocity by the
people of Mesilla again contributed to the ongoing atmosphere of friction between the United
States and Mexico. The accused Mexican citizens were able to use the border to shield
themselves from U.S. authorities. Major Backus determined, “the worst fortune of the whole, is
that the act was committed by Mexicans from Mesilla, who are protected by the Mexican
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authorities.”461 The Major’s concerns were well placed. The four men charged for the crime
sought refuge from U.S. authorities across the border of the Rio Grande in La Mesilla, and
Mexican authorities were less than cooperative in handing them over. Eventually, the list of
accused was narrowed down to just one Mesilla resident, Pedro José Borule. The process of
extraditing the man fell to the hands of a U.S. Marshall, who crossed the river into Mexico to
attempt to arrest the alleged murderer of the Apache chief. Upon trying to requisition Borule for
trial in the United States, the Alcalde of Mesilla brazenly refused to give him up. Mesilla
residents themselves were also of the opinion that Borule should not be given to U.S. authorities.
They were in such support of the actions of the murderer that they prepared themselves to oppose
any arrest by the U.S. Marshal through force if necessary. Because of the tenuous situation
between U.S. officials and the government and people of Mexico, the judge in charge of the case,
Kirby Benedict, appealed to the military for help in securing the accused. Major Backus
declined his request, however, stating that the delicate relations existing between the two nations
prevented him from using military force to extradite the alleged murderer.462 The border was
responsible for allowing Borule to escape justice, much to the chagrin of the Mescalero people.
The Mescaleros were offended that seemingly no justice was being served for the murder
of their beloved leader. They, however, had yet to retaliate for the murder and initially placed
their bets on the justice system of the United States. Upon learning that U.S. officials had had
trouble acquiring Borule, the Mescaleros informed the commanding officer at Fort Fillmore that
they would give him five more days, and afterward, they would be forced to take matters in their
own hands if no progress was made in obtaining the accused. The Santa Fe Weekly Gazette

461
462

Backus to Nichols, 10 November 1853, LR, DNM, RG393, NA, M1102, Roll 6.
Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, 4 February 1854.

217

articulated the fears of the citizenry concerning this situation. The paper stated, “The most
serious apprehensions were entertained by the citizens on both sides of the river, and unless
General Garland takes some decisive steps, on his arrival at Fort Fillmore, to have this offender
arrested and punished, a renewal of hostilities must be the consequence.”463 U.S. officials were
thus placed in a precarious position, with the Mescaleros threatening violence on both sides of
the border, and the Mexicans unwilling to give up the accused murderer who had crossed the
boundary into the United States and killed a respected Apache leader. Despite their threat of
retaliation, months passed without any Apache retribution. However, U.S. officials were unable
to arrest the accused.
After the United States acquired Mesilla through the Gadsden Purchase in early 1854,
officials were finally able to secure the arrest of Borule. The U.S. government had long sought
to build a railroad through southern New Mexico, and officials reasoned that the land directly
below the New Mexican boundary contained the best topography upon which to create such a
railroad. That area, of course, belonged to Mexico, however, and the United States began to
covet that particular region for a railroad to link the south with the Pacific coast. In 1853, due to
uncertainty in the exact placement of the border, New Mexican governor William Carr Lane had
brashly claimed the Mesilla Valley for the United States. Although Lane had acted without the
blessing of federal authorities, the government saw an opening to finally acquire the region
because of the governor’s actions. To prevent hostilities, the two nations negotiated a treaty in
December of 1853, which ceded the southernmost portion of New Mexico to the United States in
exchange for 10 million dollars. The terms of the Gadsden Purchase also finally rendered Article
XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo null and void. The treaty thus gave possession of the
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Mesilla Valley to the United States, placing countless Mexican residents under the authority of
the U.S. As Mesilla was initially founded as a space to escape U.S. colonialism, many residents
were less than pleased to be back under the sovereignty of the Union. Nevertheless, with the
town of Mesilla under U.S. authority, officials were finally able to detain the man accused of
murdering Cuentas Azules.
Through the Gadsden Purchase, Borule became a citizen of the United States, and U.S.
authorities immediately arrested him. The accused stood trial in May of 1854, more than a year
after the murder. During the trial, many of the Mescaleros were in attendance upon the court and
“seemed to desire nothing more than the murderer be punished.”464 The Apaches, who were
non-citizens, attended the trial of a man who, when he committed the crime, was not a citizen of
the United States, but became one seemingly overnight. Thus, U.S. colonialism and the
implementation of an arbitrary boundary brought with it implications concerning citizenship that
profoundly impacted the various residents of New Mexico. The borderlands were indeed a
continually shifting space with substantial implications for its many ethnic groups. In the end,
Borule’s attorney asked for permission to enter a nolle prosequi, and the prosecutor decided not
to indict Borule. The judge granted this request, and the defendant was released.465 The U.S.
court system failed to bring justice to the aggrieved Mescaleros. The fact that the case was so
easily tossed out displays Euro American indifference to Native American justice. In terms of
vigilante hostility toward Native peoples, historian Larry D. Ball argued, “efforts to take court
action against suspected vigilantes were usually futile, as jurors in most cases sided with the
accused, especially in cases where Native peoples were attempting to attain justice.”466 This
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would not be the last time that the courts abandoned Native Peoples injured by the conduct of the
people of Mesilla.
The Mescaleros possibly considered the failure to bring Borule to justice as a violation of
the treaty negotiated by U.S. authorities and the tribe in 1852. That year, the Mescaleros,
Chiricahuas and New Mexican authorities had negotiated the Treaty of Acoma in Santa Fe.
Cuentas Azules had been a primary signatory for this particular treaty. The Treaty of Acoma is
significant because it was the only treaty with Apache peoples ratified by the President and
Congress. Unlike the various other treaties made with Apache peoples by New Mexican
authorities, the U.S. government fully backed and approved this treaty and had an obligation to
see it upheld. Article VI of the treaty stipulated: “Should any citizen of the United States, or
other persons subject to the laws of the United States, murder, rob, or otherwise maltreat any
Apache Indian or Indians, he or they shall be arrested and tried, and upon conviction, shall be
subject to the penalties provided by law for the protection of persons and property of the said
States.” When Cuentas Azules placed his mark upon the treaty, he could not have known that
article VI would apply to himself. Although his murderer was indeed arrested, the case was
rather quickly dismissed. Thus, Borule was certainly not “subject to all the penalties provided by
law for the protection and property of the people of the said States.” To the Mescaleros, the
government had failed to uphold the terms of the treaty, which ultimately led to further hostility
with the Mescalero nation.
Failure by the United States to avenge the death of their chieftain was a tipping point in
U.S.-Mescalero relations. By 1854, there was a marked increase in Mescalero raiding and
hostility. During the summer of 1854, Mescaleros sporadically attacked traffic on the San
Antonio – El Paso road. In June, they ambushed several emigrant trains at Eagle Springs, killing
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people and stealing over two-hundred head of cattle. The Mescaleros also drove off stock from
the vicinity of Anton Chico and Bosque Redondo.467 The list of Mescalero depredations during
1854 continued to grow, and as a result, General John Garland launched a series of military
campaigns in the heart of Mescalero territory. Michael Steck noted a connection between the
murder of Cuentas Azules and the conflicts with the Mescaleros that began in 1854. He stated
that the killing of the chief by the people of Mesilla “is alleged to have been one of the causes of
the war of 1855 with that tribe.”468 The actions of the people of Mesilla almost certainly
contributed toward full-scale war between the United States and Mescalero nation. The
complicated nature of cross-border interactions led to a war within the U.S. between the military
and Native Peoples based on the actions of Mexican citizens.
As the Gadsden Purchase was finalized, and the people of Mesilla were brought under the
administration of the United States, the brutal actions of the people of Mesilla did not cease; but
in fact, accelerated. During the early part of U.S. rule over the Mesilla Valley, the Mesilla Guard
turned southern New Mexico into a stage of terror and brutality for the Mescalero people. In
February of 1858, the Mesilla Guard once again engaged in a horrific massacre of innocent
Apaches. On the seventh of the month, someone stole three horses from the town of Mesilla.
Without any evidence, the Mesilleros quickly accused a band of Apaches residing near Doña
Ana of the theft. The Guard had hurriedly tracked and pursued the band to a camp some three
miles outside of the town. Similar to the previous attacks, these Apaches were Mescaleros who,
one observer noted, were “living on terms of amity with the inhabitants of [Doña Ana],” and
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were “permitted by the Indian agent to come into and linger about [the town].”469 This particular
band had been living near that location for the past six months where they were “trafficking in a
small way for corn, pumpkins or something else to eat.”470 There, on the outskirts of the city, the
Guard surprised the Mescaleros in their camp. They murdered three Indians, including the noted
Mescalero head-man Shaw-o-na. This particular chief, according to Michael Steck, had been
“the terror of the country for the last three years.” Steck, in a comment out of character for the
respected Indian Agent, argued, “if they had stopped after killing the men in camp, they would
have done the country a great service and not brought disgrace upon themselves.”471 However,
the Mesilla Guard was not finished enacting their style of bloody revenge.
After carrying out these initial murders, the Guard, “in a semi-intoxicated state,” rode
into the center of Doña Ana where many Indians were trading with the residents. Once in town,
the attackers, “in a riotous and wanton manner, and without warning commenced an
indiscriminate attack upon the Indians.”472 Witness to the massacre; lawyer John Watts
described it thus: “I was astonished at the sight of from thirty to fifty well-armed and mounted
men charging into town painted and dressed as Indians.” The Mesilla Guard began murdering
Indians wherever they found them. Surviving victims of the attack fled and attempted to take
refuge in the homes of nearby residents as many of the local Hispanos were willing to shelter the
Indians in their houses for protection. Watts claimed that the Guard “surrounded and broke into
several houses, dragged helpless Indians out into the street and murdered them in cold blood
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committing such atrocities that I am not willing to describe it on paper.”473 In one instance,
several Indians found refuge in the home of a local man, who, being armed along with his wife
and son, were able to prevent members of the Guard from entering. A witness to this particular
act of goodwill noted that an “old Mexican…hid several Indians in his house and like a man
faced the murderers with his gun in hand.”474 Although there had been centuries of hostility
between New Mexicans and Native peoples, certain Hispanos had responded to the massacre
with a sense of common humanity, heroically protecting the Apaches from unprovoked
execution.
After the dust had settled, the Guard had murdered at least nine Mescaleros, wounding
many more. At least five women were among the dead, of whom the guard “most horribly
mutilated.”475 The Santa Fe Weekly Gazette described the mutilation of these women in vivid
detail, stating, “one Indian woman clung to a Mexican woman, begging for her life, but the
brutes tore her away, cut her up, took out her heart, and split it open! Another had her tongue cut
out and her breasts cut off, and was thus tortured to death! In what age of savage barbarity have
such deeds equaled in brutality?”476 Thus, the Mesilla Guard’s brutal tactics were not only
reserved for men. Female Indians were frequently targeted, and most brutally dismembered. To
the Guard, Indian women were not worthy of the regulations of war that supposedly protected
them from such atrocities. The Guard most certainly considered both Indian men and women as
less than human, and female Indians certainly weren’t deserving of standard gendered
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conventions concerning violence and warfare. The Guard’s apparent delight in massacring
women elicited disgust in many of the borderland’s residents.
For their part, U.S. military officials in New Mexico saw the events of February 1858 as
the final strike against the people of Mesilla. As the town was now under the authority of the
United States, New Mexican officials contemplated how they were going to respond to the
Guard’s horrific massacre. To instill a sense of fear into the residents, senior military officials
proposed that, due to the residents’ proficiency at defending themselves, troops stationed at
nearby Fort Fillmore would no longer be needed. The Assistant Adjutant General of the territory
reported, “as the people of Mesilla have taken it upon themselves to protect that region of the
country against Indian depredation, the garrison of Fort Fillmore will be no longer required; and
that the next mail will bring an order for the withdrawal of one company, and, in a very short
time, one for the evacuation of the remainder of the garrison.”477 The fort, however, was never
actually abandoned and U.S. officials had only made the suggestion due to their frustrated
inability to control the actions of the people of Mesilla.
The people of Mesilla, however, saw the military’s threat to abandon the post as credible.
In their minds, the desertion of the fort would spell absolute disaster for their community. In
desperation, the citizens of Mesilla petitioned the military not to leave the post at Fort Fillmore.
The residents stated, “the continued depredations upon our property, particularly upon the
western side of the Rio Grande by the Gila Apaches, and those residing in the Florida Mountains
and near the Mexican line, keep us in a state of excitement and alarm. Our losses are numerous
and serious, for most of those who lose their animals, lose that upon which they principally rely
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for support.” They then went on to partly blame the military for the creation and actions of their
Mesilla Guard: “The people of this county are poor, it can hardly be said that there is a wealthy
man residing within its limits, and being thus poor, almost daily deprived of their means of
support and there being no mounted force at Fort Fillmore to pursue and chastise the marauding
Indians, the citizens of the towns of Mesilla and La Mesa have felt it imperatively necessary to
form a company of mounted men who, in consideration of their constant readiness to pursue at a
moments’ warning…has several times followed the Indians, have killed some and recovered at
various times a portion of the property stolen from us, but the statements of barbarous atrocities
having been committed by them in Dona Ana…are grossly exaggerated and false.” The
petitioners then argued the need for additional military in the vicinity of the town, rather than the
withdrawal of the paltry force currently stationed there. They pleaded to General John Garland:
“general, we need the presence of your troops. There is no county in the territory more exposed,
or more in want of military protection than Doña Ana, and we respectfully inform you that if you
adhere to your intention of evacuating Fort Fillmore, the result will be disastrous not only to the
residents of the county but to travelers over the roads.”478 Numerous people of the community
signed the petition, including multiple members of the Mesilla Guard.479 Thus, the people of
Mesilla had complained that lack of military power had compelled the creation of the Mesilla
Guard, yet they had balked when faced with the prospect of the military’s withdrawal from the
region.
Department Commander John Garland, who, unlike his predecessor, had generally been
tolerant toward independent civilian expeditions, responded to the petition. This particular
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excursion had been different than others allowed by Garland. The actions of the Mesilla Guard
were committed against Indians at peace with the United States. The Guard’s overtly violent
tactics and targeting of women had also repulsed the general. Of the people of Mesilla’s plea to
prevent the abandonment of Fort Fillmore, Garland replied, “with respect to the retention of the
two companies at Fort Fillmore, I can not now speak positively, but will naturally consider the
matter. It must be borne in mind that the Mesilla is the strongest settlement in New Mexico… I
regret to be compelled to say that, instead of receiving aid from the citizens, hostilities have in
some cases been provoked by their acts of outrage upon the Indians… It is proper for me to say
that, those of our citizens who perpetrate acts of violence and outrage, such as have been
represented to me – have no claim to the protection of the military and will receive none.”
Garland reasoned that if the civilians were intent on self-protection, then there was no need for
the military to remain. Responding the petitioners’ request for a greater military presence near
the town, Garland stated, “The request cannot, in the present condition of affairs, be complied
with. Two of the mounted companies at Fort Buchanan have been ordered out of this
department, one hundred mounted men have been detached from Fort Union for the Salt Lake,
Utah, and a company of mounted men ordered from Fort Stanton to the Red River where a
settlement has been recently broken up by the Comanches.”480 Due to General Garland’s reply,
it appeared to the people of Mesilla that the town would have to endure without any further aid
of the United States military.
In contrast to U.S. military officials, local government agents and civilians in Mesilla
regarded the actions of the Mesilla Guard in a much different light. In their hometown, the
members of the Mesilla Guard were hailed as heroes were accorded honor and certain privileges
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because of their status as Indian fighters. From the Indian agency at Fort Thorn, Michael Steck
officially protested the use of unsanctioned civilian violence to Rafael Ruelas, Prefect and
Probate judge of Dona Ana County and resident of La Mesilla. Ruelas, who assisted in
establishing Mesilla eight years prior, responded to Steck’s complaint, justifying the Mesilleros’
use of force. As for entering the homes of civilians to kill Apaches hiding there, Ruelas stated,
“Now if you in Dona Ana begin to protect the thieving Indians when they have broken every
peace treaty that they have made…and I think there is no section in any treaty which gives them
permission to steal…they do wrong.” Ruelas went on to claim: “we do not esteem you in Dona
Ana [for] treating us as savages and barbarians for having done our duty. It is the first law of
nature to protect oneself and one’s property.”481 Thus, the highest office-holder in Mesilla was
fully aware and in favor of the actions of the Guard. Scant evidence even shows that Ruelas may
have himself ordered the Guard into the field to commit the deadly act. Acts that had historically
bestowed honor among Hispano communities were considered dishonorable by Anglo officials.
The people of La Mesilla also praised the actions of the Guard, bestowing honor and
other benefits upon its members. A contemporaneous report by Lieutenant J.W. Alley shed light
on the status of the Guard in their own community. He noted, “The Mexican band is held in high
esteem by the people of Mesilla, the party seems to be constantly held in readiness to pursue
Indians, retake stolen property from them, and when not employed in active service of this
nature, enjoying certain privileges in that town, they are known as the Mesilla Guard.”482 Ana
María Alonso argues that the privileged status of militia groups was a common theme under the
Mexican government during the nineteenth century. In her case study of the northern Chihuahua
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town of Namiquipa, Alonso argues that men who protected their communities were able to use
military valor and honor to improve their social positions. On the frontier, the legitimization of
authority became linked with warfare, and in many cases, the Mexican government itself was
able to manage violence and fuel the search for personal honor by furnishing civilian warriors
with rights to land, tax exemptions, rights to booty captured from defeated Indians.483 This type
of culture was no different in La Mesilla, and these behaviors bled into the U.S. era with the
actions of the Mesilla Guard. Through violent acts against Apaches, the members of the Mesilla
Guard were able to maintain honor during a time when Anglo officials attempted to strip away
traditional notions of Hispano honor.
The make-up and membership of the Mesilla Guard also adhered to a model brought
from militia groups existent in New Mexico during the Spanish and Mexican eras. The Guard
had followed a centuries-long process of offering substitutes, most commonly, peons for militia
service. The practice of debt peonage had cemented itself in New Mexican society by 1800. At
times these peons were related to their patrons, yet captured members of hostile tribes were also
incorporated into the peonage system. During the Mexican era, subaltern classes such as peons
bore the brunt of the fighting, and access to military honor improved the social status of these
people. It wasn’t until April 14, 1867, that the U.S. officially outlawed peonage in the territory.
A description of the Guard by Colonel Dixon Miles illuminated the Guard’s organization. The
Colonel noted, “This company is composed of one hundred landholders, but when the company
is called into service, if any of the landholders are disinclined to march, they are obliged to
furnish a substitute, always of course one of his peons…among the company that came here and
perpetrated the recent outrage; were mostly peons, (as I hear), not over five landholders among
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them, the balance peons, runaways from [illegible] and deserters from the Mexican army.”484
There’s no doubt that these substitutes held a higher standing in the community of Mesilla then
they otherwise would by actively participating in the defense of the town.
During this time, the motives, scope, and tactics of the Mesilla Guard came into sharper
focus. The Guard was active on a larger regional scale than previously thought. Colonel Dixon
miles noted the geographical scope of the Guard, stating, “The people of Mesilla have raised and
maintain a volunteer company of Mexicans. This company carries on war against all Indians
wherever met, and it seems by extending its sphere of action have penetrated as far as the
Mimbres and attacked the Indians peaceably living there, despoiling them in their recent foray,
of horses, etc, on the pretense of having dead cattle stolen.”485 One article in the Santa Fe
Gazette detailed twenty members of the Mesilla Guard, led by one Juan Ortega, going far up into
Rio Abajo County to rob a band of Apaches of “some twenty head of animals, mules and
horses.”486 It seems that the Mesilla Guard were heavily active far from their home base of
Mesilla. It was common during the Mexican era for armed groups to make extended forays
away from their home base to pilfer Indian property. The Mesilla Guard continued to observe
this form of raiding Indian communities.
The Mesilla Guard also participated in the centuries-old borderlands practice of captivetaking. Upon completing the February 1858 massacre, the murderers had taken with them one
child. Up to that time, captive-taking in New Mexico was so common that it was responsible for
the continuation, growth, and creation of Hispano communities. New Mexican villagers
commonly, ransomed, exchanged, or brought captive Indian children into the household as
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criadas, as servants or slaves. Captive taking was so prevalent in the borderlands that a new
class emerged made up of those brought into captivity: the genizaro. Between 1700 and 1880,
some five thousand Indians entered New Mexican society as genizaros. They generally occupied
a lower standing in society than the broader Hispano community. In theory, these people were to
have their ransom paid off after ten to twenty years of service, yet as James Brooks argues, in
practice “these people appear to have experienced their bondage on a continuum that ranged
from near slavery to familial incorporation.”487 Most, however, appeared to achieve familial
assimilation in the households of their masters. It’s uncertain what the Mesilla Guard had
planned to do with their captive children, but it’s clear that the act was part of the broader longterm borderland precedent of captive-taking.
Once again, due to the actions of the Mesilla Guard, fear mounted that the aggrieved
Mescaleros would seek vengeance upon the inhabitants of New Mexico. Because members of
the Guard now resided in U.S. territory, any possible retribution by the Indians would no longer
bear any distinction between residents and citizens of Mexico and the United States. Soon after
the massacre, southern New Mexicans noted signal fires in the mountains which communicated
to the residents: “not a doubt that the Apaches are collecting to take revenge – and a terrible
bloody retribution will follow.”488 As a result, Colonel Miles ordered the Alcalde of Mesilla to
return the captive child to the Mescaleros. He also cryptically relayed to the Alcalde, “It would
be well for you to warn the inhabitants of the impending storm that apparently will break soon
over there.”489 To try to calm the aggrieved Apaches, Miles ordered Indian Agent Michael
Steck, well respected by several Apache bands, to come to the Mesilla Valley to try to appease
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them. The Colonel also suggested, contrary to the inclination of General Garland, strengthening
the post at Fort Fillmore with mounted troops, as he believed that the actions of the Guard would
“bring the whole Mescalero nation into active hostility.”490
The February 1858 outrage by the Mesilla Guard was indeed the final tipping point for
the Mescaleros. One week after the massacre, approximately one hundred men of the tribe came
into Doña Ana intent on attacking the residents of La Mesilla. Michael Steck immediately met
with the Mescalero headmen Manuelito and Gomes. Steck persuaded the Mescaleros not to
attack the town of Mesilla, claiming that if they commenced an assault on the settlement, then
the military would have to “attack them and carry the war into their country.” Being well
respected among the tribe, the headmen took Steck at his word. Accordingly, they promised the
Indian agent that their people would commit no violence upon the people of Mesilla. As a result
of Steck’s actions, the Mescaleros retreated and did not enact revenge, and large-scale warfare
was averted.491
The situation, however, became more heated less than a month later when members of
the Mesilla Guard pursued a band of Mescaleros who had allegedly stolen cattle from the town.
The Guard tracked down the Indians, took back the animals that the Indians had supposedly
stolen, and killed at least two members of the tribe. Within days of the incident, reports came in
from Mesilla that the Mescaleros, in retaliation, had erected a “skull and bones” in the town.
This ghastly symbol was a sign that the Apaches were still very much aggrieved with the actions
of the Mesilla Guard, and intended to settle the score. Colonel Dixon Miles argued, “Should the
independent action of the inhabitants of Mesilla continue, the Indians will to a certainty unite and
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carry out their threat, as reported by erection of ‘skull and bones,’ by wiping this town out.”492
Despite striking fear into the hearts of New Mexican residents, the Mescaleros stayed their hand
for a time. The threat of retaliation by the Mescalero people, however, only prompted the Guard
to be even more hostile toward the tribe.
Unhindered, and perhaps emboldened by the threats of the Mescaleros, in April of 1858,
the Mesilla Guard would carry out their final massacre against the Mescalero people. Since the
December previous, a band of Mescaleros had been living near the vicinity of Fort Thorn, near
present-day Hatch. These people had been on friendly terms with the people of the garrison, and
hadn’t committed any depredations upon nearby settlements. Despite this relative quietude, in
the early morning hours of April 17, 1858, thirty-six members of the Mesilla Guard led by Juan
Ortega, charged into the Mescalero camp. During this surprise attack, the Guard drew their
pistols and knives, butchering three men, three women, and one boy. The Guard also wounded
two women and one boy in the attack, taking several children captive. Michael Steck, relaying
an eye-witness account, reported, “The people living at the agency were aroused by the screams
of Indians and when going to their doors saw the party…indiscriminately butchering Indians
regardless of age, sex, or condition.”493 Again, the Guard seemed determined to target
Mescalero women. Steck added that the Mesilla Guard “seemed to take a fiendish delight in
murdering innocent defenseless and unoffending women.”494 As the chaos ensued, the

492

Miles to Nichols, 4 March 1858, LR, DNM, RG393, NA, M1120, Roll 7.
Steck to Collins, 15 April 1858, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, New Mexico 1858-1859,
Record Group 75, National Archives, Microfilm Publication M234 (hereafter LR, OIA, RG75, NA, M234), Roll
549.
494
Ibid.
493

232

Mescaleros scattered in all directions. Some sought refuge in the homes of nearby civilians,
while others took shelter near the river to hide amongst the trees.495
During the massacre, the Commander at Fort Thorn, Lieutenant William Henry Wood,
responded immediately to the situation. He ordered the garrison under arms, then went out with
the infantry and captured the whole party about half a mile from the post. Michael Steck noted,
“Within fifteen minutes of receiving information of what was going on, Wood rushed into the
midst of the Guard, drew his pistol, and demanded an immediate surrender.”496 The Guard
submitted to Lieutenant Wood without incident and were marched into the garrison at Fort
Thorn, disarmed, and placed under a strong guard. Upon disarming the Guard, the Lieutenant
noted that the thirty-six men were heavily armed, having thirty-five rifles, fourteen Colt
revolvers, and six other pistols between them. Lieutenant Wood had also exhibited that most of
the men had lived in Mesilla since the town’s founding, and all but two claimed to be citizens of
the United States. The majority of the Guard had been Mexican citizens before the Gadsden
Purchase.
Again, fears of Mescalero retaliation spiked. Conscious that New Mexican civilians were
working at the Santa Rita Copper mines nearby, Lieutenant Wood sent a military envoy to
protect the miners in case the Mescaleros took retaliatory measures. Wood sent a sergeant, a
corporal, and twenty privates to the Copper Mines to “protect this party in their efforts to
develop the mineral resources of that section of the country.” On the other hand, the same troops
were dispatched to protect the Mescaleros against potential additional attacks from the
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Mesilleros. The Lieutenant, however, was anxious that the introduction of soldiers in the area
would make the Indians “feel we had lost confidence in their professions of peace.” Wood told
the leader of the copper miners that if any Indians should approach him and question the
presence of U.S. troops, he should “intimate to them that the soldiers were sent into their country
to protect them, should attempts again be made by the Mesilleros to molest any portion of their
tribe.”497
Despite these fears of Mescalero retribution, Michael Steck reported that the Apaches
were not as inclined to take revenge as some had believed. Steck claimed that the band was
“perfectly peaceable” and “appear to be on the most friendly terms.”498 He added that the quick
capture of the guard by Lieutenant Wood “has had a most excellent effect upon the Indians…it
shows them that while we have confidence in their good behavior they will be protected, many
of them are here today cheerful as though nothing had happened.”499 Dixon Miles also stated,
“The Indians are perfectly satisfied at the course adopted by the Commanding General of the
Department and have left for their location where they intend planting corn. The wounded are
improving and will soon be well.”500 Ultimately, Lieutenant Wood claimed that the Mescaleros
were content with awaiting “the decision of the U.S. district court for redress for the grievous
injury done them by the people of Mesilla.”501 The Mescaleros would not be satisfied, however,
by the final result.
This repeat massacre once again enraged New Mexican officials who had been powerless
to stop such behavior. General John Garland stated,“ [I can] not believe that this outrage [had]
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been committed by persons having any just claim to the protection of our laws, they have
insulted our flag,” adding, “No armed body of men near our Mexican frontier…can be permitted
to approach one of our military posts without giving due notice, much less to engage in the
murder of our peaceable citizens and friendly Indians, who are entitled to the protection which
our flag purports to give them.”502 The General added, “It is high time that a stop should be put
to these lawless acts of violence and murder. Orders will be transmitted today, to the
Commanders of Forts Thorn and Craig, to afford every facility in their power in the way of
“posse, prisons, etc., to aid the civil authorities in the due execution of the laws.”503 In
accordance with General Garland’s wishes, an attempt would finally be made to bring the
Mesilla Guard to justice. Very soon after the capture of the Guard, Judge Kirby Benedict issued
an arrest warrant for the thirty-six men. The military handed the men over to the civil
government, where they were to be taken north to Socorro to be tried. On April 28, the thirty-six
members of the Mesilla Guard, under heavy escort, made their trek up the desolate Jornada del
Muerto to Socorro where they were to await trial.
In a properly functioning legal system, with the evidence clearly showing the Guard’s
guilt, it would have been almost certain that the Mescaleros would finally attain justice.
However, officials who recognized the historical hatred between New Mexicans and Native
peoples had little faith that the jurors would convict the Guard. Michael Steck accepted that the
citizenry of New Mexico was sympathetic to the violent actions of the Guard, claiming, “It is
useless to attempt to bring the perpetrators of the outrages to justice as a vast majority of the
people and the officers of justice sympathize with the murderers.”504 New Mexican communities
502

Garland to Miles, 22 April 1858, LS, DNM, RG393, M1072, Roll 2.
Garland to Benedict, 26 April 1858, LS, DNM, RG393, M1072, Roll 2.
504
Steck to Collins, 15 February 1858, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico. Michael Steck
Papers, MSS 134, Box 1.
503

235

held Indian fighters such as the Guardsmen in high esteem. Hispano jurors were not likely to go
against centuries of social custom by convicting the Guard. Superintendent of Indian Affairs
James Collins held the same viewpoint, stating, “This affair will give you some idea of what we
have to contend with in securing peace and protection to the Territory. The Mexicans who
committed the deed are held under arrest, and are at Socorro being tried before Judge Benedict…
But it will be of no use to commit them for a trial before a jury of their own countrymen, they
will of course be acquitted.”505 These premonitions proved correct.
The trial took place in October of 1858 causing “considerable excitement all over the
territory.” Large crowds of spectators collected in and around the courthouse to witness the
proceedings. The prosecution put forth their case that the Mesilla Guard murdered the
Mescaleros in cold blood, bringing in many witnesses who confirmed that fact. The prosecution
then tried to prove that this particular band of Indians had not stolen cattle in or around their
camp either before or during the massacre. Overall, they had tried to verify that the attack by the
Guard was unprovoked and unwarranted.
The argument of the defense entailed that a few days before the murders, seven or eight
oxen were stolen from Mesilla, which they said was an all too common occurrence in the town.
They claimed that the thieves wore moccasins similar to those worn by Indians. They then
attempted to prove that the Guard followed the trail of the robbers, which led them straight to the
Mescalero camp near Fort Thorn. The defense failed, however, to prove that the affected Indians
were indeed the ones who stole the oxen. The defense also tried to confirm that the actions of
the Guard were perfectly legal. They stated that the volunteer company was doing their legal
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duty under the orders of the Alcalde of Mesilla, Rafael Ruelas. This being the case, the Guard
was certainly adhering to a practice brought directly from the Mexican era, as local leaders were
frequently tasked with the defense of their communities. U.S. officials in New Mexico had
generally shunned this custom, leaving most matters concerning warfare in the hands of the
military. This mattered not, and the jury, after a very brief deliberation returned to the court with
a verdict of not guilty.506
Lieutenant William Averell was present during the proceedings. His description of the
trial highlights both Anglo American racial attitudes towards these jurors of Mexican descent
and disgust at the acquittal of the accused. He described the trial thus: “The court in session was
something worthy of contemplation…the judge charged the jury with sonorous declamation,
“Señores Caballeros” and a dozen Mexicans arose to their more or less bare feet from the jury
benches…all wore the serape… The cigarillo solaced their arduous mental strain. They could
have said unanimously to the prisoners “estamos hermanos,” and appearances would have
sustained the statement. The Señores Caballeors…shuffled out when it was concluded and
returned as soon as they had smoked another cigarillo with a verdict of “not guilty,” and the
prisoners were discharged.”507 Averell in very racialized language disagreed with the conclusion
of the jurors. His description implied that the Hispano jurors were too poverty-stricken,
incompetent, and overly comparable to the defendants themselves to warrant a fair trial.
Averell’s racial mindset echoed that of many Anglo Americans concerning Hispano unsuitability
for full citizenship, which included jury duty.
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Despite U.S. claims that the actions of the Mesilla Guard warranted punishment, justice
was ultimately denied the Mescalero people and granted the members of the guard. Although
Indian peoples were not citizens, the United States took it upon themselves to provide protection
to Native Peoples in their jurisdiction, especially those at peace or under treaty. The United
States failed in its obligation. The verdict ultimately reaffirmed that Hispanos’ claim to what
they saw as a moral right to retribution had legitimacy. The cycle of violence between Hispanos
and Apache peoples throughout the centuries all but ensured that Native peoples would not
receive impartiality from Hispano jurors. The Mescaleros had thus utilized a justice system that
would never grant objectivity toward Indians. Retributive violence against Native Peoples
during the Mexican era seldom merited legal discipline, and it appeared that not much had
changed during the U.S. period. The acquittal of the Mesilla Guard illustrated that unsanctioned
violence toward Indian groups continued to be largely overlooked.
Many of the people of New Mexico held mixed feelings concerning the verdict. In an
editorial contrary to their typical anti-Indian bias, the Santa Fe Weekly Gazette voiced their
disapproval of the judgment. The column stated that:
“The killing of those Indians was perpetrated within a very short
distance of the flag of our country, a fact which adds largely to the
aggravation of this bloody deed. We, the citizens of the United
States not only claim for ourselves, but also concede and promise
indiscriminately to every foreigner ample protection, wherever the
banner of our country floats. These Indians were as much entitled
to that protection as the Mesilla Guard themselves. If a violation
of these privileges is approved, by American Citizens of all our
boasting about the ‘Star spangled banner’ is a humbug. If it is
expected the officers of the government to be only silent spectators
whilst such scenes are being enacted, let us tear down the stars and
stripes, and put instead the device: ‘a shield for lawlessness and
violence.’”508
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This excerpt highlights that although Euro-Americans likened Native Peoples with “foreigners,”
the United States had still been responsible for their protection. The failure of the U.S. to
provide that protection was a violation of the supposed morality of Anglo American citizens.
After the trial, the Guard still managed to cling to life, though never again were they
accused of the level of violence committed against Apaches in 1858. In March 1860, the Guard
reappeared in the archival record for the final time. They had chased a band of Apaches west
into the Florida Mountains, subsequently crossing the border into Mexico and confronted some
380 Apaches in northern Chihuahua. Upon encountering the large group, the Guard, numbering
about thirty, decided to flee and return to Mesilla.509 Shortly afterward, during the opening of
the Civil War in 1861, New Mexico Governor Abraham Rencher commissioned two of the
original thirty-six, including their leader, Juan Ortega into the newly created, pro-Union Mesilla
and Mesa Mounted Volunteers of the Militia of the Territory of New Mexico.510 Thus, these
men now answered to the territorial militia, which effectively ended the unsanctioned exploits of
the Mesilla Guard.
This chapter adds to a historiography addressing the implications that violence and
colonialism have had on Native and non-Native peoples in what is now the southwest United
States. Both interpersonal and structural forms of violence significantly affected borderlands
peoples. Lance Blyth argues, “Violence can be a useful tool for communities to employ,
particularly in areas where no single political organization or cultural group has a monopoly on
its use, such as borderlands.”511 That was certainly the case in nineteenth-century New Mexico.
However, until relatively recently, historians have not critically examined the causes and effects
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of such violence. Ned Blackhawk claims, “Despite an outpouring of work over the past decades,
those investigating American Indian history and U.S. history more generally have failed to
reckon with the violence upon which the continent was built.”512 This chapter has attempted to
explore the nature of such violence, its foundations, and its consequences. Brutality played such
a significant role in the lives of the various peoples in the southwest United States that only
through a lens of violence can we obtain a clearer picture of the true nature of both colonialism,
the construction of the United States, and their effects on both Native and non-Native peoples
situated in the area.
The demise of the Mesilla Guard did not coincide with an end of the violence between
the many peoples living in the southwest United States. Other vigilante groups continued to
organize unsanctioned military expeditions against Native peoples. Ideas concerning race,
gender, violence, and vigilantism in the southwest United States persisted far into the future, and
most notably emerged with the 1871 Camp Grant Massacre near Tucson, Arizona in which a
group consisting of Anglo Americans, Mexican Americans, and Tohono O’odham Indians
engaged in the murder of nearly 150 Apache Indians.513 Simultaneously, the United States’ war
with Apaches would continue for decades, concluding only with Geronimo’s surrender in 1886.
The narrative of the Mesilla Guard is but one of many examples of the atmosphere of brutality
that had manifested itself in the borderlands throughout the centuries.
This long trajectory of violence helped to shape communities and cultures in New
Mexico. Citizens of the Spanish empire, Mexico, and the United States employed many forms of
colonial violence against the Native Peoples in the area. The actions of the Mesilla Guard were
the result of a long history of this violence which was sanctioned and sustained by the state, most
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notably, Mexico, and carried out by its citizens.514 The United States also observed forms of
violent colonialism against Native Peoples less centered on the actions of its citizens, but more
so based on military prowess. These combined modes of violence dealt a forceful blow to
Apaches, yet these people remained powerful enough to play a central part in the course of
empire. An examination of the Mesilla Guard offers an example of how the multiple people of
the borderlands interacted, and also highlights the significance of the racial interplay that was
unique to the US southwest.
The actions and acquittal of the members of the Mesilla Guard tell us much about
relations of power in the borderlands during the mid-nineteenth century. Even though the United
States claimed sovereignty over New Mexico after the U.S. War with Mexico, the fact remains
that they were virtually powerless to prevent these former citizens of Mexico from employing
their traditional forms of protection. The residents of Mesilla were simply repeating precedents
concerning what they believed was their only option for dealing with the Apache threat. They
were not willing, nor able to in their opinion, submit to the will of the United States by halting
vigilante militia justice. Furthermore, the Guard was able to utilize the newly conceived border
to escape prosecution on multiple occasions and continue their bloody exploits. Ultimately,
however, despite claiming ownership over the area, Spaniards, Mexicans, and Anglo Americans
were incapable of subduing the Apaches for almost three centuries. The story of the Mesilla
Guard illustrates how fragile control and dominance were in what is now the U.S. southwest, and
no one group held a true monopoly of force.
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Chapter 5: The Civil War, 1860-1865
As Governor Abraham Rencher and Colonel Thomas Fauntleroy quarreled over the use
of civilian soldiers, and the Mesilla Guard turned southern New Mexico into a theatre of terror
for certain Apache peoples, the specter of war began to consume the eastern United States. The
issue of slavery had finally reached its breaking point, and by 1861, the majority of southern
states had broken away from the Union. The dark cloud of Civil War soon engulfed the territory
of New Mexico. For both Union and Confederate officials, New Mexico was an essential
component in their schemes of Manifest Destiny.515 With its vast mineral resources and access
to the flourishing markets of California, New Mexico soon became a significant staging ground
of conflict involving the struggle over the meaning of labor, the status of free people of color,
and the nature of citizenship in the Southwest. What began as a violent debate over the
expansion of slavery across the United States, soon resulted in the rapid transformation of
civilian defense in the young borderlands territory.
From the onset of the U.S. Civil War, the need for New Mexican volunteers to
supplement the regular army was readily apparent. The coming of the War immediately placed a
heavy strain upon the regular military already stationed in the territory. Since the end of the
U.S.-Mexico War, the federal government had maintained a military presence in New Mexico to
restrain the power of the various Indian nations in the region. By June of 1860, the regions of
New Mexico and Arizona maintained approximately 1,500 regular military soldiers.516 As
examined previously, however, many residents felt that the number of troops had been
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inadequate to overpower the Native Peoples of the territory. As multiple Southern states began
to secede in 1860 and 1861, the U.S. Army in New Mexico suffered a significant blow to these
perceived insignificant troop numbers. Most Southern officers stationed in the region cast their
lot with the Confederacy and resigned their commissions. Prominent U.S. military officials such
as New Mexico Department Commander, William W. Loring, and General Henry Hopkins
Sibley joined the Confederacy leaving Union loyalist Colonel Edward Canby in command of the
military department of New Mexico. Despite such high-profile desertions, the majority of
enlisted men in New Mexico remained at their posts. Nevertheless, these losses all but ensured
that military ranks in New Mexico would need to be filled by civilian volunteers to both resist
the growing Confederate threat and war with Native Peoples.
The secession crisis, particularly that of Texas in February of 1861 further marred the
U.S. military in the southwest. New Mexico’s access to the eastern United States through Texas
was abruptly cut off. Without efficient transportation to and from the east, New Mexican
subsistence stores accrued heavy losses. At the same time, the department of New Mexico had
to come to terms with a shortage of horses as well as a poorly timed change in the weather that
resulted in a lack of rain that devastated crops. These circumstances drove Colonel Canby to
proclaim that conditions in the territory were near the level of famine.517 In addition, U.S. troops
in New Mexico had already gone unpaid for many months, inducing many more soldiers to
defect to the nearby Confederacy under the assumption that their new administrators would pay
them.518 As a result of these chaotic conditions, local businesses began to refuse to credit the
military owing to the uneasiness and restlessness concerning the economic future of the
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territory.519 Due to the coming of the Civil War, the army in New Mexico certainly faced many
challenges before even a shot was fired.
The federal government soon called on civilians to enlist in the volunteer army in all
states and territories loyal to the Union, including New Mexico. After the firing on Fort Sumter,
on May 3, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln issued a nationwide proclamation organizing
volunteer forces into the service of the United States to wage war against the Confederacy.
Under these orders, authorities in New Mexico began recruiting local citizens to fill two
volunteer regiments for terms of three years. The military had mustered four companies into
service at Fort Union, four at Albuquerque, two at Fort Stanton, and two at Fort Craig. These
companies collectively became known as the First and Second Regiments of New Mexico
Volunteers. The military would muster several more volunteer regiments into service as the War
progressed. These companies were armed and equipped for immediate service under orders of
Colonel Canby. The mustering of these volunteer companies initiated an era of civilian defense
in the territory whereby the military, civil officials, and citizenry finally worked in unison in a
concerted effort to defend the territory against the Confederates and combat Native Peoples.
The use of civilian soldiers in New Mexico during the U.S. era before the coming of the
war in 1861 had been highly inconsistent. Certain military officials such as Edwin Sumner and
Thomas Fauntleroy had been hesitant to enlist Hispanos in volunteer military units due to
racialized notions concerning ability, loyalty, and citizenship. Others, like John Garland, tended
to embrace Hispano civilian warriors. The decade of the 1850s saw both a rise and decline of the
use of civilian volunteers mainly depending on the personal views of the department commander
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in charge. New Mexican civil officials and the residents themselves, however, had almost
always advocated for the use of civilian warriors. The efforts of the civil government,
spearheaded by the governors, had led to the ratification of legislation concerning civilian militia
units. Even so, residents such as the citizens of Mesilla continued the mode of warfare prevalent
under the Mexican regime, taking vengeance and warfare into their own hands through
unsanctioned war expeditions against enemy Indians. Disagreements and ambiguity concerning
civilian warfare had indeed led the territory down a path of turmoil during the 1850s.
Unlike much of the previous decade in New Mexico, the 1860s saw military officials
freely utilize territorial residents for defense. By the end of the Civil War, New Mexico had sent
6,561 of its civilians to war, more than North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, Montana,
Idaho, Wyoming, and Colorado combined.520 With this recent mobilization of civilians in the
service of a war over the nature of labor and allegedly for the freedom of enslaved African
Americans, this was the first time that any significant number of ethnic Mexicans engaged in
combat on behalf of the United States. The volunteer army and militia in New Mexico, however,
underwent a process of racialization in which they suffered under a host of both negative racial
and gendered perceptions and discriminatory practices by Anglo Americans stationed in the
territory. Many of the racial sentiments that animated the U.S. to declare war on Mexico fifteen
years earlier continued to influence how Anglo military men and civilians treated ethnic
Mexicans in the militia and volunteer army. However, seeing the necessity of mustering up the
Nuevomexicanos in defense of liberty and the integrity of the territory recently conquered from
Mexico, raised new questions about the meaning of citizenship, race and gender; but their service
also sparked critical conversations about the claims these people of color could make on the
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nation to protect their rights as Americans. Although their Anglo counterparts derided their
service and participation in the War, that same service in defense of liberty and against slavery
accrued to the Hispano militiamen a newfound moral authority and status. Whereas previous
generations anchored their rights to the Spanish and Mexican laws and institutions, the
generation that fought in the Civil War could point to their service to the United States as
leverage to live as full citizens in post-War America.

Foreseeing a variety of potential benefits in serving for the United States, thousands of
New Mexicans immediately responded to the government’s call by enlisting in the volunteer
military. Many Hispanos believed that military service was a gateway to a citizenship status
equal to that of Anglo Americans. Nuevomexicanos were finally offered an opportunity to prove
their loyalty, masculinity, and readiness for citizenship. Men who had seen their traditional
gateway to honor being closed by the U.S. government were willing to enlist and prove their
valor on the field of battle. The prospect of payment was also a very prominent incentive.
Unlike previous militia duty during the Spanish, Mexican, and early U.S. eras, in which payment
primarily consisted of captured booty and prisoners, the federal government promised to pay
volunteer units in actual U.S. dollars. These men, many being alive under the Spanish regime,
looked forward to payment in hard currency for their military service. Compensation in hard
currency gained importance as the territory saw a shift away from pesos and an economy based
on barter and trade, to one based on cash backed by the U.S. Treasury. The U.S. government
promised New Mexican volunteers the same pay rate as their regular army counterparts at

246

thirteen dollars a month.521 The government gave those who agreed to enlist for three years a
bounty of one hundred dollars, a quarter of which was to be paid in advance.522 Many volunteers
ultimately never received the payment owed them, nevertheless, this was an extremely enticing
offer to many impoverished Hispanos who survived predominately through subsistence
agriculture.
Another major factor which led a multitude of New Mexicans to enlist was the prospect
of escaping the long-standing institution of debt peonage. Ever since the Spanish had claimed
sovereignty over the region, the custom of debt peonage had long been a persistent feature of
New Mexican society. Peonage consisted of the “voluntary” servitude of a particular person for
payment of a debt.523 However, peons often labored for life under the same master. Numerous
households contained at least one peon, but some ricos had amassed substantial numbers.524
Many Anglo-American observers unfamiliar with the practice equated New Mexican debt
peonage with southern chattel slavery. Territorial official William Watts Hart Davis postulated,
“In truth, peonism is but a more charming name for a species of slavery as abject and oppressive
as any found on the American continent.”525 The U.S. military in New Mexico was subsequently
able to take advantage of the desire by many peons to free themselves by enticing them to enlist.
These people were able to use enlistment in the volunteers as a pathway to independence.
Colonel Canby, for example, issued a circular stating that the military would not discharge
volunteers due to past indebtedness and petitions to reclaim peons had to be filed with the U.S.
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District Courts. These orders made it extremely difficult for masters to reclaim their enlisted
peons.526 Large numbers of peons flocked to recruiting stations around the territory. Noting the
prevalence of this phenomenon in the Mesilla Valley, Probate Judge Frank Higgins observed, “in
this valley I do not think more than one company could be raised, and these chiefly from peons
who enlist to escape servitude.”527 An article in the Santa Fe New Mexican similarly noted that
many peons had “extricated themselves from their thralldom as servants by going into the United
States Volunteer regiments.”528
Hispano peons had used military service to free themselves from servitude and at the
same time, transform their social status. The desire by many peons to enter military service
echoed that of the genízaros during the colonial era. Through military service, genízaros were
able to secure a more respectful position in a New Mexican society which, by and large, had
denigrated these peoples. Peons had also attempted to utilize military service to become
independent, functioning members of society. Through military service, they were better able to
take advantage of the benefits of U.S. citizenship, limited as they were in New Mexico during
this time. Being free of their masters, peons sought to own land, exercise their right to vote, and
achieve a level of independence they had only dreamed about. Military service promised such a
pathway. The Civil War also offered a passageway to a better life for multiple peoples
throughout the United States. African Americans, the Irish, and immigrants residing in the
northern and southern states flocked to join the military for reasons similar to the New Mexican
peons. In this respect, the Civil War was distinctive from all other U.S. wars up to that point, as
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disadvantaged people could use military service to secure a better standing in society as well as
to attain better economic opportunities.
Although many Hispanos found reasons to enlist, countless New Mexicans were
understandably apprehensive about volunteering. In particular, poorer Hispanos could not
fathom the likely damage that could come from being away from their homes, farms, ranches,
and families for an extended period. Being absent for up to three years could potentially destroy
their fields and livestock, only leading to further impoverishment. Many New Mexican civilians
were also not particularly motivated to battle a Confederate menace on behalf of a nation that
had forcefully colonized their region against their will just fifteen years previous.
“Volunteering” was not always voluntary, and multitudes of potential New Mexican recruits
found ways to shirk military duty. Militia Captain Rafael Chacón noted that civilians from New
Mexican villages were “frightened by the stories of the recruitment of soldiers for the army and
militia, and they stayed out in the mountains under the pretext of gathering pinons and acorns,
but, in reality, in order to escape recruitment.”529 In his diary, Colorado Volunteer, Alonzo
Ferdinand Ickis, similarly observed that in one village “there are no men in the town they are
skulking over the Mts to keep out of sight of the Territorial pressman who are knabbing every
man who is able to carry a musket and into the Militia they go.”530 A significant amount of New
Mexican civilians, therefore, attempted to opt out of serving military duty during the Civil War.
U.S. officials were consequently compelled to acquire recruits using different techniques
which included coercion and intimidation.531 In an order to a New Mexican recruiting officer,
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Colonel B.S. Roberts commanded, “If any of the Officers or Soldiers of the Militia, called into
service…refuses to obey your call, I am instructed to Send you Military force to compel their
obedience.”532 Like many Americans in other parts of the nation, New Mexicans cared little
about the sectional debates that sparked the War. They were generally less than motivated to
potentially give their lives for the return of the South to the Union, or for the equality and
freedom of African Americans. Consequently, recruiters in New Mexico were tasked with
reframing the War as something worthy of Hispano enlistment. U.S. officials endeavored to play
off of the regional sentiments of the population by framing the Civil War as a battle between the
local Mexican population and their traditional enemies, the Texans.533 Much of the northern
Mexican population had stigmatized Anglo Texans. New Mexicans had, therefore, seen Anglo
Texans as a traditional enemy for many years. These combined recruitment tactics drove many
hesitant Nuevomexicanos to enlist. By the end of the war, some 3,846 volunteers and militia
were organized all over New Mexico.534
In charge of these units were New Mexican men of high reputation and wealth. A
combination of both prominent Anglo and Hispano leaders headed both volunteer and militia
companies. In command of the first New Mexico infantry, for example, was influential New
Mexican businessman, Céran St. Vrain, followed by famed frontiersman Kit Carson upon St.
Vrain’s resignation. Brothers Nicolas and Miguel Pino, who had participated in a planned
rebellion against the United States in 1846, had both commanded companies of volunteers and
militia during the Civil War. Prominent former Mexican military officers Manuel Antonio
Chaves and Rafael Chacón also led local volunteer companies. Thus, it seems that much of the
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anxiety concerning an alliance with Mexico by the New Mexican population was diminished
during the era of the Civil War.
Nevertheless, many U.S. officials feared that individual sections of the New Mexican
population could potentially turn to the Confederacy. To many Anglo American observers,
Nuevomexicano reluctance to join the volunteer military displayed a long-standing lack of
loyalty to the United States. Long before the coming of the Civil War, Anglo Americans had
concluded that the New Mexican population possessed little if any allegiance to the United
States. Many believed that Nuevomexicano historical and cultural ties to Mexico carried with
them a deep and abiding fidelity to their former state. The 1846 War with Mexico, a rebellion by
Hispanos and Pueblo Indians near Taos, and the refusal of Hispano groups such as the Mesilla
Guard to follow U.S. law when it came to conflicts with the Apaches, indeed concerned U.S.
military officials. Consequently, they had been hesitant to organize an army of Hispanos that
could potentially rebel against their new government. To many U.S. officials, the ethnic
Mexican population could never truly be loyal to the United States, as, during the Civil War, the
debate shifted from Hispano loyalty to the Mexican state to allegiance to the newly formed
Confederacy. Colonel Canby made note: “The Mexican people have no affection for the
institutions of the United States,” and “have a strong, but hitherto restrained, hatred for the
Americans as a race.”535 Through the eyes of Canby and other officials, it would not, therefore,
be difficult for the allegedly disloyal New Mexican population be supportive of the goals of the
Confederacy.
Fears of Confederate loyalty in the southern portion of the territory were a particular
concern. Years before the Civil War, Hispano residents of the town of Mesilla, which was the
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seat of Doña Ana County, had frequently petitioned Congress for recognition of a new
geopolitical entity in the southern region of New Mexico to be called Arizona. Southern New
Mexicans had clung to a long list of grievances against New Mexico, leading to a desire to create
a new territory more receptive to their needs. Many Hispanos were not accustomed to certain
regulations put in place by the U.S. government that had been absent under the Spanish and
Mexican regimes. Probate Judge of Mesilla, Rafael Ruelas claimed that the government of New
Mexico had not provided “the protection which belongs to them.” He also stated that there was
“only a limited and inconvenient administration of the laws,” arguing, “[We] are geographically
disunited from New Mexico by sterile deserts, difficult (or rough) mountains, and desolate
jornadas… which are infested by barbarous and savage Indians.” He added, “The interests of the
people of New Mexico are very distinct from ours – and that we are treated with contempt or
cursed with a partial legislation.”536 By 1856, without the blessing of the federal government,
residents in the region took it upon themselves to hold the first Arizona Territorial Convention,
during which participants in this convention went as far as electing their own governor. They
also petitioned Congress to formally establish a Territory of Arizona.
In light of these views, on the eve of the Civil War, southern New Mexico became a
hotbed of secessionism. Residents created the community of La Mesilla only twenty years
earlier to avoid being under the purview of the United States. Due to the War, southern New
Mexicans saw an opportunity to finally detach themselves from U.S.-governed New Mexico. On
March 16, 1861, citizens held a convention at Mesilla in which they passed a resolution
repudiating the United States and attaching themselves to the Confederate States.537 The
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prospect of joining a nation more receptive to the needs of the local population outweighed
concerns regarding the South’s views relating to race. In fact, the South’s critical views
concerning the racial makeup of New Mexico differed little from the North’s. The Mesilleros
were so critical of the U.S. government that they opted to join forces with their traditional
enemies, the Texans. Upon the fall of Fort Sumter, Hispanos in Mesilla erected a Confederate
flag in celebration. Upon Confederate Colonel John Baylor’s entrance into the town, the
residents received the Confederates with a tremendous ovation and “vivas and hurrahs rang them
welcome from every point.”538
U.S. officials were anxious that disaffected citizens in other parts of New Mexico could
potentially turn their backs on the United States like their counterparts in the southern region.
Both civil and military officials urgently attempted to identify and punish alleged New Mexican
traitors. In a letter to a militia commander, Governor Henry Connelly claimed, “I fear that there
are…within the limits of your Division, disaffected and disloyal persons, who would be disposed
to frustrate the intentions of the government in regard to the defense of this territory.” He added,
“You will at once have him, or them arrested and brought to the guard house of this military post
for correction and punishment.”539 The military also issued a broad order stating that:
“all loyal citizens are expected to manifest their loyalty
now, and disloyal citizens and opposers of these orders will be
daily reported to the Commanding officer of the nearest military
post, and if necessary they will be arrested, and sent forwith to said
military posts. It will be the duty of all militia officers in this
Territory to aid in carrying these orders into immediate effect and
to give information of any persons who may be discovered
opposing them, or who are found deceiving the people using
words, proclamations or letters in favor of the enemy, and all
person who are suspected of being spies of the enemy or using
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arguments in favor of the invaders of our Territory shall be
arrested forthwith.”540
Threats such as these weren’t just idle, as officials indeed arrested many New Mexican
citizens believed to be disloyal. By January of 1862, arrests were a daily occurrence in Santa
Fe.541 Fears concerning Nuevomexicano lack of allegiance to the United States were such that
Colonel Canby found it ultimately necessary to declare martial law in the territory while
requiring all males over the age of sixteen to take an oath of allegiance to the United States. The
necessity of Colonel Canby to require oaths of allegiance certainly spoke to the Anglo belief that
Hispanos were not part of the larger American fabric. The Civil War most prominently brought
out longstanding issues concerning the national fidelity of the New Mexican people.
In late July of 1861, the immediate necessity of New Mexican volunteer troops became
apparent as Confederate Colonel John R. Baylor with a force of about three hundred Texans
crossed over the Rio Grande from Texas and occupied the town of Mesilla. The Confederates
sought to claim New Mexico and the southwest predominately as a way to secure its mineral
resources as well as to gain access to a route to the booming markets of California.542 Union
General James H. Carleton noted as much, claiming that the South desired “the right of way to
the Pacific, to which great importance is said to be attached.”543 After a brief firefight near the
town, Major Isaac Lynde, Union commander at nearby Fort Fillmore surrendered his army of
about five hundred men to Baylor’s force of less than three hundred. Taking possession of
southern New Mexico, Baylor formally renamed it Arizona and assumed the title of governor.
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In the face of this threat, Colonel Canby knew that more haste was needed in recruiting
New Mexican civilian volunteers. Days after Baylor’s invasion, Colonel Canby issued a
suspension of habeas corpus and made a plea to the citizens of New Mexico to take up arms in
defense of their communities. Canby appealed: “All loyal citizens, as they value their liberties,
their homes and the soil of their birth…to aid and assist, to the utmost of their ability, in repelling
invasion, suppressing insurrection, and sustaining and enforcing the laws of the United
States.”544 In addition to attempting to add more New Mexican volunteers to his fighting force,
Canby also appealed to the governor of Colorado to organize volunteer units to supplement his
troops in New Mexico.
The New Mexican civil governors also responded to the invasion by encouraging
civilians to form local militia units. Governor Abraham Rencher immediately issued a
proclamation after Baylor’s incursion stating, “I…do call upon all good and loyal citizens to
uphold the authority of the laws and to defend the Territory against invasion and violence from
whatever quarter they may come. For this purpose, I exhort and require all persons able to do
military service to organize themselves into military companies.”545 Two months after
Rencher’s proclamation, newly appointed Governor Henry Connelly also responded to the
Confederate occupation, issuing a declaration of his own regarding the defense of the territory.
Connelly claimed that section 43 of an act of the Legislative Assembly approved January 6,
1852, provided, “In case of insurrection, rebellion or invasion, the Governor shall have the power
to organize and call out the militia for the service in such numbers, and form such districts as he
may think proper.”546 Accordingly, Connelly, with the blessing of Colonel Canby, ordered the
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immediate organization of the militia in every county of New Mexico. This would be the first
time that the militia of New Mexico had been called up on a territory-wide scale during the U.S.
period.
In an attempt to motivate citizens to enlist in the militia, Governor Connelly appealed to
notions of masculinity while hearkening back to a long tradition of New Mexican civilian
defense. In a circular to the citizens of the territory, Connelly claimed, “You cannot, you must
not, hesitate to take up arms in defense of your homes, firesides and families.” Calling upon a
perception of Hispano masculine duty, Connelly stated, “Your manhood calls upon you to be on
the alert and to be vigilant in the protection of the soil of your birth.” He also made reference to
the fact that New Mexican civilians had historically played a prominent role in the defense of
their communities, arguing, “As your ancestors met the emergencies which presented themselves
in reclaiming your country from the dominion of the savage and in preparing it for the abode of
Christianity and civilization, so must you now prove yourselves equal to the occasion and nerve
your arms for the approaching conflict.”547 Anglo Americans had historically questioned
Hispano masculinity, and many U.S. military officials had reasoned that the Hispano male lacked
the “manliness to defend themselves.” This interpretation had been a significant reason that
military officials such as Edwin Sumner felt that Hispanos could not be capable soldiers.
Appeals for New Mexican men during the Civil War to do their manly duty by protecting their
women and children certainly didn’t fall on deaf ears. Similar to their male counterparts across
the United States, a masculine duty to defend their firesides certainly motivated many Hispanos
to enlist for volunteer duty. Through tactics such as these alongside coercion, militia units called
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out by the governor began to organize, and by February of 1862, these units had begun arriving
at Fort Craig.548
In gendered terms, Anglo American observers had been less than optimistic concerning
the fighting spirit of these Nuevomexicano citizen-soldiers. In particular, Anglos generally
believed that Hispanos lacked the masculine quality of courage. W.H.H. Davis commented, “At
home, their manhood has been almost crushed out of them; and when led to the field, they had no
interest in the contest, and nothing to fight for.”549 Colorado volunteer Alonzo Ickis noted, “If
these Greasers will only fight we are all OK. Time will tell.”550 The chief of the Fort Union
ordnance depot also held these sentiments, stating, “A residence of twelve years among them,
that without the support and protection of the Regular Army of the United States they are entirely
unable to protect the…Territory…no matter how many there may be or how well armed the New
Mexican volunteers are.”551 Alongside being branded as cowards, Anglo Americans such as
these used gendered language to suggest that Hispano males were inherently prone to thievery,
sexual violence, and an addiction to alcohol; all traits that were antithetical to Anglo notions of
manliness. The Anglo perception of the inability of Hispano bodies to adhere to proper gender
codes was widespread in nineteenth-century New Mexico, which ultimately contributed toward
the inability of Hispanos to claim full citizenship.552
Calls by both the military department commander and the governor for civilians to
mobilize and enlist for volunteer duty led to the enactment of two different yet intersecting
military units in the territory during the Civil War. Both the New Mexican Volunteers, overseen
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by the military, and the Militia of New Mexico, directed by the governor, were called upon for
military duty during the War. Although the governor oversaw the militia, both militia and New
Mexican volunteer units ultimately fell under the purview of the department commander.
Colonel Canby, and later General James Carleton utilized both of these forces as they deemed
necessary. The militia and volunteers frequently partnered with the other as well as the regular
troops in military endeavors. To prevent any confusion regarding the two units, military officials
noted, “Persons subject to militia duty will be exempted therefrom by enlisting in one of the
Regiments of New Mexican Volunteers.”553 Usually recruited for a term of three months,
wealthy, influential local leaders such as farmer, politician, priest, and delegate to Congress, Jose
Pablo Gallegos led these militia units. Although serving similar purposes, the payment for
militia service differed from that of the volunteers; the territory of New Mexico was responsible
for the payment of the militia, while the volunteers were to be compensated by the federal
government. New Mexico’s treasury, however, was empty and as many as 1,400 militiamen
would never receive payment for their role in the War.554
The Civil War in New Mexico brought about the first time in the history of the United
States that the nation militarily deployed a large force of ethnic Mexicans. Union leaders
begrudgingly decided that they could not do without the contributions of the ethnic Mexican
population if they wanted to preserve the territory for the United States.555 African Americans
also played a prominent military role in the Civil War through segregated military companies.
Unlike African Americans, however, the federal government chose not to segregate Hispanos
from Anglo Americans in the military. This had much to do with the law designating ethnic
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Mexicans as “white.” The Naturalization Act of 1790 offered U.S. citizenship to only “white”
immigrants, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase denoted citizens of
Mexican descent as “white.” This meant that all ethnic Mexicans in the territory were
considered both “white” and citizens under the law, while African Americans, Asian Americans,
and American Indians were not.556 Mexican Americans in New Mexico thus fought alongside
Anglo Americans in unsegregated units. As such, General Canby issued an order in 1862 which
specified that “In the organization of companies the enrolled men of native and foreign birth will
be kept distinct except that in the New Mexican companies.”557 Most Anglo Americans, such as
the soldiers and volunteers in the militia, however, grounded Mexican identity not as white, but
as a product of racial mixing.558 Therefore, despite the federal laws designating Mexicans as
white, their social reality in the territory and on the field of battle included discrimination and
charges of racial inferiority.
Colonel Canby, like most other U.S. military officials, let racialized ideas concerning the
inferiority of ethnic Mexicans influence his actions and rhetoric concerning Nuevomexicano
volunteer units. Canby frequently grumbled about the perceived ineffectiveness of Mexican
American companies, pointing out the “inexperience of the volunteers” and the “ignorant staff
officers,” noting, “I question very much whether a sufficient force for the defense of the
Territory can be raised within its limits, and I place no reliance upon any volunteer force that is
raised, unless strongly supported by regular troops.”559 Canby argued, “The New Mexican
Volunteers, without the support of the regular troops or of volunteers drawn from some other
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section of the country, cannot be relied on to resist an invasion of the country.”560 Thus, Canby
appealed to the Anglo-heavy Colorado volunteers to supplement the New Mexican troops. He
also believed that Nuevomexicano troops had to remain “under the supervision of an officer of
the army” to be at all effective.561 He, therefore, maintained that in each company, there should
be commissioned “one American who could be relied upon.”562 Thus, Canby, in racial terms,
was fundamentally unable to trust New Mexican civilians for the defense of the territory. He
fully advocated that Anglo American officers should lead Hispano companies whenever
available.
Anglo volunteers stationed in New Mexico also routinely held negative racial perceptions
of Hispanos which influenced their views of ethnic Mexican volunteers. Colorado volunteer,
Alonzo Ferdinand Ickis made a claim: “the more of them [Hispanos] that are killed the better the
country is off. They won’t work but will steal all they can lay their dirty hands on.”563 Referring
to the New Mexican volunteers as “Corahoes”564 Ickis noted in his diary: “Two Co of
Corahoes…were not worth their rations.”565 He also made the disparaging comment that “Two
hundred Corahoes were discharged and paid off. They will now have a few dollars to lose at
monte.”566 Anglo Volunteers such as Ickis routinely used such racialized rhetoric to disparage
the combat prowess of the New Mexican volunteers in upcoming battles.
Serving side by side with Anglo Americans in the military, discrimination against
Nuevomexicano volunteers was rampant. In addition to referring to the New Mexican volunteers
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as “greasers,” Anglo American ideologies of the time assumed that different “races” had
naturally different standards of living.567 Therefore inequities which favored the Anglo
American regular troops concerning the distribution of military supplies and furnishings were
common. Despite promising clothing to the volunteers, the army was unable to clothe a large
number of these men. Captain Andrew W. Evans noted that many of the volunteers “are in no
sort of uniform whatever, but are rather dressed in dirty rags, and some are even without
shoes.”568 Many of these men, without being issued blankets were relegated to sleeping on the
ground; one observer noting, “They are wholly deficient in bunks and bed sacks, have never had
them.”569 Furthermore, New Mexican volunteers were also segregated into substandard living
quarters. Volunteer Lieutenant Colonel José Francisco Chavez noted this and made a formal
complaint that his men were provided inferior living quarters compared with the regular
troops.570 As a result of his petition, a regular army official countered that the volunteers “have
not been slighted in any respect whatever,” judgementally adding that “the volunteer soldiers of
your command have never been so well fed, clothed and quartered.”571 Captain Rafael Chacón’s
company also felt the brunt of discriminatory practices as the quartermaster at Fort Wingate
refused to shoe the horses of Chacón’s men. Chacón noted that this was due in part because
“This quartermaster looked down on all the native officers without any distinction as to their
rank.” The quartermaster begrudgingly complied after Chacón showed him a direct order from
the War Department to have his horses shod.572
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Inequities concerning the payment of the regular military and volunteers was also an
extremely volatile issue. Although neither the regular military nor volunteers received
compensation on time, volunteers who enlisted specifically due to the promise of being paid
were particularly distraught when the army failed to do so. Concerning imbursement, General
Canby stated, “Many regular troops have not been paid for more than twelve months and the
volunteers not at all.”573 The volunteers, therefore had no money to send to their families and
many, as a consequence fell on desperate times. Volunteer captain Ethan Eaton complained that
his company had not received a “cent of pay” in fifteen months, noting the destitute condition
that the situation left many of the volunteers’ families.574
When faced with the prospect of non-payment, many volunteers either revolted or
deserted. A riot erupted among the members of Company C of the First Regiment of the First
Division as a consequence of not receiving compensation as promised. All the men of the
company were subsequently split up and transferred to other companies.575 Concerning this
disturbance, departmental headquarters admitted, “There had been a serious revolt in two
companies” because of the volunteers “not having been paid and clothed as they were
promised.”576 Desertion, of which non-payment was a crucial factor, was an all-too-common
occurrence. Canby made note of large-scale desertions by members of the volunteer force,
claiming, “The volunteer forces, already organized, will melt away by desertion.”577 He also
added that any further delay in payment would result in “a marked and pernicious influence upon
these ignorant and impulsive people.”578 Faced with this issue, Canby made multiple attempts to
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secure payment for these volunteers.579 However, it seemed that ethnic Mexicans who enlisted
to secure a more equal standing and citizenship status with whites would be disappointed.
For their part, due to racialized notions concerning Nuevomexicanos, the Confederates,
with only very few exceptions, did not utilize the Hispano population in any combat facility for
the duration of their occupation of southern New Mexico. Anglo Texans’ history of white
supremacy ideology long had a significant impact in the borderlands. Ideas concerning Anglo
supremacy had, in part, led to the Texas Revolution in 1836. Racial ideology also played a
prominent role in acquiring the Mexican north after the U.S.-Mexico War. The fear of the
eradication of race-based slavery led Texas to secede from the United States. When Confederate
Texans invaded and occupied southern New Mexico, they certainly were not prepared to place
any military responsiblility in the hands of the Hispano population. When a local man, Pablo
Alderete, for example, raised a local company for the Confederates, the military commander
declined to utilize it for service.580
Anglo Americans in southern New Mexico had maintained, even before the coming of
the Confederates, that Hispanos were unfit to serve militarily during the Civil War. Sam Jones,
the editor of the Mesilla Times, reasoned that Hispanos could not be trusted in any combat
capacity. Speaking of the Union army in New Mexico, he claimed, “The better part of the army
officers and men are composed of native New Mexican volunteers, who do not differ, in any
essential degree, from the people of Old Mexico, who neither know nor care anything about the
principle involved, and are, with a facility proverbial with the Mexican race, ready to espouse the
side of the successful.”581 In general, the Confederates also ascribed to this racial doctrine and
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refused to allow Hispanos to assist militarily in their struggle against the Union. There were
discussions among Confederate leadership, however, that the local Mexican population could be
utilized to fight Native Americans as they had done for centuries. In 1861, the Congress of the
Confederate States passed a law declaring the extermination of all Indians deemed “hostile” in
New Mexico and Arizona. To accomplish the task, John Baylor suggested using “the Mexicans,
if they can be trusted.”582
The Civil War in New Mexico entered a much more dire phase in December of 1861 as
General Henry Hopkins Sibley, with approximately 3,000 volunteer Texans, supplemented John
Baylor’s force in Mesilla. Baylor had requested these reinforcements in part because local
support by Hispanos for the Confederates began to dissipate in southern New Mexico. Similar to
their northern counterparts, the Confederates routinely questioned the loyalty and allegiance of
the New Mexican population. Baylor claimed, “The Mexican population are decidedly Northern
in sentiment, and avail themselves of the first opportunity to rob us or join the enemy. Nothing
but a strong force will keep them quiet.”583 Upon learning of Sibley’s invasion, Colonel Canby
immediately issued an order to all militia companies so far organized in New Mexico to “keep up
a corps of observations of the enemy’s movements, as also to prevent the entrance of small
parties of the enemy into the settlements.” He added, “You will form Guerilla parties to attack
and damage the enemy as much as they possibly can.” Despite these efforts, in February of
1862, Sibley’s army had successfully advanced up the Rio Grande to within one mile of Fort
Craig and challenged the Union to an open-field fight.584 The subsequent Battle of Valverde was
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the first major conflict between Union and Confederate forces in the Intermountain West, and the
New Mexican Volunteers and militia would play a major role in this consequential battle.585
The result of the Battle of Valverde on February 21, 1862, was a costly loss for the
Union, and not surprisingly Nuevomexicanos bore the brunt of the blame for the defeat. The
Union army consisted of 1,200 Regulars and 2,600 New Mexico and Colorado Volunteers, along
with several companies of New Mexico Militia.586 The Confederate force comprised of 2,150
officers and men. The Battle of Valverde was thus the largest Civil War battle in the Southwest,
and the costliest, with 100 Union killed and 160 wounded, and 72 Confederates dead, and 157
injured. After a day of brutal combat, Union troops, both regular and volunteer, were compelled
to retreat to Fort Craig. Regular army officials and soldiers immediately blamed the supposed
cowardice of the New Mexican volunteers for the failure.587 Surveyor General John A. Clark
noted that the New Mexico volunteers had “retreated at the first fire” and “rushing into the
river…were killed by dozens.” He added, but for the “cowardice of Colonel Pino’s regiment it
would have been a glorious victory.”588 Captain Gurden Chapin noted, “The militia have all run
away and the New Mexican Volunteers are deserting in large numbers. No dependence
whatever can be placed on the natives; they are worse than worthless; they are really aids to the
enemy, who catch them, take their arms, and tell them to go home.”589 One newspaper also
curtly noted that “a regiment of Mexicans ran away.”590 Colonel Canby himself noted that “No
reliance can be placed on the New Mexico Volunteers and Militia, and I advise their being
disbanded.” Noting the longstanding tension between New Mexicans and Anglo Texans, Canby
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stated, “They have a traditional fear of the Texans, and will not face them in the field.”591 He
also added that the battle of Valverde was a “disaster” and was fought “almost entirely by the
regular troops with no assistance from the militia and with but little from the Volunteers, who
would not obey orders or obeyed them too late to be of any service.”592 Alonzo Ickis argued, “At
the first sight of such as very large body of Texans Pinos men ran leaving us white men only 250
to hold the section.”593 Through the eyes of Anglo American observers, Hispanos acquired little
or no honor on the battlefield and lacked the manliness required to be effective warriors. Despite
these views, evidence shows, however, that the vast majority of Nuevomexicanos fought well at
Valverde and did not flee the battlefield in mass as these witnesses had claimed.594
One month after the battle of Valverde, Union forces scored a victory at the battle of
Glorieta inducing General Sibley and his men to retreat to Texas. A combination of regular
troops alongside New Mexican and Colorado Volunteers participated in a series of battles in the
mountains near Glorieta over several days.595 Fifty-one Union and 50 Confederate soldiers were
killed during the clashes. The destruction of the Confederate supply train during the events at
Glorieta triggered the end of the Confederacy in New Mexico. The Confederate departure was
therefore prompted by a lack of food, blankets, and other provisions necessary to continue the
occupation of New Mexico as well as the fact that Union General James H. Carleton had been
dispatched with his California Volunteers to retake Arizona and New Mexico. Sibley had
recognized the fact that the Confederates had ultimately failed to attain their objectives in New
Mexico and decided to send their army back to Texas as soon as possible, never to return during
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the duration of the War.596 Thus, the Confederate threat in New Mexico was rather quickly
squelched at the expense of many lives lost on both sides. The regular troops, alongside
volunteer and militia units organized to fight the Confederates, were subsequently able to turn
their attention to the longstanding Indian wars in the territory.
General James Carleton’s entrance and Sibley’s exit spearheaded a turning point in which
the federal and territorial officials in New Mexico would use all available troops to wage a
protracted war against the independent Indians in the territory, even as Civil War tensions
continued to the east. General Carleton arrived in New Mexico and relieved Colonel Canby of
the command of the department on September 18, 1862. During the ensuing four years, the new
department commander conducted a brutal and unprecedented military operation against Indians
in New Mexico and Arizona.597 General Carleton’s Indian policy would turn out to be a
combination of concentration camp and benevolent despotism.598 New Mexican volunteers and
militia played a crucial role in Carleton’s aggressive war against the territory’s independent
Indians.
Carleton expected his arrival in New Mexico to initiate a new era in New Mexico. Many
Americans, including Carleton, perceived that the Southwest had languished under the Mexican
regime, and life in the region bordered on savagery. Upon his arrival, Carleton immediately
declared martial law and attempted to mold Nuevomexicano spaces to conform with those that
he considered more Euro-American friendly. In this way, Carleton tried to bring the New
Mexican settlements into conformity with his vision of national identity.599 First, Carleton
turned his focus to the common Anglo American notion that Hispanos and their dwellings were
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unclean. To the inhabitants of New Mexico, General Carleton ordered, “The keeping of their
dwellings, quarters, stores, corrals, etc. in a state of cleanliness may be necessary to health and
comfort.” He added, “It is expected that all of the inhabitants living along the Rio Grande
southward from the jornada del Muerto to Fort Bliss in Texas, will…repair their dwellings and
clean up their streets.” He then promised, in a fashion that echoed General Stephen Watts
Kearny’s proclamation in 1846, that his arrival would bring the territory back from the brink of
ruin. Carleton stated, “The people may now rest assured that the era of anarchy and misrule
when there was no protection to life or property; when the wealthy were plundered; when the
poor were robbed and oppressed; when all were insulted and maltreated; and when there was no
respect for age or sex, has passed away; that now under the sacred banner of our country, ALL
may claim, and shall receive their just rights.”600 Carleton certainly ascribed to notions of
Hispano inferiority and believed that upon his arrival, he had brought civilization in tow.
What Carleton did, in fact, bring with him was his own racialized ideas concerning New
Mexican cowardice and lack of allegiance to the United States. He had spent the bulk of his
military service in the southwest, and like many other Anglo officials, his impressions of
Nuevomexicanos were anything but flattering. Carleton claimed, “[I have] heretofore resided
five years in this country…and know somewhat the character of the people.”601 Carleton first
attempted to root out any New Mexican resident accused of uncertain loyalties. The General
issued an order: “All doubtful Americans and foreigners,” were to be seized and sent “strongly
guarded” to the nearest fort, where, “with the spade, at least, they could help defend the flag.”
Using harsh language, he added that all who belong “to this class of men would suffer their
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houses and stores to be laid in ashes.”602 He also sought to punish New Mexicans who attempted
to evade military duty for their perceived cowardice. In a letter to a militia captain, Carleton
claimed, “When the country was invaded, I have been told that many American citizens…left the
Territory and remained absent until all the danger had passed by.” He added, “It is rumored that
we are again menaced by the enemies of the Union; and again such good citizens may find it
convenient to leave New Mexico while this threatened danger hangs over it.” He articulated,
“Whenever, until further orders, citizens wish to leave New Mexico to go to the States, you will
detain them and have them assist you, unless they have passports signed by myself.”603 Carleton
had no patience for Hispanos who, in his view, were either weak-willed or held no loyalty
toward the U.S.
Shortly after Carleton’s arrival, rumors soon emerged of an additional Confederate
invasion. Carleton feared that there would be “another advance of a hostile force of Texans,
numbering, it is said, 6000 men under Baylor.”604 The General immediately sent volunteer and
militia troops to scout the south looking for any trace of the enemy. He ordered Kit Carson and
his men to “watch and annoy [the enemy] by day and night.” He tasked the volunteers with
“burning off all the grass in front of [the Confederates]; stampeding stock; [and] firing into the
camps at night.” He also ordered volunteer officers: “Animate – as you can do” – the New
Mexican citizen soldiers “with a settled determination to attack the enemy from every corner; to
shoot down their teams; to stampede their stock when grazing; to destroy the bridges…to hover
by night around their camps; to set fire to the grass…to shoot down their men at night…then
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before day to scatter in all directions.”605 To motivate civilians for this mode of warfare, and
noting that volunteer units had so far received no payment, Carleton told Carson, “Your people,
as well as the inhabitants of the country, shall have as their own, all the property they can capture
or steal from the enemy.”606 The General thus reverted to a payment system based on the
pilfering of Indian possessions.
Carleton also attempted to utilize many New Mexican civilians in capacities other than
combat. He conscripted civilians to strengthen the military posts in anticipation of a Confederate
advance. He ordered that Forts Union and Craig were “to be defended at all hazards against any
force that may be sent.”607 Therefore, upon the threat of another Confederate invasion, Fort
Craig was a beehive of activity as the army worked feverishly to strengthen the post.608 Carleton
needed civilian labor to help shore up Fort Craig and other defenses around the territory. The
General would appeal to the citizens of the territory to volunteer for this task. Carleton wrote to
Cerán St. Vrain stating, “As the citizens are all interested in our success, we must appeal to them
to come forward and help with their labor to complete these defenses.” He added, “We want
them to show their patriotism in volunteering their labor – each man his twenty days. We will
feed him – but we have no money to pay him.” He went on: “Your social position is such, that if
you started the movement, the whole country would emulate your example.”609 Ultimately yet
not surprisingly, volunteers didn’t flock to sites such as Fort Craig in the numbers that the
General had hoped. Carleton, therefore, conscripted workers in Socorro County for twenty days
to work on nearby Fort Craig. Anglo observers denigrated Hispanos forced to work on such
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projects. Major Edwin A. Rigg made the derogatory claim that the residents who were forced to
provide physical labor were “dilatory in reporting to work on the fortification,” adding, “Nothing
but the strong arm of the military will compel these people to do their duty to the
government.”610
As James Carleton was busy preparing for another Confederate assault, New Mexico
Governor Henry Connelly had been highly concerned with the longstanding issue of hostilities
with Native peoples. The Confederate invasions of 1862 had left the territory further exposed to
Apache and Navajo attacks as several military posts had to be abandoned upon the arrival of the
Texans. Certain Native groups took advantage of this power vacuum to defend their homelands
against the longstanding intrusion by Mexican and American colonists. During this time, Native
Peoples attacked the settlements with more frequency than they had before the War, wreaking
havoc throughout the territory. Connelly noted that as the military and civilian volunteers had
been sidetracked with addressing the Confederates, “the Navajoes were consequently
undisturbed in their infernal work of destruction. Well did they take advantage of this
opportunity. Never before were their atrocities so numerous. They overran this whole
country.”611 One report claimed that the Apaches had come to believe that they had “stampeded
the entire white population.”612 The Independent Indians had killed an estimated two-hundred
civilians since the start of the War.613 Speaking particularly of the Navajo, Connelly argued,
“extermination by the sword, or by starvation, is our only remedy for the evils which they have
caused, and will continue to cause our people, so long as there is one in existence.” The
governor, therefore, sought to use whatever means at his disposal to combat the Indian threat.
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Connelly admitted that the primary reason he called out the militia in 1861 was not the
Confederate threat, but the Indian. He believed that the regular military, along with its
volunteers, would be able to effectively combat the Confederates leaving his militia free to war
with independent Indians. In late 1861, the governor had proposed that the militia under his
command would be “actively engaged against any and all hostile tribes at least four months in
the year…until we have, with them, a permanent peace.”614 Accordingly, the militia had been
delegated to punish offending Indians when they weren’t assigned to assist in expelling the
Confederates. After the complete expulsion of the Confederates, however, the governor saw a
chance to fully utilize the militia as he had initially intended.
The Volunteers under the department commander had also been regularly tasked to make
war upon independent Indian nations. By 1862, Colonel Canby had designated four companies
of New Mexican volunteers for service in Indian Country under Kit Carson. Canby had noted
that the Navajos and Mescaleros were “exceedingly troublesome” and gave these volunteers
“constant employment.” He perceived, as other observers such as Indian agent Michael Steck,
that the New Mexican people actually encouraged this turmoil with their constant plunder,
murder, and enslavement of the Indians.615 Nevertheless, if Indians attacked or raided a nearby
settlement, even in retaliation for offenses committed by Anglos or Nuevomexicanos, New
Mexican volunteers were frequently dispatched to punish them. An extensive war by the
volunteers against the Indians had been hindered by the presence of the Confederates. After their
retreat, however, a full, protracted, and consequential war against independent Indians would be
spearheaded by General James H. Carleton shortly after he replaced Canby in late 1862.

614

Connelly to Seward, 26 October 1861, SDTP, NM, RG59, NA, T17, Roll 2.
Durwood Ball, “Fort Craig, New Mexico, and the Southwest Indian Wars, 1854-1884,” New Mexico Historical
Review, 73, no.2, (April 1, 1998): 161.
615

272

The additional Confederate invasion that Carleton feared never materialized, and with
that particular threat distant, the general’s next avenue would be the unfettered subjugation of the
Indians in New Mexico and Arizona. Carleton stated just that; claiming, “[As] the probabilities
of an invasion cease, at this moment I consider such probabilities so remote as to justify me in
employing the troops under my command in chastising the hostile tribes of Indians.” Carleton
knew he would need the help of a larger force than what was at his disposal for his war against
such tribes like the Navajo and Apache. In late 1863, Carleton had asked the federal government
to supply him with an additional regiment of cavalry for this purpose. The government denied
his request on the pretext that “the commanders of frontier departments, remote from the more
active theater of operations, must make every exertion to economize material and men…the
number of troops now stationed in the frontier departments and Territories is much larger than in
time of peace, and yet nearly all the commanders are asking for large re-enforcements; both are
entirely beyond the reach of the enemy; no extraordinary circumstances are known which require
additional troops.”616 Thus, the task of warring with Native peoples fell to the regular military,
volunteers, and militia companies already stationed in the territory. Despite Carleton’s pleas for
more troops, for the first time since the U.S. had entered New Mexico, non-native peoples in
New Mexico would deploy a force large enough to cause considerable and lasting damage to
Native groups. Mescalero Chief Cadete noted the sizeable presence of troops in New Mexico
during the Civil War era, stating, “Your troops are everywhere; our springs and waterholes are
either occupied or overlooked by your young men.”617
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Carleton first set his gaze upon the Mescalero people. He sent Kit Carson with five
companies of the New Mexico Volunteers to Fort Stanton to operate against the tribe during late
1862. Carleton’s extremely harsh policy toward the Mescaleros was articulated in an order to
Carson: “All Indian men of that tribe are to be killed wherever you find them. The women and
children will not be harmed, but you will take them prisoners.”618 Before reaching Fort Stanton,
a portion of Carson’s volunteers under Captain James Graydon clashed with a group of
Mescaleros, killing two chiefs, Manuelito and Jose Largo as well as several other men. After
another brief firefight with Carleton’s California Volunteers, a large number of Mescaleros
promptly fled to Fort Stanton and surrendered to Kit Carson.619 Fairly quickly, Carson held a
significant portion of the Mescalero tribe prisoner, all of whom he sent to the newly-formed
Bosque Redondo reservation. By March of 1863, Carson claimed that the Mescalero ordeal had
been a “short and inexpensive campaign,” as the majority of the Mescalero tribe, some four
hundred, had been taken prisoner to Bosque Redondo.620
Next, Carleton focused the energies of the volunteers and militia on the subjugation of
the Navajos.621 Carleton claimed that the Navajos “have long since passed that point when
talking would be of any avail. They must be whipped and fear us before they will cease killing
and robbing the people.”622 After defeating them militarily, Carleton would then endeavor to
“withdraw the whole Navajo tribe from their present locality of mountain recesses, and place
them upon the Pecos river…there they can be taught the arts of civilized life whilst they are
receiving the protection of Government arms.”623 For this task, Carleton again chose Kit Carson
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and his volunteers. Carleton also deployed militia units to assist Carson’s volunteers to “perform
such service among the Navajos as will bring them to feel that they have been doing wrong.”624
Carson and his men marched into Navajo country establishing a garrison called Fort Wingate.
Carson eventually made Fort Defiance, now known as Fort Canby, his headquarters from which
he and his New Mexican Volunteers and militia would wage war on the tribe. The volunteers
and militia initiated a violent war against the Navajo with no quarter. They also attempted to
destroy the lifeways of the Natives by demolishing every Navajo food cache, capturing their
horses, and taking their sheep.625
Having long been enemies of the Navajos since the era of the Spanish, Hispano
volunteers and militia during the Civil War adhered to a unique centuries-long style of retaliatory
warfare. Hostilities between the two had led to a particularly brutal cycle of violence and
retaliation that had taken place largely unabated for centuries, and the Civil War was no
different. From Fort Wingate, a company of men under Rafael Chacón and his First New
Mexico Cavalry engaged in this mode of warfare. Chacón had been a military volunteer under
the Mexican governor Manuel Armijo during which he had been present at Apache Canyon to
repel Stephen Watts Kearny’s invading army nearly two decades prior. After the U.S. takeover
of New Mexico, Chacón had fought for the Americans, battling the Utes and Mescaleros under
Kit Carson in 1855. During the Civil War, Chacón and his men sought out the Indians wherever
they would find them and kill them. These Volunteers would then take the Indians’ belongings,
and capture several women and children, depositing these captives into the centuries-old
borderlands slavery system. Rafael Chacón himself took one Indian girl for his own to be
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“instructed in the Catholic faith.”626 Extreme brutality was also quite common in this mode of
warfare. After witnessing the vicious act of New Mexican volunteers scalping a Navajo man,
one Anglo American participant noted, “This style of proceeding may inaugurate retaliation and
a system of warfare in which we may be the sufferers. The Navajoes seldom or never scalp their
prisoners and the barbarous practice should not have been commenced by us.”627 Longstanding
modes of violence were, therefore, certainly not eradicated by the coming of the Americans.
Further, following an enduring precedent of warfare in New Mexico, many Native groups
played crucial roles in the military’s fight against the Apaches and Navajos. The army utilized
these people in various roles; primarily scouting and spying on the enemy. The military
frequently employed the Ute people during the War. These people saw action against both the
Confederates and the Navajos. In August 1861, Colonel Canby instructed commanders at Fort
Union: “Urge the organization of the Utes as rapidly as possible and if any of them are in the
immediate neighborhood of your post ask Col. Carson to send them out as spies and annoy and
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Illustration 5.1: Captain Rafael Chacón
of the New Mexico Volunteer Infantry.
Palace of the Governors Photo Archive,
New Mexico History Museum, Santa Fe.
NM. 148455

cripple the Texans.” The Utes agreed to help the military, their only stipulation being that the
army keep their families fed in their absence.628 In his war with the Navajos, Kit Carson had
asked for the authority to employ one hundred Utes as auxiliaries. The Utes had been engaged in
conflicts with the Navajos since the late 1850s and were also more than willing to help the
United States in their campaign against that tribe.629 Carleton forwarded Carson’s claim to
Washington, arguing, “The Utes are very brave, and fine shots, fine trailers, and uncommonly
energetic in the field…They could be mustered as a company or, preferably, could be employed
as spies and guides.”630
Carson’s Ute partners assisted him in his war with the Navajo primarily by spying and
scouting. These Utes did not require pay as soldiers but were paid in provisions and captured
booty. In particular, the Muache Utes received firearms, clothing, and provisions, as well as
permission to take livestock as reimbursement for their services.631 Carson also argued that the
Utes be allowed to take prisoners as payment for their services, claiming, “It is expected by the
Utes…to allow them to keep the women and children, and the property captured by them…as
there is no way to sufficiently recompense these Indians for their invaluable services.” The Ute
auxiliaries took captives who were frequently then sold into the system of borderlands slavery.
Carson noted, “The Utes dispose of their captives to Mexican families, where they are fed and
taken care of and thus cease to require any further attention on the part of the government.
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Besides this, their being distributed as Servants thro’ the territory causes them to loose that
collectiveness of interest as a tribe, which they will retain if kept together at any one place.”632
Carleton himself knew about and condoned the slave/captive system. Thus, in many ways,
warfare during the Civil War in New Mexico echoed modes of combat that had taken place for
centuries in the region.
Many Pueblo peoples also assisted U.S. troops, although James Carleton had difficulty
trusting them. He believed, like other department commanders previously, that the Pueblo
Peoples were allied with hostile Native tribes. In a letter to Kit Carson, Carleton aggressively
noted, “You will assure the Zuni Indians that if I hear that they help or harbor Navajoes, or steal
stock from any white man, or injure the person of any white man, I will as certainly destroy their
villages as sure as the sun shines.”633 Despite Carlton’s views, Pueblos were frequently recruited
for terms of six months to drive off confederate herds, scout, spy on the enemy, and report their
movements. During Kit Carson’s war with the Navajo, the Governor of Zuni gave Carson three
guides, and about twenty other Zunis accompanied him. These people assisted Carson, during
which they had taken some Navajo sheep and goats before returning home.634 Pueblos also
frequently operated against the Navajos without military oversight. In October of 1863, a force
of Pueblos had killed Navajo Chief Barboncito and sixteen others, capturing forty-four women
and children and one thousand sheep.635 Utes were also commonly found in the field acting
without military permission. In September of 1863, Michael Steck reported that some Utes had
killed nine Navajos and captured forty children, while Pueblos had killed two.636 Native allies of
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the U.S. government certainly played significant roles in helping the military achieve its
objectives as they had done for centuries.
By the winter of 1863, Carson’s campaigns had destroyed massive amounts of Navajo
provisions and taken many lives, but he was still unable to secure a decisive victory.
Occasionally small bands of destitute Navajos turned themselves in and were escorted to Bosque
Redondo.637 This was not enough, however, for Governor Henry Connelly who was compelled
to use the newfound power that the Civil War had given the militia to once and for all subdue the
Indians. He continued to push for the enlistment of more men for militia duty, issuing a
proclamation to motivate New Mexican civilians for warfare against Native peoples. In
September of 1863, Governor Connelly appealed to the people of New Mexico: “To defend
against all enemies, is the first and paramount duty of all good citizens.” Hearkening back to
New Mexicans’ inherited duty of defense against Indians, he added, “Our common country has,
again, called upon you for aid, in suppressing rebellion, and liberating yourselves from the
effects of the savage foe, which as, for so many years, waged a relentless warfare against your
lives and property. An opportunity is now offered to you, not only to chastise your hereditary
enemy, the Indians, but to receive ample reward, from the Government, for services you may
render in the field, against those desolating tribes.” He stoked the fires of old animosities: “This
territory is the land of your forefathers, conquered by their valor, from the savages that are now
preying upon your interest and bequeathed by them as a legacy to you and yours, in the
expectation that you would defend it as they had done and as it becomes you to do.”638 Thus,
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Connelly frequently appealed to notions of a Hispano duty to battle Native peoples that was
inherited from their forebears.
By early 1864, Kit Carson and his volunteers had begun to make progress in their war.
Many impoverished Navajos had been in retreat to north-eastern Arizona. With these Navajos
hemmed in and short on provisions, Carson decided to launch an attack at Canyon de Chelly, the
traditional Navajo stronghold. Surrounded and destitute, many Navajos in the canyon area chose
to surrender. Large groups of Navajos soon began presenting themselves at Forts Wingate and
Canby.639 Pleased with the overall results of the campaign, Carleton stated, “This is the first
time any troops, whether when the country belonged to Mexico, or since we acquired it, have
been able to pass through the Canon de Chelly …It has been the great fortress of the tribe since
time out of mind….I believe this will be the last Navajoe War.”640 Carleton commended the role
of the volunteers, praising “the gallant and meritorious services of certain officers of the regular
and volunteer forces of this distant command during the last three years.” He requested that
several officers be breveted. Out of the eight officers of the New Mexico volunteers
recommended by Carleton, only one had a Hispanic surname.641
Some New Mexican civilians had indeed responded to continued calls to engage in
hostilities with the Indians, but not in the way officials had envisioned. New Mexican civilians
frequently illegally attacked and raided Navajos who were in route to Fort Wingate to surrender.
Volunteer Captain A.B. Carey noted that the Navajo chief Delgadito and his group were attacked
by “a party of Mexicans” while leading his group to Fort Wingate. He reported that the civilians
killed several men, kidnapped women and children, and drove off a portion of the Indians’
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herd.642 Although he noted, “Any attack made on these people now, would in all probability,
injure those who were coming in in good faith,” Carey actually praised the actions of the
attackers, stating, “The citizens cannot be blamed, but must on the contrary be praised for their
energy in pursuing so far the robbers of their flocks – their hereditary foe – the Navajo.” He
eventually added, “They should at the same time understand that any act of hostility committed
against the Navajo at present may place a barrier in the way of carrying out the wise measures
now in successful progress.”643 One month later, Carey also discovered “the dead bodies of 3
Navajo Indians” during a scouting expedition to round up any remaining independent Navajos.
He claimed, “A Navajo Indian has since Informed me that the party who killed them were
Mexicans.”644 The U.S. military would have a difficult time halting Hispano retribution against
their longstanding Native foes.
Civilians also continued to engage in the long-standing precedent of stealing from the
Navajos, even after the tribe had sued for peace. Kit Carson himself claimed, “Since active
hostilities have ceased against the Navajoes, various parties of citizens have come into this
country for the purpose of robbing from the Navajoes, and some of them have carried their
audacity so far as to steal from those under my protection at this Post.” A Volunteer Captain
also noted, “The Indians have lost 50 head of horses and mules which were stolen by Mexican
thieves.”645 Carson, therefore, recommended that New Mexican Volunteers “pursue and capture
whatever band of citizen marauders may come here for the purpose of thwarting the laudable
action of the Government in removing the Navajo Indians to the Reservation.”646 Certain
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Nuevomexicanos, therefore, took full advantage of the Navajos’ newfound vulnerability,
attacking and robbing them at an ever-increasing pace.
The civilian practice of attacking retreating Navajos was so prevalent that Governor
Connelly issued a proclamation dissuading residents from continuing the custom. His
proclamation stated that:
“Whereas any hostile demonstration upon the part of our citizens
towards the said Indians during this suspension of hostilities would
frustrate the intentions and efforts of the government…First. That
hostilities on the part of the citizens with the remainder of the
Navajo tribe of Indians…shall cease. Second. That all forays by
our citizens of a hostile character into the country…of the said
Navajo tribe of Indians, are hereby positively prohibited under the
severest penalties. Third. That any parties of armed men, with
hostile intentions, hereafter found in this Navajo country, will be
immediately arrested… Fourth. It is proper in this connection to
warn the people against further traffic in captive Indians.”647
The need for the governor to issue orders condemning Hostilities toward the Navajo after their
surrender is telling. After the Navajo surrender, Hispanos found it easier to harass the Natives,
taking full advantage of their situation to enact vengeance against their age-old enemy.
After the surrender of the bulk of the Navajo tribe, the military then tasked the New
Mexican Volunteers with escorting them to the Bosque Redondo reservation. This ruthless
march would become known to Navajos as the infamous “Long Walk.” Many Navajos died
under the supervision of New Mexican volunteers during this notorious trek. In one instance 165
Navajos left Fort Canby with fifty New Mexican Volunteers under Captain Joseph Berney.
Early in the march, “the Indians suffered intensely from the want of clothing, four were entirely
frozen to death.” Later being joined by about 1,400 additional Navajos, Captain Berney stated
that “I lost fifteen Indians on the road…ten died from the effects of the cold.”648 Another March
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was taken on by New Mexican Volunteers from Fort Canby to the Bosque Redondo with 2,400
Navajo prisoners under Captain John Thompson. One hundred ninety-four Navajos of Captain
Thompson’s party died en route. General Carleton curtly blamed these deaths on “The weather”
which “was very inclement with terrible gusts of wind and heavy falls of rain.” He also claimed
that deaths were due to “eating too heartily of half cooked bread made of our flower to which
they were not accustomed.”649 Thus, New Mexican volunteers bore first-hand witness to the
awful consequences of the forced march.
By late 1864, General Carleton, through the use of the New Mexico Volunteers and
Militia, had begun to overpower the Mescalero and Navajo nations. Their defeat and subsequent
journey to the Bosque Redondo reservation was severe and unforgiving. After the military had
moved the tribes to the reservation, despite his application and acceptance of heavy-handed and
brutal tactics, Carleton was able to articulate some semblance of misplaced empathy for the
Indians. Carleton asserted that: “For pity’s sake, if not moved by any other consideration, let us
as a great nation, for once treat the Indians as he deserves to be treated. It is due to ourselves as
well as to them that this be done.” He added, “The exodus of this whole people from the land of
their fathers, is not only an interesting but a touching sight. They have fought gallantly for years
on years… as brave men entitled to our admiration and respect, have come to us with confidence
in our magnanimity and feeling that we are too powerful and too just a people to repay that
confidence with meanness or neglect… we will not dole out to them a miser’s pittance in return
for what they know to be and what we know to be, a princely realm.”650
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The Civil War brought about the first time that people of color were utilized in any
significant way to engage in warfare on behalf of the United States. Unlike African Americans,
legal notions of whiteness prevented Nuevomexicanos from being segregated from Anglo
American military units. However, Anglo officers and soldiers frequently discriminated against
these men. Hispano troops were commonly placed under Anglo American officers or had a
prominent Anglo American officer among their company, as they were generally not trusted to
lead themselves. They were also accorded inferior supplies and housing, rarely of the quality
issued to regular troops. Despite their essential roles in battling the Confederate menace, many
Anglo Americans were not willing to accord these people the respect that they had garnered on
the battlefield due to prevalent racial and gendered biases. Due to racialized notions of ethnic
Mexican cowardice and lack of masculine qualities, Nuevomexicanos bore the brunt of the
blame for costly losses. Anglo American racialization of Nuevomexicanos thus played a
prominent role in the New Mexican struggle to repel the Confederates. Nevertheless, both the
New Mexico Volunteers and Militia had helped to drive out the Confederates and overpower two
dominant tribes of Indians. Racial discrimination on the battlefield, however, undermined the
common purpose of the War. Protection of the territory against the Confederates was almost
certainly affected. Lack of everyday necessities, respect by their Anglo counterparts, and a
complete absence of compensation certainly affected morale on the battlefield. A sense of
national unity, a prominent reason for the War, was undercut by discriminatory practices in
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places such as New Mexico. The Civil War in New Mexico displays that the nation certainly
was not close to being brought together in a racial sense. In fact, the end of the Civil War would
bring about a reinforcement in the idea of white supremacy in the United States.
The Civil War era in New Mexico can be also be thought of as a continuation of a
particular mode of warfare that had endured in the area for centuries. As Union troops had
driven the Confederates from the territory, military officials turned their attention to the
subjugation of the Indians. Civilians in New Mexico saw this as an opportunity to war with their
traditional Indian foes, receive payment, and retain their honor as fighters. They took full
advantage of this opportunity enacting violent retribution upon their enemies. Under officers

Illustration 5.2: The U.S. army “counting Indians” at the Bosque Redondo
Reservation, undated. Photograph No. 111-SC-87964; “Fort Sumner,
New Mexico. Guadeloupe County at the Bosque Redondo on Pecos
River. Counting Indians;” Photographs of American Military Activities,
ca. 1918-1981; Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 18601985, Record Group 111; National Archives at College Park, College
Park, MD.

such as Kit Carson, and with the help of certain Native groups, Nuevomexicanos were able to
defeat their generational enemies, the Mescaleros, and Navajos. They had then driven these
tribes to the Bosque Redondo reservation, where only famine and death awaited.
285

Hispanos hoping for a better claim to citizenship by fighting on behalf of the United
States would be disappointed. The Civil War did little to change Anglo perception of the diverse
New Mexican population. Political equality and full citizenship for New Mexicans, especially
the poorer classes, remained beyond reach. Anglos in the territory continued to enjoy far greater
material wealth and professional success than Hispanos.651 They continued to racialize Hispano
and Indian bodies in such a way that questioned these peoples’ fitness for full citizenship.
Despite all they had done during the War, poorer Hispanos continued to fall victim to Anglo
assertions of white supremacy. The supposed unsavory mix in New Mexico of Hispano and
Indian peoples also impeded efforts to incorporate the territory into the Union as a state. It
wouldn’t be until 1912 that the U.S. Congress agreed to grant New Mexico designation as a
state, thus permitting its people the right to vote on a national scale. Former peons were
sometimes able to secure their freedom through military service, yet, as a whole, many Hispanos
were unable to use their service in the War as leverage to live as full citizens.
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Chapter 6: The Expansion, 1865-1898

Despite everything the New Mexico Volunteers and Militia had done during the Civil
War, these units faced an uncertain and unpredictable future after its conclusion. Existing militia
systems throughout the United States created during the War disappeared rapidly with the end of
hostilities.652 In New Mexico, the threat of large-scale Indian attacks also waned with the
imprisonment of the Mescaleros and Navajos on the Bosque Redondo Reservation, although
interethnic tensions did not end for another two decades. The federal government, therefore,
disbanded New Mexican volunteer units, and the territorial militia likewise fell into decay.
Civilians, however, continued to petition the government for permission to militarily confront
nearby tribes whom they blamed for continued raids into the settlements. Like their pre-Civil
War counterparts, the post-war governors of New Mexico attempted to appease the civilian
population by issuing a host of orders and proclamations trying to establish civilian defense
forces throughout the territory. These efforts were generally successful toward building small
temporary civilian defense units, but by and large, they had failed to create an organized and
sustained territorial militia. The endeavors of the territorial governors were, however,
responsible for legalizing small-scale civilian violence against certain Native groups after the
Civil War.
As the 1870s came to a close, however, the territory would, in fact, see a large increase
in the number of sanctioned civilian-military units. The shifting racial makeup of New Mexico,
territorial emergencies such as the Lincoln County War and Victorio’s War, and national trends
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regarding militia service were ultimately responsible for the growth of the territorial militia in
New Mexico. The factors mentioned above would do more to advance the creation of a
sustained territorial militia than the efforts of any previous New Mexican governor during the
U.S. era. Thus, immediately after the Civil War, the use of civilian warriors in New Mexico
waxed and waned in response to emergencies and contingencies in the territory. However,
motivated by specific events alongside the marked influx of Anglo American settlers, the
territorial legislature managed to pass a new militia law in 1880, the first since 1851, that
allowed for the rejuvenation of an ongoing and robust militia.
The growth and ultimate reauthorization of a territorial militia during the 1870s and
1880s can be tied, in part, to racial trends that had been taking place in New Mexico after 1865.
As the nation struggled to reconstruct after the War, many Anglo Americans sought to build new
lives by relocating to western territories. Anglo Americans flooded into former Mexican
territory at a rate never before seen, establishing small but vibrant Anglo communities
throughout both New Mexico and the newly created territory of Arizona. Many of these
migrants came from the southern states and brought with them deeply racialized notions of nonwhite peoples. Ethnic Mexicans, however, remained the majority in New Mexico for years to
come. This being the case, the Hispano population in the territory would be much more resistant
to Anglo assaults on their language, culture, and landholdings than other areas of the southwest.
Yet, the growth of the “white” population in New Mexico contributed toward the acceptance of
local militia units by the Anglo-heavy military leadership and territorial government.
Despite a marked increase in the white population, the majority of militia units birthed
during this era continued to consist primarily of ethnic Mexicans. The military allowed the
formation of these companies toward the end of the nineteenth century partially because Anglo
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American officers frequently led these groups. Civil and military officials found it easier to
consent to civilian militia units that they considered more “American” and less “foreign.” These
officials could more readily accept the citizenship status, supposed loyalty to the United States,
and alleged superior fighting prowess of Anglo American officers than they could the ethnic
Mexican population. To U.S. military officials, Hispano civilian warriors were relegated to their
rightful subordinate position under the leadership of Anglo men. Many Anglos who could never
accept an entire Hispano militia considered this a panacea. Consequently, many militia units
were placed under white command, which ultimately contributed toward the exponential growth
in the number of sanctioned militia groups. In fact, of all the western states and territories in
1885, New Mexico had the second-highest number of total militiamen at 1,468, behind only
California.653 By 1898, the federal government would re-designate the militia as the New
Mexico National Guard, the title that is used presently. This was a remarkable change from the
early era of U.S. rule in New Mexico during which the army rarely allowed civilians to assemble
for the purposes of warfare.
New Mexico’s militia growth also mirrored an expansion of state and territorial militias
around the United States during the late nineteenth century, which many historians attribute to
episodes of civil unrest such as the 1877 railroad riots.654 Quelling public disorder, therefore,
became an essential component in the rise of militias in the United States after 1877, and New
Mexico was no different. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 further contributed toward the
growth of the New Mexico militia because of its attempt to prevent federal troops from
becoming involved in civil disputes. New Mexican militia units helped the local constabulary
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with episodes of civil unrest such as the Lincoln County War and other civil disorders. The
growth of the territorial militia coincided with national developments that encouraged the use of
civilian soldiers as a local police force. The relative acceptance of the militia as a police force
also contributed toward its use in the continued subjugation of nearby tribes. The territorial
militia would become heavily involved in episodes of Indian unrest such as the Victorio and
Geronimo uprisings.
Thus, the flowering of a territorial militia, after years of neglect, was triggered by various
factors such as shifts in the racial makeup of New Mexico, national trends favoring the use of
state and territorial militias, alongside the desire to suppress local civil, labor, and Indian unrest.
Since the invasion of New Mexico by the United States in 1846, Anglo military officials had
generally tried to limit the scope of civilian warfare in New Mexico, notwithstanding the
institution’s short-lived increase during the Civil War. By the late 1870s, Hispano civilians, this
time under Anglo leadership, were once again used extensively by the government to war with
Independent Indians as they had done for generations previous. The exponential growth of the
non-Native population alongside a newfound emphasis on the militia to suppress civil uprisings
and subdue Native tribes would turn the tide of the centuries-long stalemate. By the 1880s, the
civilian population in New Mexico would become victorious in their three-hundred-year-long
war with the Natives, aided in part by demographic changes sparked by the railroad and the
cumulative impact of disease, land loss, and Indian policies promoting assimilation.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Civil War, territorial officials held onto hope that the
relatively large number of troops stationed in the territory during the War would remain
operational. They were disappointed. In 1866 the federal government mustered out of service
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the vast majority of New Mexican volunteers organized during the Civil War. As a small
concession, however, the federal government, noting the territory’s continued conflict with
certain Native tribes, agreed to authorize the retention of four companies of the New Mexican
Volunteers for service against the Indians.655 The military selected Kit Carson to lead these New
Mexican volunteers with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The army had split Carson’s
companies into two cavalries and two infantry; the vast majority of these men possessing
Hispanic surnames.656 Carson and his volunteers, remnants of the Civil War regular army in
New Mexico, were stationed at Fort Garland in Colorado to police the Utes and Jicarilla Apaches
in the northern portion of New Mexico territory. Carson’s command amounted to little more
than negotiation and peacekeeping, and the volunteers saw little action.657 While these
volunteers were kept busy policing the far northern part of the territory, the vast majority of New
Mexico was left without proper volunteer or militia units after the conclusion of the war.
As the regular troops stationed in the territory regressed to pre-Civil War numbers, the
militia in New Mexico also fell into a state of decay, reverting to a few, if any, standing
companies even though relations with Independent Indians remained volatile and unpredictable.
After the war, the Utes had been at peace, but the Chiricahua Apaches, as well as many Navajos,
had still been at war with individual New Mexican settlements. Considering the strength of many
Indian nations, several civil officials continued to advocate for a more significant military
presence in New Mexico. In 1867, Acting Governor William F. M. Arny echoed pre-Civil War
governors by voicing his frustration with the apparent lack of regular military troops. In a report
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to the United States Congress, Arny argued that since at least 1846, the citizens of New Mexico
had been constantly “met with loss of life and property.” He claimed that the cost of damages
caused by Indians totaled $1,377, 296; a significant and most likely overstated amount of money
during this time. Critical of the regular military, Arny claimed, “Our people have been suffering
unceasingly from the loss of life and property occasioned by the incursions made upon them by
the tribes of hostile Indians notwithstanding the vigilance and efforts of ourselves and the troops
of the government.”658 Arny was also discouraged with the apparent deterioration of the militia.
He claimed that having no militia would leave “our population at the mercy of the savage Indians
with the exception of such protection as the general government may give.”659 Thus, after the
War, the civil government in New Mexico still desired a standing militia and was as critical of
the regular army’s supposed ineffectiveness as they had been before the War.
Inundated with civilian petitions to war with nearby Indians as they had done for
generations, and under the perception that the military had offered little adequate protection,
Arny called upon the settlers to engage in their own self-preservation, issuing a proclamation in
late 1866 which beckoned the citizens of the territory to be vigilant and protect their homes if
necessary. Arny’s proclamation also served as a reminder to the people that the Act of 1857
authorizing the loan of public arms, was still in effect, through which they could obtain firearms
if necessary. Stopping short of calling for a sustained and organized territorial militia, Arny’s
proclamation recommended all able-bodied male citizens of the territory to arrange themselves
into unofficial volunteer companies. If these companies found it necessary to pursue
independent Indians, they could, therefore, report to the governor, and he might furnish them
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with arms in accordance with the Act of 1857. In the proclamation, Arny voiced his hardhearted belief that the Indians would never cease murdering until they were “brought into proper
subjection or exterminated.” The governor supposed, like many other officials, that the Indians
should “be conquered and placed upon reservations outside of the settlements and kept there.”
Until that task had been completed, Arny argued, “We must protect ourselves.”660 This
proclamation was not an official declaration for militia organization, but an ad-hoc, temporary
solution to any Indian troubles that may materialize within or nearby the settlements. The
citizens, therefore, continued to serve the function of racialized warfare, which drew upon
generations of the militarization of Hispano communities against Indigenous peoples.
William Arny’s desire to place Indians on specific reservations was nothing new, but
after the Civil War, the central component of federal Indian policy became setting aside lands
exclusively for Indian habitation, which also had the effect of allowing Euro-Americans to
acquire the land once claimed by Indian peoples.661 The placement of the Navajo people on the
Bosque Redondo exemplifies a most vicious and costly example of this policy. A few years
before Arny’s proclamation, New Mexico Volunteers under Kit Carson mercilessly rounded up
several thousand Navajos by employing overtly violent tactics, as well as destroying their food
caches and capturing their horses and sheep. The military had forced the Navajos to make the
long and deadly walk to a newly selected reserve called Bosque Redondo. By all accounts, the
Indian experience at Bosque Redondo was appalling. Not only were Navajos placed alongside
their traditional Apache enemies, but the inhabitants of the reserve suffered from drought and
freezing temperatures. The majority of the 9,000 Indians at Bosque Redondo soon faced
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starvation. Many observers began to criticize the mastermind behind the Bosque Redondo
policy, General James Carleton. His more humanitarian opponents, particularly the new
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Michael Steck, highlighted the severe plight of the peoples at
Bosque Redondo. Critics such as Steck ultimately succeeded in having Carleton ousted from
New Mexico in 1867 and saw to it that the Navajos returned to their homeland. Despite the
catastrophe at Bosque Redondo, the desire to place all Indians on reservations remained the
foremost policy concerning Native Peoples in New Mexico after the Civil War.
In 1869, the U.S. Department of the Interior issued a circular to Indian agents stationed
around the nation, which emphasized the new-found emphasis on placing all Native peoples on
reservations. The circular communicated, “It is the wish and policy of the Government to
localize all the Indians upon the reservations…Indians who fail or refuse to come in and locate in
permanent abodes, upon reservations, will be subject wholly to the control and supervision of the
military authorities. It is proper that you should at once notify the Indians of this determination
of the Government, so that those who are friendly may not leave their reservations and subject
themselves to the suspicion and supervision of the military authorities.”662 This new policy
guided the nature of relations between Native and non-Native peoples in New Mexico, and its
implementation had diverse and complex implications.
Despite there being no standing militia directly after the Civil War, militia affairs were
undoubtedly at the forefront of the minds of territorial officials. By 1867, New Mexican
administrators had become inundated with requests for back-payment of militia service both
before and during the Civil War. Dating back to the beginning of the U.S. era in New Mexico,
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very few militiamen were paid in anything but spoils taken from their enemies. With the end of
the Civil War, officials believed that the time had come to attempt to pay the militiamen who
fought both before and during the War. These same administrators noted that the territory had
not only failed to adequately reimburse civilian warriors, but also the citizens who had assisted
the militia in various other ways. One governmental circular argued, “The citizens of this
Territory have upon all occasions promptly given their services and furnished subsistence to
equip and maintain the militia, and have at no time received reimbursement, and consequently
there are now unpaid accounts due our citizens, amounting to many thousands of dollars.”663
The territorial legislature, therefore, issued an act to remedy these many requests for
payment. The bill stipulated that any previous militia company captains were required to furnish
muster rolls of their respective troops “during the late rebellion, or at any other time.” They
were to highlight their names, rank, age, when and where enrolled, for what period of service,
and under what proclamation or situation that the governor had called them into service. This
effort to pay the militia for their service during the whole of the U.S. period proved practically
impossible, as the territory was chronically bankrupt. In an attempt to remedy this, instead of
hard currency, the territorial government issued certificates of allowance, which were to be paid
by the Treasury when funds became available. The first certificates began to roll out in March of
1867 to militia units called out by Colonel Canby during the Civil War. These certificates held
little real value. One observer noted, “These certificates were not binding upon the territory
except in a moral way.” In the end, these certificates were to a large degree, turned over to
attorneys or merchants for collection and discounted. As most of these certificates were
eventually disregarded, many militia units that had served since the advent of the territory would
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never receive proper compensation.664 One can infer that the reticence of the territory to
organize a standing militia was due, at least in part, to their inability to pay them.
Payment wasn’t the only issue plaguing the implementation of a standing militia; the
legality of mustering civilian-soldiers also came into question. Motivated by generations of
civilian/Native warfare, Hispano residents repeatedly petitioned the territorial government to
organize themselves into a territorial militia to war with the Natives. New Mexican governors,
however, were still uncertain if they held the authority to call volunteers into service without the
approval of the federal government. Although the militia law of 1851 approved such measures
in theory, the seldom-adhered-to law seems to have been long forgotten at this point. In July of
1868, Acting Governor H.H. Heath issued a circular replying to one such citizen petition. In the
circular, Heath claimed that he, as governor, did not have the authority to call out the militia,
arguing, “There is no law upon which [the governor] can rely for calling upon the militia of the
territory to pursue and chastise these Indians.” He also stated that even if he did have the
authority to call out the militia “it is not improbable that any serious movement on the part of the
territory against the Indians would result in a general war with them and promote dangers which
it is imperatively necessary to avoid.”665 Heath, therefore, to the chagrin of the civilian
population, declined to call up a territorial militia because he didn’t have the legal authority
alongside his desire to avoid full-scale war with the Natives. Heath echoed the concerns of many
military officials long before the Civil War that militia movement against Indian peoples
promised unrestrained warfare that the government would not be able to control.
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Rather than formally calling out the militia, Heath reaffirmed the informal
recommendations of William Arny two years earlier which somewhat satisfied the desires of the
civilian population. Heath advocated, “In each settlement such number of citizens as may be
deemed necessary, hold themselves in readiness at all times, to protect their neighborhood from
the incursions and depredations of the Indians. Then, if Indians molest the people, let them be
pursued, if Indians are killed, the fault will be their own…. When such companies as are referred
to shall have been organized, a proper number of them will be furnished with arms from the
Territorial Armory.”666 Heath’s recommendations, therefore, advocated what amounted to statesupported vigilante violence and racial warfare.
Through these instructions, the acting governor had encouraged the long-adhered-to cycle
of revenge warfare while fostering the democratization of civilian militarism. Individual
communities acted through democratic means by encouraging the maintaining of a “defense”
force by petitioning the government to support them. Warfare upon Indigenous peoples in New
Mexico was, therefore, partially coordinated by the general public who attempted to pressure the
local government through democratic means to aid them in their mission. Historian Brendan C.
Lindsay makes a similar argument in his examination of Indigenous genocide in California,
arguing that assaults on Native peoples were organized from the periphery, with the general
public pushing for Indians to be exterminated.667
Like Arny, Acting Governor Heath claimed that the governors lacked the power to call
the territorial militia into service, yet both men’s subsequent recommendations inherently gave
civilians more military independence than if the governors did hold the authority. By decrying
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that there was no law on the books for them to call out the militia and encouraging civilians to
defend themselves, in effect, these post-Civil War governors were giving civilians the authority
to conduct warfare as they saw fit. Ad-hoc defense units promoted by these governors were
encouraged to act on their own, without the oversight of the civil government or military.
Similar to the ongoing Native American genocide in California, these regulations made the
killing of Indians essentially legal, and roving death-squads were free to patrol the countryside to
eliminate enemy Indians without any legal recourse. This method was not dissimilar to New
Mexico’s neighbors to the north and east. The governors of both Colorado and Texas had given
militia groups such as the Texas Rangers almost free reign attack Indian peoples.668
In 1869 Governor Robert B. Mitchell took a similar yet even more hardline approach to
territorial warfare with independent Indians. In August of that year, Mitchell incurred the wrath
of the federal government by issuing a proclamation declaring that all Indians not residing on
reservations were to be considered “outlaws.” Mitchell, a stern and hotheaded veteran of the
U.S. War with Mexico and the Civil War, recklessly issued this order without the authorization
of the federal government or military. Mitchell’s proclamation read: “In consequence of the
constant depredations and the murder of our most esteemed and valuable citizens – cruelly
murdered by the Navajo and Gila Apache Indian tribes – said tribes are hereby declared outlaws,
and will be punished wherever found outside the limits of their respective reservations (except
under the immediate escort of the soldiery) as common enemies of the country…. I do further
authorize the citizens of the Territory to use sufficient force, in all localities, for the protection of
its citizens, even should it result in the killing of every such depredator.”669 Mitchell’s actions,
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similar to his predecessors, gave the citizenry the power to deal with independent Indians as they
saw fit. However, by declaring all non-reservation Indians “outlaws,” and calling for the murder
of these peoples, Mitchell provided a pretext of legal authority for civilians to enact violence
against Native peoples. In essence, Mitchell criminalized independent Indians on their own
ancestral homeland while calling for large-scale violence against them.
Mitchell’s proclamation stemmed, at least in part, from his frustration with the federal
government and military’s dealings with Indians in the territory. Mitchell placed the blame
directly on the federal government for the territory’s woes relating to the Indians. Like his
predecessors, he was deeply distressed that the military presence in the territory so quickly
disintegrated after the Civil War. Mitchell argued that he had “hoped that the government
would, after the close of the late terrible, bloody and wicked rebellion, and the large increase of
the regular army, furnish to our accomplished Department and District Commanders, Major
Generals Sheridan and Getty, a sufficient number of available troops to protect our people
against constant depredations on the plains, and very many parts of the Territory, from hostile
and thieving bands of Indians which occupy every thoroughfare to, and almost every rod of
border of our Territorial limits.” 670 Mitchell’s criticism of the federal government and the
military would, however, go further than most previous New Mexican governors during the U.S.
era.
Mitchell forcefully condemned the federal government’s relations with the territory’s
Indians. The governor believed that chastisement, rather than conciliation, should have been the
federal government’s first and only policy when dealing with Indian peoples. Mitchell’s main
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criticism was that as part of terms of peace, the federal government supplied certain tribes with
firearms. The military’s rationale for providing guns to specific tribes at peace was benevolent
in nature. Humanitarian observers noted the despondent condition of these groups and supplied
them with firearms to both hunt and protect themselves from hostile tribes. Mitchell, who saw
Indians as inherently savage and hostile, disregarded this truth and ultimately advocated for the
violent subjugation of all independent Indians in New Mexico. The governor announced, “The
distribution of arms and ammunition by these commissioners and agents, enables the various
tribes of Indians to more successfully carry on their…wicked warfare against the whites.”671
Mitchell was, therefore, highly critical of the military’s Indian policy, and believed that their
actions encouraged Indian warfare against the “white” race.
Mitchell, like his predecessors, advocated for civilian defense, yet he argued that the
federal government had virtually prevented the people from adequately protecting themselves.
He claimed that civilians would not be able to effectively war with the Indians “so long as the
government with its strong arm keeps our enemy under its protecting care, and prohibits our
people from redressing their own wrongs.” Indeed, the military had been almost always opposed
to settlers “redressing their own wrongs” as this could be construed as taking revenge upon, in
many cases, innocent Indians leading to unrestrained and unwelcome warfare. Mitchell,
however, claimed that the government was more sympathetic to independent Indians than they
were the settlers. Mitchell appealed to the government: “give us half the means for our
protection you give the hostile Indians to enable them to make war on us, and we will guarantee
a very different state of things on the frontier.”672 Thus, New Mexican governors after 1865
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were even more critical of the federal government and military as their pre-war counterparts.
The military’s supposed ineffectiveness led these men to advocate for vigilante violence against
most Native groups.
On top of declaring Indian peoples as outlaws, Mitchell ultimately proposed a heavyhanded solution to the territory’s war against the Indians. He suggested, “hang the chiefs and the
head men on the spot – and allow the military to make such terms with them as they may deem
best, after a severe and just punishment has been inflicted on every warlike tribe.”673 The
governor, therefore, again encouraged violent hostility toward independent Indians. He was,
however, not alone in his assertion that non-reservation Indians were inherently hostile.
Mitchell’s outlook echoed that of New Mexico Department Commander, Colonel George Getty.
Colonel Getty’s official policy was to eliminate all off-reservation Apaches. Getty’s
headquarters wrote to the commander at Fort Craig, “All Apache Indians in this Territory are
hostile; and all male adults capable of bearing arms should be killed…unless they give
themselves up as prisoners.”674 Despite this being the official strategy, the military’s exploits
were not as aggressive as Getty’s policy suggested. Mitchell’s policy, however, was more
belligerent than Getty’s in that he labeled all off-reservation Indians as outlaws, not just
Apaches, as subject to violent vigilantism on behalf of the civilian population.675
The federal government criticized Mitchell’s reckless proclamation declaring all nonreservation Indians as “outlaws,” due in large part to the potential provocation of civilians to
attack Indians with impunity. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ed Parker was an especially harsh
critic of Mitchell’s rash and irresponsible proclamation. He argued that the Governor had no
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right “to bring about a state of war contrary to the wishes of this Department and without the
authority of the military branch of the Government.” He added, “I will immediately advise the
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for New Mexico to disavow…the proclamation.” Seeing the
danger in allowing citizens to deal with these “outlaw” Indians as they saw fit, Parker also
argued, “The Governor assumes all control, puts aside both the civil and military authorities of
the General Government and proclaims an indiscriminate warfare by an irresponsible body of
citizens against certain Indians.”676 The conflict between the civil government and the military
in New Mexico once again reared its ugly head, as the two institutions fought for jurisdiction
over the right to use deadly force against Indians. These tensions continued to define the scope
of the state, the perceived “freedoms” of civilians to wage war against Native people, negative
Anglo perceptions concerning Hispano civilian warfare, and the breadth of militarization
throughout New Mexico’s population.
Other federal officials echoed commissioner Parker’s protests. Secretary of State,
Hamilton Fish, requested to Mitchell’s successor, William Pile, that he rescind the proclamation.
Pile sympathized with Mitchell, however, and instead of annulling the proclamation, suggested
to the Secretary a modified yet similar course of action. Pile argued that Mitchell’s proclamation
was indeed justified: “The Mescalero and Gila Apaches are at open war with us – are constantly
murdering and robbing the citizens of this and the Territory of Arizona, [these Indians] are
‘outlaws’ and no harm came from the proclamation so declaring them.”677 Pile also noted that
the military in New Mexico had agreed with the outlaw proclamation, stating that Carleton’s
replacement, General George Getty concurred, “All bands of Indians found away from their
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reservations would be treated as ‘hostile.’” Therefore, instead of annulling Mitchell’s
proclamation, Pile attempted to modify it through his own. Pile’s proclamation would heavily
emphasize the use of civilian warfare in protecting the settlements against Indian raids.
First, Governor Pile issued an announcement in September of 1869 that amended
Mitchell’s orders. In his decree, Pile clarified that not all non-reservation Indians were to be
deemed outlaws after all. Pile noted that most of the Navajos were “peaceably at work on their
reservation, the depredations being committed by roving bands without the permission or
sanction of the chiefs or head men of the tribe.” Accordingly, he clarified, “Only marauding
bands known to be committing depredations shall be considered and treated as hostile.” He
further emphasized the need for civilians to organize, as Mitchell had suggested. Pile permitted
civilians “to defend their lives and property and punish all marauding bands of Indians, and at
the same time, they are required not to molest peaceable Indians living on their reservations.”678
By proclaiming “only marauding bands” of Indians as hostile, Pile was able to calm the fears of
federal officials. The Governor’s next move, however, caused federal officials much anxiety, as
it gave New Mexican civilians a considerable amount of power to conduct warfare against
Indians.
Pile’s proclamation implemented a peculiar system of civilian defense that vastly differed
from the territorial militia templates of the past. In August of 1869, the Adjutant General’s
Office of New Mexico in cooperation with the governor issued orders noting, “The constant
depredations committed by roving bands of Indians, renders the employment of more vigorous
measures than have hitherto been used, necessary, in order to protect the lives and property of the
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people.” The proclamation thus called for the probate judges of each county in New Mexico to
immediately organize mounted posses of not less than ten nor more than twenty-five men in each
precinct in their respective counties.679 By calling these companies “posses,” and giving the
probate judges the power to employ them, Pile fashioned these units as local police rather than a
territorial militia. In this way, Pile attempted to sidestep the fact that he did not hold the power
to call a militia into the field.
Pile’s posse policy somewhat echoed recommendations put forth by General William
Tecumseh Sherman two years prior. In 1867, Sherman issued an order that attempted to make
civilian defense more uniform in all the western territories. Sherman claimed that each state and
territory implemented civil defense in particular ways, arguing, “A great diversity of opinion and
practice exists as to how far the civil authority can apply.” Sherman stated that “when the
Indians leave their reservations and go beyond the country committed to them, and there commit
a crime, they fall under military control, or subject themselves to arrest and punishment by the
civil power.” By stating such, he argued the civil authority did indeed have the legal ability to
punish Indians. He went on: “it is hereby made known that if each State and Territory will
organize a battalion of mounted men, ready to be called into the service of the United States, it
will be called for by the department commander, and used in connection with the regular troops.”
He recommended: “The civil authorities of the said States and Territories should, by their
sheriffs of counties and by their deputies, have small posses armed and prepared, at all times, to
pursue and hunt down the small horse thieving bands of Indians, who, by dispersing, avoid the
military forces.”680 Pile’s posse system was similar to these recommendations, yet Sherman

679

General Orders no. 1, 24 August 1869, SDTP, NM, RG59, NA, T17, Roll 3.

680

Sherman, Order no. 8, 13 July 1867, TANM, AGR, ORC, NMRCA, Roll 84.

304

advocated for the use of such posses only as called upon by the department commander, while
Pile’s system sidestepped that stipulation, requiring no permission from the military. Pile’s
system echoed that of New Mexico’s neighbor to the east, Texas. The Texas Rangers were a
largely independent militia organization, frequently operating without the oversight of the U.S.
military.681
Through their proclamations, military and territorial authorities in effect criminalized the
majority of Native peoples who were not confined to reservations. In addition, the territorial
government had allowed the citizens to create posses to “punish” non-reservation Indians. The
punishment that these posses were legally permitted to inflict upon Native people had no clear
boundaries. These men were given the legal authority to enact violence upon Indians in New
Mexico on the pretext of “defense.” Furthermore, Indians could be unfairly targeted by the
posses for crimes they did not commit, and they had no legal right to appeal nor did they have
access to the U.S. court system.
Pile’s “posse” system was undoubtedly different from New Mexico’s inconsistent militia
systems of the past. The probate judges were to select a “competent and reliable man” to take
command of each posse. These posses were to use their own weapons, but if there were a lack of
weapons, they were to be furnished by the government under the Act to Supply Arms of 1857.
The duty of the commanders of each posse was to investigate the presence of “marauding bands”
of Indians and report to the probate judge his findings. The judge could then order the posse into
the field to chastise the Indians, recapture stolen property, and to “proceed at once against any
bands of Indians infesting their immediate vicinity.” Explicit instructions were given for the
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posses “not to molest Indians who are living peaceably in the localities permitted by the United
States.” The order did, however, give citizens a considerable amount of power in implementing
warfare. The order stated that the posses “are authorized to punish with the utmost severity, any
bands of Indians engaged in committing depredations against the inhabitants of the territory.”682
Also, unlike past militia organizations, these posses were under no obligation to communicate
with the governor. They were to only report to the probate judges of their respective counties.
Being first-hand witnesses to the potential devastation wrought by Indians, these probate judges
were almost certainly more likely than the governor to sympathize with the people and allow
retributive forays against the Indians. Enacting punishment with the “utmost severity” was an
extremely vague term that opened up the possibility of legal murder and massacre.
Governor Pile addressed the people of the territory concerning the need for his new posse
system, arguing that from the time the territory came under the authority of the United States, its
condition had been “unsatisfactory.” He claimed that because of the troubles with independent
Indians, New Mexican “industry has languished, production has not advanced, and there has
been no material increase in the population or wealth of the Territory,” adding that the territorial
treasury is “BANKRUPT.” He argued, “Men will not earnestly endeavor to accumulate and save
when they may and are likely to lose by lawlessness that which they have accumulated and
saved.” Therefore, Pile argued that the posse system was a last-ditch effort to save the territory
from certain ruin. Pile claimed, “[The citizens’] wages for labor, the desire for food and clothing
for their families and their well being in every sense of the word depends very greatly upon
the…proper and efficient execution of this order.” Pile communicated a sense of urgency in his
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order observing that a massive wave of immigration had been taking place in the territories
surrounding New Mexico. For New Mexico to benefit from such migration, Pile argued,
“Whether this great wave reaches and blesses this Territory, and we reap our proportion of its
advantages, depends on our action now.”683
While his order gave communities unprecedented authority to engage in warfare as they
desired, the governor also acknowledged the risks of bequeathing civilians such power. Pile
insisted, “Great care be exercised by the organized ‘posses’ in the different counties, to prevent
the molestation of peaceable Indians working on or near their reservations.” Perhaps more
critical to Pile than the potential prospect of innocent Indians losing their lives due to his system,
the governor’s main concern was that the federal government would interfere with and cancel his
system if not properly adhered to. He argued, “Should such Indians be molested, the authorities
at Washington would unquestionably interfere and order the discontinuance of the whole
organization.”684 Thus, the regulations of the posse system were to be strictly adhered to, if only
to allow the system to continue without disruption from the federal government.
Upon learning of Pile’s new posse system in New Mexico, federal officials were anxious
at best. The idea of the posse system reached the desk of President Ulysses S. Grant, who was
“apprehensive that disorders and excesses may be committed by the citizens organized in the
manner stated in the order, and that only extreme necessity will justify their employment.”685
After multiple non-sanctioned expeditions against Indians, including the Mesilla Guard
massacres, anxieties about violent excesses were indeed justified.
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Governor Pile attempted to ease the president’s anxieties concerning his program. Pile
admitted, “The danger of excesses alluded to strongly presented itself to my mind.” He argued
that the Indians themselves were responsible for their own murder and massacre by raiding the
settlements: “so long as bands of Indians murder…they will be pursued by these citizens
prompted by ‘exigencies of self defense’ and if the guilty are not overtaken innocent Indians are
robbed and murdered instead.” However, he argued that the posse system would ultimately put
an end to unsanctioned violence, stating, “Acting under orders and responsible in some measure
at least for their conduct will tend to decrease the apprehended ‘disorders and excesses.”686 A
smart move on his part, Pile argued that his system would stop rather than encourage
unnecessary violence against Native peoples. Despite Pile’s assurances, these posses amounted
to vigilante violence rather than organized warfare, seemingly possessed of unchecked authority
to kill or capture Indians.
The federal government also took issue with Pile’s decision of continuing, albeit slightly
amended, Robert Mitchell’s “outlaw” proclamation. U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish
argued, “The act upon which your order is based applies only to hostile bands while your
communications show that individual Navajos who commit depredations are not to be regarded
as hostile in the sense of being public enemies but simply as marauders for private gain.” In
reply, Pile continued to argue that marauding Navajos, as well as the Gila and Mescalero
Apaches, should be absolutely considered hostile “and in every sense public enemies.” Pile
explained that in the past three months, these tribes had murdered twenty-seven civilians across
southern New Mexico. He added, “You will perceive that these bands of Indians ‘are hostile’ in
the precise sense contemplated by the law.” In closing, Pile stated that “the great extent of the
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country and the limited number of soldiers make it utterly impossible to prevent these crimes by
United States troops. I am anxious at least to make an earnest effort to accomplish this desirable
result through the people themselves.”687 Within one generation, Native peoples that had ruled
the region were now re-cast as “public enemies.” The New Mexican government, thus, defined
tribes such as the Navajos and Apaches as enemies of the state who were beyond civilization,
ungovernable, and not worthy of the presumption of innocence.
Hispano and Anglo communities around the territory enthusiastically organized into
posses intent on demonstrating notions of honor and masculinity that were historically tied to
self-defense. They immediately set out to attack and “punish” their traditional enemies. There
were nine instances in six months where the posses had “pursued and punished” bands of
Apaches and Navajos accused of depredations. On November 14, 1869, a posse in Doña Ana
County commanded by Tiburcio Madrid overtook a band of Indians who allegedly stole 1,200
sheep. They killed three Indians and recaptured all of the sheep.688 In March of 1871, 120 miles
northwest of Pinos Altos, a thirty-two man posse pursued a band of Apaches accused of stealing
a number of horses and mules. The posse confronted the Apaches, killing fourteen. During the
fight, the Apaches killed the posse’s leader, John Bullard.689 The violent tactics of the posses
had induced many Indians to seek peace with New Mexico. The governor claimed, “The citizens
of New Mexico were well armed and they [the Indians] could not ‘steal enough to live on;’ thus
being the strongest testimony to the utility of the posse organization.”690 Due to the enthusiasm
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of these posses to fight, alongside the supposed triumph of forcing Indian groups to sue for
peace, many considered the system a success.
In a letter to the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, Governor Pile reveled in the perceived
success of his project nine months after its implementation. He claimed, “I am gratified to be
able to report to you for the information of the President that for six months there has not been a
single white man murdered in this territory by Indians and very little stock molested.” Pile also
gleefully argued that the posses were more effective at curbing Indian raids than the military. He
made the strong claim that reducing Indian raids “can be done more efficiently and vastly
cheaper by maintaining a small armed force of citizens in each expressed settlement than by
regular military organization.”691 According to him, the posse system was a better, more
efficient, and less costly system of frontier defense than the regular military. Pile’s arguments
were compelling, and the federal government reluctantly allowed him to continue his policy.
New Mexico’s posse system coincided with a federal shift in Indian relations known as
Ulysses S. Grant’s Peace Policy. As a whole, Indian affairs in the United States were at an alltime low after the Civil War. Regular troops and civilians in western territories regularly carried
out multiple murders and massacres upon Native Peoples. Atrocities during the 1860s such as
the Sand Creek Massacre in Colorado Territory, Bear River in Idaho, and the Washita Massacre
in Oklahoma, prompted the President to implement a unique system that focused on the
reservation as a basis of solution. In theory, the reservations kept Indians out of the way and
provided a means whereby they could be taught to live like white men. Coinciding with the
termination of the treaty system in 1871, what became known as the peace policy generally

691

Ibid.

310

called for the use of peaceful rather than forceful means. The plan sought to locate all the tribes
on reservations with eventual individual allotments, expand the education program and facilities,
provide food and clothing for the Indians until they could become self-sufficient, and improve
the quality of Indian agents. In large part, the peace policy also advocated for the complete
extermination of Indian culture and lifeways.
In New Mexico, the state of Indian relations was such that civilians were extremely
reticent to offer independent Indians the benefits that the peace policy supposedly claimed to
provide. Citizens of Mesilla, Mimbres, and Pinos Altos forwarded resolutions condemning the
peace policy “particularly when it consisted apparently of collecting Indians on reservations safe
from pursuit for wrong-doing and without troops to prevent them from depredating.”692 These
civilians were concerned that Indians would continue to retaliate or attack, afterward retreating to
the safety of their reservation. In his first annual message to the territory in 1871, Governor
Marsh Giddings also denounced the peace policy, stating, “[Hatred] is not softened at all but
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aggravated by the attempt so persistently made to create a sympathy for the ‘poor Indian,’ which
the people have looked upon as extenuating the relentless cruelties, while overlooking apparently
the agonies indescribable and the death tortures of defenseless men, women and children.”
Ultimately, Giddings conceded, “Whether the ‘Peace Policy’ will succeed best or not, is yet
uncertain, but if the result mentioned viz: preventing by the [feeding of] the Indians from raiding
upon the settlers, can be secured, there is no doubt our people would be willing that they [the
Indians] should be filled until their skins should fail to withstand the pressure.”693 These words
show the extreme hatred that New Mexicans held for independent Indians, yet if the peace policy
actually brought about peace, then it was at least worth a try.
Indian troubles directly after the Civil War led to the organization of small ad-hoc
civilian “defense” forces, but by the late 1870s, New Mexico would take advantage of national
trends that encouraged the growth of sustained militia groups. By 1878, there was a rapid
increase in the use of militia units throughout the United States. Since the War of 1812 until the
Civil War, there had been a long and slow decline in the strength, numbers, and utilization of
civilian militias.694 The volunteer militia’s lowest ebb came during 1865-1877, as men were
exhausted by the Civil War and uninterested in voluntary military service.695 However, after
1877, most states and territories saw a precipitous increase in militia service. Historical opinion
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identifies the 1877 railroad disorders as the crucial event that led to the rise of militia systems in
the United States.696 The upheaval brought about by the Great Railroad Strike was put down
largely through the efforts of state and local militia units. Afterward, organized militia units
increasingly acted as a police force by quelling riots, aiding civil authorities, suppressing laborrelated incidents, protecting prisoners, and policing racial incidents. After 1877, the borderlands
was not immune to labor disputes. During the early twentieth century, Colorado had been the
site of a series of labor wars in which the Colorado National Guard was brought in to militarily
quell upheaval, leading to violence and death.697 In Bisbee, Arizona in 1917, thousands of
members of a deputized posse arrested striking mine workers, deporting them to Mexico.698
Thus, a militia explosion subsequently occurred around the United States in reaction to labor
disputes that would soon reach New Mexico.
At the same time, Congress signed into law the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. The act
prohibited the regular army from aiding civil authorities. Consequently, if local police required
assistance, they would call upon local militias rather than the regular military. A Democratic
Congress passed the Act as a response to concerns over the Regular Army’s employment during
Reconstruction.699 Due to social upheaval and the Posse Comitatus Act, militia use in New
Mexico skyrocketed in part because most municipalities in New Mexico lacked a standing police
force or sheriffs officers due to a lack of funding and tax revenue. New Mexican authorities
would take advantage of this newfound reliance on civilian militias by organizing local men to
quell civil disputes.

696

Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard, 44.
See Thomas G. Andrews, Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2008);
698
See Benton-Cohen, Borderline Americans.
699
Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 112.
697

313

After the Civil War, New Mexico became rife with civil disorder, and the government
organized militia units to help civil authorities deal with these issues. After 1865, New Mexico’s
population was growing fast. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad completed its track
into New Mexico in 1878 and marked a period of rapid economic, social, and political change.700
Throngs of Anglo Americans moved to New Mexico. During the start of the War, there were
80,000 non-Indian inhabitants; by 1880, there were 109,000.701 Likewise, New Mexico was
quickly becoming a place in which scores of drifters, gunmen, and other outlaws flooded into the
territory. Frequently, settlements remained without proper or efficient law enforcement to deal
with lawlessness and violence. The lawless nature of the frontier was exacerbated by a
masculine code that “demanded personal courage and pride, reckless disregard for life, and
instant redress of insult, real or fancied – all traits with great appeal to the masculine young
adventurers who flocked to the frontier.”702 Migrants wishing to make a quick dollar alongside
scores of outlaws soon plagued western territories such as New Mexico.
However, the idea that the absence of law enforcement alone triggered civil disorder is
erroneous. Richard White argues that the notion that violence in the west vanished as society
imposed law and order is a myth. He claims that the frontier social order itself encouraged
violence, as the majority of frontier violence consisted of clashes between social groups, not
necessarily individuals. With this in mind, the popular myth of the rule of law upon a lawless
and violent land loses its meaning.703 At the same time, members of such groups who engaged
in violence in areas with sparse official law enforcement believed they were establishing order,
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not contributing to disorder.704 Such was the case in many areas throughout New Mexico during
the 1870s. Many New Mexican communities became rife with chaos and disorder, much of it
stemming from social and class conflict alongside unsanctioned attempts to promote law and
order.
It was in this context that the famous Lincoln County War commenced, necessitating the
organization of a militia unit to assist in restoring the peace. Competition for political-economic
power was the basis for the conflict.705 During the same time as the San Elizario Salt War to the
east, in 1878, during which an ad-hoc civilian militia and the Texas Rangers were battling over
the rights to nearby salt beds, two rival factions had emerged that attempted to secure economic
dominance over Lincoln County, New Mexico.706 One party, led by businessman James Dolan
and his supporters vied for supremacy with another faction, led by John Tunstall, Alexander
McSween, and John Chisum. Dolan’s group was backed by a criminal group called the Evans
Gang, while the Tunstall-McSween faction was supported by a group termed the Regulators.
Violence and revenge killings between the two factions lasted for three years, ultimately leading
to the death of 22 persons. Territorial officials realized that an additional force would be
required to restore the peace.
In 1879, Governor Lew Wallace, having the blessing of the military, authorized New
Mexico native and Lincoln County resident, Juan B. Patron, to raise a company of mounted
riflemen as a response to the regional turmoil. In regards to assembling a militia group in
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Lincoln County, Wallace argued, “It became apparent that to restore confidence in the people,
and give them necessary protection at their homes and while they were planting their crops and
to enable the officers of the law to make arrests of notorious offenders, something like a military
organization was essential.” Wallace subsequently appointed Patron as Captain of the “Lincoln
County Rifles.” This militia unit consisted almost entirely of Nuevomexicanos, with the
exception of a few Anglo Americans who lived within or nearby the Lincoln precinct. Wallace
ordered these men “to be constantly in readiness at a minute’s notice from the Governor or
Patron, and to be at the request of the Sheriff of Lincoln County.” These men had been
assembled without the prospect of prompt payment, Wallace informing the militiamen: “No
promise of pay could be given…, but that the matter of pay would be deferred to the Legislature
for its action.”707
The Lincoln County Rifles were immediately put to use, searching for gang members
Josiah G. Scurlock and Charles Bowdre. Bowdre had managed to escape, but they arrested
Scurlock and brought him in. They also made repeated but vain attempts to find gang members
Jesse Evans and William Campbell. Despite making valiant efforts at apprehending violent gang
members, many residents criticized the militia group and pejoratively termed them “the
Governor’s Heel-flies.”708
Despite such criticism and their relatively limited role in the conflict, Governor Wallace
praised the effects that the organization of the militia had upon the residents of Lincoln County.
The governor claimed that the actions of the Lincoln County Rifles was “most excellent,”
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asserting that “the civil officers had at command an efficient posse, and the moral effect of
knowledge of the existence of the organization was such that the enforcement of order, within
the province of its operations, was perfect as in any community in this country.” He stated,
“Detachments of the company serving under the Captain and his officers were in constant
motion, and accomplished arrests theretofore often tried but always without result.” The
governor was wise to exaggerate the actions of the militia in regards to the Lincoln County
troubles, as this would help lead to a revival of the territorial militia as a sustained, organized
system.709
Contemporaneous hostilities with Indians under the Chiricahua Apache leader Victorio,
beginning in September 1879, further prompted the mobilization of territorial militia companies.
With three hundred armed followers, Victorio had engaged in open conflict with the citizens of
New Mexico, West Texas, and northern Chihuahua, murdering about one hundred men, women,
and children. Governor Lionel Sheldon noted the fear that Victorio and his followers had placed
upon the civilians, claiming that the band hand been “outraging and carrying them [New
Mexicans] as slaves into captivity, braining children, torturing the living and mutilating the
dead.”710 The military, most notably the 9th Cavalry had extreme difficulty capturing Victorio
and his followers. Victorio confused his enemies by using speed and crossing the U.S.-Mexico
border to evade his pursuers.711 Under these conditions, southern New Mexican civilians
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perceived the importance of banding together for protection. These people had seemingly
deemed the existing “posse” system inadequate to deal with this new threat.
The situation was so dire that residents of southern New Mexico had threatened to
organize independent expeditions against Victorio if the governor did not establish sanctioned
militia units for their defense. These settlers issued a handbill arguing, “During the past eight
months the southern counties of New Mexico…have been the scene of a most savage Indian
war.” Describing actions by the Indians deemed “barbarous,” the residents argued that
“the true condition of affairs in these counties…has been
systematically misrepresented to the authorities at
Washington by the military commander of this district, BE
IT RESOLVED: That the campaign instituted by the
military authorities…against these Indians has resulted in a
complete and disgraceful failure. That, as self preservation
is the law of nature, unless prompt action is taken by the
military arm of the government…the duty we owe to
ourselves and our families will require us to take the field
in our own defense. That His Excellency, the Governor of
New Mexico, be earnestly requested to exert his utmost
endeavors…to obtain for us the…privilege of organizing
and taking the field with our militia…”712
This handbill was read to residents of Mesilla in both English and Spanish and was
“frequently interrupted by vociferous applause.”713 Residents of southern New Mexico were
thus very close to enacting revenge upon Victorio’s band without the regulation of the civil
government or military.
Governor Lionel Sheldon took heed of the grievances of the citizenry. Due to the
successes of the Lincoln County Rifles, the swelling of new Indian troubles, and national trends
that favored militia service, the territorial legislature finally agreed that a new militia law would
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benefit the territory greatly. Thus in January, the government of New Mexico enacted the Militia
Law of 1880. Excluding orders given during the Civil War, the militia law of 1880 was the only
piece of legislation which called for the organization of a sanctioned militia in New Mexico
since the long-defunct militia law of 1851. Sheldon justified the implementation of such an act
by stating, “Bands of hostile Indians are now at large in the counties in the southern part of New
Mexico, imperiling the lives and property of citizens; and a state of war actually exists between
such Indians and the settlers and citizens of that section.”714 In effect, the new decree soon
initiated a militia renaissance in New Mexico.
Sheldon argued the necessity of a new militia law based on his belief that the regular
army had virtually abandoned the territory and had refused to offer sufficient aid in the struggle
against Victorio’s band. The governor claimed, “Upon the outbreak of these Indians, troops of
the regular army, stationed within the Territory, instead of being marched to the scene of
slaughter were ordered to the defense of the people of a neighboring State…leaving the force at
the disposal of the military authorities in New Mexico totally inadequate to effectively punish the
savages, as subsequent events have amply proved.” Before resorting to the enactment of a new
militia law, Sheldon first requested authority from the military to call out four companies of
volunteers to defend the settlements. The military refused his request because “there was no
congressional authority for the employment of such volunteers.” The governor then conceded
that any such volunteer companies would work without pay, asking at the very least for the
military to distribute rations to the militiamen. The military also denied this request. Due to the
perceived lack of military support, Governor Sheldon claimed that he had no other recourse than
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to adopt a new militia law. In regard to the law’s implementation, the governor claimed, “The
representatives of the people of this Territory are forced to the painful conclusion that no
adequate assistance or protection is to be expected or relied upon from the government of the
United States, and that in such an exigency nothing is left this people but a recourse to the
natural right of self-defense.”715 Similar to the Mexican era in New Mexico, lack of federal
military support promoted the belief among the civilian population that they possessed a natural
and lawful right to “defend” themselves against Indian peoples.
The Militia Law of 1880 theoretically gave the governor the power to organize and call
out, seemingly without the permission of the military, a force of volunteers “for the protection of
the lives and property of the citizens of the Territory.” The law stated that the governor could
organize companies of not less than thirty-six nor more than one hundred men. These men were
to elect their captains, first, and second Lieutenants. The governor was authorized, at the
expense of the territory, to hire transportation for the delivery of arms and ammunition to these
established companies, to purchase rations for use in the field, to buy the necessary arms and
ammunition, to employ a surgeon, and to provide storage for the arms and ammunition. It’s
unclear, however, how a bankrupt New Mexico was to fund such a program. The territorial
government did try to rein in costs, however, adding a provision that the territory was under no
obligation to pay these men for their service.
The regular military seemingly had no issue accepting help from newly formed militia
units under the law of 1880. That same year, Department Commander, Colonel Edward Hatch
brought one thousand troops together for an all-out campaign against Victorio and the Apaches.
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Militia units quickly came together and cooperated with regular troops to battle Victorio and his
allies. The Adjutant General of New Mexico wrote to one militia captain; “It is the desire of the
Governor that you and your company act in concert with the U.S. troops in that regard, and
render them all the assistance possible in overtaking and capturing them [the Indians].”716 New
Mexican civilians were more than happy to assist the regular army in chastising their traditional
enemy.
A militia group known as the Mesilla Scouts, for example, assisted Colonel Hatch in
searching for Victorio. Similar to the Mesilla Guard twenty years prior, the people of Mesilla
formed the Mesilla Scouts in late 1879 as an extra-legal militia unit created to war with nearby
Indian enemies. Under the leadership of prominent Mesilla citizen, Albert Jennings Fountain,
the company initially consisted of thirty men, almost all of them ethnic Mexican. Chosen to lead
this company were prominent Anglo citizens such as Fountain, John Crouch, and Charles Bull.
The Mesilla Scouts held weekly drills, and they established a command post on the town plaza
and assigned scouts to watch for Indian activity.717 In 1880, knowing little of the surrounding
area, the military called upon the Mesilla Scouts to assist them in tracking Victorio and his band.
With the assistance of U.S. troops, a battle ensued at Hembrillo Canyon in which the Apache
leader ultimately escaped. Fountain’s cavalry, however, eventually participated in capturing the
Apache chieftain, Nana.718
With the enaction of the Militia Law of 1880, militia companies emerged across the
territory, and the territorial legislature tasked Albert Jennings Fountain with organizing a unit for
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Doña Ana County. With the title of Captain, Fountain added men from other nearby settlements
into a militia cavalry. On multiple occasions, the territorial government tasked Fountain’s
cavalry with chasing down gunmen, rustlers, and highwaymen. Fountain’s men shot to
prominence when, in 1883, the militia tracked down and arrested John Kinney of the infamous
John Kinney Gang.719 The Kinney Gang had been involved in cattle rustling, robbery, and
sometimes murder. They were also a part of the Murphy-Dolan faction during the Lincoln
County War.
As was the case with the Mesilla Scouts, the territorial government applied the new
militia law toward transforming other extralegal protection squads into state-sanctioned militias.
In March of 1881, Anglo raiders from Colorado, known as the Stockton Gang had continually
attacked communities near Rio Arriba County in northwestern New Mexico. These raiders were
responsible for the murder of at least three Anglo citizens of the county as well as the theft of
numerous cattle. In retaliation, residents of Rio Arriba County killed one of the Stockton
leaders, William Porter Stockton, wounding his wife in the process. Isaac Stockton, living in
Texas at the time, vowed to avenge his brother’s death. With a gang of twenty men, Stockton set
up camp in Durango, Colorado, from which they periodically threatened residents of Rio Arriba
County and stole their stock.
The residents of Rio Arriba County found it necessary to organize themselves for selfdefense against the Stockton Gang. The extralegal self-defense organization was led by
prominent men of the community, such as William B. Haines and A.F. Stumpf. Haines was a
lawyer, merchant, and “man of good reputation,” and Stumpf was a wealthy ranch owner. Both
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Haines and Stumpf had been officers in the New Mexico volunteer corps during the Civil War.
These men were in charge of organizing patrol units and seeing to it that militiamen were
constantly policing the roads. The situation was so dire that the citizens of the county placed
everything else on hold as they patrolled their settlement. Adjutant General Max Frost noted,
“Business and agricultural pursuits are still at a standstill, most men being on guard and patrol
duty.”720
The citizens of the San Juan and Animas Rivers subsequently petitioned the governor for
help with their struggles against the Stockton Gang.721 In response, Governor Lew Wallace
ordered the Adjutant General of the Territory, Max Frost, to travel to the county to ascertain
what was going on. He ordered Frost to take “sixty strands” of arms and ammunition with him.
He also notified the Adjutant General that if the civilians were organizing themselves for
defense, he was advised to organize the residents into a lawful militia according to the Militia
Law of 1880. In turning the independent company into a state-sanctioned militia, the Adjutant
General was to “exercise the utmost care in selecting men for the company.” The Governor told
the General to “Investigate each man’s history and reject every one who cannot establish a
reputation as a good law-abiding person.” The newly sanctioned militia was to respond directly
to the County Sheriff, who was to call out the company to help him in the service of serving
warrants and making arrests.722
The Adjutant General of New Mexico followed the Governor’s orders. He organized the
independent self-defense company into the “San Juan Guards.” Arms and ammunition were
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given to them, as well as a payment to the officers totaling $2,500. Frost appointed the same
men who led the unsanctioned self-defense unit as officers of the militia company. Haines and
Stumpf were commissioned as captain and lieutenant, respectively. Under these men, the militia
company acted “as a force to serve warrants, arrest felons and outlaws, and to preserve the peace
within the limits of the county of Rio Arriba only.” The Adjutant General stipulated, “The
officers and enlisted men of the San Juan Guards are particularly cautioned that under the law,
they can only act as a force in organized bodies, under the command of their properly appointed
and commissioned officers.” He also added that the San Juan Guards are ordered: “Not to leave
the limits of the County of Rio Arriba or the Territory of New Mexico when on duty or acting as
a posse to deputy sheriffs.”723 Thus, the militia law effectively turned non-sanctioned groups
into organized volunteers under the watchful eye of the territorial government. It is crucial to
note that the legitimacy of both the Mesilla Scouts and San Juan Guards was, in part, due to the
fact that these units were led by prominent Anglo men of their respective communities.
The San Juan Guards effectively acted as a “posse comitatus,” serving warrants and
making arrests under the authority of the deputy sheriffs. With the help of the militia, the Rio
Arriba county war soon came to a close. According to the Captain of the San Juan Guards,
militia duty was a dreary, costly affair. Haynes stated, “It is a terrible thing for this country
being compelled at this season of the year to keep the militia in the field. Their crops are
suffering for water and attention and the stockmen have not been able to round up and have to
leave their cattle unbranded. One of the most despicable positions a man can be placed in is that
of commanding a company who are complaining, mourning, and homesick.”724
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Immediately after the Rio Arriba County War, continuing Indian troubles with certain
Apache groups continued to accelerate, which necessitated assistance from militia units newly
formed under the law of 1880. The Mexican army had killed Victorio in late 1880, but his
supporters continued on the warpath. In early 1882, Lionel Sheldon noted that the Chiricahua
Apache leaders Nana and Juh were raiding in Sonora, “plundering and killing people.” He
pointed out that the Sonorans would fight back and “likely drive the hostiles upon us.”
Numerous militia units were subsequently organized all around the territory under the law of
1880. By the end of 1882, almost every county in New Mexico had at least one militia unit at
the ready. From that point forward, militia growth exploded in the territory. By 1884, there
were thirty companies of militia in New Mexico; thirteen were cavalry, the rest infantry. In
general, each company contained approximately forty-five men. Six of the companies procured
their uniforms at their own expense.725 These units were used for several purposes, such as
escorting prisoners, suppressing outlaws, and engaging in warfare with Indians. Cooperation
between the militia and regular army became common, and army officers continually aided and
assisted the militia with advice and suggestions when asked. These militia units primarily
consisted of Hispanos, and many Anglo outlaws unaffectionately labeled these units the “Greaser
Militia.”726 The epithet placed upon the Hispano militia implies that many Anglo Americans
rejected the authority and legitimacy of Mexican American citizen-soldiers.
It is, therefore, no coincidence that the enlargement of the militia coincided with the
“whitening” of its officer corps. Despite all they had done during the Civil War, even as late as
the 1880s, distrust of Nuevomexicanos by Anglo officials still ran high. Many Anglos held
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racialized beliefs that the ethnic Mexicans were unfit to serve in organized militia units. Anglos
were also still concerned with the Hispanos’ supposed lack of loyalty to the United States. Not
ten years earlier, ethnic Mexicans near El Paso revolted against the Anglo elite in what became
known as the San Elizario Salt War.727 Worries of such rebellion spread to the nearby territory
of New Mexico. In a letter, Adjutant General of New Mexico Edward Bartlett felt compelled to
reassure the Adjutant General of the United States: “I have from conversation with the native
officers and men, that the native New Mexicans would be loyal to the United States in all that
that word implies. Even as they were during the war of the rebellion.”728 Many Anglo American
officials were, however, still leery of allowing Nuevomexicanos to take up arms. Thus, the
exponential growth and legitimization of the militia may not have occurred had there not been a
growing Anglo American population to fill these militia units, specifically the officer corps.
Moreover, as more Anglos moved into New Mexico, the desire by the government to protect
Anglo property from Indian raids was undoubtedly stronger than it had been for the ethnic
Mexican residents.
With fears of rebellion, distrust of the ethnic Mexican population, and the racialized
notion that Hispanos were unfit to lead themselves, the majority of prominent militia officers
commissioned by the territorial government were Anglo Americans. Almost all of the field
officers of the militia were Anglo Americans. By 1886, there were three regiments of cavalry
and one infantry of militia organized in the territory. The first cavalry regiment consisted of
twelve units, all men of Mexican descent. Eight of the nine senior officers of the regiment,
however, were Anglos. Also, more than one-half of the line officers were described as

727
728

See Cool, Salt Warriors.
Bartlett to U.S. Adjutant General, 18 November 1886, TANM, LS, NMRCA, Roll 78.

326

“experienced Americans,” and commands were given in English. The second regiment of
cavalry consisted of ten units of fifty men each. Of the nine senior officers of this regiment, only
one had a Spanish surname. One of those units contained mostly Laguna Pueblo Indians led by
Anglo American officers. The third cavalry regiment consisted of six units, all Anglo Americans
with Anglo officers. Lastly, the regiment of infantry consisted of five companies of 40 men
each; three companies were led by Anglo Americans and two led by ethnic Mexicans.729 The
whitening of the militia officer corps continued into the late nineteenth century, until 1897, when
the volunteer militia was re-designated as the New Mexico National Guard. The whitening of
the upper class in New Mexico led to the Anglicization of the militia and its officer corps, which,
in part, allowed the New Mexico militia to flourish as the nineteenth century came to a close.
Although ethnic Mexican service in the territorial militia thrived, their subordination to white
officers shows that they still did not receive the citizenship status that they believed military
service merited.
However, they were given the opportunity to put their masculinity and honor on full
display. The territorial militia saw so much growth that militia companies annually participated
in competitive drills. The purpose of such competitions was to foment, as one observer noted, a
“spirit of generous rivalry” among the various companies in the territory…”as such contests do
much to encourage the zeal and efficiency of the troops.” The competitive drills took place in
front of regular army officers who “greatly admired” the discipline of the militia. Uniformed in
the same dress as the U.S. Army, the Las Vegas companies took first prize in the 1883
competition.730 Indeed, such competitions revealed the continuation of the militarization of
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society. A culture of militarism and masculinity continued to permeate society by the late
nineteenth century, despite early Anglo American efforts to eliminate the tradition of civilian
militarism.
Despite its growth, the militia still had to overcome many obstacles. The territory
continued to have trouble furnishing them with appropriate arms. One observer noted in 1885,
“The arms of the militia are not what they should be. The territorial rifles and carbines are now
obsolete, and while serviceable, are not good weapons in the event of a general uprising of the
Indians – who have the best modern arms…. If the militia and the regulars should be called upon
to cooperate and either should get out of ammunition it can be readily seen that they could yield
each other no support.”731 Running out of arms and ammunition for the militia was indeed a
common occurrence. In 1885, the Adjutant General of New Mexico tried to requisition more
weapons from the military. He argued, “We have now eight militia companies after the
Apaches, and their supply of ammunition is running out and we have none here to send.”732
Lack of funds was also a vital issue that hindered the effectiveness of many militia
companies. By 1885, the New Mexico legislature limited militia appropriations to $5,000
annually which caused many problems, as hostilities with Indians in 1880 itself cost at least
$20,000. In 1885, the yearly supply of militia money had been exhausted by July, and the
territorial government continued to issue worthless certificates as a form of “payment.”
Although Adjutant General Bartlett argued, “There’s no room for a reasonable doubt that these
certificates will be paid in full with interest.”733 In the end, there was no way that the territory
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could honor them. The issue of payment was such that Adjutant General Bartlett asked the
regular military if they would be willing to pay for militia expenses. There is no evidence that
the military ever responded to Bartlett’s pleas. Despite these problems, the militia continued to
grow and become more active in territorial issues.
The territorial militia played a meaningful role, in concert with the regular army, in the
troubles emanating from Geronimo and his followers. In 1885, Geronimo, with forty-five
warriors and nearly one hundred women and children, broke out of the San Carlos reservation in
Arizona and attacked U.S. and Mexican settlements along the border. Within days, fifty-seven
border residents were reported slain. On May 26th, residents at Silver City had written to
Governor Lionel Sheldon that Geronimo and his band had passed near the settlement and urged
that the militia be called out against them. Governor Sheldon subsequently called out the
territorial militia to assist with finding Geronimo and bringing him to U.S. authorities. The
militia was also ordered “to protect the people who were in danger.” The militia acted both
independently and in concert with the regular troops in pursuit of Apaches. By August of that
year, at least eight militia companies had taken the field against Geronimo.
In one instance, sixty mounted men of Captain Russell’s company assisted in attempting
to track down Geronimo and his band. These men scouted over four hundred miles of southern
New Mexico, looking for clues. They found evidence that the party of Indians had camped at
White Tail Lake in the Mogollon Mountains. When they arrived, they found that the Indians had
abandoned the area. Begrudgingly, one observer noted, “The company being out of supplies
except fresh beef, and many of the horses broken down, it was deemed advisable to return.”
Despite not accomplishing their goals, one observer noted, “No men ever worked harder or
endured fatigue with more cheerfulness than the officers and men of this company, buoyed up as
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they were with the hope of avenging the death of so many innocent people and protecting others
from a like fate.”734 Thus, the motivation of these civilian soldiers, at least partly, stemmed from
revenge. As in the distant past, the cycle of violence and revenge was a driving factor for
militiamen.
In another instance in 1885, Geronimo’s band had been spotted in Sierra County.
Consequently, nearby settlers had abandoned their homes out of fear. Accordingly, the Adjutant
General ordered Captain James P. Blaine’s militia company “E” to scout the mountains. The
company was discharged after finding nothing. Albert Fountain’s Mesilla Scouts and other
companies near Deming and Silver City were also called up upon the governor’s orders. These
companies worked in cooperation with the regular army to pursue and scout Indians. Most of
these expeditions spearheaded by the militia ended with “no satisfactory result.” However, The
Santa Fe Republican reported: “Since the militia have been in the field very few depredations by
the Indians have been reported.” Upon returning home, the militiamen were met with “delirious
welcomes from grateful citizens in every village and town en route to their homes.”735
After the military and militia had driven Geronimo into Mexico, Governor Ross
communicated his satisfaction with the efforts of the militia in the campaign. He congratulated
“the people of the territory upon the termination of the Apache raid within its borders.” He also
addressed the issue of payment: “the commander in chief regrets sincerely that the meager
appropriation made by the legislature for payment of this class of expenditure will not meet the
allowance to the officers and men which they have so worthily earned. But certificates of
indebtedness will be issued for pay and other allowances for all claims under the militia act, and
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it is believed that upon a showing of the necessity for this expenditure, which the governor will
make to the next legislature, that the body will promptly provide for payment of these certificates
with interest.”736 The territorial government, however, seldom honored these certificates. A few
months later, Geronimo had returned from Mexico, making his way through the territory. Militia
detachments worked in the mountains alone and in concert with regular troops until Geronimo
fled back across the border at the close of the year. Despite not being able to apprehend
Geronimo and his followers, Hispano men, after years of attempts to stamp out civilian warfare,
were once again legally encouraged to war with the Apaches as they had done for generations
previous.

By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the territory of New Mexico went through a
significant transformation. Directly after the Civil War, the New Mexico Volunteers and Militia
fell into a state of decay, reverting to their pre-War numbers. As they had for generations, the
civilian population continued their efforts to engage in warfare with their traditional enemies.
They frequently appealed to the territorial government for permission to raise a substantial
militia to fight Indian peoples. Despite their best efforts, New Mexican civil officials could not
get civilian defense programs off the ground. By the late 1860s, these administrators
implemented specific controversial techniques to try to use civilians to quell Indian hostilities.
Using the justification that they didn’t have the authority to organize and call out a standing
militia, certain governors had given the citizenry sizeable powers to police their own
communities. Multiple governors had labeled all off-reservation Indians as “outlaws” and gave

736

Bartlett to Ross, 7 December 1886, TANM, AGR, ORC, NMRCA, Roll 84.

331

the civilian population the authority to bring these “outlaws” to justice. Civilians took advantage
of this power by using laws such as William F. Pile’s “posse” system, to violently subdue their
enemies. However, as significant events threatened portions of the territory, this system would
be seen as not nearly effective enough. With the sentiment that the regular military remained
inadequate, territorial officials felt they had to enact a strong militia law. They did so in 1880.
The new law led to a strong and capable militia force.
After the Civil War, many Anglo Americans had begun to settle in New Mexico,
prompting a much more lenient stance concerning militia use. However, the vast majority of the
New Mexican population remained ethnic Mexican. Anglo territorial officials, believing in the
necessity of a standing militia, acknowledged that Nuevomexicanos would have to make up the
bulk of militia companies. Despite their significant role in the Civil War, Hispanos in New
Mexico were still deeply racialized by the Anglo elite. Distrust concerning allegiance continued
to run high, as ethnic Mexican uprisings such as the San Elizario Salt War were but a recent
memory. Anglo racial attitudes also painted Hispano militia groups as illegitimate and absurd.
Anglo Americans could never fully accept the legitimacy of a militia composed entirely of
Mexican Americans. Realizing the necessity of maintaining a territorial militia, especially after
the civil disputes and Indian troubles of the 1870s and 1880s, the Anglo elite in New Mexico
tolerated Hispano militia groups so long as Anglo officers led the majority of these groups.
Thus, the growth of the territorial militia was contingent upon having white officers lead these
men. This being the case, militia growth exploded in New Mexico, with these men being
utilized for several tasks ranging from subduing outlaws to waring with Native peoples. The
strength of the militia continued well into the late 1890s when it was re-designated as the New
Mexico National Guard.
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After three-hundred years of warfare between New Mexican civilians and the Native
population, the late nineteenth-century saw the final conquest of indigenous people. The
relentless tide of colonialism slowly diminished the power and numbers of the territory’s Native
population. Since the late seventeenth-century New Mexican civilians had played a large role in
this shift. Continued attacks by civilians and the military onto Native groups simply became too
much to repulse. Heavy-handed policies such as outlawing Native people on their own land
opened Indian people up to lawful and repeated attacks by the civilian population. Indian people
had had a long history of being branded enemies of the state, beyond civilization, ungovernable,
and not privy to colonial law. By the late-nineteenth century, however, a spike in population
numbers, alongside a newfound alliance of civilian and regular military soldiers, led to the
inability of Native groups to effectively mount an offensive war against the civilian population in
New Mexico. After three hundred years, the civilian population had prevailed in their war
against the Natives.
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Conclusion

The creation of the New Mexico National Guard was by no means the end of
anxieties concerning civilian militias in the borderlands. Borderlands residents have since
organized citizen militias that have primarily focused on the elimination or subjugation of the
racial “other.” The borderlands have seen a unique precedent of civilian “defense,” usually
targeting subaltern groups. Beginning with the civilian warriors in New Mexico examined in
this dissertation, many other civilian militias, sanctioned or otherwise, have assembled and
employed their own forms of violence. Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California have all
seen the creation of “defense” organizations, many of which have engaged in appalling violence
against certain groups. Aside from the Mesilla Guard massacres of the 1850s discussed in this
dissertation, in 1856-1859, white settlers in California engaged in a series of attacks upon the
Yuki people of Round Valley in California killing over 1,000 Indians during that time.737 In
1871, a group of Mexican Americans, Anglo Americans, and Tohono O’odham Indians came
together and executed 144 Apaches.738 During the twentieth century, the Texas Rangers
continually attacked and harassed ethnic Mexicans throughout the state. In 1918, a group of
Texas Rangers and local ranchers killed 15 unarmed Mexicans living in west Texas.739 This
event prompted a wider investigation in which the U.S. government estimated that the Texas
Rangers were responsible for thousands of murders of ethnic Mexicans throughout Texas.740
These are but a few of the countless examples of civilians coming together to enact violence
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against the racial “other” in the region, notwithstanding the thousands of lynchings across the
borderlands.741 Borderlands militarism, civilian militias, vigilante violence, and race-based
warfare certainly wasn’t limited to New Mexico, nor does it have temporal boundaries, but
continues to endure.
More recently, the issue of undocumented immigration has culminated in the creation of
extralegal vigilante organizations commissioned to stop illegal migration and apprehend asylum
seekers along the southern border. In August 2004, a group of private individuals created a
borderland vigilante organization termed the Minutemen Project. They tasked themselves with
patrolling the Arizona-Mexico border in an attempt to curb undocumented immigration from
Mexico. Minuteman founder Jim Gilchrist has stated that he created the organization to “keep
the U.S. under the rule of law.” The initial purpose of the Minutemen was to assist the U.S.
Border Patrol in locating illegal immigrants. The Border Patrol, however, declined their offer,
encouraging the group to stay home. President George W. Bush himself criticized the militia,
calling them nothing more than “vigilantes.” The Minutemen organization has since deteriorated
but has influenced other vigilante organizations tasked with the same purpose. Estimates stand
that about a dozen of these militias now patrol southern Arizona and New Mexico. Dressed in
army fatigues and armed to the teeth, these men and women are prepared to use force and
intimidation to stop and apprehend any migrants they see crossing the border.
These overwhelmingly white vigilante groups defend their use of militarization because
they believe that the federal government has failed in their duty to police the southern border.
Gilchrist himself claimed that he created the Minutemen to fix “the lack of enforcement of
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immigration laws,” ultimately arguing, “The laws need to be enforced.” Civilian militias such as
the Minutemen Project are drawing upon a long tradition of civilian “defense” groups in the
borderlands that claimed the government to be insufficient in upholding the law. These militias
have also condemned the government for not taking a more hardline approach to undocumented
immigration. Gilchrist has gone on record advocating for the deportation of all “illegal aliens
currently occupying U.S. territory.” By using terms such as “occupying,” Gilchrist suggests that
undocumented immigrants from Latin America have “invaded” the United States and must be
expelled. The group has influenced other unsanctioned militias such as the United Constitutional
Patriots who, since 2019, have attempted to detain undocumented immigrants in southern New
Mexico. In April 2019, the United Constitutional Patriots apprehended 200 migrants at gunpoint
near Sunland Park, New Mexico. Although not sanctioned by either the state or U.S. Border
Patrol, the latter has cooperated with the UCP to apprehend migrants along the New Mexican
border.742
Civilian militias, sanctioned or otherwise are not just a significant aspect of borderlands
history, but also the history of the entire United States. Civilian warfare has operated in
particular ways in New Mexico, yet there has been a precedent throughout the United States of
civilians employing force against the racial “other.” In general, the civilian population has felt
justified in employing the use of force when they believe that the state has failed them. This line
of thinking has led to multiple massacres, lynchings, and vigilante violence across the nation.
New Mexico is just one example of this custom of civilian use of force.
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As of yet, there has been no complete substantive study of civilian warfare, non-state
sanctioned vigilantes, posses, or lynchings during the U.S. era in New Mexico. This study is just
a fragment of a subject that should be further explored. This dissertation is the first study to
examine various themes related to the issue of civilian warfare in New Mexican history. By
looking into the long and meaningful pattern of civilian warfare through two centuries, this
dissertation has sought to offer a fundamental understanding of how settlers and Native peoples
in New Mexico understood and performed warfare during this time. Examining two centuries of
the practice also illuminates the significance of cultural continuity over time. By centering on
the U.S. era, it is essential to note that these peoples’ ideas and enactment of warfare conflicted
with the desires of many U.S. officials and led to conflict between the people, territorial
government and federal government concerning the institution throughout the nineteenth
century. This study has thus attempted to be the first examination of these critical and
overlooked aspects of the history of New Mexico.
When studying this topic, an evident model of historical change and continuity emerges.
Most historians of the Annales school of history discarded the traditional notion of historical
time, abandoning the idea of a single linear directional history. In its place, they posited that
there were instead multiple, coexisting times.743 This study tends to adhere to this train of
thought. A protracted stretch of cultural change challenged the incredibly speedy nature of
political change. Almost overnight, the region of New Mexico switched hands from Spain to
Mexico, and later Mexico to the United States. These political entities hurriedly claimed
sovereignty over these areas, at least on paper. As they did so, however, they relatively quickly
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set about to try to enact changes that fit their style of governance. After 1848, for example,
many U.S. officials in New Mexico, mainly military, sought to end the centuries-long practice of
civilian warfare. A forced change in the ingrained culture of the residents would not, however,
be swift. Many New Mexican residents believed they had a historical right to warfare, and
subsequently sought to continue the modes of warfare carried out by themselves and their
forebears for centuries before. This was due to both cultural and historical precedent as well as
their belief that the U.S. military could not by itself offer them adequate protection from
independent Indians. Scholars such as Ana María Alonso have also noted the slow cultural
change in the region, arguing that the culture of honor due to centuries of warfare on the northern
frontiers of Spain and Mexico has repercussions even into the present.744 Rapid political change
thus butted heads with cultural continuity, which led to a very tumultuous atmosphere in the
region during the nineteenth century.
The subject of civilian warfare in New Mexico can also divulge much about the nature of
frontiers and borders. During the Spanish and Mexican periods, New Mexico was the
northernmost and most sparsely populated of their imperial realms in North America. The
region can undoubtedly be defined as a frontier within which many different peoples converged,
and cultural and geographic borders were not clearly defined. Accordingly, frontiers can
generally be thought of as spaces of both accommodation and violent conflict. During the
Spanish and Mexican eras, their northernmost frontier certainly leaned toward the latter. These
governments never held the power to subdue independent Indians in New Mexico, and they
never attempted to adhere to any sort of “middle ground.” In his seminal book, The Middle
Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, Richard White
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shows how neither the French nor the Native peoples in the Pays d’en haut held the power to
bend the other to their will. Instead, these people forced each other onto what White calls a
middle ground. White defines the primary tenant of a middle ground as “attempts to try to
persuade others who are different from themselves by appealing to what they perceive to be the
values and practices of those others.”745 Although neither the Spanish nor Native peoples in
New Mexico had control over the other, the Spanish ultimately sought to dominate and
assimilate New Mexico’s indigenous inhabitants. The government of New Spain had no interest
in adhering to any kind of middle ground in New Mexico. They did, however, go as far as
permitting Pueblo peoples a certain level of autonomy for self-government. But this was only
because the colonizers were aware that they didn’t hold complete authority over these people,
evidenced by their expulsion by the Pueblos from New Mexico during the 1680s. Yet over the
independent Indians in the region, neither the Spanish nor Mexican governments ever held any
dominion.
The governments of both New Spain and Mexico generally refused to recognize their
northern frontier as a place of accommodation. Both governments largely continued to attempt
to assert their sovereignty upon indigenous peoples on the northern frontier over whom they had
no power to subdue. As the Spanish believed their culture and religion to be superior to those of
the indigenous inhabitants, they had attempted to forcibly assert their method of civilization over
the many Native peoples in New Mexico. Missionization, attempted suppression of Native
cultural and religious practices, and the system of encomienda all displayed Spanish attempts at
asserting hegemony over New Mexico’s indigenous populations. This often led to violent
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conflicts such as the Pueblo Revolt and brutal interactions with other New Mexican Indians. The
meeting place of New Spain’s northern frontier was indeed a place of violent discord over
accommodation. On the rare occasions in which relative compromise did occur, it was usually
as a last-ditch effort after violent methods had been exhausted, such as the peace with the
Comanches after 1786.
As the northern frontier switched hands from Spain to Mexico in the early nineteenth
century, the new government implemented a different way of dealing with Native peoples in the
region. The Mexican government, using new nationalistic rhetoric, branded every person
residing within its boundaries as a citizen of Mexico. In theory, all inhabitants, including
independent Indians, were citizens of the new nation-state. Although intending to denote a sense
of racial unity throughout the nation, Mexico through the Plana de Iguala still attempted to
assert its will over the independent Indians of New Mexico. In this respect, much like the
Spanish, the new nation had disregarded any notion of Native sovereignty on their northern
frontier. They had forcibly incorporated Native peoples as citizens into a nation-state that, at
least on the northern frontier, existed only on paper. Yet, Mexico like New Spain essentially had
no authority over these people, and this new citizenship meant nothing to groups such as the
Apaches. These governments indeed held very little sovereignty over their northern frontiers and
their inability to accommodate the indigenous inhabitants made matters worse. The situation
would remain the same long into the U.S. era.
When the United States claimed ownership over New Mexico after its war with Mexico,
the frontier indeed remained a space of blurred cultural borders. Yet, for the first time, it also
became a contested boundary between two nation-states. Although the United States officially
took possession of Mexico’s northern frontier by 1848, the official border wasn’t even clearly
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defined until after the Gadsden Purchase in 1854. As the two nations formulated a hardened
border separating them, the former borderland of New Mexico became a bordered land.
However imaginary and arbitrary this new boundary was, it had real ramifications for the
inhabitants of New Mexico as connections between imperial competition and intercultural
relations developed in the region.
The newly delineated border assisted in defining notions of citizenship, which became
intertwined with ideas concerning race and gender. A hardened border helped to distinguish in a
primarily racial sense internal membership into the political communities of the United States.
In contrast to the relative racial fluidity of the region during the Spanish and Mexican eras, the
solidified border hardened the lines separating which people belonged and which people didn’t.
Mestizos in New Mexico differing in religion, culture, and phenotype from most of U.S. Anglo
society, were never considered assimilable into a U.S. polity predicated upon the idea of Anglo
Saxon supremacy. Racialized questions concerning the ethnic Mexican ability to fight due to
ethnicity and gendered ideas pervaded the minds of Anglo Americans. Many Anglo American
observers imagined Nuevomexicanos’ natural state as existing on the other side of the border just
by virtue of their “race.” As such, New Mexicans became separated from the national majority
and held status as second-class citizens. This notion of exclusion led many U.S. military
officials to question the merit of arming a population they believed were racially inferior and the
antithesis of what constituted an American. The residents themselves, of course, thought
differently and sought to continue warfare against Native peoples the way they had for centuries
before the Americans arrived. Ethnic Mexicans also saw military service as a gateway to full
citizenship. They would be disappointed. Their continued adherence to self-defense, however,
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allowed Hispanos to implement their own notions of citizenship as they, in effect, embodied the
state in its perceived absence.
This notion of cultural and racial belonging and exclusion, made more concrete with the
creation of a delineated border, had real consequences for Nuevomexicanos who wished to
continue to war with Native peoples as they had under the previous governments. With the U.SMexico War being but a recent memory, many Anglo Americans looked upon ex-citizens of
Mexico who now resided in the U.S. with a certain level of suspicion. In a racial sense, most
Anglo officials would always consider Nuevomexicanos “Mexicans” and frequently imagined
them as being allied with their former nation. Many Anglo officials, both military and civil,
regularly feared an uprising among the New Mexican population in the vein of the Taos
Rebellion of 1847. U.S. military officials thus questioned the merits of allowing such a people
access to arms. In a similar vein, U.S. officials could never place their trust to enact warfare in
Native peoples such as the Pueblos, who had historically assisted the Spanish and Mexican
regimes in their battle with independent Indians. This was one of the main contributing factors
of the U.S. military’s hesitance in allowing for civilian militias during the early U.S. period.
Analyzing civilian warfare also tells us much about both the causes and effects of warfare
and violence in New Mexico from the colonial era to the late nineteenth century. Certainly,
centuries of almost constant warfare among settlers, along with their Native allies and
independent Indians, had an enormous impact upon the many communities of New Mexico.
Because the province lay amid such a hostile environment, the economic promise of the region
could not be fully realized until peace was secured. Constant warfare took a heavy toll on the
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New Mexican economy, especially during the tumultuous years of the 1760s and 1770s.746 The
province of New Mexico thus languished economically throughout the bulk of the Spanish era.
Settler population growth was also severely hindered by constant attacks by Comanches and
Apaches.747 Due in large part to the violent atmosphere in the region, vecino settlement on the
far northern frontier remained relatively sparse and consisted mostly of poor ranching and
agricultural communities. Only until after the peace with the Comanches was the province
finally able to begin to prosper for the Spanish and New Mexico also saw a marked increase in
settler population numbers.
Peace with the tribes during the late eighteenth century finally allowed the province to
begin to flourish economically. Yet, as the region was brought under the purview of the
Mexican government, a new era of hostility brought wholesale destitution. Vecino communities
in New Mexico began to be crushed under the weight of unprecedented Indian attacks, especially
starting in the 1830s. Countrysides in New Mexico, like elsewhere along the northern frontier
became depopulated as terrified residents fled to more populous settlements. This era of extreme
hostility is what historian Brian DeLay calls the War of a Thousand Deserts, in which
communities were unmade by hostile warfare with native peoples such as the Apaches. This war
led to the “creation of man-made deserts where once there had been thriving Mexican
settlements.”748 This depopulation and unprecedented hostility also led Anglo observers to
believe that the Mexicans were not effectively subduing the Mexican north. They would
consequently seek to redeem the Mexican north from what they felt was an inability of the
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Mexicans to conquer their Indian enemies. Little did these American officials realize that the
heir of hostility would remain far after they had taken possession of the territory.
For the Native peoples residing in New Mexico, the situation was even more dire.
Contemporary historians have noted the devastation wrought upon the settlers by Native Peoples
in the Spanish and Mexican north, especially during the Mexican era. Yet, the damage done to
Indian peoples by settler and military violence is often overlooked. Due in large part to endless
hostilities with the colonists and militaries of multiple governments, extreme poverty and
starvation frequently befell these people. Many observers noted that Native raiders had no other
recourse than to either steal or starve. This is most exemplified in Indian agent Michael Steck’s
observation that Apache children had been obligated to suck on the bark of trees to obtain
whatever scarce nutrients lay within. Many independent Indian groups were thus more than
willing to exchange peace for much-needed provisions. More sympathetic Anglo observers,
such as Steck, were very empathetic toward the plight of impoverished Native peoples in New
Mexico. However, both the military and settlers continued to carry out bloody warfare upon
these people, no matter how impoverished. The Mesilla Guard, for example, in cold blood,
murdered Apache women and children who were present at Fort Thorn to receive rations. And
the U.S. military’s march to the Bosque Redondo with impoverished Navajos, known as the
infamous “long walk,” led to several Navajo deaths.
This study has also sought to show that violence and raiding was not just a one-sided
process. Historians have typically portrayed the act of “raiding” in the southwest borderlands as
a purely indigenous phenomenon. Historians have generally described vecinos acting in a
similar manner as something entirely different. Settlers entering Indian communities to carry out
theft and violence have characteristically been depicted as an act of necessary and even heroic
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retribution. If “raiding” can be defined as entering a foreign community to rob or enact
vengeance than there was no difference between what is known as Indian raiding and the actions
of the settlers. The fact remains that both Native peoples and vecinos alike practiced invading
communities to procure goods, animals, and human prisoners. In fact, the primary motivating
factor for many civilians to war with Native people was the prospect of attaining these spoils. In
essence, settlers raided Native people just as Native people raided the settlers. Most historians of
New Mexico have habitually overlooked this reality, opting instead to emphasize a more
Eurocentric approach to “savage” raiding and heroic settler reprisals. This study has endeavored
to remedy this traditional and flawed interpretation.
This dissertation has also made an effort to adhere to a multi-racial perspective
concerning interactions between the many peoples of New Mexico. We, as historians have
tended to approach historical race relations in a purely binary way. This method, however
illuminating, ignores the complexity of race relations particularly in places where more than two
cultures meet and interact. The borderlands have historically been a place in which many
different peoples and cultures converge. Borderland areas such as New Mexico can be great case
studies in the ways certain ethnicities historically interacted with each other, which in effect,
influenced how they interacted with other peoples. The ways that Anglos associated with ethnic
Mexicans, for instance, affected Anglo relations with Native peoples. In that regard, this study
hopes to add different and new dimensions to race relations in the borderlands.
Since its inception as a state in 1912, New Mexico has emphasized an imagined past.
Tourism flyers such as one pictured below have stressed the region’s tri-racial background in a
way that skews the reality of racial interaction in the area. Settler-colonialism has certainly
contributed toward the interaction of various races and ethnicities, however, this contact has been
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much more fraught with conflict and violence than these advertisements have depicted. The
history of New Mexico is not one the peaceful coming together of the races and a continuing
multi-racial harmony. It’s quite the opposite. The endeavor to eliminate the racial “other” has
contributed toward violence, death, subjugation, and poverty. The narrative of civilian warfare
in New Mexico shows the reality of interethnic interaction and the consequences of settlercolonialism. Revealing the true history of the region helps to overturn efforts to distort the past
to conform with the imaginary of a virtuous history.
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Illustration 7.1: New Mexico Tourism Advertisement. 1949. Accessed January 30, 2020.
http://www.vintageadbrowser.com/travel-ads-1940s/62
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